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Notes on Aristotle's *Ethics*

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chief problems which the science of language has to solve. Fick has shown that the inflexion of *léigmi*, *léigsi*, &c., rests on the words, *léiqi*, *liqēni*, *liqai*, *liqdhai*, which are in form noun-cases. It follows that we may in general expect to find the same formative elements, which appear in the declensions of nouns, appearing in conjugations of verbs.

An obvious instance is the case of the futures and aorists in *s* (*fazo*, *rexi*, *λύσω*, *ἔλυσα*, *bhaviṣyāmi*, &c.). We need not hesitate to regard this *s* as essentially the same as that *s* which appears in Sanskrit loc. plur. *su*,¹ in Greek locatives in *σι*, and in dative plurals in *s*.

On the same principle I propose to identify the *b* of *ibo*, *ibam* with the *b* in *tibei*, *nobis*, *ibus* (*is*), *rebus*, with *φ* in *ἴφι*, *σφι*, *βίηφι*, with *bh* in the Ssk. cases *bhyam* (*tū-*

bhyam, *asmābhyam*), *bhyām* (dual), *bhyas*, *bhis*, with *b* in Slav. *tebě*, *sebě*. I submit that 'Infinities' of the type *léiqbhi*, *liqbhéi*, were in use before nouns and verbs had come into existence as distinct parts of speech. In the Greek forms, and in Sanskrit, we have *bhi* (*bhj-*); in the Latin singular forms (*tibi*, *sibi*, *ibi*, *-cubi*, *ubi*), and in Slavonic we have an unmistakable *bhei*.² Latin *bus*, which we can hardly refuse to identify with Ssk. *bhyas*, was originally *bhjos*, we may similarly assume the loss of *i* in the terminations *bo* and *bam*.

Along with such words as *bherē*, *ei*, *deiki*, there existed other forms, such as *éibhi*, *éibhō*, and from these were formed systems of verbal tenses; e.g. *eibhio* (*ibo*), *eibhiam* (*ibam*), while they also entered into nominal declensions.³

JOHN B. BURY.

¹ In Greek this form has survived in *μεταξύ* (basis *μετακ, *μεταξ : *μέτασσα* :: *πéριξ* : *περίσος*). I conjecture that it also survives in *αἰσν-μήτης* (*αἰσν* for *αἰσν* : *αἰσα* = *αἰτα*, Osc. *acteis* = *partis*, cf. *aestumo*).

² Lat. *beis* (*nobis*) : *bei* (*tibi*) :: Ssk. *bhis* : *φi*.

³ Another instance of this principle is the imperative in *dhi* (*crudhī*, *κλῦθι*), as compared with cases in *θι* (*οἰκοθι*).

NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S *ETHICS*.

I. 5,8, πολλοὶ λόγοι καταβέβληνται πρὸς αὐτὰ is, I believe, commonly translated 'many arguments have been laid as a foundation to prove them,' rather a bold metaphor from *καταβάλλειν κρηπίδα*. I now find that Ramsauer translates 'have been published,' giving as proofs the expressions *καταβεβλημένοι παιδεύσεις*, *μαθήματα* = the common, current studies from *Politics* 1337b21, 1338a36. I had previously arrived at his conclusion independently, comparing Plato *Soph.* 232d, τὰ γε μὴν...δὲ ἀντειπεῖν δεδομωμένα πον καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλευμένῳ μαθεῖν, where the form of expression reminds one of the original legal use of *καταβάλλειν*, 'file, deposit among the public records' (see L. & S.), from which the general meaning 'publish' was derived.

I. 8,10, τὸ γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν. It certainly seems as if this must mean 'The feeling of pleasure is a mental state,' not bodily, according to the doctrine laid down in X. 3,6. Ramsauer quotes this, but adds with characteristic candour that he cannot see the bearing of the remark on the passage. With these words omitted the general meaning is perfectly clear, and the expression, as I think, more pointed than the commentators have suspected. 'The life of the good man

is in its very nature pleasant;' here come the debated words, then 'whatever one is called a lover of, that is pleasant to him; thus a horse to the lover of horses, a spectacle to the lover of sights; and, in the same way, just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice, and virtuous acts generally to the lover of virtue.' It is clear that to prove his general position, *ἐκάστω ἐστὶν ἡδύ, πρὸς δὲ λέγεται φιλοσοιοῦτος*, he finds it best to begin with the simplest instances, material ones, e.g. a horse, a spectacle; then from what all admit in these obvious cases there is an inference to the less obvious case where the thing loved is immaterial, e.g. virtue. Perhaps then he insists on pleasure being a mental state to show that there is no need that the object exciting it should be a material one; e.g. if pleasure were really *ἀναπλήρωσις* of the body—the opinion he refutes in Bk. X.—the exciting object could only be material food. I once thought the dubious words could be rendered 'the feeling of pleasure is found in connexion with psychical objects' (as well as material), e.g. in connexion with τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν (which are *ψυχικαὶ ἐνέργειαι*, I. 8,2); now, however, I think this interpretation impossible, for allowing there were no objection to the meaning given in it to τὰ ψυχικά, Aristotle

would probably have written τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ ψυχικά ἐστιν.

V. 4. The exact conception of διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον having given much trouble particularly in its relation to ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα, I am surprised that no one—as far as I know—has examined with sufficient care the instances given of its application. The doubt is, how exactly this kind of justice can apply to ἐκούσια συν. (such as ὦν, πρῶσις, &c. ch. 2,13), with regard to which it is expressly said in ch. 4,13, ἀδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. The difficulty is cleared up by an exacter explanation of ἀποστέρησεν (4,3), which is a case to which διορθ. δίκ. applies. For ἀποστέρειν—as scholars know, though the meaning is not given in L. & S. 6th edn.—is the exact opposite of ἀποδιδόναι, the latter being = to pay one's debts (this is known to L. & S.), the former = to refuse to pay one's debts. If instances are wanted, take the case of the rascally borrower (this was a χρῆσις, loan without interest) in Dem. c. *Nicostratum*, § 13, λαβὼν δὲ τὸ ἀργυρίον οὐχ ὅπως χάριν τινά μοι ἀποδίδωσιν ὧν εὖ ἔπαθεν, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ἐπεβούλευσέ μοι ἔν' ἀποστέρησιν τἀργυρίον, or the case of the unfortunate lender (this was a δανεισμός, loan on interest) in c. *Pantaenetum*, § 53, 'through having been often a borrower as well as, in this special instance, a lender, I, too, know these gentlemen (i.e. the money-lenders, for whom it was said no Athenian jury would find a verdict), and I don't love them, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἀποστέρω μὰ Δι' οὐδὲ συκοφαντῶ. Thus the ἐκούσ. συναλ. to which διορθ. δίκ. applies were—to speak strictly—συναλ. in which the ἀρχή was ἐκούσιος, V. 2,13, that is contracts with the *formation* of which the law did not interfere; but when one of the parties had derived from them the benefit he expected, then if he refused to pay the 'consideration' he had agreed on, the law stepped in and said he should not have all the gain and the other all the loss. Mr. Jackson translates ἀποστέρησεν by 'defrauded,' which is, of course, as correct and suitable a version as any one word can be; he does not think it necessary to give any note. May I say it is much to be desired that Mr. Jackson would again devote his great knowledge and ability to the interpretation of the *Ethics*? One word more. While Mr. Jackson's interpretation of Bk. V. 5 (of which Ramsauer, unfortunately for himself, is ignorant) seems irrefragable, I regret he should provoke opposition by describing its subject as a third kind of justice co-ordinate with distributive and corrective, when Aristotle has expressly said there are but two kinds of

justice, διανεμ. and διορθ. It is quite true that Aristotle speaks of τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός; but this δίκαιον, like πατρικόν and δεσποτικόν δίκαιον, is not ταῦτόν, but only ὅμοιον to the real justice, the ἀπλῶς or πολιτικόν δίκαιον. For to Aristotle the real justice can only be had in the state, regulated and enforced by law, cf. *Pol.* 1282b14, 'The end in all arts is good, and greatest good and especially good in the supreme art, that of statesmanship, ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον,' also *Pol.* 1283a37, κοινωνικὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φασὲν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἣ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας, and *Pol.* 1253a36, ἣ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν. That particular analogue of real political justice, the formula of which is τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός, might, we see from *Pol.* I., have been named χρηματιστικόν or κτητικόν δίκαιον, and would be a branch of οἰκονομικόν δίκαιον. There is then nothing strange, as Mr. Jackson thinks, in the words πῶς ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον εἶρηται being placed just before a description of πολιτικόν δίκαιον, that being the true justice, while 'commercial justice' is only a δίκαιον καθ' ὁμοίότητα.

IX. 4,4. I am almost ashamed to pretend I can have anything fresh to say on this well-known crux. Fritsche's and Peters' interpretations of γενόμενος ἄλλος ('becoming older' or 'better') are impossible. Ramsauer gives up the passage. To me Grant's interpretation seems correct as far as it goes, but further explanation is needed. 'Every one wishes himself what is good, but does not desire to become another, and then for that new creature to have everything,' i.e. Every one wishes the best for himself, but not at the price of losing his personality; he wants the good for himself now as he is (taking ἀλλ' ὅν ὁ τι ποτ' ἐστίν as opposed to γενόμενος ἄλλος, and throwing ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν into a parenthesis—I will discuss this later); and the intellect is what each man really is (δόξετε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι); therefore he must take care of his intellect. Now to most of this, except the use of the word 'personality,' an advance and refinement on the simple conceptions of Aristotle, I fully assent. But is Grant right about the conclusion of the whole matter, 'therefore he must take care of his intellect'? It is hard to see how such a direction is implied in the passage immediately under consideration, which is not hortatory in tone; and in fact it is irrelevant to the object of the chapter, which is to prove that the relation of a man to his friend is similar to the relation of the good man (ὁ ἐπιεικής)—

not of others—to himself. For instance the mark of the relation of friendship is that man βούλεται τὰγαθὰ to the friend for the friend's own sake; now this is the feeling of ὁ σπουδαῖος towards himself, he wishes well to himself and for the sake of himself, i.e. for the sake of his intellect, which is the man's self. Now comes the debated passage, which I interpret 'it is true every one (ἐκαστος) wishes well to himself, but suppose he became different he would wish himself well no longer.' Now the man who is not perfect actually does become different. I call attention here to the parallel passage X. 7, 9. 'The intellect is the very self of the man; it is absurd then (Aristotle's strongest expression of confidence in his position) to choose not one's own life but some one else's,' which is what one does if one does not live κατὰ νοῦν; therefore the imperfect man, when and as far as he gives up living κατὰ νοῦν, has 'assumed the life of another' (in the language of Bk. X.), has 'become another' (in the language of Bk. IX.), and his former

self is in no way interested in his present self; the A. of yesterday no longer wishes well to the A. of to-day; therefore the common man cannot be said βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἑαυτῷ, but only the good man; and therefore only good men (and men in so far as they suppose themselves good, and therefore unchanging, IX. 4, 2) feel towards themselves as men feel towards their friends.

The rather extraordinary reference to God also becomes intelligible. God is like the good man (συγγενής, φίλος, X. 8, 13), inasmuch as he is pure νοῦς and necessarily unchanging; in fact, in a measure, the perfect man lives the life of God (ἀθανατίζει, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖ), since he obeys τὸ θεῖον in himself. But we cannot say of God βούλεται ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ, for he has τὰγαθόν already. The words ἀλλ' ὣν ὁ τι ποτ' ἐστίν are not absolutely needed to explain the assertion about God, and had better be kept, as above suggested, to express the opposite of ἄλλος γενόμενος.

J. SOLOMON.

1094 b, 19. ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. These words have been suspected on the ground that an ἀγαθόν, not a καλόν, is required. Rasso's διὰ φιλίαν is, however, open to nearly the same objection, for φιλία is a καλόν as well as an ἀγαθόν (cf. 1155 a, 28). If any change is required, I would suggest ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀρχήν. Ἀρχή is very common in lists of ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ.

1096 b, 5. πιθανώτερον δὲ εἰκόασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κ.τ.λ. 'It is more plausible to say that the One is good than that the Good is one.' This apparently belongs to the earlier part of the discussion. Susemihl regards 1096 a, 34 ἀπορήσει... 1096 b, 5 ἐφημέρου as a marginal note. Would it not be simpler to put 1096 b, 5 sqq. after 1096 a, 34 γυμναστική? Perhaps the present position of the sentence is due to the 'editor' having supposed that there was some reference to the view of Speusippos and the Pythagoreans that the Good was not eternal, for which see *Met.* 1072 b, 30 and 1091 a, 34. But it seems hard to find such a reference in 'the sentence as we have it.

1097 a, 27. πλοῦτον αἰλοῦς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα. The meaningless αἰλοῦς has been suggested by ὄργανα. Bonitz conjectures φίλους, but, though φίλοι may be ὄργανα (cf. 1099 b, 1), we want something which is always an ὄργανον. I would suggest δούλους.¹

¹ I find that I have been anticipated here by Mr. Bywater in the last number of the *Journal of Philology*.

1098 a, 4. τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον. These words are condemned by Grant, Rasso and Susemihl. But would it be sufficiently clear without them that there is an ambiguity in τὸ λόγον ἔχον? In a remark of this kind the absence of grammatical connexion need not trouble us. In a modern work it would have been put in a foot-note with a reference to 1102 b, 25sqg. The καὶ in the next sentence (διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης) is an undesigned testimony to the genuineness of the words. Rasso and Susemihl bracket it also, but what interpolator would have thought of it?

1099 b, 5. εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἴεν ἢ φίλοι. The words ἢ φίλοι are omitted by the Greek commentators and the inferior MSS. and are bracketed by Susemihl. It is true that Aristotle has not mentioned πολυφιλία καὶ χρηστοφιλία with the rest as he does in *Rhet.* i, 5, but μονότης in the line above shows he had it in his mind, and that is enough to justify ἢ φίλοι here, supported as it is both by K^b and L^b.

1099 b, 23. μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. This is possibly right, but μάλιστα <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην is easy and tempting.

1099 b, 26. ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ποιά τις. I believe κατ' ἀρετὴν to be a gloss on ποιά τις. Otherwise it is hard to see what ποιά τις could mean. Surely not τελεία, for that is a ποσόν not a ποῖόν.

1100 a, 4. καὶ ἀρετῆς [τελείας] καὶ βίου

τελείου. When ἀρετὴ τελεία stands by itself, as in 1101 *a*, 14, it seems to mean ἀρετὴ which has had time to develop ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. It can hardly be 'complete' (i.e. all) ἀρετὴ for εὐδαιμονία is ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. But if so it cannot stand here with βίον τελείου immediately following.

1100 *a*, 6. εὐθηνούντα. It is admitted that εὐθηνούντα is the Attic form of this word. Now it occurs according to Bonitz's Index nine times in Aristotle (apart from the present passage), and in only one of them, viz. *Pol.* 1258 *b*, 17, does Bekker not give some variant which shows that the original reading must have been εὐθενεῖν and not εὐθηνεῖν. The variant is generally εὐσθενεῖν, more rarely the correct form εὐθενεῖν. So in the present passage K^b, the oldest MS., has εὐσθενούντα. We must also add two passages in the *Problemata*, 862, *a*, 11 and 925 *a*, 3, where Bekk. has εὐσθενεῖ without any variant though εὐθενεῖ is clearly right. So too we must read εὐθένεια for εὐθηνία Bekk.

in *Rhet.* 1360 *b*, 16 (εὐσθένεια Q Y^b Z^b) and εὐθένεια for εὐθηνία in *Hist. An.* 602, *a*, 15 (εὐθένεια C^a: εὐσθένεια cett.). Aristotle is much more of an Attic writer than sometimes appears from Bekker's text.

1101 *a*, 14, κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν. Another case of ἀρετὴ τελεία with βίος τέλειος following. But Eucken has shown that 16 μὴ...βίον is wanted after 17 οὕτως.

1101 *a*, 34. συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν. 'We must take into account this difference as well.' But the Paraphrase, σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς, distinctly favours συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, L^b O^b H^a Ald. Ar. Vet. Int. For συλλογιστέον i.q. σκεπτέον, see L. S. *s.v.* ii, 2 and examples there.

1101 *b*, 1. εἰκε γὰρ: εἰκεν οὖν L^b. Surely this points to εἰκε γοῦν which would be very appropriate here with its mixed illative and restrictive force.

JOHN BURNET.

NOTES ON LATIN POETS.

PERSIUS III. 39—43.

Anne magis Siculi gemuerunt aera iuueni
et magis auratis pendens laquearibus ensis
purpureas subter ceruices terruit, 'imus,
imus praecipites' quam si sibi dicat, et intus
palleat infelix, quod proxima nesciat uxor.

'The ghastly inward paleness, which is a mystery, even to the wife of the bosom' Conington. I can imagine no worse nonsense than *inward paleness*. What is paleness? It is one among the outward symptoms of inward disorder: it exists in the complexion, nowhere else in the frame of a living man. When a man is dissected, then his inward parts may have this colour or that: till then they have none at all. And if we are to talk about this inconceivable malady, it will be superfluous and yet at the same time inadequate to say that it is unguessed by the wife of the bosom. It doubtless is: much more than that, it is and must be unguessed by the invalid himself: he cannot possibly know that there is anything the matter with him. I need only mention and dismiss the idea that *palleat* can mean merely *fears*: that sense, if wanted, must be introduced by the emendation *infelix paueat*. Conington in his commentary explains with natural hesitation '*intus*

palleat, not a very intelligible expression at first sight, appears to include the notions of *depth* and *secrecy*;' but as those notions are included in the perfectly intelligible expression *quod proxima nesciat uxor*, the other becomes more wonderful than ever.

I suppose that when we read the passage negligently, without pausing to realise how absurd it is, we carry away a vague impression that it means *paleness from an inward cause unknown to the wife of the bosom*. Of course it does not; but it is an almost imperceptible alteration of what does:

et ulcus

palleat infelix, quod proxima nesciat uxor.

The construction is the same as I. 124 *Eupolidem palles*, you are pale from reading Eupolis. The metaphor is frequent enough: take for an instance Cic. *de off.* III. 85 'hunc tu quas conscientiae labes in animo censes habuisse, quae uulnera?'