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Army Organization. Our Infantry Forces and Infantry Reserves

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Evening Meeting.

Monday, April 27th, 1868.

MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. JAMES LINDSAY, Inspector-General
of Reserve Forces, in the Chair.

NAMES OF MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 20th and 27th
April, 1868.

ANNUAL.

Mainwaring, Alfred R., Lieut. R.A. 1l.
Moffatt, Boland G., Lt. 8th, or King's. 1l.

ARMY ORGANIZATION.

OUR INFANTRY FORCES AND INFANTRY RESERVES.

By Major **ARTHUR LEAHY**, R.E.

THE CHAIRMAN.—Major Leahy, whom I have now the pleasure of introducing to you, will read us a paper this evening upon "Army Organization, our Infantry Forces and Infantry Reserves." It will be in the recollection of many of the gentlemen now present, that, a short time ago, Major Edwards read a paper in this theatre entitled "An Organization for the Army of England." The subject of Army Organization is now engaging great public attention. It is perfectly evident that within the last year, public opinion has been formed to this effect, that, with our considerable force of Militia and Volunteers, it is now high time that the various forces which compose our Army and its Reserves, should undergo such an organization, as will, in the event of a war, adapt them to the service of the country, not only at home but abroad. Without carrying the scheme so far as either Major Edwards or Major Leahy propose to do, for there is still considerable difficulty in this country in bringing our Reserve Forces, in the shape of the Militia and Volunteers, into a more active organization for the purpose of instruction, some assurance must be given to the country, that these forces are being organized, and brought together from time to time for the purpose of acting as an Army, instead of each force remaining in that isolated state in which hitherto it has been for years.

Therefore, whether the larger plan which these two gallant Officers bring forward can be carried out later or not, there is no doubt that there is a call for an organization of some kind or other, and unless this be brought forward in the course of another year, the public will be greatly disappointed. The subject has been noticed in the House of Commons; it has been engaging public attention; and sooner or later, through the agency and help of gallant Officers like Majors Edwards and Leahy, this desirable organization of the Army will doubtless be carried out.

Major LEAHY: I am induced to lay before the meeting the propositions in the paper which I am about to have the honour to read, in the hope that I shall thereby contribute to the ventilation of the important subject which was recently brought under the notice of the Institution by Major Edwards, in a lecture entitled, "An Organization for the Army of England," and I feel sure that any suggestions which may encourage discussion, or help towards bringing about a practical solution of the difficulties with which the subject of Army Organization is surrounded, will be indulgently received by the meeting.

I do not propose to enter into the circumstances, so fully set forth in Major Edwards' paper, under which an earnest consideration of the question is called for at the present time, but it appears to be necessary, for the proper understanding of what I am about to say, that I should recite certain general propositions which were enunciated at the lecture, and in which I venture to assume we shall all concur.

These propositions are—

1. That it is the general opinion of the public that there are defects in our military organization which require to be remedied in order to admit of the armed Forces, maintained by the country, being used to the best advantage.

2. That these changes are more especially necessary in respect of the Forces for national defence, and that if the necessary reforms be carried out, we ought to be in a position to place in the field, at very short notice, an army of about 200,000 men for home defence, and by so doing, to save the nation from periodical invasion panics.

3. That if circumstances should arise which render necessary the despatch from our shores of an expeditionary force, we should be in a position to equip and send out a limited expeditionary corps without delay, confusion, or extravagant expenditure.

4. That our self-governing colonies, more especially the dominion of Canada, are bound to train local militia, or other forces, to co-operate with our regular Army in the event of the occurrence of wars requiring that the several territories should be protected from aggression.

5. That it is desirable to effect any necessary changes without increased annual expenditure, without injuriously affecting existing interests, and on a system which will admit of a reduction of the standing Army to a minimum establishment in time of peace.

These, I apprehend, comprise the chief points of the problem which we would desire to solve, and I am impressed with the idea that if

the subject be dealt with on a comprehensive basis, and with a determination that in carrying out any necessary reforms, objections on matters of detail shall not be allowed to interfere with the execution of such general scheme as may be eventually approved, the solution will not prove so difficult as may be supposed.

On one point only do I desire to express a strong doubt, that is whether any scheme to carry out the project for keeping a larger number of men in immediate readiness for active service can be carried into effect without an immediate increase of annual expenditure. I do not think, however, that the public would object to that expenditure, provided it was solely incurred on the "non-commissioned officers and rank and file" of the additional forces, and not absorbed in additional staff or establishments.

The extra expenditure would be tolerated with less grudging if the project provided for an eventual reduction of the non-effective charges which now absorb over two millions of the fifteen and a half voted in the Army Estimates.

The subject of Army Organization has, it appears to me, to be considered under the following heads:—

A. Political. Under this head may be considered—

The constitution and government of the military forces and establishments. The persons liable to military service, and the conditions of such service. The general control or checks to which the executive, charged with the management or command of the Forces, and with the expenditure of public moneys set apart for military purposes, shall be liable.

B. The organization and training of the combatant forces, and the regulations under which they shall be called out. The determination of the numbers to be annually embodied, and whether for permanent service or for a certain number of drills or days' training.

C. The administrative organization, viz., that by which the supply of all things necessary for the efficiency of the combatant troops is regulated, and the accessory arrangements, made with the object of increasing their defensive or offensive powers.

Under each of these divisions several important questions may be raised on which lengthened discussions could be taken; but although necessary for purposes of explanation to refer to points which do not come under that head, it is not proposed to invite *discussion* on questions other than those necessary for the consideration of the second division, viz., the numbers, training, and organization of the combatant troops.

Even that appears to me too large a subject to be exhaustively dealt with in a single paper, and I only propose to enter into the details of that branch of it which relates to the organization of the infantry forces on the British establishment, and our home reserves.

On the numbers, organization, and distribution of the infantry must depend the proportion and organization of the auxiliary arms of

the Service, viz., cavalry, artillery, engineers, and of that portion of the train which has a place on the field of battle for the transport of ammunition, wounded, &c.

I will, in the first place, call your attention to the composition of the Imperial Forces and to the figures, which I believe to represent tolerably correctly, the numbers of the regular troops and of the reserve and auxiliary Forces which it is within the power of the Crown to call out for defence of this realm, or of the possessions subject to Her Majesty.

The establishments which at the present time come under the supervision of the Governments of this country and of the Governments of India, Canada, and the colonies in Australia, the Cape, &c., are—

I. *The Regular Army.*

The existence of this Army is dependent on the annual votes of Parliament, and the total numbers voted for the year 1868-9, including the proportion of British regiments set apart for service in India, and paid out of Indian revenues, are as follows:—

REGULAR ARMY, 1868-9.

			British Establishments.	Indian Establishments.	Total.
Infantry	..	..	87,898	45,962	133,860
Colonial Corps	..	..	7,770	..	7,770
			<hr/> 95,668		<hr/> 141,630
Artillery	..	..	20,712	12,855	33,567
Cavalry	..	..	12,189	5,410	17,599
Engineers	..	..	4,726	339	5,065
Train	..	..	1,798	..	1,798
			<hr/> 135,093	<hr/> 64,566	<hr/> 199,659
Miscellaneous Corps and Establishments	..	..	13,698	..	13,698
Totals	..	..	<hr/> 148,791	<hr/> 64,566	<hr/> 213,357

The whole of the foregoing numbers are embodied for permanent service.

The number of horses on the British Establishment is 13,000.

In reference to the regular Forces, I do not propose any material alteration in the total numbers of the Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the infantry regiments (I have not gone into the details of the other branches of the Service). What I do propose is, that the infantry shall be so organised that the regiment shall be the unit for purposes of recruiting, for training soldiers for colonial or Indian service, and for training reserves. Each regiment should therefore consist of two or more battalions, one battalion being on colonial

service, and made up to its quota by periodical drafts of volunteers from the home battalion. To the home battalions should be attached a proportion of the army reserve forces sufficient to make up both battalions to the war establishment.

The details will be found in the tables, which have been printed as appendices to this paper.

I propose that the position of Officers commanding regiments and battalions shall be improved; the former so as to be equal to that of regimental Colonels of the Royal Artillery, and they shall be made responsible for the recruiting of their regiments, and be entrusted, subject to proper checks, with the management of the reserves which are held in readiness to fill up the ranks of their corps in the event of the occurrence of war or other contingency requiring it to be placed on a service footing.

Subject to approved regulations, they would determine the time, and place at which each reserve soldier should undergo his annual training, and probably regulate the retaining fee accordingly.

They would, in fact, be generally responsible, not only for the drill and discipline, but also for the establishment of the regiments.

The unit for purposes of administrative organization, would be a division (or, in time of peace, a military district), consisting of two or more brigades.

The duties of inspection and supervision of training to devolve on the General Officers commanding districts, and the Brigadiers serving under their orders.

The supervision of all enrolled Forces, whether reserves, militia, yeomanry, or volunteers, to be entrusted, ex-officio, to these officers.

In camps, when the militia and volunteers would be brigaded with the Line, the officers commanding regiments would become the acting brigadiers, assisted by temporary staff, selected probably from officers who had passed the Staff College. Their fitness for active commands would then be tested, and the command of a regiment would be sought as the last stepping-stone to a General's command.

II. *The Local Army in British India.*

The numbers and composition of these forces, which are paid out of Indian revenue, are decided by the Secretary of State for India in Council, subject to the sanction of Parliament.

According to the official book, entitled "Army of Great Britain, 1867-8," published by the Topographical and Statistical Department, the present numbers are as follows:—

Infantry	104,070
Artillery	2,097
Cavalry	23,585
Engineers	3,248
Miscellaneous	4,020
Total	137,020

These forces are permanently embodied.

III. *The Reserve Forces.*

The establishment of these forces was fixed by the Army and Militia Reserve Acts of 1867, and they consist of three classes.

Class I. Men who have served or are serving with the regular forces, and whose first service has not exceeded the first term of enlistment	20,000
These men are to be liable to permanent service in or out of the United Kingdom.	
Class II. Pensioner reserve.. .. .	30,000
These men are liable to service in the United Kingdom only.	
Class III. Militia reserve	30,000
To consist of volunteers from the Militia, and to be liable to general service.	
Total	80,000

These establishments have not yet been completed, nor does there appear to be any immediate prospect of filling up class I. The regulations in respect of class III. are not yet published.

The modifications that I would propose with the object of increasing the numbers and efficiency of the reserves are—

1. To attach to each regiment the proportion of reserves required to fill up its ranks in time of war. This will absorb classes I. and III. (say 50,000 men in all).

To entrust to the professional officers, now kept up for the purpose of commanding these men, the duty of training them, and not to depute that duty to militia officers.

2. To shorten, if necessary, the period at which a soldier may pass into the reserve, especially in those cases where the men have learned an industrial employment in which they would be likely to lose proficiency by a long period of embodied service. This ought to increase the number of enlistments and diminish desertion.

3. To form special corps for garrison duties, composed of men of good character who have served with their regiments for a *full period of home and colonial service*, and who have been allowed to re-engage for further duty.

These corps shall be formed on the model of the Coast Brigade Royal Artillery, and to be employed in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean, St. Helena, &c. The men to undertake certain garrison and other duties which now take men away from their regimental duties and interfere with the training of young soldiers; and to be employed, when possible, on the public works, or in other duty for which extra pay is granted. Clerks and messengers in military offices, servants for staff officers, &c., should, when not pensioners, be taken from the men of these corps.

They should have special privileges in respect of marriage, exemption from drill, &c.

A small proportion of officers only need be permanently employed, and the greater proportion of these might be taken from the ranks. In time of war the complement of officers could be completed from the half-pay list.

These corps would form the "cadre" to which the disembodied pensioner force of 30,000 men would be attached when permanently enrolled, or when mustered for inspection, and they would be very useful for the defence of fortresses; more especially when the war garrison would consist chiefly of volunteers.

The pensioners from the cavalry, artillery, and engineers should be attached to their respective corps.

It has been stated before the Royal Commission on Recruiting (Question 4,299) that the large proportion of re-enlistments in the Royal Artillery is in no small degree influenced by the inducement of service in the Coast Brigade; and it is conceived that the formation of a similar corps for line soldiers would have the effect of making the service more attractive.

IV. *The Auxiliary Forces*

Comprise the militia, yeomanry, volunteers, and trained bands.

(a.) *The Militia*.—The present establishment for the three kingdoms is 120,000, with power upon invasion, or imminent danger thereof, to raise it to 180,000 men, the original and additional numbers being as under:—

For England (by 15 and 16 Vic., c. 50)		{ 80,000
		{ 40,000
For Scotland (by 17 and 18 Vic., c. 106; 23 and 24 Vic., c. 94)		{ 10,000
		{ 5,000
For Ireland (by 17 and 18 Vic., c. 107; 23 and 24 Vic., c. 94)		{ 30,000
		{ 15,000

And, as to *England* at least, the total number may be raised by ballot.

In the estimates of 1868-69, provision is made for the embodied pay of 5066 permanent Staff, at a cost of £205,000, and for the pay during training, of a proportion of the 128,971 militia officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, the sum taken for training is £194,000, being somewhat less than the cost of the permanent Staff.

This is a fact which I would ask you to bear in mind. It is a question whether the numbers and cost of this staff may not be reduced.

The militia has existed as a county establishment for over three centuries, and service in the force is compulsory (with certain exemptions) for men between the ages of 18 and 30, to be selected by ballot from lists prepared by the Lord Lieutenant; any man drawn has, however, a right to provide a substitute, and as there is now no difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of volunteers for the authorized bounty of £6 (spread over five years), the ballot is annually suspended by Act of Parliament.

The number of militia called out for training in 1866 was about 71,000, of these about 4,400 were absent without leave.

Several letters have recently appeared in the papers urging the necessity for paying more attention to the training of the militia, and especially advocating greater care in the selection of officers, who, according to the intention of the force, ought to be county gentlemen, with local interests common with their corps.

It is represented that in consequence of the system of appointment and the absence of test of personal fitness for command, the officers are not up to the mark. If this be so, the defect should be remedied, but there would not appear to be any reason for disturbing the constitution of this, our earliest, military force.

(b). *Yeomanry Cavalry*.—This volunteer force takes precedence immediately after the militia, and before other volunteer corps.

In case of rebellion, or invasion, or on appearance of an enemy on the coast, this force may be assembled for active service.

The yeomanry consist of 48 corps, comprising 264 troops; the total number as shown in the estimates 1868-9 is 16,185. It is suggested whether "appearance of an enemy on the coast" is not in these days of steam an expression now out of date, and one which should be revised.

(c). *The Volunteers*.—No limit is placed on the Crown as to the number of volunteers which may be enrolled for service.

The volunteers can, in case of invasion, be ordered to march to any point within Great Britain.

The establishments and efficiencies of the volunteer corps which have been formed under authority are as follows:—

STRENGTH OF THE VOLUNTEER FORCE, 1867.

Arm.	Maximum Establishment.	Enrolled.	Efficient.	Extra Efficient.
Light Horse	935	699	507	458
Artillery	40,666	35,508	30,611	..
Engineer	6,580	5,511	4,715	4,301
Mounted Rifle	575	391	272	114
Rifle	167,056	145,752	119,111	85,715
Total	215,812	187,861	155,216	90,588

(d). *Trained Bands*.—It would appear that the 46 Geo. III., c. 90, though not in operation, is still in force, and could (it is presumed) be put in operation in England (excluding Wales) by Order in Council and proclamation. Under it the Crown can enrol 200,000 men, and upon invasion or imminent danger thereof can embody them for service.

It must be borne in mind that there has seldom been any difficulty in supplying the ranks of the defensive forces with recruits; for, should recruits fail to present themselves as volunteers, Parliament would be ready (judging from the experience of the past) to concede to the

Crown the power of raising them by conscription; but that with regard to the offensive forces the same observation does not apply; on the contrary, great difficulty has always been experienced in keeping their ranks filled with recruits to meet even the waste which war occasions, and far greater difficulty in increasing their numbers.

V. *Reserve Forces in British Possessions Abroad.*

Particulars of these forces are given in the book before referred to.

The approximate total numbers are 303,000 men and of these about 220,000 are infantry. The cavalry exceed 5,000.

These numbers are considerable, but they appear to be very insufficiently organized and trained.

The establishment of the active militia of Canada alone amounts to over 150,000 men, but it has had very little training.

May not this be accounted for by the unwillingness of the Colonial Legislatures to provide for the cost of the permanent staff, which in our own militia forms so large a proportion of the cost of training? In the colonies much higher pay would have to be given to secure the services of competent instructors, who would, as in England, have little or nothing to do for 11 months in the year.

For this reason I have, as one of the main proposals of my scheme for Army Organization, advocated the retention in certain colonies of a full number of battalions, containing a small number of men, but a full proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers.

The following is an extract from the proposal:—

“In certain of the British colonial possessions which are required to contribute to their own defence, local reserves should be organized and trained so as to form part of the Imperial Army.

“This may be done by reducing the number of private soldiers in the battalions and affiliating to each battalion a proportion of local reserves.

“This would not only lessen the drain on this country for men in time of war, but would effect a saving of expenditure in training local reserves.

“It would moreover be possible to train during the drill season two or more batches of reserves with each battalion, so that the number of men held in reserve might be much larger than that required to fill up the ranks of the battalions.

“Emigration to Imperial colonies might be encouraged by allowing the men to settle subject to service in the reserve, and the ‘outflow through emigration,’ which is now an ‘obstacle to recruiting,’ might be turned to account in reducing the drain on the mother country for soldiers to defend her own colonies.”

There appears to me to be no reason why the battalions in British North America should not be made up so as to provide nearly the whole of the training staff for the local militia.

Extra duty pay should, of course, be given to officers, non-com-

missioned officers, and men during the time they are employed as instructors of militia.

From the foregoing sketch of our Military Forces it will be seen what a very large body of men there is to be dealt with, and how much may be done by devising a comprehensive scheme of organization, and carrying it out, if necessary, gradually.

The organization of these forces would appear to be a duty that devolves on the executive Government of the day, subject of course to the approval of the Parliaments concerned, by whom any necessary funds would have to be provided. I apprehend that little if any legislation is necessary to give effect to an efficient organization.

To sum up the numbers are as follows:—

I. Trained and more or less organized,

<i>a.</i> Regular forces (British and Indian)	..	213,857
<i>b.</i> Local Army in India		137,020
	Say ..	<u>350,000</u>

II. Trained but not organized,

Home.	Establishment.	Trained.
<i>c.</i> Reserves	80,000	18,000
<i>d.</i> Militia	134,037	91,000
<i>e.</i> Yeomanry	16,185	16,000
<i>f.</i> Volunteers	215,812	155,000
Total, Home Reserves	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
enrolled	446,034	280,000
<i>g.</i> Colonial Reserves (probable)		
number		<u>100,000</u>
Total, trained but not organized (say)		<u>380,000</u>

III. Neither trained or organized,

<i>h.</i> Incomplete Establishments,		
Home Reserves	167,000	
<i>i.</i> Trained Bands	200,000	
<i>k.</i> Colonial Reserves (balance of		
303,000)	203,000	
	<u> </u>	<u>570,000</u>

Grand Total of Imperial Forces (say) 1,300,000

Before entering into further explanation of the changes which I advocate, I desire to bring to your notice certain additional information and facts which it appears to me should be prominently before you during a discussion.

You are all doubtless aware that for many years prior to 1847, the

recruits for the regular Army were enlisted for life, although usually discharged to pension of 1s. per day at the end of 21 to 24 years' service.

The Army Service Act, 1847, limited the first period of engagement to 10 years, for the Infantry, and to 12 years for the Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers. If engaged for additional periods to complete 21 years' service, in the Infantry, Artillery, or Engineers, or 24 years in the Cavalry, pensions of 8*d.* per day with an addition for good conduct were given on discharge.

The objects in view in making limited enlistment compulsory, appear to have been as follows:—

(1.) To induce a larger proportion of young men to enter the army, and by ameliorating and shortening the conditions of service, to cause it to be deemed a punishment to be turned out of it.

(2.) To throw back on the country a larger proportion of men who had a regular military training, and who would in time of need be available for national defence. These men to be encouraged to join a reserve force.

(3.) By discharging the men before they had completed the service necessary to entitle them to a pension, and during a period of life at which they could revert to industrial employments, the estimates would have been eventually relieved of a proportion of the non-effective charges.

From the years 1848 to 1854, while the Army was maintained on the peace establishment which for so long a period had been its normal condition, the provisions of the Army Service Act, 1847, were found to answer necessary requirements; but when in 1855 there was, consequent on the Crimean War, an extraordinary demand for recruits, it was found necessary to shorten the period of enlistment, and temporary powers were obtained to legalize enlistment for a shorter period, to be regulated by Order in Council. Under these powers, which have now lapsed, men were enlisted for the duration of the war.

During the years 1864–5 there was difficulty in obtaining a number of recruits sufficient to meet the losses resulting from deaths, discharges, and other ordinary causes, and the deficiency was likely to be still further increased on the expiration of the term of service of the men who had enlisted for 10 years during the Indian Mutiny of 1857–8.

In April 1866, a Royal Commission was appointed to enquire into the causes of the deficient supply of recruits; to suggest remedies for the removal of this deficiency; to report on the operation of the Army Service Act, 1847; on the expediency of retaining powers over men after their discharge; the periods for which men should be engaged; the foundation of a reserve force; and the adoption of a system of recruiting for general service.

The Report of the Commission was made public in October, 1866, and the blue book which contains the evidence gives elaborate statistics shewing the working of the Army Service Act, 1847, together with outlines of the laws which then were, or had previously been in force for regulating Military Service.

As this Report sets forth the facts and statistics on which subsequent legislation has been based, and is the official document to which reference may most appropriately be made for purposes of discussion, the following extracts, which bear on the subjects proposed for consideration have been selected for insertion in this paper:—

In reference to the deficient supply of recruits during the years 1864-65, and the causes of such deficiency, the Commission reported that "the evidence which has been given before us and the returns in the Appendix to our Report all tend to show that during the last two years the number of recruits raised for the Army has not been sufficient to supply the demand. The deficiency, however, is not such as to create uneasiness, as we think that it may be traced to causes which, for the most part, admit of remedies being applied to them.

"For many years there existed in this country two distinct kinds of military organization. The one was the regular Army, in which the service was voluntary, and which was under the more immediate control of the Crown; the other the Militia, in which the service was compulsory.

"For some time past the principle of compulsory service has been suspended, and by this departure from the old system, and by adopting the same mode of filling the ranks of the Militia as is resorted to for the Army, the recruiting for the latter in time of peace has been, to some extent, interfered with; and to this may be traced one of the causes of the present deficiency of recruits for the line."

After enumerating certain improvements effected in the condition of the soldier, the Report states that, "notwithstanding these great improvements, it is to be feared that there is no increased disposition on the part of the youth of the country to look to the Army as a profession.

"The constant outflow through emigration, the great demand for labour in all branches of industrial employment, and the consequent rise in the rate of wages, form, no doubt, a principal obstacle to recruiting at the present time; but we are informed that the mode of conducting the recruiting service itself is also far from satisfactory."

With regard to the remedies required to remove the deficiency, the Report states:—

"We have examined various witnesses as to the benefits which might result from localising different regiments, or connecting them with special counties or districts; but we cannot say that this would be a desirable or expedient course.

"On the other hand, strong evidence has been laid before us showing the advantages resulting to recruiting from a local connection being maintained between individual corps and certain localities. Men enlist much more freely in corps which already contain a number of their friends and acquaintance; and such connections should,

"therefore, we consider, be in every way encouraged. Much may be done in this direction by strengthening the relations that exist between particular corps of the Army and particular Militia regiments, whether arising from county denomination or other circumstances, and the object might also be facilitated by the line regiments supplying good non-commissioned officers to the corresponding Militia regiments, and by directing the volunteering from each Militia regiment to one, or even two or three, regiments of the line."

Then follow proposals for facilitating the transfer of recruits from the Militia to the line; for the grant of additional pay, good conduct pay, clothing, and rations, and the retention of pensions for long and faithful service, as means for increasing the popularity and efficiency of the Service.

In reference to the operation of the Army Service Act of 1847, the Report states "that limited enlistment is by no means a new feature in the Army, and that the period of service was at one time as brief as three years; that the framers of the Army Service Act, 1847, have been disappointed in the expectation that every person who declined to engage for the second period of service would enter into an arrangement whereby he might be enrolled in a reserve force, in which, under certain regulations, he might acquire a right to pension; and thus an army of reserve would be formed on which the country might rely in times of exigency; and that the reserve force, as constituted by warrant in 1859, has been a complete failure.

"There appears, on the part of the military witnesses, a strong opinion against the present law; but when they are asked whether it would be expedient to recur to the practice of enlisting nominally for life, but practically for 21 years, nearly all of them admit that such a recurrence is out of the question.

"Some of the witnesses recommend a lengthened period for a first engagement, even up to 18 years, but most of them concur in fixing the first period at 12 years, and in making it the same in all branches of the Service, with a second period of nine years, for which every soldier should serve to entitle him to a pension for life.

"Looking to the weight of evidence given on this subject, we recommend that a change be made in the present law, and that the periods of service be altered to 12 years for the first period, and 9 years for the second period, for all branches of the Service, making in the aggregate a service of 21 years, which every man should complete to be entitled to a full pension for life.

"Soldiers are by regulation permitted to purchase their discharges, and this permission is considered a boon, and is frequently asked for. We do not recommend its withdrawal; but, considering the high rate of wages to be obtained in civil life, as compared with those which prevailed at the period when the present price of discharge was fixed, we are of opinion that the scale should be considerably raised.

"A return in the appendix shows that during the five years ending

" 1864-65, out of 25,403 soldiers whose time of service had expired, 11,343 left the Army, whilst 14,060 remained.

" A comparatively small proportion of non-commissioned officers actually left the Army during a period of eight years, averaging during each year, for all branches of the service, only about $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the sergeants, and about double that percentage of the corporals."

The Commission stated that,—

" In regard to the retention in the Army of men after the expiration of their first period of service, there can be no doubt that if we look only to the efficiency of the Army, and take into consideration the strong opinions which pervade the minds of its officers, it is not desirable that too many of the old and seasoned soldiers should be lost. Nor do we think that such is the case.

" The following table shows the comparative ages of cavalry and infantry, in proportion per thousand of strength; the age and service of the soldiers composing the cavalry and infantry are not less favourable for military efficiency at the present day than they were in 1816, just prior to the introduction of the Limited Service Act, when enlistment for life was the rule:—

Ages.			Cavalry.		Infantry.	
			1816.	1866.	1816.	1866.
Under 18 years	..	..	3·2	14·2	52·3	17·8
18 to 20	"	..	74·0	79·9	124·3	114·6
20 to 25	"	..	339·0	304·0	342·6	275·2
25 to 30	"	..	322·5	369·0	277·0	356·2
30 to 35	"	..	137·0	148·0	98·0	150·8
35 to 40	"	..	78·9	57·2	84·3	74·4
40 to 50	"	..	43·4	27·4	21·3	10·8
Upwards of 50	..	..	2·0	0·3	0·2	0·2

This table shows that out of 1,000 infantry soldiers, 407·6 were under 25 years of age; and only 85 exceeded 35 years.

" In the artillery nearly two-thirds of the men entitled to take their discharge re-engage, and in the Engineers about three-fifths.

" In the cavalry and infantry the proportion of re-engagements is considerably smaller."

Then follow sundry recommendations, having for their object an augmentation of the number of re-engagements:—

It was also recommended " that, on the score of health alone, men should not be sent out to India under 20 years of age. We further advise, on the ground of efficiency, that none but thoroughly trained soldiers should be sent abroad."

Further, " that in any modification of the Army Service Act, a dis-

“cretionary power should be given to the Secretary of State for War
 “to authorize the re-engagement of men under orders for foreign
 “service for such periods, not exceeding 12 years, as may extend
 “their engagement to the full period during which their regiment is
 “expected to remain abroad, accompanying their re-engagement with
 “a graduated scale of bounty, according to the additional periods
 “engaged for. Any men who, on their return home with their regi-
 “ment, still require some additional service to entitle them to a pension
 “for life, should be allowed to enter into a third engagement, but
 “without bounty, in order to enable them to complete the full period
 “of 21 years.

“That inducements be given to soldiers now serving in India to re-
 “engage in that country after their first period of service is expired.

“The prevalent idea of the great dislike to service in India appears
 “to be unfounded.

“Out of 18,804 soldiers whose first period of service expired during
 “the six years ending in 1865, about one-half, viz., 9,431, re-engaged,
 “leaving 9,397 to be embarked for England; and we think that
 “with other moderate inducements, such as a small increase to the
 “present scale of bounty, a much more favourable proportion might be
 “obtained.

“Before closing our remarks on this portion of the subject, we
 “would observe that the prolonged concentration of the military
 “forces at home in large camps is a source of dissatisfaction. No
 “doubt the greatest benefit is derived from bringing considerable bodies
 “of troops of all arms together for exercise in summer; but we think
 “that when the drill season is over the troops should be dispersed
 “throughout the country, that they may be seen by and mix with the
 “masses of their countrymen, and thus stimulate their military feeling
 “and act as recruiting centres during the winter, which is the period
 “most favourable for obtaining recruits.”

With regard to the system of recruiting, the Commissioners
 recommended the establishment of “a distinct staff for recruiting
 “purposes, which should be under the immediate orders of the Com-
 “mander-in-Chief, and its head responsible to him through the
 “Adjutant-General. This staff should consist of an Inspector-General,
 “not attached to any particular district, but having under him as
 “many district officers for assistant inspectors as may be found neces-
 “sary fully to occupy the whole country, with subordinate officers
 “again under them.

“The organisation should be completed by a certain number of non-
 “commissioned Officers from each corps of the Army, supernumeraries
 “to the establishment, who, while retained on the recruiting service,
 “should be entirely at the disposal and under the control of the re-
 “cruiting officers.”

They observe that bounty-money is usually spent in riot and dissipa-
 tion, and tends to encourage desertion, and do not recommend an
 increase. An increase of bringing-money is, however, suggested.

They state that “we would by every means encourage enlistment
 “at head-quarters of regiments, and it seems to us that if soldiers

“going on furlough were empowered to beat up among their friends for recruits, for whom they would receive the regulated bringing-money, some desirable additions might be made to the ranks of their respective regiments.

“In reconstructing the system of recruiting, great attention should be paid to the medical examination of recruits.

“It would be a great advantage if this could be done entirely by medical officers, subject to military authority.”

But no arrangement by which this system of enlistment could be made general was proposed.

The establishment of training schools as a means of providing recruits is suggested, on the ground that those for the Navy have been most successful.

In reference to the employment of soldiers, the Commissioners observe:—“It appears to us that in the infantry especially the soldier has a large amount of spare time on his hands, which might be turned to more profitable use than is now the case. To this end we would suggest that the soldiers should be taught industrial trades, and be encouraged to work at them when their doing so would not interfere with their military duties. They should all receive instruction in the use of the spade and mattock, so as to be able to wield them effectively, and to throw up earthworks with facility—a knowledge from which the greatest advantages might be derived on active service.”

The Commissioners conclude their report by reference to the formation of a reserve force, and state “that it opens up a very large question, the decision of which rests rather with statesmen and Cabinets than with a Commission such as that of which we are members.

“Recent events, however, have taught us that we must not rely in future on having time for preparation. Wars will be sudden in their commencement and short in their duration, and woe to that country which is unprepared to defend itself against any contingency that may arise, or combination that may be formed against it.

“The first duty of those who preside over the administration of the Army is to look to its constitution.

“As a peace establishment, and having in view nothing more than the proper provision of that military protection which we are bound to afford to our Indian territories and our extended colonial possessions, the Army is at present barely sufficient for these purposes; one, and not the least cause of its unpopularity as a service, arising from the fact that the soldier must spend two-thirds of his time in a state of expatriation.

“Under these circumstances we must look more to our Army. We think its present strength is barely sufficient for a period of peace, and the question is, how we can most readily and speedily increase it through the means of a reserve force consisting of men who have already received that training in its ranks, but may have fallen back into the ordinary duties and callings of civil life. We have already stated the fact that the ‘Army of Reserve Force,’ as constituted under the Warrant of 1859, has been a complete

"failure, and the measures which we have proposed to induce more men to re-engage in the regular Army, will no doubt tend still further to check its increase. Under these circumstances we are not prepared to propose any plan as one that may be relied on to secure a large army of reserve.

"Having thus given our opinion on the different points referred to us, in conclusion, we must observe that we are perfectly aware that our suggestions, if acted upon, will tend to increase the cost of the Army. But, when we consider the vast interests at stake, and the immense amount of wealth and property accumulated throughout the country as well as in our large cities, we cannot believe that the nation will hesitate in paying what, after all, will amount to a very trifling rate of insurance; and by maintaining the peace establishment of the Army in a sound and satisfactory condition, and having in its support a well disciplined reserve, we may thus arrive at a military organization such as shall give confidence to the country, and enable all your Majesty's subjects to prosecute without distraction those duties and pursuits in which they may be engaged."

It is impossible to read that Report without feeling that there *may* be solutions to the problems involved different from those proposed by the Commission, and as the *policy* of the results which the Act of 1847 was intended to bring about has not been questioned, it is submitted that proposals having for their object the attainment of those results are deserving of serious consideration.

In referring to the failure of the Act to produce the expected reserve force, may not this be accounted for by the fact that of the ten years' men more than half re-engage, and that of the non-commissioned Officers only $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. leave the Army in each year.

It is therefore for consideration, whether in place of inducing the men to re-engage and hold on for pensions at an annual cost per man which, including the value of pensions, is about double that of young soldiers, and about ten times that of a reserve soldier, it would not have been worth while to have tried the opposite course, of largely reducing the period of compulsory service, and of requiring all to leave the Army, except men of superior character and soldier-like qualifications, and those who have a claim to permanent employment in respect of colonial or active service, offering them the alternative of remaining on the rolls of their regiments for service in the reserve, with a liberal retaining fee.

It appears inconsistent to urge the importance of a reserve force consisting of men who have already received training in the ranks of the Army, and to propose measures that would have the effect of checking the increase of such reserve.

It may be interesting to examine the financial effect of re-engaging men for a second period of service (viz., 12 to 21 years), as compared with a system of enlistment for short (say 3 years) service.

There is no official published statement of the present pay and allowance of a soldier of under 3 years as compared with one of over 12 years' service, but excluding bounty, barracks, medical attendance,

and some other items which I cannot exactly calculate, and which are common to all engagements, it will, I think, be found that the proportion is as follows, supposing the men to be well conducted :—

Under 3 years	£32 per annum.
12 to 21 years (average)	£40 ,,

So that if, in place of re-engaging the time-expired man, he were replaced by a young soldier, there would be a surplus of £8 per man per annum, to defray the cost of keeping the older soldier in a Reserve Force, should he be inclined to enrol himself.

The foregoing refers to the cost of the men while serving. But we have also to take into consideration the expectation of pension, the dead weight which the Legislation of 1847 was intended to lighten.

Referring to the tables attached to the Report of the Recruiting Commission, we shall find that more than one-half the recruits are enlisted under 20 years of age. The average age of soldiers who have completed 12 years' service may therefore be taken at 32, and they would be entitled to discharge with pension at 41. The average amount of pension for men who serve the full time is, I believe, about 1s. 1d. per day, or say £20 per annum.

If we turn to the annuity tables, to be found in the Postal Guide, page 44, we shall see that the lump sum to be paid at 32 years of age for a pension of £1 per annum, to commence at the expiration of 10 years from the date of purchase, would be £10 4s. 4d., or for a pension of £20 per annum, £204 6s. 8d., or, if paid by annual instalments, the annual payment would be £23 2s. 4d.; so that if the Army Estimates were to be relieved of the pension list, and the cost of paying and auditing the pension accounts—a measure which I believe would find favour with some of those best able to form an opinion on the subject—the War Department should pay to the Post Office Department a sum of about £23 per annum for every soldier of 32 years of age, re-enlisted under the Army Service Act, 1867. I believe that about 30,000 have re-engaged under the inducements offered on the recommendations of the Recruiting Commission. If the post office tables are applicable, the annual cost to the country of these men is not far from £600,000 per annum in excess of that which will appear in the estimates while they are serving.

A fact of interest in connection with the pension list is, that although there are 61,748 men in receipt of pensions, the numbers enrolled for service in case of emergency is only 14,100.

I will now examine the financial effect of holding out an expectation of a pension as an inducement to men to “enlist for a short term of “enrolled service, with a liability to afterwards serve in a reserve force,” as advocated by Lord Grey, in his letter of 23rd August, 1866, Appendix Y, of the Report of the Recruiting Commission.

It may be assumed that it would not be necessary to grant pensions until the end of thirty years' total service or 50 years of age, being ten years less than the age fixed for civil service pensions.

Supposing, as before, the average age of engagement to be twenty years, the lump sum to be paid down for a pension of £20 per annum, to commence at 50 years of age would be about £70, or about one-third the value of the pension of the re-engaged soldier of 32 years of age. The annual cost, if paid by instalments, would be about £4, as compared with £23.

If, therefore, the tables of the Post-office may be accepted as approximately applicable, there can be no doubt of the financial result of the short-service scheme, so far as pensions are concerned.

It is calculated that if in place of re-engaging 30,000 time-expired men we were to give them immediate pensions of from 4*d.* to 6*d.* per day as retaining fees for service in the reserve, with a promise that they would have pensions of £20 a year each on attaining 30 years' total service, and if we were to replace them by 30,000 younger soldiers, the cost to the country would not be so great as that of keeping the veteran soldiers in our regular Army, and we should within the next two years have a very respectable reserve composed of men who had received their training in the ranks of our Army.

The calculation on which this statement is based is as follows:—

1. Annual cost of 30,000 re-engaged men (12 to 21 years' service) at £40 per annum	£	£
		1,200,000
2. Annual cost of 30,000 young soldiers at £32	960,000	
Retaining fee of 30,000 reserve soldiers at £8.....	240,000	
		<hr/>
Total annual cost of 60,000 men .		1,200,000
3. Present value of pensions of £20 per annum payable to 30,000 men of 32 years of age at 10 years from re- engagement.....		<hr/>
		6,130,000
4. Present value of 30,000 pensions of time expired men payable after 20 years' service in reserves	3,200,000	
Present value of 30,000 pensions of young soldiers payable 30 years hence	2,097,000	
		<hr/>
Total value of pensions ..		5,297,000

The annual expenditure for 30,000 young and 30,000 reserve soldiers being the same as for 30,000 re-engaged soldiers, the estimated saving in respect of the capitalized value of pensions is about £800,000.

It is an experiment, of which we have no previous experience, to enlist men on a *present* bounty for *future* active service before an enemy abroad; in effect, to give the reserve men all their advantages in time of peace, and to wait until time of war for their service. Hitherto a present payment has been the inducement for men to leave their homes and engage in active service before the enemy, and whether men who

have long before spent their bounty, and, therefore, have nothing to look forward to but the hardships and hazards of actual warfare, will be ready and willing to enter upon active service, must be, to say the least of it, extremely doubtful.

Enlistments for ordinary Army service are, moreover, made of men who are single, unmarried, and physically capable of serving. These facts being ascertained, the man at once enters upon service, and is constantly under military and medical "surveillance," so that though marriage or malingering or self-mutilation are not impossible, yet Her Majesty's Regulations forbid the one, and the other is a crime punishable under the 81st Article of War.

But with the new reserve force the case will be widely different. For eleven months in each year they will be civilians, and therefore can marry at any time without the breach of any regulation; and their physical capabilities may be altered by accident or design without incurring any punishment. Either or both of these incidents would gain them a release from their enlistment, or compel the Crown to take men into the service who would not otherwise have been accepted.

It is, therefore, very desirable that men enlisted for service on a contingency should have a prospective pecuniary inducement to appear when required.

Subsequent to the appointment of the Recruiting Commission, and while they were receiving evidence, war was declared between Austria and Prussia, and the astonishing result of the three weeks' campaign which ended in the defeat of the Austrians at Sadowa, and brought the war to a conclusion in a few weeks, caused increased public attention to be directed to our Military institutions, and people began to ask in what condition we should be were a hostile force to succeed in effecting a landing on our shores.

In the absence of any proposal from the Commission to provide for such contingency, the Prussian Military System under which such successful results had been obtained in Germany, was naturally suggested as a model whence an improved organization might be devised.

As the adoption of one or more of the principles of the Prussian system has been advocated by nearly all who have written on the subject of army organization, I have procured information from Lieut.-Colonel Cooke, R.E., of the Topographical Department, explanatory of that system. The Prussian system embodies three principles; the first, a general conscription with liability of every able bodied man to serve in the regular army or in its reserves between the ages of 20 and 27, and subsequently in the "Landwehr" between the ages of 27 and 32. All not serving in the army or Landwehr being liable to serve in the "Landsturm" between the ages of 18 and 42 inclusive.

This principle could not be applied to this country, mainly for the reason that our regular army is not solely defensive, two-thirds of the number being constantly on Colonial or Indian service.

The second principle, namely that of assigning to each regiment a particular territory, in which it is usually quartered, and attaching to

it a reserve and "Landwehr" battalion in which all eligible persons residing within that district must, for some time of their lives, be enrolled, has also been deemed inapplicable in this country, but it is submitted that a modification of the plan could with advantage be adopted by, as already suggested, attaching to each of our regular regiments a battalion for service in India or the colonies and a proportion of the Army reserves. Our militia, volunteers, and trained bands would correspond with the Prussian Landwehr and Landsturm.

The third principle of the Prussian system is to lighten so far as consistent with reasonable efficiency the military service, so as not to interfere with the industrial occupations or education of the young men who come up for service in the standing Army. And to specially shorten the service of those who are willing to relieve the state of the cost of their maintenance and equipment.

This is a principle which, it is submitted, admits of extensive application in our Army, and in its reserves.

Looking on military defensive service of the State as a tax to which all men are liable to contribute either time or money, there would not appear to be any reason why some privileges, or some exemptions in respect of taxation should not attach to those who give up, without adequate payment, their time to qualifying themselves for taking an active part in the defence of the nation.

In round numbers the annual pay and allowances of a regular private soldier are about £32, of a militiaman £6, and of a volunteer, £1 10s. If any members of the two latter classes will give up their time and spend money in order to attain a degree of efficiency nearly equal to that of the regular soldiers, they should be entitled to every consideration.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke has also lent me an abstract prepared by him of the militia laws in force in the State of New York, which is very interesting, as showing how the Prussian system has been adapted to meet the case of a Republican constitution.

The distinctive features of the New York system are—(1). That all able bodied men are liable to serve, but that most service is commutable by fines; the greater part of the funds to defray the expenses of the militia are raised by fines levied by non-attendance at drills, &c. (2). That subject to an examination as to fitness, and an inquiry as to character by the Commander-in-chief, the officers are elected, the company officers by their companies, the field officers by the company officers, and the brigadiers by the field officers.

During the months which elapsed between the publication of the Report of the Recruiting Commission, October, 1866, and the assembly of Parliament, February, 1867, articles appeared in more than one newspaper, notably in the "Pall Mall Gazette," and "Saturday Review," advocating the principle of enlistment for short periods of enrolled service, with liability to be called out on emergency during a longer term, and proposing separate engagements for Colonial service.

Concurring as I did in these views, I gave some consideration to the details necessary to give effect to these principles, and I came to the

conclusion that by adopting a regimental organization such as I have indicated, particulars of which are given in the printed tables, the system might be applied to our Army with but little disturbance of existing arrangements, without injuriously affecting existing interests, and without any expense beyond that which would be due to an addition, if any were needed, of the number of men enrolled for service. The scheme was brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War, in January, 1867; it was subsequently printed in April, 1867, and submitted for consideration, in contradistinction to plans by which the Reserves, to fill up the ranks of the regular regiments, were proposed to be trained by and attached to the Militia.

I will now proceed to explain the main features of the organization which I advocate, and to state the points which are submitted for consideration.

The heads under which it appears to me the subject should be considered have already been stated (page 312).

Under the first head (A), that which involves political consideration, it is not proposed to alter any existing legislation at present, but if difficulty be experienced in making up the Reserves to the numbers authorized by Parliament, it is recommended that no opportunity should be lost of passing into them any of the recently re-engaged soldiers who may be willing to leave their regiments with the liability to come up when required; their places in the regiments to be taken by young soldiers.

The calculations showing that this would financially be the better course, have been already submitted, and if the military advocates for re-engagement were asked whether they would recommend the expenditure of a given sum of money in the re-engagement of 30,000 men, of 30 to 35 years of age, or whether, the funds being limited, they would prefer that these 30,000 men should be passed into a Reserve force, with power to call them up to rejoin their regiments, their places in the ranks being taken by 30,000 younger soldiers, of 18 to 25 years of age, I have little doubt but that they would prefer the larger number of men.

I apprehend that it is in the power of the Secretary of State to make regulations for giving effect to this suggestion.

If after some experience of the working of the system it should be found desirable to shorten the period for compulsory service, from two-thirds to, say, one-third, the period of the first enlistment, the alteration of a word in Clause 55 of the Mutiny Act, would give power to the Secretary of State to use discretion in the matter.

Under the second head (B) it was proposed (page 312) to consider the *numbers, training, and organization* of the combatant troops.

1. As to numbers, I have already stated (page 319) the authorized establishments, and it is not proposed to increase the establishments of the British Infantry forces, or of the Home Reserves (see Table III).

The only proposal submitted, with the object of increasing the num-

ber of men is one that was suggested to me, viz., that we should turn to account for purposes of national defence the large number of persons holding civil employment under the Crown.

On reference to the Navy and Civil Service estimates, it will be found that there are over 27,000 subordinate civilians employed by the Admiralty, Customs, and Excise Departments; over 15,000 are employed in the dockyards alone; these men might be trained by the staff of the proposed garrison battalions, with which they could, in the event of war, be associated for the defence of the fortifications that guard the establishment in which they earn their livelihood. The superior officers of the departments should be required to officer these men.

Having settled the *number* of men, the next step is to form them into "Companies," "Battalions," "Regiments," and "Brigades" for purposes of *training* and inspection, and to admit of their being readily formed into *Divisions* or *Army Corps*.

The present and proposed regimental establishments will be found in Table I, the main features of the regimental organization which is submitted for consideration are:—

1. That keeping up as we do infantry officers and non-commissioned officers in numbers sufficient to train and command 53,000 men in excess of our peace establishments, those officers and non-commissioned officers should be employed to supervise, train and command the 50,000 reserve men which Parliament has authorized the Secretary of State for War to raise and organize as a reserve for general service (See pages 313, 314, 315).

2. For the training and organization of the pensioner reserves, the formation of garrison regiments is proposed (see page 315), the composition and distribution of these corps will be found in the tables.

3. That the project may be carried out gradually and without a reduction of the old established regiments. The percentage of Officers and the number of men per company will be the same as at present and, taking into account the regimental reserves, the proportion of combatant officers to men will be sufficient, being in excess of that in the armies of the great Continental powers, viz.:—

British army	1 officer to 28 men.	Austrian army	1 officer to 40 men.
French	" 1 " 33 "	Prussian	" 1 " 49 "

The service battalions are proposed to be of nearly the same total strength as the infantry battalions now serving in India, and the brigades of about the same strength as at present.

4. By organizing the infantry regiments in two battalions and increasing the number of battalions on home service, it will be possible not only to organize our army reserves without additional staff or establishment, but to so arrange the military districts that each shall form the nucleus of an army corps with staff complete.

Some important improvements, many of which are suggested in the

report of the Commission on Recruiting could also be carried out, viz. :—

To facilitate the assembly of troops in camps during summer, and their dispersion in country quarters during winter.

To establish more permanent head-quarters for the several regiments, and thereby add to the comfort of the officers and men—establish local connections for recruiting,—admit of greater facilities for the useful employment of the men, and for their instruction in trades.

To define the period of service in India and the several colonies, and adapt it to the climate and conditions of each station. Many of the objections which soldiers now have to colonial service would be removed.

To conduct recruiting regimentally and without an expensive recruiting staff—the men in reserve, acting as recruiting agents to their regiments, and keeping up local connections.

By requiring reserves to be exercised at the head-quarters of regular regiments, the period of year at which the annual exercise should take place could be arranged so as to interfere as little as possible with the industrial occupations of the men. In certain cases arrangements might, with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, be made for exercising men in reserve with volunteer corps or militia regiments.

It is believed that the arrangements proposed would not only attract to the ranks of the Army a large number of intelligent men who would not now think of enlisting, but it would have the effect of making service in the army reserve force more popular than service in the militia.

In order to carry out the revised regimental organization, it would be desirable to select officers for the command of regiments and battalions, and that the appointments should be made without purchase, probably from a general list of field officers.

The pay of the Officers in command of regiments to be made equal to that of a regimental Colonel in command of a brigade of artillery, and that of an Officer in command of a battalion equal to that of a colonel 2nd Commandant of Marines.

This would involve, an increased annual expense of about £26,000 to be met by a reduction of the separate recruiting staff, which now costs over £27,000.

These appointments would give a professional opening to regimental officers, other than that of staff employ. The lowest staff position which a Captain can hold, is now better paid than the command of an infantry regiment, and it is not surprising that some of our best regimental Officers, especially those who, while desirous of making the Army their profession, cannot afford to serve for a pay little, if any in excess of the interest on the purchase money of their commissions, should take the first opportunity of giving up their regiments for staff appointments of comparatively minor importance.

I do not think that so long as the establishment of Officers is, as at present, in excess of the number actually required to train and com-

mand the men actually embodied, and while there is a demand for commissions in excess of the supply, any great increase of the standing pay of the regimental Officers could be proposed, but the position of regimental officers might be improved without any great expense, by giving the rank of major to captains of a certain standing, as it now is to Lieutenants in the Navy, and also as a reward for service in the field or other *good service*.

We should under the proposed regimental organization no longer have the frequent changes of establishment which have given rise to grievances on the part of officers.

A serious drawback to military life as a profession is the impossibility (without a sacrifice of promotion which is fatal to future advancement) of exchanging, when for sufficient reasons individual officers are unable to accompany their regiments on ordinary colonial service. By arranging the roster for colonial service regimentally, it would in such cases be possible, without injury to any one, to allow exchanges of home and colonial duty, and an officer who did not object to an extra turn of colonial service, could, as a private arrangement, receive a bonus for taking the duty of another. It would of course be necessary to keep a strict roster, and to specify the number of years for which the officers should serve with the battalion in the colonies. It would also be necessary to remove staff officers from the regiment, or to make them supernumerary, so that their special employment would not throw an undue share of duty on others. A reduction of regimental officers has been proposed to enable this to be done, and if further reduction were requisite, it would be carried out by not filling up all the vacancies among the subalterns of the home battalions.

The inconveniences of the purchase system would be reduced to a minimum by the adoption of Captain Vivian's proposal for reducing the regimental ranks.

As no increase in the total numbers of the British establishments is proposed, it is necessary to show how the men and battalions may be distributed under my scheme so as to meet the requirements of the Service.

This I have done in Tables II and IV, and it will be seen that if the composition of battalions which I suggest be adopted, there would not, in any grade, be an excess of present establishments, and consequently no increased expense.

These details may, however, be modified without affecting the principles advocated. I worked them out and have had them printed in order to satisfy the meeting that the scheme is practicable, and could be carried out without additional staff or establishments, but I do not propose to enter into explanation of them, unless requested to do so.

The only point which calls for explanation is, that I have adopted eight company battalions for two reasons—1st, to admit of an increase of battalions; 2nd, because, under present regulations, flank companies are done away with. I propose, however, to have four battalions in a brigade, in place of three.

Having settled the establishment of "battalions" and "brigades," the

next step will be to *organize* them into "divisions" and "army corps," and to settle the precise distribution of the forces.

The project for an army corps laid down in the "Regulations for the equipment and supply of stores by an Army in the field" is based on the *infantry* force, viz., two divisions (or four brigades) of infantry, of the total numbers of 10,000 men.

The units for the formation of an army corps of any required strength may be taken to be a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry. To each of these a proportion of field (or horse) artillery and train would be attached, and a proportion of engineers would be told off to each infantry division.

So long as the proportions are laid down, and the troops are distributed throughout the kingdom so as to be readily brought together for annual exercise in those proportions, there is, I submit, no necessity for making it a condition that the forces shall be distributed in corps of "equal" strength; nor would it be practicable to do so without large expenditure in the erection of barracks, &c.

I have, therefore, prepared a project, Table IV, showing the peace distribution which I would propose. Under this project, the regular infantry would be so distributed that brigades might be annually assembled for exercise in the camps proposed for the several districts, and in four out of the six districts there would be cavalry brigades.

I have shown the number of infantry, of infantry reserves, and of militia, which I would propose to attach to each district for supervision of training, and for the purpose of being brigaded with the line. These numbers are given in the diagram before the meeting, and the distribution is further illustrated by a map, on which are shown the suggested positions of the head-quarters of districts and brigades, and of the camps.

In preparing the project I have arranged the districts mainly in reference to the railway communications and existing barrack accommodation, so placing the head-quarters that they may, as regards postal communication, be conveniently situate, in reference to the outlying brigades and stations.

Thus the southern division, with its head-quarters at Aldershot, and which would be the nucleus of an army corps of over 60,000 infantry for the defence of the South Coast, would have the command of the South-Western Railway and its branch lines.

In time of war the brigades of line regiments at Portsmouth and Gosport would join the moveable force, their places in the garrison being taken by the Pensioner Reserves and Militia and Volunteer battalions.

It would be the duty of the Generals commanding districts and of the Brigadiers to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the whole of the defensive resources and requirements within their respective commands, including the arrangements for transport, the means of procuring at short notice additional horses for the cavalry and artillery, the positions to be entrenched, and all the numerous arrangements necessary for turning the forces under their supervision to the best possible account in the event of war or invasion.

The arrangements for the management, repair, or destruction of the railway communication within the district should be carefully prepared in concert with the officers of the railway companies, and of those of Volunteer Staff Corps who have taken up that subject.

With a peace organization and distribution of the regular and militia forces such as I have here indicated, and a corresponding organization and distribution of the cavalry, artillery, and engineer corps, there would be no difficulty in putting into the field a defensive force far in excess of the 200,000 men which was suggested as one of the conditions of our problem, nor would there be any delay or difficulty in organizing an expeditionary corps of a total number of 100,000 men.

In respect of the yeomanry and volunteer forces, all that appears necessary for their more perfect organization, is to make arrangements by which brigades formed of these forces should be manœuvred with those of the line and militia, and to place the inspection under the Generals in command of districts.

I doubt the expediency of placing volunteers in the same brigades as regular soldiers. The regulations under which they serve differ so much from those of the regular Army, and the fact of the men being taken from a different class in life, would appear to afford sufficient reasons for forming brigades of exclusively volunteer battalions. This, however, is a subject for discussion. No volunteer battalion should, I conceive, be allowed a place in a field brigade which does not come up to a certain standard of efficiency. Volunteer corps which, for want of opportunity or other causes, do not attain this standard, to be allotted with the pensioner force for the defence of fortresses, &c.

I trust I have now sufficiently explained the measures proposed for the organization of our infantry forces and our home reserves, so as to meet the propositions set before you. I have not proposed any new establishment, and although, for purposes of organization and inspection, I have proposed an addition to the number of brigades, the brigade staff may be formed by a redistribution of staff appointments.

In reference to our self-governing colonies, I have indicated (page 318) the arrangements which I propose for *training* the local reserves, their organization would be carried out on the same principle as that of the home Army, subject to modifications to meet local requirements.

In regard to the third head under which the subject of army organization has to be considered, viz., the Administrative Organization, I would, for my individual opinion, refer to the evidence which I gave before Lord Strathnairn's Committee, in 1866, page 140 of Blue Book. I then advocated the amalgamation of the Military Staff Departments, under one head, and of the Supply and Transport Departments under another.

In the field, the first of these Officers would be at the General's side to carry out his orders in respect of the movements and disposition of the combatant troops in front. The other would be charged with the equally important staff duty of bringing up the supplies from the rear.

In a garrison or military district these two staff Officers, with the

Officer commanding the Royal Artillery, being the Officer in charge of armaments, and the Commanding Royal Engineer being the Officer charged with defences and works, and a Financial Officer, who should be a civilian, would form a Council to which the General might appropriately have resort for advice on all important matters affecting his command.

I see no reason to alter the classification of duty which I then advocated, with this exception, that the civil element should not in any respect be an executive Officer, but that he should be one of the civil servants of the Crown, probably a selected clerk from the War Office or Treasury, and that his relations to the General should correspond with that of a Colonial Secretary to a Governor, with that of a clerk of a bench of magistrates to the Justices, or with that of the Assistant Under Secretary of State for War to the Secretary of State, viz., to advise the General on all matters of finance or regulation, and to carry on, under his instructions, correspondence on subjects of administration, and to issue warrants for expenditure authorized by the General under emergent circumstances without the previous sanction of the Secretary of State.

Under present regulations, when a military force is beyond the immediate control of the Secretary of State for War, the General is his representative, and it would appear to be inconsistent with that theory to give to any subordinate Officer a position or power which would imply a control independent of the General, and this would be the more objectionable in principle if the controlling Officer had to direct executive business involving the local expenditure of public money.

The suggestion I make would not involve the creation of new high appointments, and the administrative capabilities of the civil servants would be increased by their temporary employment in the capacity of Secretaries to the Generals in command of stations.

The subject of administrative organization is, however, now under consideration, and is not one on which it is proposed to invite discussion.

THE CHAIRMAN.—We have to thank Major Leahy for having laid before us a very comprehensive scheme, which, as you have heard embraces a large number of subjects both of principle and of detail. The subject is a very large one; and Major Leahy has treated it with very great ability, and in a very comprehensive manner. Perhaps, the best course that we can now pursue will be, that if any points in the paper are not quite understood, and more explanation is required, gentlemen should question Major Leahy, in order that he may more fully explain them. I am rather inclined to doubt from the large area which the paper embraces, whether it can be discussed very easily without being first in print, and read by those who wish to discuss it. The paper is extremely well put together, but, as I have said, it embraces so much detail, that if I attempted to discuss it, I think I should have some difficulty in knowing how to handle some of the points, without a little more study than can be given to them upon hearing them the first time. As far as I am personally concerned, I am not prepared to enter into any discussion, or to express any opinion upon it at the present moment. Probably I should not be prepared to express any very strong opinion upon it at all, on account of the position I have the honour to hold. For whatever I might say, though it might only be in discussion,

might carry with it more weight than it might deserve, and be received as an authoritative scheme, when it would be only the opinion of an individual. I make these few remarks for the purpose of suggesting to the meeting that, as far as the discussion is concerned, we should take another day for it; but I think there are many points upon which members might wish to be further enlightened, and upon which they might now put questions to Major Leahy.

Colonel Alcock, Commandant 1st Regiment Middlesex Militia.—It may appear very presumptuous in me to venture to offer an opinion upon so comprehensive a paper, and one so ably written as that which we have just heard. But, perhaps, as you, Sir, have already suggested, it might be possible on a matter of detail to mention something that may be of interest to the meeting. The point of detail which I would select, is one applicable to that part of the service to which I belong, viz., the Militia. It happens to be one in which I can, I think, to a very great extent corroborate the general principles which the lecturer has laid down. One principle is, that a Regiment of Militia should consist of two battalions; another is, that the industrial employments of the men who form the Reserve, should not be interfered with. The Lecturer compared our organization in that respect with the organization of the Prussian service; but it would be more appropriate, as it seems to me, to compare it with that of the French. A good deal has appeared in the papers lately, and everybody knows, that the organization of both the French and English services has a certain similarity, inasmuch as in both, there is an active Army, and a Reserve, consisting of old and young soldiers, and a second reserve, consisting in the French, of the *Garde Mobile*, and in the English, of the Militia, the Rifle Volunteers, and the Pensioners. The French organization is strong, because it is based upon the conscription. The English organization is weak, because it is not based upon the Militia, which is the old constitutional Army of the nation. Now, what I wish to point out is—not that I am so well prepared, perhaps, as I ought to be to speak upon the subject,—but I think I can show distinctly that the view which the Lecturer has taken is perfectly sound, and applies most particularly to the Militia Service. The Militia, as we all know, is called out for twenty-eight days' service in the year. It consists of men who can give twenty-eight consecutive days from their employment; therefore, it includes that class only, and no other. If you wish to increase your members, you must include a larger class. The gallant Officer has said that the industrial employments of the men should not be interfered with. And here we come to the rule, that when you want a larger number of men, you must consider the relation which the pay and the period of military service bear to the wages and the demands of civil employment. You must consider both, or else you cannot get the men. The Militia are expected in times of emergency, in times of war, to supply the line with drilled men, and at the same time to keep up their own establishments; two things, which we know from our experience in the Crimean War, are almost impossible. It was done, but only with great difficulty. Under the present system of warfare, it would be still more difficult, because things must be done much faster than they were formerly. To succeed, we must depend entirely upon organization, and not upon money. The idea seems to be prevalent that, being a very wealthy country, if it comes to a push, we could, by trusting to the pluck of our men, and to a lavish expenditure of money, accomplish anything. It is my firm conviction that this is a mistake, and that we must trust to organization. That remark brings me back to the subject of organization. For the Militia to supply the line with trained men, and to keep up their own establishments, they require themselves to have a Reserve. Consequently, instead of our organization being similar to that of the French Army, namely,—

Active Army,
Reserve of old and young soldiers, mixed,
National Guard Mobile,

the English ought to have been as follows:—

Active Army and Army Reserve,
Militia and Militia Reserve,
Rifle Volunteers and levy *en masse*.

The effect of having a Militia Reserve would be this; that those men who are unable

to give 28 consecutive days' training, whose civil employments would prevent their doing so, would be in the Militia Reserve. Of course, anybody may say: but how would you manage all this? I can assure you that the thing is so simple, that it is wonderful beyond measure that it has never been adopted. The fact is, that we are actually training and selecting men whom we are unable to keep, because militia regiments cannot have in their ranks, men who cannot give those 28 consecutive days' training, and well drilled and equipped men, of excellent character, are obliged to leave the militia, and this at the very time when there is some talk of an increased capitation tax in order to increase the number of the rifle volunteers. I should not like to speak in excess of the number, as it is impossible to know very accurately, but upon an average from 30 to 40 well-trained men, of excellent character, fully equipped, leave the militia regiments every year, merely because they cannot give 28 consecutive days to training with their regiments. The state of the case is simple enough. If you want to retain these well drilled men, many of whom would gladly serve in their regiments if embodied, your plan would simply be to put them into the "Militia Reserve." If you ask me how the Militia Reserve is to be managed, I say, manage it in the same way as the Rifle Volunteers are managed; you are doing all you can to increase the Rifle Volunteers. I say give us a Militia Reserve in every respect the same as the Rifle Volunteers; deal with the men as you do with the Rifle Volunteers. Let men be attested for either the Militia or the Militia Reserve, and let those whose masters will not allow them to serve 28 days, go into the Militia Reserve. I think I collected from what the gallant Officer said, that the Staffs are expensive, and that it might be a question whether the Staffs could not be reduced. I think it would be much better policy, not to reduce the Staffs, but to increase the amount of benefit which the country should receive from their services. You have got excellent Adjutants and excellent Staffs, make them also the staff of the Militia Reserve. There is likewise some talk about the want of promotion in the Militia; that difficulty might be easily overcome. Only let some efficient lieutenant who resides upon the spot, undertake to form a company, and when he has got a company for the Reserve then let him have his promotion. By this means you would increase the chances of promotion. Without going further into the subject, I can assure you that if any one will consider it thoroughly, he will see that there is great truth in the view I have put before you, that the efficiency of our Army, both for internal and external action, would be much greater with that simple alteration which I propose. It is an extraordinary thing that we actually have the men, but we do not keep them; all I propose is that they should be kept. If the subject were to be examined, it would be found that I am right in what I have said. It would entail no expense whatever, although I am far from advocating that expense should not be incurred when necessary; the country is rapidly increasing in wealth, and the cost incurred in organizing for its defence, is the insurance we pay on our national wealth, which has been increasing at the rate of £120,000,000 per annum, while our rate of insurance is not increasing at all. No one can foretell what may happen, no one can forecast political or commercial events, and should any eventuality arise, our Army Organization ought to be commensurate with the magnitude of the interests at stake.

The CHAIRMAN: I would remind the meeting that Major Edwards' paper is also before it. Everybody is cognisant of it, and in any remarks made upon that paper, in combination with that of Major Leahy's, I hope that the whole subject will be dealt with.

Captain J. B. ROBINSON, Northamptonshire Militia: Perhaps I may be allowed to say a few words, principally in support of what the last speaker has said with regard to the Militia. I think we have been very much misled by the use of the word "Reserve," in fact we have no Reserve properly so-called; we have no Army Reserve that can be moved out of the country. We have merely got a local Militia, in the old sense of the term, and the Volunteers. Colonel Alcock stated that Militia regiments did volunteer to serve in the Crimea. That was done under a special Act of Parliament, and it would require another Act of Parliament to enable them to volunteer for foreign service at the present time. Before any reform in the auxiliary services of the Army can be made, it should be known what we want. There is confusion in our ideas as to the Militia. Some officers look upon the Militia as a service

that is merely a nursery for the line, while Militia Officers probably look upon the Militia as a Service in itself, which is to be kept intact, and in the finest working order possible. No one can blame the Militia officer for being jealous for the efficiency of his own *corps*. Until we arrive at some idea of what we want—whether the Militia is to be simply a nursery for the line, or whether it is to be a local force ready to garrison England, and so far to act as a reserve to support the regular Army by service at home in garrison duty—we shall never come to any satisfactory decision. The Militiamen, as to rank and file, I believe to be of very good stuff indeed, but many of the Militia Officers are men who have had no opportunity of learning their duties. The Officer is called out for 28 days; he finds half the regiment, or one-third of the regiment consists of recruits, and the others, men who were well drilled a year ago, but who have, perhaps, half forgotten their duties. The sergeant-major and the adjutant, naturally and properly, think more of forming the men than of forming the officers. Unless the officers have an opportunity of being attached to regiments of the line, and thus learning their duties, we shall never have them efficient, and we shall never get an efficient regiment.

Major LEAHY: With reference to a Militia reserve, it must be borne in mind that the militia consists at present of 120,000 men, with power to raise it in time of war to 180,000 men. These additional 60,000 men might be enrolled in a Militia Reserve. There is a further power to enrol and train 200,000 men under the Act of 1806.

Colonel ALCOCK: The authority does not exist for having any Militiaman if he cannot serve the 28 days. After the man's period of service has expired, he retires, if it has interfered with his civil employment, and if during the five years of his engagement as a militiaman he gets a good situation, he is entitled to leave the service upon paying 18s. 6d. My view is that such well drilled men ought not to be allowed to leave, but ought to fall back into the Reserve, and be treated like Rifle Volunteers.

The CHAIRMAN: The great object, as I understand, of the two papers laid before you is "Organization." There is no doubt that what the gallant officer, Colonel Alcock, has brought before you, is most worthy of consideration; it is a most important part of the subject. There is no doubt whatever that the militia are under considerable difficulties: in the first place from being called out at particular periods of the year for 28 days, people have to leave their industrial occupations, and consequently are often obliged to give up their militia service rather than lose their industrial employment; and, in the second place, there is also a great difficulty with regard to the officers. We have heard a good deal of "the county connection." The "county connection" has been hitherto a most important element in the militia, but I am afraid that those who study the Army List and look at the requirements of the Militia, will find that that service at the present moment is not quite so popular a service as it should be, with those who live in the different counties. The militia is very short of officers, very short of subalterns, and in some instances, I am afraid, very short of captains. As I said before, however, the great problem brought, first by Major Edwards, and secondly by Major Leahy, before this Institution, is a system of "organization" which shall make our forces more useful both in time of peace and in time of war. At the present moment I am not quite prepared to say in what particulars the difference between the two papers consists. Major Leahy distinctly goes in for two battalions, a battalion for home and a battalion for Indian or Colonial service. I think Major Edwards divides his into three classes, [Major EDWARDS: As regards the reserves I make no change whatever.] and in another form of organization that they should be "divisionized" in different parts of the country; that the militia should be occasionally formed up with the line, and that there should be a system of brigades and divisions in different parts of the country. That I understand to be part of the system which is advocated, a system which is obviously necessary to make our forces more efficient, to bring the staff into greater play, to have the duties more adequately performed, and also what is still more important, to enable those in charge of certain portions of the country to know exactly what the resources of those parts are, supposing the troops were suddenly called out. Those, as far as I can understand, are the chief features of the subject brought before us. The two papers certainly require very minute study for the purpose of thoroughly com-

prehending what are the different objects proposed by the two lecturers, and for the purpose of bringing a useful discussion to bear, with the view of seeing what would be the best system of army organization for the country.

Major EDWARDS: We are going, I think, rather too much into detail, and keeping away from the general principles which I tried to establish. Perhaps, as some of the members present may not have read my paper, I may mention two or three points in it. The principles are:—

- 1st. To concentrate the army to a greater extent in the United Kingdom.
- 2nd. To divide it into *corps d'armée* of equal strength, and distribute it with reference to them.
- 3rd. To organize the militia and yeomanry, so that they can readily join the regular *corps d'armée*.
- 4th. To give to the field artillery an organization which will render it capable of rapid expansion.
- 5th. To form dépôts for the establishment and instruction of a reserve of trained men for the different services.

Anybody who considers the want of organization in our Army at the present moment, can, I think, only come to the conclusion, that these are the *five principal steps* that are necessary for putting us in a position to turn out all our forces in the shortest possible time, either for the defence of the country, or for the despatching of expeditionary corps to different parts of the world. To divide our Army into *corps d'armée* of equal strength, is, I think the most important step. The administrative units of an Army vary according to different circumstances, and may be as in ours, a battalion of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, or a battery of artillery. But the tactical unit of an Army is the same for all modern Armies, or nearly so; it is generally called the *corps d'armée*. It is composed of all arms of the Service, infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, military train, in proper proportion to one another. Now, if these tactical units are not organized in time of peace, it is impossible that an Army can be effective in time of war. This I hold to be a most important point in considering the organization of an Army. Because if you are suddenly called upon for defensive warfare in this country, or warfare abroad, and your tactical units are not kept up in time of peace, you cannot create them in time of war. This happened to a certain extent in the Crimean war. We sent out that expedition by battalions of infantry, regiments of cavalry, and batteries of artillery, and all the odds and ends of the Service. First of all, we occupied Malta, where these forces were formed into brigades and divisions. Then they were pushed up further to the front. Our present system obliges us to occupy some safe spot outside the enemy's frontier in order to form our Army, before we are in a position to use it for hostile purposes. If we do not form our Army to a certain extent in this country, it is quite impossible, when war breaks out that we can despatch an expedition abroad, perfect, complete, and ready to undertake such hostile operations as its strength will allow of. Therefore I hold that it is absolutely and indispensably necessary that the tactical units of our Army must be maintained in time of peace.

In talking of the Militia and Volunteers, the subject, generally, is not considered in a comprehensive spirit. People generally run off into "Reserves" without knowing that the whole of the Reserve forces must be capable of being fused together into one mass at a moment's notice for use. It is no use your having an indefinite number of battalions of Militia, Volunteers, and regular troops, unless you have all the different arms of the Service tolerably proportioned to one another. For that reason it is absolutely necessary to organize the militia and yeomanry, so that they can easily join the regular *corps d'armée*.

The great object in view, is to be able at once to place the regular Army of this country on a war footing, ready to commence a campaign at once; so that the War Minister, from his office in London, with the Commander-in-Chief, could, in two or three days, bring forth all our defensive power. At the present moment I need hardly tell you what a state we should be in, if this country were really invaded. If a thoroughly organized Army of 80,000 men were to land on our shores, we should find it very difficult to make any show against it. If the country were threatened with invasion, we should call out our Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. But

before they could become of any use, they would have to receive an Organization corresponding to that of a regular Army. The present regular Army would become the nucleus for the formation of *corps d'armée*.

Colonel ALCOCK: I should like to ask, whether I understood rightly, that each regiment of militia was to have a second battalion?

Major EDWARDS: Yes, each regiment of militia. There are 135 regiments at the present moment. Instead of that, I would have 60 regiments of three battalions.

Colonel ALCOCK: So I collected. As the object which you wish to obtain is the mobilization of the militia, it depends upon minute details. I should like to state that it is essential that each particular Militia Regiment should have its Reserve. The reason is very obvious, and it would carry the more weight, because it would be a direct saving to the country. It would be a saving to the country in two respects. In the first place, the country would get more for its money; and in the next, in the event of war—everybody who has any knowledge of what occurred during the Crimean War will know this—that when a militia regiment was embodied, and became equivalent to a regiment of the line, the wives and children of the married men being left behind, became a very heavy charge upon the State. If there had been a Militia Reserve regiment, as there ought to have been, the married men would have been transferred to the reserve, and the single men would have gone from the reserve into the regular army.

Major EDWARDS: That point I meet by having each regiment to consist of three battalions. The first battalion would consist of men who would serve and undergo a considerable amount of training. If you take three regiments as they are now, three county regiments, and fuse them into one regiment of three battalions each, the first battalion will consist of men who will undergo more efficient training, and who will be ready at a few days' notice to join the regular Army; the second battalion will be available to undertake garrison duty—they would not require the training of the first battalion, and that meets the question of keeping the men who could not afford to give up twenty-eight days to training; the third battalion would be the reserve, who would answer all the purposes which Colonel Alcock has suggested.

Colonel ALCOCK: I admit that the theory is perfect, but I must be excused for saying that I doubt its efficacy in practice. The present system, as it is, is perfect, if you would only use it; leave the regiments as they are, and give them a reserve, and you will have them ready to bring out at a moment's notice. At this very moment we are discharging men from many regiments at the rate of forty men in the year, well-trained men: those are the men I want to put into the reserve.

Captain ROBINSON: With regard to putting the married men into the Reserve, I know one village in the midland counties, where all the married men volunteered for service in the Mediterranean, and all the unmarried men joined the dépôt.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we have laid the foundation to-night for a good discussion. The two papers should be read attentively by all who wish to take part in the discussion, I trust that when we meet again, we may have a good discussion upon the merits of the proposed systems of organization. There are many points, no doubt, of detail, as you have just now heard; but they are, if anything, points for the office—one might almost say,—rather than for a discussion on the broad question. The question before us is organization upon a great scale, and our discussion should be mainly upon that. If it is agreeable to all, we will adjourn to Thursday week. I conclude by saying that you will permit me to express the thanks of the meeting to Major Leahy, as well as to Major Edwards for the papers which they have laid before us. They will be most useful I am sure to the Service.

The meeting was then adjourned to Thursday, May 7th.