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Some Notes on Plato and Aristotle

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Prof. Hale discussed such cases in the *American Journal of Philology* viii. 1.

But even if it were granted that all these passages are modelled on the forms of reported speech, that would be no *explanation* of the phenomenon; it would merely transfer the difficulty to another place. How did it come about that in reported speech the tenses of the Subjunctive came to have future reference? Surely because of the inherent power of some tenses at least of the Subjunctive to express futurity: cf. in the Simple Sentence the use of the Deliberative Subj. (Pres. and Imperf.). The future sense of the Imperfect and Pluperf. Subj. seems to have arisen in connexion with the meaning 'ought'; e.g. *potius diceret* 'he ought to have said' 'he should have said,' just like the future meaning of the English 'should.'

The true key to all these passages seems to me to lie in recognizing a broad use of all the tenses of the Subjunctive with prospective meaning; the rule may be expressed as it stands in § 512 of my Latin Grammar (where however I have given only such instances as are universally recognized as falling under it):—The Subjunctive is used as a Future-equivalent wherever reference to the future is clear from the context. In such cases

| Subj. | | Indic. |
|--------|----------------|-----------------|
| Pres. | corresponds to | Fut. |
| Perf. | " | " Fut. Perf. |
| Impf. | " | " Fut. |
| Plupf. | " | " Fut. Perf. |
| | | } in past time. |

E. A. SONNENSCHNEIN.

SOME NOTES ON PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

PLATO *Rep.* iii. 405 C. ἐπέτεια νοσήματα— which Mr. Jowett for some reason I cannot divine translates by 'epidemics'—is well rendered in Mr. Warren's edition 'annual' or 'seasonable diseases, belonging to the time of year.' These regularly recurrent diseases, needing to be regularly cured or regularly provided against, are, I believe, called by doctors 'seasonal.' In my youth the provision against one class of them—what, I do not know—was sulphur, with which, disguised in treacle, we were annually dosed. At other times people have at certain periods of the year regularly submitted to bleeding. In a well known line of the *Ars Poetica*, Horace speaks of purging himself of bile each spring. To the cure of these recurrent and in a special sense natural disorders Plato had no objection.

Ib. vi. 498. Plato is describing and censuring in this well-known passage the way in which philosophy was pursued in his day. Its most difficult part was attacked by mere striplings just out of childhood (μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ παιδων) τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ: in after life men at the most participated in philosophic discussion merely as listeners and by way of πάρεργον: towards old age their philosophic fire was usually quenched as absolutely as Heraclitus' sun at nightfall. The general drift of this is clear enough; but what do the words τὸ μεταξὺ &c. mean? Stallbaum rendered them 'dum student quaestui,' 'while they are engaged in business and housekeep-

ing'; and he has been followed by Davies and Vaughan, Jowett and the Engelmann translator. But do 'striplings just out of childhood' engage in οἰκονομία and χρηματισμός? And if they can be dialecticians while so engaged, why cannot older men? But the truth is that we have here the well-known idiom by which after μεταξύ and similar words 'only one of the two limits is given,' as Sidgwick puts it on Aesch. *Choeph.* 63; add to his examples Thuc. iii. 51 τὸν ἔσπλον εἰς τὸ μεταξύ τῆς νήσου (= the water-space between the island and the mainland: Krüger had thought from ignorance of the idiom that καὶ τῆς Νισαίας must have fallen out). The passage before us now becomes rational; philosophy is only actively pursued by youths just out of childhood, during the interval between childhood and the business occupations of a grown man.¹

Arist. *Nic. Eth.* v. 2. 6. General and partial ἀδικία are here said to be συνώνυμος, because their definition is 'in the same genus,' ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον. It has always seemed to me that by the 'genus' here spoken of must be intended the Category of Relation πρὸς τί or πρὸς ἕτερον 6b 37. I am glad to see that Mr. Stewart in his new notes on the *Ethics* takes the same view, supporting it by an extract from a Greek commentator. It is simpler to refer to the master himself: cf. *Met.* Δ 1016b 33 εἶδει [εἰς] ὧν ὁ λόγος εἰς, γένει δ' ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς

¹ The passage is similarly explained by Mr. H. Richards in *Classical Review*, Vol. II. p. 324b. Ed

κατηγορίας: compare also 1024b 10–13 *ἕτερα τῷ γένει λέγεται...καὶ ὅσα καθ' ἕτερον σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται*. It must be confessed that *συνώνυμα* of this kind (if Aristotle really contemplated such a kind) positively refuse to come under the well-known definition in the *Categories* where it is said that the *λόγος* must be one¹; Jackson and Grant throw no light on the present passage.

In Bk. v. Aristotle describes corrective justice as equally concerned with the voluntary and involuntary intercourse of men with each other. Under the latter head comes robbery and injustice, the results of which law rectifies; but some difficulty has often been felt as to the relation of corrective justice to the voluntary *συναλλάγματα*, such as purchase and sale, borrowing and lending, &c., with which Aristotle expressly says the law does not interfere. Mr. Jackson with his usual good sense brushed away this imaginary difficulty by pointing out that if one man lends another money (which is a purely voluntary transaction and may be effected on any terms that please the parties), and the borrower afterwards refuses to repay the loan, corrective justice properly steps in to make him do so. In a note which appeared in the *Classical Review* (iii. p. 196) I thought to confirm this by showing that Aristotle's examples plainly indicated him to have such an idea in his mind; for by the side of *ἐμοίχευσεν* he puts *ἀπιστέρησεν*, which is common Attic for refusal to pay a debt; I put a concrete case of this, of the same simple character as Mr. Jackson's. A contract of sale (say of a book) has been freely formed; the vendor has delivered the book; what is to happen if the purchaser does not pay for it? Obvious as all this is, Mr. Stewart still repeats that Aristotle gives no example of corrective justice applied to voluntary *συναλλάγματα*; to make up for this he offers us a brilliant example of his own, and then proceeds to criticize Mr. Jackson's. And what is this criticism? He thinks Mr. Jackson's example wrong—though admitting that Aristotle would probably have accepted it. If he would have accepted it, why is it wrong? Because, says Mr. Stewart, not to return borrowed money would be *κλοπή*, theft. This is indeed enough to make any one with an atom of legal instinct or legal training stare and gasp. A lends B one pound, not intending or expecting to get that particular

sovereign back again; that has become B's property once for all; he cannot steal it, though he keeps it for ever; he is only saddled with a liability to pay back a sovereign. His neglect to pay may be criminal; but he steals nothing.

In the famous ch. on exchange Mr. Stewart, though rightly insisting that Aristotle expressly recognizes only two kinds of *ἀπλῶς δίκαιον*, seems to me to introduce mere confusion by trying to view the justice of exchange as a kind of public justice. It should be regarded as one of the *δίκαια καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, perhaps a part of what he afterwards calls *οικονομικὸν δίκαιον* (cf. *Pol.* i. 8. 13). It is also wrong to import into a commentary on this chapter the ideas that the worth of an article or a workman depends on the amount of labour in the one or trained skill in the other; of all this there is no trace in the *Ethics*. Aristotle must have the credit of starting the problem of value—Why is one thing more costly than another? But his solution merely re-states the problem, being in fact this: that the relative values of things are determined by men's relative need of them; that men pay more for a house than for a pair of shoes because they want it more, and so—the agreed measure of want being money—they are willing to pay more for it. Any one with a tincture of economic science sees that this tells us nothing; but it is not wonderful that this should have escaped Aristotle. Economics no better than his are probably common enough at the present day.

In the passage about *ἀρχαί* in Bk. i. 7. 21 Mr. Stewart explains the statement that some *ἀρχαί* are obtained by *αἴσθησις* as follows: either we must say that *αἴσθησις* is necessarily involved in *ἐπαγωγή* and a first step to it, or we must suppose that *ἀρχή* here is not a principle but a mere starting-point. This must prove rather confusing to the beginner. The fact is that Mr. Stewart cannot place himself at Aristotle's point of view; probably it is too simple for him. The *ἀρχή* of a particular science, according to Aristotle, is the fundamental subject-matter (as we might say, concept) of that science, or the definition of the same. The *ἀρχή* of Euclid, Book iii. (we cannot too sedulously use geometrical illustrations to interpret Aristotle's view of science) is the circle and its definition, of arithmetic the unit and its definition, of thermotics heat, and of ethics τὸ ἀγαθόν. Now if we refer to the *Posterior Analytics* i. we find that *ἀρχαί* must be assumed, for they cannot be demonstrated; that in some cases it is

¹ Mr. Stewart in saying that the *λόγος* here is one seems to contradict the first passage above quoted from the *Met.*

necessary to call 'special attention to this assumption and make its nature clear by ἐπαγωγή from particulars which are directly known; but that in some cases (where the subject-matter is φανερόν) there is no need to call attention to this assumption (c. 10. 76b 16), e.g. with regard to heat and cold, which are obvious, and so unlike the unit, which is the ἀρχή of arithmetic. Put into language suitable to the present occasion the whole amounts to this; that the ἀρχή of arithmetic requires ἐπαγωγή to assure us of its existence and meaning, but the ἀρχή of thermotics is apprehended by αἴσθησις. Cf. *de Part. An.* 639b 11, where the physician is said to fix his end (ὑγίεια) ὁριστάμενος ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει.

In Bk. viii. on κληρωτὸς βασιλεὺς Mr. Stewart gives (after Coray and Ramsauer) the passages from Plato which indicate by illustrations the character intended, though he also adds the futile view of the older commentators. He does not notice my attempted proof in this Journal that the phrase would be regular Greek of the time for a 'nominal king'; a proof based on the constitutional practice at Athens and the constitutional precepts of Aristotle, and corroborated by its power to supply for the first time a rational interpretation (of which Prof. Lewis Campbell approved) of a passage in the *Laus*.

That a familiarity with the Greek commentators, good as it is, may at times prove an obstacle to something better, a knowledge of the original authorities, is shown by the curious note on αἰ ποτε τὸ ζῶον and what follows it in Bk. vii. 14. 5: 'Aspasius tells us this saying is due to Anaxagoras.' Does Mr. Stewart really know nothing of Anaxagoras' remarkable theory (stated by Theophrastus and to be found in any edition of Ritter and Preller) that perception was not by similarity (as Empedocles had thought) but by opposition, that opposition was painful, and therefore (as Aristotle says here) all perception involved pain, to which we gradually become accustomed?

A few words may be added on the passage immediately following the above (*Eth. N.* vii. 14. 6, 1154b 9)—ὁμοίως δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνώμενοι διακίευνται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ δέονται ἰατρείας ... καὶ αἰ ἐν ὁρέξει σφοδρᾶ εἰσίν. Mr. Stewart here simply copies Grant's note. Grant's view, identical with Michelet's, and suitable to the general tenor of the ch., holds that we have here compared 'the desires of youth with those of drunkenness and the melancholy temperament,' all being violent: and

he tells us that we shall find the same comparison in *Problems*, Bk. xxx. c. 1. But then would he translate ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης, as the worthy Michelet frankly does, 'est enim prona ad voluptates iuventus'? In consistency he is bound to do so; but he observes a wise reticence on this point, and so does Mr. Stewart: both value what Mark Pattison called 'the two editorial privileges—silence where explanation is needed, diffuseness where it is superfluous.' Of course Michelet's translation is impossible, but then his and Grant's theory of the passage becomes impossible too. Nor does the lengthy 'Problem' to which Grant refers exactly bear out his account of it. It tells us that all περιττοὶ are μελαγχολικοὶ and have often shown the well-known pathological symptoms of that κράσις: the μελαγχολικοὶ are all περιττοὶ and ἐκστατικοὶ in different or perhaps even opposite directions, showing abnormal talkativeness or taciturnity, abnormal affectionateness, compassion, &c.: wine imitates in a single person, but temporarily only, all these striking and unusual forms of character. This is because both the μελαγχολικὰ πάθη and wine are πνευματώδη, which is also proved to Aristotle's mind by the lecherousness which is the result of both. Another explanation—not apparently intended to contradict the above—is that the μέλαινα χολή can be both exceedingly hot and exceedingly cold, and this accounts for the melancholic temperament being in excess sometimes in one direction (cheerful, bold, talented, amorous), sometimes in the opposite. All men have something of this 'melancholic' ἔξις, but a few have it in excess. Not till we are four-fifths through the 'Problem' is a word said about youth. Then we are abruptly told 'when the κράσις is colder it causes irrational dejection; therefore suicides are frequent with the young, and sometimes found among the old' (954b 35). Presently we are told that youth, like wine, makes one hopeful; and again that the young are more cheerful. Finally the great feature of the melancholic temperament is represented as its unevenness, its 'ups and downs.' I do not well see what to make of this medley as a whole. The view of the 'melancholic character' does not seem identical with what we find in the present chapter; where in the 'Problem' is the constant sense of want, the need of cure that we find here? Or at least, if we can detect these in the melancholiac's cold fits, where are they in his hot—unless perhaps it is thought that these are indicated by calling men in the hot fit εὐκίνητοι πρὸς τοὺς

θυμούς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας? And what again about youth? If it is intended to say that youth is eminently a time of hot and cold fits, it must be allowed that this is implied in an unusually indirect and desultory manner. Still I cannot deny that the writer may have intended this. Only in this case we are further than ever from an explanation of ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης. It is possible then that the passage in the *Ethics* implies a somewhat different set of ideas from those of the 'Problem,' and in particular that the young are here opposed to the melancholic (as the μέν and δέ would seem to show—the punc-

tuation needs correction, as Mr. Bywater admitted to me) so that we might translate the passage: 'And so in youth owing to our growth we are like those in their cups, and youth is pleasant; but the melancholic are in want and desire.' The point then would be that it is just the constant change and ἀναπλήρωσις of our growing years that make them pleasant; and this would accord with the general theory of the ch. In describing this turbulent tide of growth Aristotle may have been thinking of Plato's *Timaeus* 43 B.

J. SOLOMON.

CRITICAL NOTES ON THE *REPUBLIC* OF PLATO.

In publishing the following notes, which must from their number be brief, I think it may be well to premise

(1) that I pass over all passages as to which, though they are in my judgment unsound, I have no definite suggestion to make;

(2) that, where what I think the true reading is already to my knowledge offered by any MS., adopted by any editor, or proposed by any scholar, I say nothing about it, as a rule, because the information is easily accessible;

(3) that, where I dissent from the explanations of others, I abstain as a rule from stating and discussing them, not out of disrespect to scholars living or dead, but from a desire for brevity and because any one can consult their books;

(4) that for the same reasons I am not careful to indicate minutely the reported readings of MSS.

I have had before me two of Ast's editions (1814 and 1822), and those of Schneider (1830), Stallbaum (1858), C. F. Hermann (1862), Baiter (1874), and Warren (Books i.-v., 1888), though I have not studied Ast and Schneider throughout. Ast's invaluable Platonic Lexicon has not only preserved me from some errors, but sometimes helped me to positive suggestions.

330 A. οὐτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπικηρὴς πάνν τι ῥαδίως γήρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπικηρὴς πλουτήσας εὐκόλως ποτ' ἂν ἐαντῷ γένοιτο. Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέκτησαι τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; Ποῖ ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστής κ.τ.λ.

In the first sentence for εὐκόλος...ἐαντῷ (a very doubtful expression) read εὐκόλος... ἐν αὐτῷ. Some mention of old age seems required in the clause: otherwise the statement is too general.

Ποῖ ἐπεκτησάμην is bad grammar and, as commonly understood, bad sense. Derision would be quite out of place, for C. goes on to admit he has made money. Ποῖ (for which Paris A has ποῖ) looks like a corruption of πότερον—'Do you ask whether?'

330 C. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ἐγγγενέσθαι εἰσίν. Probably we should read ἐγγί(γ)νεσθαι both here and in *Apol.* 41 A, for the present tense of this verb is habitually used to express prolonged intercourse.

330 E. καὶ αὐτοὺς ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρους ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἡδὴ ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον καθορᾷ αὐτά. The weakness of age could hardly enable a man to descry more correctly what is to follow after death (τὰ ἐκεῖ). We must suppose a word or two to have been lost, probably after ἀσθενείας, in which the real effect of failing powers was expressed.

333 B. Ἄλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ καθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ καθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρονμάτων; Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Εἰς κρονμάτων and εἰς ἀργυρίου forcibly suggest that we should read εἰς τίνος.

335 A. κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες..., νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὡς λέγειν...;

Several editors omit ἦ. Read perhaps <πλέον> ἢ ὡς.

337 A. εἰ τίς τι σε ἐρωτᾷ. The mood of the verb is inconsistent with the context. We need an optative, probably ἔροιτο.