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Lutoslawski's *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* The *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, with an account of Plato's style, and of the chronology of his writings, by Wincenty Lutoslawski. Longmans, Green and Co. 1897.

J. Adam

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Posidon's; and sooner than suffer this I will stand up against you and fight, let come what may.' The seamen were astounded at such audacious words from a stripling to a warrior king: Minos was angered, as anyone would be; but he did not draw sword on the meddlesome youth, nor knock him overboard, nor even have him laid by the heels: he mastered himself and ἔφαινε ποταμίαν μῆτιν. 'Zeus,' said he, 'if I am your son, show me a sign from heaven,'—and immediately it lightened,—'and Theseus, if you are Posidon's, fish me up this ring out of your father's realm.' He believed of course that Theseus was the son of Aegeus, and expected him to shrink from the test: the young braggart, abashed by detection, would then sit still and hold his tongue. What other motive for the stratagem is conceivable? But Theseus plunged forthwith into the sea, and the heart of Minos was molten in his breast: Posidon's son or not, thought he, this is a brave lad. Eriboea was clean forgotten: we hear her name no more: the return of Theseus finds Minos not pursuing his amour but sunk in thought. No correction of τά[.]εν will be even sufferable unless it signifies some strong revulsion which put Cyprus and her gifts altogether out of his head. He accordingly did not order the ship to sail on, which she was doing already without his orders, but he ordered her to be stopped, κέλευσεν ἵσχειν νᾶα: therefore κατ' οὐρον in 87, as I said on p. 139b, is corrupt, and must either be made

into κάτουρον agreeing with νᾶα or else into some substantive like ἐπίουρον or ἀκάτουρον (= ναύκληρον) as object of κέλευσε. He gave orders, I say, to stop the ship; but fate ordained another course. The Greek word ὁδόν, between the words ἵσχειν νᾶα and ἵερο δόρυ, means the course of the ship. How did fate prevent the stopping of the ship? well, the simplest way of ascertaining is to read what Bacchylides has written. Compare Cowper, *Castaway* 19-24:

He shouted; nor his friends had failed
To check the vessel's course,
But so the furious blast prevailed,
That, pitiless perforce,
They left their outcast mate behind,
And scudded still before the wind.

On therefore they sailed, the youths and maidens trembling and weeping; but Theseus meanwhile was borne by dolphins to the palace of his father, and graced with gifts by Amphitrite, and lo, he reappeared of a sudden by the vessel's side. Ah, in what a train of thought did he arrest the king of Cnossus! The sea-nymphs lifted up their voices, the youths and maidens sang in answer, and all was joy; for the Minotaur, as Wilamowitz-Moellendorf observes, is thrown far into the background. So runs the story. The question is whether you will amend κατ' οὐρον and so remove the single incongruity which breaks its tenour.

A. E. HOUSMAN.

LUTOSLAWSKI'S ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC.

The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic, with an account of Plato's style, and of the chronology of his writings, by WINCENTY LUTOSLAWSKI. Longmans, Green and Co. 1897.

IN this elaborate and learned work Mr. Lutoslawski fulfils the promise made in his tract *Sur une nouvelle Méthode pour déterminer la chronologie des dialogues de Platon* (Paris 1896) and in the *Classical Review* for July 1897 pp. 284-286. A preliminary essay on the same subject had been printed in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1895, pp. 67-114, and the substance of a considerable portion of the work has already appeared in the author's native tongue. English scholars may consider themselves

fortunate that a writer who seems equally at home in all civilised languages should have selected English as the best medium in which to publish the first complete account of his investigations.

In an introduction of sixty-three pages the author gives an able survey of earlier investigations into the logic of Plato and the chronology of Plato's dialogues. The progress of this discussion affords an opportunity of examining the tradition about Plato's sojourn at Megara, which is accepted by Zeller and other Platonic scholars. Mr. Lutoslawski attempts to disprove the story, but (as it appears to me) without success. Hermodorus, according to Diogenes Laertius (ii. 106) 'says' (φησιν) 'that after the death of Socrates Plato and the other philosophers

visited Euclides of Megara, dreading the cruelty of the tyrants.' The Hermodorus in question was Plato's pupil (see Zeller⁴ ii. 1. 402 n.), and his testimony is therefore entitled to consideration. Mr. Lutoslawski attempts to invalidate this evidence by remarking that Diogenes' statement is given 'not as an unquestioned fact, but as an opinion of Hermodorus' (p. 43). It is however a *statement* (φησὶν), and not a mere *opinion*, of Hermodorus, and it is precisely because the statement is attributed to Hermodorus, and not given as 'an unquestioned fact' *without* authority, that it deserves to carry weight. Mr. Lutoslawski asserts that Cicero 'contradicts' the testimony of Hermodorus. The only passage which he cites in support of this contention is *De Rep.* I. x. 16 'audisse te credo Platonem Socrate mortuo primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse ut Pythagorae inventa perdisceret.' It is surely incorrect to say that Cicero means to indicate Egypt 'as the first place to which Plato travelled after his master's death.' Cicero is not professing to give a complete account of Plato's absences from Athens; and 'primum' merely balances 'post.' A visit to Megara would hardly seem to Cicero a case of foreign travel, like a voyage to Egypt or Sicily. Mr. Lutoslawski further argues (with reference to the passage already quoted from Diogenes) that 'it was not the "tyrants" whom Plato had to dread, but the democracy as revived after the expulsion of the Thirty.' This difficulty, which Stein had already raised, has in my judgment been disposed of by Zeller, whose explanation of this matter is altogether ignored by Mr. Lutoslawski. The words δέισαντας τὴν ὁμότητα τῶν τυράννων are clearly taken from Hermodorus, and neither Hermodorus nor any other contemporary of Plato used οἱ τυράννοι as a designation for the Thirty, who were known simply as οἱ τριάκοντα down to the time of Diodorus (Peter's *Chronological Tables*, E.T. p. 81n. 153. Aristotle *Rhet.* II. 24. 3 is no exception, for τριάκοντα τυράννους is quite different from οἱ τυράννοι. The word τυράννους in this passage of Aristotle is only a figure of speech; otherwise there is no point in Polycrates' *bon mot*). The words τῶν τυράννων are therefore metaphorical, and may well refer to the rhetoricians and demagogues to whom Socrates' condemnation was primarily due: compare *Gorg.* 466 C ἀποκριννύσιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τυράννοι, καὶ χρήματ' ἀφαιρῶνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς, and other passages cited by Zeller (l.c.).

Many writers on the chronology of Plato's dialogues have treated Plato's sojourn in Megara as an argument in support of an early date for the *Theaetetus* and other dialogues. Mr. Lutoslawski is convinced that the *Theaetetus* is late, and accordingly thinks it incumbent on him to prove that the 'Megara period in Plato's life' is a 'myth.' But Plato's visit to Megara need not be in any way connected with the composition of the *Theaetetus*; and Mr. Lutoslawski appears to me only to weaken his case by attacking so well-established a tradition.

The body of the work falls into two parts—one critical and preparatory, the second dogmatic and expository.

In the first, Mr. Lutoslawski attempts to establish the order and date of Plato's dialogues on the now well-known 'stylistic' method. From a review of forty-five publications on Plato's style the author establishes a list of five hundred peculiarities, more than two hundred of which were observed by Campbell. Mr. Lutoslawski does not claim to have made any observations himself, or to have verified those already made, but he attempts to improve the method of stylistic investigation and make it available for determining the chronology of an author's works. His procedure is as follows. Four kinds of peculiarities are distinguished, viz. (1) accidental e.g. 'words or idioms occurring only once in a dialogue' (2) repeated (3) important (4) very important. Each 'repeated' peculiarity is counted as equivalent to two, each 'important' to three, and each 'very important' to four 'accidental' peculiarities. By this means the relative importance of different peculiarities is estimated—a point which had received insufficient attention at the hands of previous investigators. A standard of comparison, however, is still wanted. This Mr. Lutoslawski finds (for the next latest five dialogues) in the *Laws*, which is admittedly Plato's latest work, and (for earlier works) 'in the group of the six latest dialogues, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*.' By measuring equal samples of text with one another according to these principles, Mr. Lutoslawski arrives at the following conclusions: (1) 'The latest works of Plato are the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*:' (2) 'the latest group is preceded by a middle group, consisting of *Republic* B. II.—X., *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus*, and *Parmenides*:' (3) 'the middle group is preceded by a first Platonic group, consisting of three dialogues, *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo*:'

(4) 'among the Socratic dialogues, the *Gorgias* appears with probability to be the latest.' As to the order of the dialogues within each group, Mr. Lutoslawski regards it as certain on the evidence of style 'that the *Phaedo* is later than the *Symposium* and *Cratylus*, the *Parmenides* later than *Theaetetus* and *Phaedrus*, the *Philebus* later than the *Sophist*.' He admits that 'the relative position of *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus*, of *Politicus*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus*, cannot be decided on the above observations alone.'

So much for Mr. Lutoslawski's conclusions. To those who have followed the course of recent Platonic criticism, they will not seem startling; but many even of those who are disposed to agree with the author's chronological theory, will be unable to accept the arguments by which he endeavours to justify it.

The fundamental principle of this new science of Stylometry, for which, 'if properly directed,' Mr. Lutoslawski claims infallibility, is thus enunciated: 'Of two works of the same author and of the same size, that is nearer in time to a third, which shares with it the greater number of stylistic peculiarities, provided that their different importance is taken into account and that the number of observed peculiarities is sufficient to determine the stylistic character of all the three works.' Is this an *infallible* canon? Surely a great literary genius can, within limits, vary his style at will. Is it certain that Plato never did? And will not such 'stylistic peculiarities' as vocabulary, for example, differ according to the subject matter of which an author is treating? Nor is it difficult to imagine a variety of accidental circumstances which may easily interfere with the operation of such a law. 'The peculiar method of research' says Mr. Lutoslawski, 'used in the present work is a result of the author's previous study of natural sciences and mathematics.' So likewise, as it seems to me, is the author's 'Law of Stylistic Affinity' itself. But it is by no means obvious that mathematical principles and methods are applicable either to style in general, or to Plato's style in particular. Plato himself, at all events, took the greatest pains to distinguish between mathematical and dialectical reasoning, nor would he, I think, have subscribed without demur to the fundamental canon of Stylometry.

Mr. Lutoslawski's principle would undoubtedly (as he himself allows) carry more weight if it were successfully tested 'on the

writings of a great modern writer like Goethe,' the date of whose works we know. Something of this sort has lately been attempted by Zeller, who investigates the punctuation of D. F. Strauss's writings, and finds that it has little or no bearing on their chronological order (*Archiv für Gesch. der Philos.* 1897, pp. 1—12). Or does Stylometry refuse to recognise a 'progress in punctuation' as well as in style? In point of fact, many of the stylometric observations on Plato's writings deal with idioms hardly, if at all, more important, than punctuation is in a modern writer.

If, however, Mr. Lutoslawski's fundamental principle be provisionally accepted, it is open to doubt whether he fully conforms to the conditions which he has prescribed.

The number of observed peculiarities which he takes into account is five hundred. Is this sufficient to 'determine the stylistic character' of twenty-two of Plato's most important dialogues? Perhaps it is enough to raise a strong presumption, provided that each of the peculiarities is significant. But the majority of English scholars will not, I think, see any special significance in many of Mr. Lutoslawski's 'peculiarities.' A large number consists of rare or semi-technical words, most of which are rendered necessary by the ideas which the author wishes to express. Evidence from vocabulary is, on the whole, perhaps the weakest evidence of date, unless we can show independently that the word in question came into vogue at such and such a time. I can see no significance, for example, in the following (among many other) 'peculiarities' of this kind: nos. 6—11 (pp. 78—79) nos. 28 (*πολλός Parm. 1 Polít. 1 Tim. 1*), 254—278 (adjectives in *-ειδής* and *-ώδης*) and many of those contained in nos. 458—500. The fact that a particular word occurs *once* (or twice) in each of two or three dialogues is surely too insignificant to count as evidence of affinity. Several of Mr. Lutoslawski's instances are of this kind *e.g.* nos. 459, 461 (*ιστίον Parm. 1 Legg. 1*) 464 (*μόνος Parm. 1 Tim. 1*) 466 (*παντοδαπός Parm. 1 Legg. 1*) 485 (*οὐκ εὐκολος = difficult Rep. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 2*). The same kind of reasoning would establish an affinity between dialogues which Mr. Lutoslawski separates widely from one another *e.g.* the *Cratylus* and the *Timaeus* and *Laws*: for *ζέως* (according to Ast) occurs only once in the *Cratylus* and once in the *Timaeus*, and *ἡρωικός*, only once in the *Cratylus* and once in the *Laws*. Mr. Lutoslawski argues that

the *Parmenides* is late because it contains some forty-two words which occur mostly in the later group of dialogues. (A majority of these words, however, are found also in the *Republic*, which he regards as earlier than the *Parmenides*.) But has he ever investigated how many words are common to the *Parmenides* with so-called earlier dialogues, and not found in the latest group at all, or rarely? Till this is done the evidence from vocabulary is altogether one-sided. We ought not to pronounce sentence before hearing both sides of the question. No sound conclusions can be drawn from evidence of this kind until the vocabulary of *all* the dialogues has been examined with the same care as Campbell bestowed upon that of his latest group.

Mr. Lutoslawski's observations on the usage of particles, formulae of replies, inflexions, prepositions etc., are (in my judgment) sometimes significant, but more often not. That *καθάπερ* gradually replaces *ὥσπερ* in a large group of dialogues (no. 199) is, I think, evidence of affinity; and so perhaps are the following viz. nos. 223 (*τοιγαροῦν* replacing *τοιγάρτοι*), 307 (the gradual recession of *μέντοι*), and doubtless others. But what shall we say of nos. 184—198 (various forms and usages of the dual, asserted by Mr. Lutoslawski to be 'peculiarities of later style,' but happily not so styled by Roeper, who observed them), 207—222 (where for example *ἐντέθεν ἤδη* is a mark of later style, because Jecht found it only in *Theaet. Polit. Tim. Legg.*—once in each of these dialogues, and *ἤδη* with the pluperfect is similarly so regarded, because it occurs five times altogether in *Polit. Tim. and Legg.* and only four times altogether in *Euthyphr. Prot. Crat. and Rep.*), and other instances, which any reader will at once detect? Can it be seriously argued that the following perfectly natural collocations or expressions are proofs of the later origin of dialogues in which they occur? *ἔτι δὲ τοίνυν* (286), *πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν* (288), *μὴ τοίνυν* (294), *ἦτοι—ἦ* (300), *τοίνυν* more than four times oftener than *μέντοι* (306—as if *τοίνυν* and *μέντοι* had the same meaning), *εἶπες, εἰρηκας, ὑπέλαβες* in answers (347—348), *πάν ζῶον* meaning 'every animal' (364)? These are only typical examples, and a careful study of Mr. Lutoslawski's lists—see for example 389 to 447—will furnish many more of the same kind.

It seemed necessary to give a few specimens of the sort of stylometric observations on which Mr. Lutoslawski attempts to determine the order of Plato's writings. I

gladly allow that such broader considerations as are embodied in nos. 12—20 are highly important. But many of the particular observations which have hitherto been made certainly tend to shew that Stylometry is still in its infancy. At present it savours too much of *μειαγωγία τῆς τραγωδίας*. If we may judge of Plato's sentiments by the characteristic remark *ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων περὶ σκέψης ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται* (*Rep.* 533 D), he would have sympathised with Aeschylus when Euripides proposed to apply stylometry to his tragedies.

- AI. καὶ γὰρ ταλάντῳ μουσικῇ σταθμῆσεται—
 EA. τί δε; μειαγωγήσουσι τὴν τραγωδίαν;
 AI. καὶ κάνας ἐξοίσουσι καὶ πήχεις ἐπὶ
 καὶ πλαίσια ξύμπηκτα—EA. πλινθείσουσι
 γάρ;
 AI. καὶ διαμέτρον καὶ σφῆναι· ὁ γὰρ Εὐριπί-
 δης
 κατ' ἔπος βασανίεν φησι τὰς τραγωδίας.
 EA. ἦ που βαρέως οἶμαι τὰδ' Αἰσχύλον φέρειν.

But it is time to pass to the second part of Mr. Lutoslawski's work. In this he attempts to give an account of Plato's logical theories and their development, in accordance with the chronological order of the dialogues, occasionally supplementing the evidence of stylometry by a comparison of the contents of Plato's works, and such other indications as are available. The whole of this discussion is full of interest, and abounds in acute and judicious criticism: I may refer in particular to pp. 327 note, and 393—394. The author's conclusion is well expressed in the following passage, which may serve also as an example of his clear and vigorous style: 'The system of latest Platonism is no longer a system of ideas, but a system of souls, of different and increasing perfection, from the lowest soul of a plant to the souls of stars which are termed gods. Above all rises the ruling soul of the universe, the world's maker and ordainer, a divine providence, which places each soul in the right place, and allots it its proper task in a series of successive lives extending over millions of years, probably without beginning and without end. Knowledge is acquired by each soul through its own exertions, increased by constant exercise and imparted by teaching. Ideas exist only in souls—they are eternal and unchangeable because their first model is created by God in his own thought. Thus ideas are the patterns of reality, and their existence in souls is named true Being.'

But they are not now suddenly perceived in ecstatic visions, as in the period of Middle Platonism. They must be created and elaborated by each soul in its own turn, and sought for by the logical exercises of classification, generalisation, and division' (p. 523).

Mr. Lutoslawski can hardly bring himself to admit the independence of the Ideas even in middle Platonism: 'the separate existence of Ideas outside any mind is a poetical absurdity which could subsist only for a very limited time in the imagination of a thinker like Plato, and which has never been expressly affirmed in clear words by him — because the poetical metaphors of the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium* cannot be taken as literal expressions of abstract truth' (p. 447). Such an interpretation is not new, and will always commend itself to a certain school of critics. To me it appears to carry allegory much too far. Speaking of the *Phaedrus*, for example, Mr. Lutoslawski declares 'that "beyond the limits of the stars exist pure ideas without shape or colour, intangible and invisible, not fixed in sensible particulars, but free and independent" means only: that pure concepts of reason are never fully realised in the things to which they apply, as for instance, absolute equality is never found identical with physical equality' (p. 340). If Plato meant *only* this, and nothing more, why did he take such pains, not merely to conceal his meaning, but to suggest a wholly different view?

In later Platonism, Mr. Lutoslawski emphatically declares, there is no trace of a 'separate existence of ideas.' 'We challenge our readers and critics to point out in works written after the *Parmenides* a single passage supporting the assumption that ideas exist outside every soul, or contradicting our view that ideas are perfect notions of a perfect Being, natural kinds of particular things in agreement with the thoughts and aims of their Creator' (p. 448). What of *Timaeus* 52 A τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα εἶδος ἔχον, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποιεῖόν, ὁράτον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναίσθητον, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν? Others may be more fortunate, but for my own part I cannot interpret Plato's language in this well-known sentence except as indicating that the ideas are transcendental and independent, the eternal self-existent *objects* of all thinking, but themselves *distinct* from thought (ὁ δὲ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν). In any case, if we are to

deny the self-existence of Ideas in later Platonism, it would be more reasonable to deny it throughout, as some writers have done. The allegorical method of interpretation may as well be applied consistently, if at all.

To Aristotle, as everybody knows, the separate existence of Ideas is a fundamental axiom of Platonism. On any other hypothesis his criticism of the Ideal Theory is altogether misdirected. Mr. Lutoslawski, accordingly, appears to throw Aristotle overboard (p. 525). But is it credible that Aristotle should have misunderstood his teacher so grossly, and that on a point of such vital importance? Let us allow, for the moment, that Mr. Lutoslawski's interpretation of the Platonic Idea correctly represents the element of permanent philosophical value in the Theory of Ideas. Are we justified in assuming that everything which Plato said was of permanent *philosophical* value? The poetical and mystical elements in Plato's nature were hardly less remarkable than his scientific enthusiasm and insight. The doctrine of transcendent self-existent Ideas is a creation of the poet Plato and has a permanent poetical, if not philosophical, value. It is the most powerful stimulus to the artistic imagination which Philosophy has ever supplied. Mr. Lutoslawski's characterisation of it as a 'poetical absurdity' appears to me a singularly narrow and one-sided piece of criticism, even from the philosophical point of view. The *χωρισμός* of the Ideas is 'poetical,' perhaps, but not 'absurd.'

The exposition of Plato's logic which fills the second division of the volume touches on many other questions which have long been debated among Platonic scholars. Mr. Lutoslawski's treatment is frequently incomplete and inconclusive, as could only be expected on so wide and thorny a subject. It is impossible, for example, to settle the disputed question of the connexion between the *Ecclesiastusae* and the *Republic* in a single page. Many of the author's combinations and conjectures are plausible and interesting: I may refer in particular to much of what he has to say on the *Phaedrus* (pp. 326—362). Others are improbable or trivial, as for example when Plato is himself declared to be the 'charmer' in *Phaedo* 78A! To my mind such a piece of self-advertisement in one of the noblest and most touching passages of all literature is utterly incredible in the most self-effacing of all ancient authors. Other examples will be found on p. 355 lines 2—10, and

p. 502 n. 269. Nor is the author's scholarship always sound. Thus on p. 293 the words *σαφέστερον τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον* (*Rep.* 511C) are paraphrased by 'this knowledge of ideas is even much clearer than the ordinary knowledge based on perception,' but what Plato says is that the superior *νοητόν* is clearer than the inferior *νοητόν* (ἡ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλούμενον κ.τ.λ.). The words *διὰ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν κ.τ.λ.* in *Rep.* 524C are thus explained: 'We owe it to the clearness of numbers that we distinguish things which to our senses appear confused' (p. 299). The meaning of course is 'but with a view to clearing up this chaos of sense' (τούτου sc. τοῦ συγκεχυμένου) etc., as Jowett and Campbell correctly explain. The most serious slip which I have observed is on p. 288, where the author remarks:—'This' (Kronh's view that the theory of Ideas does not occur in the early books of the *Republic*) 'would leave no room for—καλὰ ἦθη ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ ξυμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπον, as a κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυνάμει θεᾶσθαι (*Rep.* 402D). This power of superhuman vision here invoked is certainly the same which we know from the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*.' What Plato says is *ὅταν ἂν ξυμπίπτῃ ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις κ.τ.λ.* What he means is simply that the combination of a beautiful soul and a beautiful body is the

fairest sight for him 'who has eyes to see,' and *εἶδος* means of course 'personal appearance' and not the 'Idea,' whatever view we may take of τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη just before.

To sum up, Mr. Lutoslawski's main thesis as to the development of Plato's teaching may or may not be true, but in my opinion he has failed to demonstrate it. Alike in the stylometry of Part I., and in the dogmatometry—*sit venia verbo*, for such it is—of Part II., his arguments too often suggest the special pleader, and frequently ignore, or insufficiently refute, rival views. It is said that Chrysippus on one occasion impatiently exclaimed to his teacher Cleanthes 'Give me your *conclusions*, and I will find the proofs' (*Diog. Laert.* vii. 179). A perusal of Mr. Lutoslawski's work may recall this anecdote to the minds of some readers. But Mr. Lutoslawski has done a real service to Platonic scholarship by collecting and classifying the valuable stylometric observations hitherto made on the text of Plato, and enabling scholars to estimate their bearing on the chronology of the dialogues. His results may not be convincing: work of this sort seldom is. But he is always interesting and suggestive, and few men know the literature of their subject so well. Mr. Lutoslawski has amply earned the gratitude of all students of Plato, and his further studies on the author he loves so well are sure of a hearty welcome wherever Plato is read.

J. ADAM.

BURY'S *PHILEBUS*.

The Philebus of Plato. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices, by R. G. BURY, M.A. Demy 8vo. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

In this edition Mr. Bury has mentioned a vast number of perhaps ingenious but certainly unnecessary alterations of the text (this does not apply of course to all that are noticed) and a vast number of perhaps ingenious misinterpretations, collected from the writings of various commentators and essayists. It is true that he is judicious enough to reject nine out of ten of them, or nineteen out of twenty, or a greater proportion; but he would have done better service to the public, I think, if he had speeded, at least not retarded, all this mischievous or useless ingenuity on its course to oblivion.

The following criticisms may be offered:

(1) Note 8 on 13 A tells the student that a mistake which Protarchus made was a hasty generalization. The mistake of Protarchus consisted in assuming that generic similarity negatives specific dissimilarity. This is surely not hasty generalization.

(2) *περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.* 15 A.

The text seems really to require the emender's hand. Dr. Jackson in the last number of the *Journal of Philology* proposes to read: *ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ, ἡ. . .* But then it is not easy to say what meaning can be assigned to *πολλὴ σπουδὴ* to make it a good antithesis to *ἀμφισβήτησις*.

Mr. Bury proposes *ἡ πολλὴ σπουδῇ. . .* which is good as far as it goes, but *ἡ πολλῇ σπουδῇ* seems decidedly better. Controversy in real