II.—MENTAL ACTIVITY.

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I.

THE attempt is here made to discover the proximate source of what usually goes by the name of "mental activity". In setting about this task, one way only is open, and that is to examine the nature and import of the various components of our conscious content. For it is a self-evident and settled truth, that our knowledge consists solely of what we consciously realise.

Of all differences discoverable among the congeries of conscious states that make up our moment of mental realisation, the one that has struck observers as most salient is that obtaining between sensations and thoughts, or, more properly, between perceptions and conceptions. These two modes of mental realisation seem to bring with them the knowledge of two different worlds. One of these worlds apparently subsists outside of us, figured in open space before our senses. The other is more or less clearly apprehended within our own inner self, by force of what we call our reason or intelligence,

To thinkers of all times it has been a standing puzzle to make out the exact relation of these two closely interdependent and yet so widely disparate worlds. "*De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*," has ever been a leading theme with philosophers. And it will be admitted, that this ancient topic still in our time occupies a central position in theoretical philosophy. Whether considered, metaphysically, in relation to a real world revealed to the senses, and another most real world of all revealed to intelligence; or considered, psychologically, simply as relating to perceptual and conceptual experience;—it is the topic which above all others is at present engrossing the attention and exercising the ingenuity of those who are busying themselves with philosophical interpretation.

In an inquiry of the kind before us it is advisable to follow historical lines. The recent critical re-examination of their respective standpoints has led almost all schools alike to go "back to Kant". Spiritualists and Materialists, Transcendentalists and Associationists, Nativists and Empirical

Evolutionists, do not disdain to hitch in common their museful Pegasus to the lumbering chariot of the Critical Philosophy. No wonder. All leading views with their contradictories find themselves there discriminated and represented. Metaphysically, Kant believed in a supersensible world to which Reason in its completeness points. But he believed also in a world of Things-in-themselves giving material to the senses. Psychologically, he reinstated in German philosophy perceptual presentation as a mental occurrence differing in kind, and not only in degree, from conceptual knowledge. And while from the physical standpoint he looked upon cosmical development as an outcome of mechanical necessity, from the moral standpoint he taught that a power of free mental causation is flowing through man into nature from a supernatural source.

In Germany the going back to Kant meant principally a reaction against an undue preponderance attributed to intellectual agency in the make-up, not only of individual knowledge, but of nature at large. In England, on the contrary, it meant a reaction against an undue preponderance attributed to the efficiency of mere sensorial elements in the constitution of experience.

Kant himself, while apparently weighing in equal scales the respective merits of sense and intellect, really tipped with a prejudiced and overwhelming thrust the beam in favour of the latter.

At the dawn of the neo-Kantian era, the present writer took pains to point out and to expose the fundamental misconception which allured Kant to attempt once more the task of rationally unifying the then seemingly so disparate worlds of sense and intellect.¹

Like the Cartesians, Kant had formerly seen his way to no other than a mystical solution of the great standing problem. "Nempe nos omnia intueri in Deo:" this was, at that time, his, as well as Malebranche's, conclusion. But the alleged discovery of synthetical judgments *a priori*, presupposing a power in us capable of constructing geo-

¹ *Die Kant'sche Erkenntnislehre*, &c., 1871, pp. 92-93. "The fundamental mistake made by Kant was the arbitrary bisection of the cognitive faculty into a passive and an active half; with the attribution of the entire passive part to sensorial perception, and of the entire active play to abstract conception." "According to his view there is received through sense nothing but a given chaos of non-cognised impressions; and, consequently, it falls to this one active power in knowledge, namely, to intelligence, to bring into this casual, subjective and passive congeries of sensorial affections, unity, order, necessity, objectivity—in fact, everything that imparts to it animation and efficiency."

metrical knowledge without the aid of any sense-derived material,—this alleged discovery made the relation of intellect to sense appear to Kant in a new light. Space itself—the form in which such *a priori* geometrical constructions, as well as all *a posteriori* sensorial appearances, manifest themselves—must, then, be an original endowment of our own sensibility. And it must be the spontaneous activity of the intellect that shapes the geometrical figures within the empty and passive perceptual form, and that thereupon works up these specific spatial determinations into universally valid knowledge.

The intellect was, under this aspect, conceived as an agent whose productive activity is capable of impregnating with perceptual existences the changeless spatial form, determining it in those active ways that alone enter into knowledge. And this same intellect was, moreover, conceived as the synthetical power which works up this self-determined spatial material to complete cognition.

Such being the case, the sensorial material yielded during perceptual presentation by sense-affections can, in the entire absence of intellectual elaboration, also subsist in an undetermined and unsynthesised state. And if presentations in Space are, as such, wholly undetermined and unsynthesised, then, all the more, as presentations in Time, they, as well as all non-spatial presentations in this constantly lapsing medium, must remain chaotically incoherent, until brought under the grasp of knowledge-constructing intellect.

From this point of view, it inevitably follows, despite Kant's struggle against it, that all presentations of the "outer" and "inner sense," i.e., all material for knowledge, whether consisting in appearances given in Space, or of anything at all given in Time,—that all such experiential stuff is virtually non-existent as constituent element of actual conscious experience. For, according to Kant, before determinate extension is actually constructed by the spontaneous activity of the Intellect, and the successive moments of such construction gathered up and combined by this same activity, there is no cognition, and therefore no conscious experience of actual Space. Before "motion as an action of the subject" produces succession, and the lapsing moments of such succession are noticed by the Intellect and unified into simultaneous apperception as definite duration, there is no cognition and therefore no conscious experience of actual Time. Consequently, under these conditions, there can be without intellectual activity no cognition of any kind, no

conscious experience of any sensorial content of intellectually undetermined and unsynthesised Space and Time.

Assuming with Kant that the Intellect is really the sole constructing and unifying power underlying experience, it has unavoidably to be conceded that the world we actually know, with all its definite spatial configurations and timely determinations, must be out-and-out its own fabrication. Detached sensorial elements can under this supposition count for nothing in cognition. For, to form part of knowledge, every element must have already been subjected to the determining and combining influences of the Intellect. What the Intellect realises, by dint of such spontaneous activity of its own, is a unitary world in which every element falls into place as an integrant part, occupying thus by force of its definite relations to all other parts a necessary, pre-established position in the entire body of thought. And as no sensorial raw-material can possibly force itself as a new increment into this already completed totality of thought, it follows, that Intellect, universally conceived, must itself be the creator and sustainer of the world we consciously realise. Our individual thought, then, merely *re-cognises* the pre-formed, self-created content of universal Thought.

This, indeed, is the consistent outcome of the Kantian doctrine of an Intelligence endowed with constructive efficiency and synthetical powers. And Kant's followers soon found courage to adopt as their philosophical creed the extreme logical consequences of this modern reversion to principles necessarily leading to something like Alexandrian Platonism. In their view, not only the outside world affecting the senses, but the sensorial affections themselves, dwindled away into non-existence. Perception was again degraded to a rank wholly subordinate to conception. And Being came once more to be looked upon as entirely identical with adequate conceptual Thought.

But whatever exegetical ingenuity idealistic followers of Kant may employ to draw the master to their side, it must be patent to unbiassed students, that he, at all events, never doubted that sense-material falls into Space and Time from some source external to our Being and its Intellect. His laborious examination led him unequivocally to the final conclusion, that the Intellect is capable of exercising its constructive and synthetical powers only on *sense-given* material; the experienced order and connexion in nature being, however, entirely the product of those intellectual powers. Still he never lost sight of his other, extra-mental, world, the one toward which intellectual conception in its completeness

was pointing. Amid all the iconoclastic thoroughness of his theoretical speculations, it remained his consoling faith, that our innermost Self stands rooted in a central, supernatural sphere, drawing therefrom its highest efficiencies. To his matured thought, it was this supernatural Self of ours that has power, not only morally to modify the work of mechanical necessity, but also to use as its fixed and necessary functions the categories, constituting with their aid valid knowledge by systematising all combinations yielded by them within its synthetical unity of apperception.

However much our present Trancendentalists may profess to lean on Kant, or, on the other hand, may strive to graft their exalted theories on the humble growth of Locke's ideas, the good of Kant's labour, as well as that of English Experimentalism, is all but lost to philosophy when Being is conceived as identical with Thought. This perplexing question of the relation of Thought to Being is the essential point on which in its various phases the contention of modern philosophy is turning. Is the power that binds into interdependence and unity the existences of the sensible world the same power which gathers up into a logical whole all fractions of our individual experience? Does our thought in its order and combinations follow a given order and given combinations of sensible things; or is it, perchance, our thought, as such, that coerces into systematic order the sensible manifold of what we call nature; or, again, are the order of succession and the casual combinations of natural existences transmuted into a logical totality of experience, by becoming organically incorporated into the matrix of our unitary consciousness? In fine, is thought-activity the source whence the significant order of nature emanates; or is it from the significant order of nature unified in our world-responsive organisation that its thought-manifestation is born? Surely it cannot be reasonably maintained that this great question of Thought and Being has yet been satisfactorily settled one way or the other.

Through Leibnizo-Wolffian influences Kant had in early days been led to look upon formal logic, with its principle of identity and contradiction, as the only instrument of knowledge. The study of Hume, however, convinced him that logical connexion and natural connexion are two entirely different modes of dependence. To his great surprise he had to acknowledge that so-called causation, or the intimate connexion obtaining among experiential facts as we become aware of them, is not of logical but of empirical origin. In actual experience one event does not follow another according

to logical principles. It is experience alone that can teach what occurrence in nature will issue from definite antecedents.

Kant, though not fully understanding Hume's purely sensorial Experientialism, was quick to perceive, that, if all knowledge is thus experientially put together by simply remembering bit by bit the sensibly impressed order of natural connexion, without our being in possession of general principles by force of which we may legitimately constitute knowledge over-reaching the experiential data,—that then all metaphysical constructions indulged in by former philosophers had been mere air-built edifices, and that there can be no knowledge whatever transcending the facts and combinations of actual sensorial experience.

It was to escape this tremendous implication, carrying with it the overthrow of everything supernatural, that, after the alleged discovery of *a priori* synthetical propositions, Kant set himself strenuously to work to gauge the compass and general reach of the spontaneous mental power, which must necessarily be operative in such intellectually constructed knowledge. When his task was accomplished, his theoretical speculation had indeed rid itself of the influence of super-sensible entities. But though on the one side it fearlessly demolished every kind of spiritualistic Ontology, on the other side it brought him into *irreconcilable* opposition to the sensorial Experientialism of English thinkers.

It was the view of these latter, that the synthesis obtaining among sensorial particulars is due to a gradual consolidation, established through reiterated experience of their order when received as actual sensorial impressions. Kant's view, on the contrary, was, that the given order of sensorial impressions has nothing whatever to do with their synthesis; that the sensorial material remains wholly unsynthetised until gathered up and combined by the specific *a priori* powers of the Intellect. With the English thinkers the significant order and coherence of mental occurrences originate experientially on the sensorial side. With Kant it is established through pre-established modes of intellectual activity.

In their explanation of synthetised experience both views seemingly refrain from calling in the help of agencies lying outside the mental content. Hume, who had pushed sensorial Experientialism as far as it would go, pretended not to believe in anything awakening sensorial impressions from outside the mind. And Kant persuaded himself that his synthetical powers were of "transcendental" and not of "transcendent" origin and nature; i.e., that they were natural mental functions existing solely as modes of combi-

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nation found actually operative in the synthesis of sensorial data.

These diametrically opposed attempts to construct a *theory of knowledge* by merely taking notice of what is actually found in consciousness, without reference to anything existing beyond it, could succeed only by means of fictitious assumptions and the neglect of essential implications. Knowledge necessarily implies something different from itself, of which it is the knowledge. Whether a result of the intimate agglutination of sensorial particulars or a product of the synthetical activity of the Intellect, the synthetised mental content would, as such, be wholly meaningless if it did not refer to something beyond itself.

Consequently, we find that Hume's experientially established order of mental occurrences receives its true significance as knowledge only in reference to the *given order of actual impressions*. These impressions, though defined by Hume as "merely the perceptions themselves," clearly imply something which impresses them, and also something which receives them. A perception cannot possibly originate its own self; and this, moreover, out of nothing. Nor can it exist self-sustained in its own medium. But, besides, when I see a flame, and the idea of heat is called up in consequence, the really important fact here is, not that I have the *idea* of heat, but that I shall receive the actual *impression* of heat as soon as I get sufficiently near the flame. Now it is evident that the directly experienced connexion between actual impressions is not of *mental* consistency. The actual impression or perception of a flame does not call up the actual impression or sensation of heat, but only its remembered idea. The established mental connexion between the perception of a flame and the *idea* of heat is, however, avowedly moulded on the connexion obtaining between the actual impression or perception of the flame and the actual *impression or sensation* of heat, which prototypal connexion is not of mental origin and consistency. Consequently, the mental order, as knowledge, refers to a pre-established, extra-mental order.

The primary assumption of nothing but actual and remembered sensorial impressions is the reason for Hume's blinking of this realistic implication necessarily inherent in his theory of knowledge. Later Associationists, with less logical consistency, have very generally referred to an extra-mental order as prototype of the intra-mental order; while at the same time laying most stress—as chiefly conducive to systematic thought-realisation—on the order in which the

remembered ideas of impressions appear in the conscious content.

Kant, strange to say, though generally pre-eminently credited with the formulation of a profound theory of knowledge, has really completely failed in this most arduous endeavour of his. For it is obvious that his intellectually constructed mental objects have no reference whatever to anything beyond themselves. They certainly do not refer, as knowledge, to the sensorial raw-material, which is declared to contain nothing at all cognisable in itself. Much less can they refer to the thus utterly estranged world of Things-in-themselves, from which wholly unknowable sphere Kant believed sensibility to be somehow impregnated with a chaotic material having nothing objective in its own make-up.

But the real oversight that led Kant to believe he was explaining knowledge, without cognitive reference to anything beyond what is found in actual consciousness, lay in his theoretical neglect of the transcendent sphere, whence he was in truth all the time deriving his synthetical power. In his system it is, and must be, a prepotent agent that from some dwelling-place beyond consciousness sets going the synthetical functions whereby "nature is made" as object of knowledge. Kant gives to this prepotent, supernatural agent the name of "Intelligible Ego". And with him it is, in verity, this intelligible Ego, as bearer of the all-efficient Intelligence and its synthetical unity of apperception, that fashions by force of its own spontaneous activity the system of knowledge going by the name of nature. It is clear, then, that the active, order-establishing power in nature, whose modes of activity are recognised by us, inhered with Kant, as with Hume, not in the conscious content itself, but somewhere in extra-conscious latency. Only it was conceived by the former as intellect-inspiring, by the latter as sense-affecting.

No wonder that, by consistently following Kant's way of interpreting the conscious content, Fichte found himself soon landed in pure Solipsism. Later, however, the magnanimous concession, that other thinking beings cannot well be mere phantoms of one's own making, and that all these thinking individuals are evidently realising in their consciousness one and the same world—these and other considerations led at last to Objective Idealism.

This ultimate view, to which Transcendentalism has very generally arrived, conceives the totality of existence subsisting in all eternity as the thought of a universal Intelligence, which reality-constituting Thought comes to be more and

more completely *re*-cognised by human individuals, by means of a revelation conveyed through a progressive historical evolution. Here the object of knowledge, as with Hume and Kant, is likewise something existing beyond the content of individual consciousness—namely, the activity of universal Intelligence, which alone is believed to constitute veritable Reality or Being.

II.

The conscious content, which exhibits in immediate presence all the experience we awaredly realise, refers, as we have seen, incontestably to some kind of reality beyond itself. The question is: Where is the dwelling-place of this reality, and what is its nature?

By naturalistic thinkers and the universal intuition of mankind, the reality known through consciousness is believed to subsist independently of this its mental realisation, becoming more and more fully revealed to us by means of specific sensorial affections and their derivatives. Transcendentalists, on the contrary, believe the implied reality to subsist as the thought-creation of a universal Intelligence, revealed to our human mind through conceptual recognition.

It has to be conceded that the consistent sensorial view fails to take proper account of such constituents of the conscious content as transcend in meaning and worth all that can possibly be of sensorial origin. For, assuredly, our complex emotions, thoughts and volitions, at least, are of strikingly super-sensible significance. The consistent intellectual view, on the other hand, seeks to suppress in a most arbitrary manner the manifest import of perceptual consciousness.

But leaving these deficiencies of the two views for the present out of sight, whence does the conscious content itself receive its being and activity? What is it that originates and sets going the diversified display experienced by us as conscious revelation?

Admitting the fictitiousness of the "psychological idea," or, in other words, the non-existence of the subject of empirical psychology commonly called "soul," Kant, nevertheless, assumes in each of us (as already stated) an actuating agent of the conscious display, belonging to the intelligible or supernatural order. With him the perceptual appearances, as such, are utterly passive, and their various modes of combination, the categories, are, as such, in no way self-acting. It is not the category of causation, for instance, that has of itself power to seize hold of the perceptual particulars in order

to weld them together in necessary dependence. In the Kantian system it is the intelligible Ego, with its spontaneous intellectual activity, which uses the categories as its instruments to fashion the conscious world we know. With the thorough-going post-Kantian Transcendentalists all actuating power inheres in a universal Intelligence. And we ourselves, as well as our entire conscious revelation, are only moments of reflex-thought in the eternal Mind.

But Hume, who tried to get rid of all supernatural and extra-conscious assumptions, by accounting for the conscious display through experiential agglutinations between the sensorial particulars and their derivations,—where does he place the actuating power amid the busy shifting and changing experienced within his self-conscious panorama? He tells us plainly that the idea of power, force, energy or efficacy is a mere fiction; that neither external nor internal impressions have anything of the kind in them. “We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power” (*Treatise*, iii., § 14). Yet when he comes deliberately to give a definition of mind, he finds it indispensable to assume power or efficacy somewhere. He says: “The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other” (*Ib.*, iv., § 6).

Here we find it unequivocally maintained that the “different perceptions” which form the conscious display, *themselves* “produce, destroy, influence and modify each other”. According to Hume, it is, and indeed must be, in the conscious particulars themselves that the power or efficacy resides, which brings them into being and gives them compelling influence over the existence and constitution of one another. We have thus self-produced existences of an obviously ephemeral character, which—themselves vanishing into nothingness—draw out of this same nothingness other previously non-existent existences, with which they are nevertheless found to be intimately pre-connected by the mighty bond of causation.

Such, indeed, is the nonsensical and nihilistic collapse that must overtake this and all other attempts to lodge the producing and actuating power in anything forming part of the conscious content.

It belongs—as I hope conclusively to show—to the essence of all constituents of the conscious content to be out-and-out evanescent and forceless. Our conscious content or

mental presence emanates from moment to moment as a new-creation from unconscious depths of being, and its successive moments with their revealing flash vanish, as such, wholly out of existence. It is of the utmost importance clearly to realise the merely indicatory significance and speedy evanescence of conscious states. Where, indeed, can there be found any permanency, self-activity or efficiency in anything of conscious consistence? And though everything we are cognisant of is revealed to us as forming part of our conscious content, yet it is a philosophical superstition to believe that there can be a self-rounded, self-significant science of purely psychical occurrences; for it is certain that psychical occurrences, as such and among themselves, have neither meaning nor power.

Philosophers who think they are constructing a science of self-sustained and self-moved psychical existences forget that all the while they are supplying from the ample resources of their own completed human individuality whatever is needed to bring the purely psychical existences into being and interaction. When I say, 'The perception of a flame brings up the idea of heat,' I really mean that in me and others this connexion has already been established, and is subsisting at all times within us in extra-conscious¹ latency. The obtaining nexus is, consequently, of extra-conscious and not of conscious consistency. It is not the perception of the flame, as a conscious fact, which produces or forces into conscious existence the idea of heat. But the same compelling influences which awaken in me the perception of a flame awaken also by dint of pre-established, extra-conscious connexion its accompanying idea of heat. It is in the pre-established constitution of the realising subject that the efficiency inheres, not in the flame as a particular percept. These realistic implications necessarily attach to the recognition of our individuated being as the enduring subject of the conscious play. And they cannot be legitimately neglected in the interpretation of our conscious content. Though there can be a psychology without a *ψυχή*, there can never be one without the feeling and thinking *άνθρωπος*.

Psychology, as a science of self-originated and self-acting conscious existences, rests on eminently fictitious assump-

¹The preposition 'extra' and its equivalents are used in this discussion in the sense of *not within* the conscious content and by no means in the sense *outside of* it, spatially conceived. Of course, the terms 'inside' and 'outside' spatially conceived apply only to perceptual phenomena.

tions, and can lead only to nihilistic results. Such a science, constructed without reference to an abiding, extra-conscious source of actuation and emanation, and without investigation of the specific states of this pre-organised matrix—such a merely introspective science, if at all consistent, will ever hang in vacancy, vaguely describing an illusive, meaningless and mostly incoherent play of evanescent phenomena. Our conscious content, brought into existence by extra-conscious powers and processes, and referring as knowledge to extra-conscious existences and activities, how can its examination yield valuable instruction when these *all-important* realistic implications are left out of account?

But, in actual interpretation, realistic implications are never left wholly out of account even by those who believe they have evaded the difficulty of an underlying reality by endowing particular constituents of the conscious content with whatever efficacy they desire. All such efforts are, however, brought to naught by the simple fact, that nothing of conscious consistency is the bearer of anything like force or power.

The constituents of our conscious content can in no way be legitimately compared to the interdependent and interacting parts of a mechanical whole; nor the order of their conscious appearance to a mechanical process. Surely, perceptual coexistences, such as colour and extension, or the shape and colour of a violet and its odour, are nowise mechanically interdependent and interacting. Nor do the many adjacent forms which coexist in a complex perception, hang together by any kind of mechanical bond. Much less can the fixed order of successive appearances within the conscious content be attributed to anything in the remotest degree resembling the successive phases of a mechanical process. The sight of a flame does not bring up from its extra-conscious hiding-place the associated idea of heat through anything like mechanical contiguity and friction.

Attempts to interpret the conscious content and its changes, by applying in some way or other 'statical' and 'dynamical' principles to its psychical facts and occurrences, must ever remain a futile undertaking, however consummate the ingenuity bestowed upon it. The constituents of the conscious content are, as such, immaterial and forceless. They are evidently devoid of what is mechanically called 'mass,' and are therefore wholly unresisting. And as nothing without resistance can possibly be in possession of force and momentum, nothing within

the conscious content can be capable of imparting or of receiving energy.

Believers in psychical energy, whether as Transcendentalists they place it in the intellect, or as Associationists and Herbartians they invest with it sensorial particulars, or as Spencerians seek to apply the principle of the persistence of force and its convertibility to psychical phenomena—one and all they have no legitimate ground to stand upon. It is only in the world of inferred extra-conscious powers that force can possibly dwell, and that energy can be received and imparted.

This emphatic denial of anything like efficacious power appertaining to mental existences or states, as such, rather boldly challenges common conviction. But surely it is only in the vaguest metaphorical sense that such terms as force, energy and their like can be applied to the ghostly flittings and inwardly occluded play of feelings that make up our conscious content.

This view of the forceless nature of the conscious content has recently been corroborated in a very striking though unconscious manner by the mathematical physicists. Their object of research, supposed to be of physical consistency, is really composed of nothing but the time- and space-relations of compelled percepts and their movements. For these inquirers purposely refrain from referring to the perception-compelling influences, or to anything beyond the complex perception as such. In consequence of this limitation of physical science to the investigation of the time- and space-relations of mere perceptual appearances, these mathematical physicists can discover in this purely ideal play of conscious phenomena neither resisting material, nor force, nor energy; and they have thus been led to discard as superfluous all such realistic and inferential conceptions, reducing everything to mere phenomena of interdependent motions.

How strange this immaterial consummation of the science of material objects! What eloquent and instructive irony speaks out of this assiduous chasing of physical reality in the psychical medium, ending with the grasp of nothing but moving phantoms—an unsubstantial play, as forceless and evanescent as the spectral visions of a dream! Fortunately, the existents whose characteristics and activities are emblematically and unsubstantially shadowed by the compelled percepts happen to be themselves endowed with sufficient permanency and efficacy to allow us to conclude that the world does after all not entirely consist of “such stuff as dreams are made off”.

Of course, it is easy to get over the fundamental difficulty of psychology by simply assuming—as most psychologists actually do—an efficient subject capable of seizing hold of, and of manipulating more or less at will, the psychical events that make up his conscious content. But, then, who and of what nature is this self-acting Subject? And how does it set about understanding the meaning and controlling the direction of the conscious play experienced as taking place within its own being?

To identify this acting Subject with anything psychical is to identify it with something forming part of the conscious content; for this is the only actual experience we have of anything psychical. And when we call this Subject "Reason," "Intelligence" or "Will," we simply elevate into fictitious existence, and arbitrarily endow with the desiderated powers, a generalised conception of one or the other class of conscious occurrences.

Permanency and efficiency are what we are in need of. But the conscious occurrences are as such transient and forceless. It is clear, then, that it is not in them we can find the requisite qualities wherewith to equip our assumed Subject. When we maintain, that "Reason" is the efficient power; or that "the Intellect" discriminates, assimilates and retains conscious facts, or perceives them, or that "Will" is the actuating force within the conscious content and otherwise, we certainly hypostatise as self-acting and efficient agents, under the name of known conscious occurrences, something of which no experience whatever is given as making up the conscious content.

To unprejudiced thinkers it must, indeed, seem at once obvious, that the Subject that has and controls the conscious content cannot possibly itself form part of this content, but must possess a nature altogether transcending it.

Now the real question is: Do we naturally, and can we as philosophers legitimately, infer as endowed with permanency and efficient power something not forming part of our conscious content? On the answer to this question depends essentially the character which our world-conception will assume.

I am confident that *positive proof* of the existence of a world of efficient powers beyond our conscious content—a world to which our own efficient Subject belongs—can be readily given to all who admit the existence of other beings like themselves. For it is incontestable, and in keeping with the forceless character of psychical occurrences, that we become conscious of the existence of other beings,

not in the least through awareness of anything forming part of their conscious content. When we perceive another human being, this perception does not contain any of his conscious states. His sensations, perceptions, emotions, thoughts and volitions are not given, as such, in the coloured and moving figure which constitutes our visual percept of him ; nor are they contained, as such, in the air-vibrations which his articulate speech sets in motion, and which mechanically strike our ear. It is evident that no constituent of his conscious content has, as such, any power whatever to affect our senses. Consequently, that part of his being which has power to affect our senses must possess a nature differing altogether from anything forming part of his conscious content. It follows, irrefragably, that the vivid and characteristic percepts which signalise in our conscious content the presence and peculiarities of another being are awakened in us, not by what we call his 'mind,' but by what we call his 'body,' or whatever name we may give to his non-psychical, extra-conscious nature.

It is important to take notice of a necessary and obvious correlative of this consideration, namely, that this bodily part of a human being's nature which has power to affect the senses of observers can never, as such, form part of this being's own conscious content. The well-known congeries of sensations and perceptions which figure as our own body in our conscious content is certainly not the existent that has power to affect the senses of an observer, but only our own perceptual realisation of such existent ; which psychical realisation is of the same merely representative order as the observer's perception of it. Now, unmistakably, it is the non-psychical, sense-affecting and, therefore, power-endowed part of a being's nature which constitutes his veritable, permanent Self. And it is within this extra-conscious Self that are evolved the transient though highly significant occurrences which make up his conscious content.

Surely these are legitimate inferences from the universal and sane conviction, that there exist other beings like ourselves. And it need hardly be mentioned that these well-grounded inferences are of paramount importance, not only to philosophy at large, but also to psychology. As the key to the significance, order and relation of the manifold, ever-changing constituents of the conscious content is found solely in their realistic implications, it is clear that no valid science of psychical phenomena can possibly dispense with a constant reference to these implications.

Physical science, even in its most abstruse mathematical

flights, confines itself to the investigation of the time- and space-relations of *sense-compelled* percepts, in which class of psychical facts and occurrences the realistic implications are of the most direct and obvious kind. By fancying for a moment a physical investigation of last night's dream-vision, one may realise how all-important the realistic implication is to science.

Psychology, which has to deal not only with sense-compelled percepts but with all manner of psychical facts and occurrences, has no easy task to discover the true realistic import of all the crowding throng of often only remotely representative psychical marks that make up the conscious realisation of nature in its widest sense. But neither these marks themselves, sensorial, perceptual, emotional, conceptual or volitional, nor their mutual relations, can possibly be understood without reference to what they are marks of. The magic web of Space- and Time-conquering ideas, the delicate gradation and profound thrill of emotions, the prescient reach of volitions,—what meaning can there be found in it all, without piercing beyond the mere psychical manifestation to what in extra-conscious reality it implies?

The simple consideration, that psychical states and occurrences have, as such, no power to make themselves directly known to other beings, contains also a sufficient refutation of such Idealism as believes us capable of being directly affected by the thought of a universal Intelligence. For, as no kind of *experienced* thought inherent in another being has power to affect us directly, and as *inferred* thought of any kind can be imagined only in analogy to experienced thought, therefore no kind of inferred thought can have, as such, power to affect us. This argument seems plain enough, and should be candidly pondered. Its frank admission or valid overthrow would greatly conduce to unify our divers world-conceptions.

But how does the legitimately inferred Subject come to understand the meaning of its conscious content, and to gain so large a control over it? Perhaps the most difficult task in philosophy is to find a sufficient explanation of these world-apprehending and self-acting faculties of the Subject. It has been shown that nothing experienced within the conscious content can at all account for them. Is it then, perchance, possible to derive some partial clue to this great enigma from that part of the Subject's being which has power to affect the senses of observers, and compel in them the vivid and minutely characteristic percepts that constitute our knowledge of its extra-conscious nature?

It is an undeniable fact that we infer activity wherever we perceive motion of any kind, and we infer it only when motion is perceived, or legitimately conjectured as present. When I see the parts of a machine change their relative positions, I conclude that the machine is acting. When I see a person move in certain ways, I say he is acting in this or that manner, or is performing this or that action. Now it is quite obvious that I, who in these cases am realising as my own perception the moving objects, am not myself the agent who performs the actions perceived by me. My percepts, together with their motions, are only characteristic signals aroused in me by the signalised, sense-stimulating existents and their specific activities. *Motion is, therefore, only our conscious sign for activities that take place in extra-conscious existents, or emanate from extra-conscious agents.*

The motions of, or within our, *compelled* percepts are, then, as conscious facts, not themselves activities, but merely signs of extra-conscious activities. And these perceptual signs of activities that are taking place in other beings derive *their own existence* from definite extra-conscious activities that are taking place in the subject in which they themselves occur. This has become a scientifically established truth by the general admission that, whenever we are conscious of a compelled percept and its motions, or, indeed, of any other psychical occurrence, an outside observer would, under favourable conditions, be able to become aware (as his own percept) of definite motions in that part of our being which he perceives as our brain. And these perceptual motions in the conscious content of the observer are undoubtedly signs of definite activities taking place in the extra-conscious or non-psychical being of the observed subject. For it is, as has been shown, this extra-conscious being which alone has power to affect the sensibility of an observer, and compel in him the percepts he is conscious of.

We may then fairly maintain that, whenever we are conscious and whenever this our conscious content changes or moves, there are corresponding activities astir in our extra-conscious being, which activities manifest themselves to observers as definite brain-motions with their further organic outcomes.

The activity which arouses from outside our compelled percepts and their motions belongs to the extra-conscious nature of the arousing powers. The activity which within ourselves gives being and movement to our conscious content belongs to our own extra-conscious nature. Activity, therefore, whether taking place in our own being or outside of it,

is always merely inferred, and never directly experienced as constituent of our conscious content. But, though a mere inference, it receives its justification and validity from the evident fact that our immediate awareness of other beings and their doings consists in compelled percepts and their motions, which conscious revelation is certainly aroused in us by *extra-conscious* powers. And—once more be it stated—‘extra-conscious’ or ‘non-psychical’ must these percept-arousing powers be called, because nothing of conscious or psychical consistency in other beings has power to arouse percepts in us.

We may then use as legitimately available factors in our explanation of so-called mental activity, first, our own conscious content; secondly, the compelled percepts and their motions aroused in an observer by our extra-conscious being and its activities; thirdly, this our extra-conscious being and its activities as thus positively and distinctly signalised through the compelled percepts and their motions within the conscious content of the observer.

As mental activity, like all other modes of activity, can be only of extra-conscious origin and nature, we cannot expect to gain information regarding it by simply examining, without reference to extra-conscious implications, that part of our being which constitutes our conscious content. Our conscious content, as such, has neither intrinsic power over its own constituents, nor extrinsic power to arouse signalising percepts in observers. It is, as has abundantly been shown, utterly forceless, and, therefore, incapable of initiating or performing any kind of action. Information regarding the origin and nature of mental activity, if at all attainable, has to be gathered from compelled percepts, which alone reveal the efficient characteristics of the acting Subject.

However meagre such perceptual information regarding our extra-conscious and efficient nature may be—consisting, as it does, of nothing but sensorial signs, that in the highest reach of perceptual realisation amount to mere coloured forms and their motions—still, various essential points concerning the nature of the Subject and its mental activity may be made out upon the evidence of these emblematic signs. First of all, as being of chief importance, the substantiality of the acting Subject can be scientifically explained. It can be shown, namely, how under constantly enforced change the acting Subject nevertheless succeeds in retaining its essential identity. This cardinal point, when merely psychologically—and, therefore, wrongly—inter-

preted, constitutes the stronghold of Idealistic Transcendentalism. I have discussed it in my article on "The Substantiality of Life" (MIND vi. 321). Next in importance is the spontaneity of the essential activities of the Subject, or its power of meeting or opposing outside inducements or encroachments with its own indwelling specific energies; and this also can be satisfactorily demonstrated from observed motor signs. I have, on various occasions, shown how this takes place for protoplasmic individuals in general.

But the question that, in connexion with our present inquiry into the source and nature of mental activity, has now chiefly to occupy us, is: whether the specific perceptual motions, which may be aroused in an observer by our extra-conscious Subject during its moments of conscious awareness, are capable of revealing anything instructive concerning the activity here at play.

From what has, I hope, been clearly and decisively shown, it has become evident that, when I will to move my arm, it is not anything found in my conscious content which performs the action. The action is performed by my extra-conscious being or Subject. An outside observer of this action perceives, as his own sensorial affection, a moving arm. And this, his percept, with its motion, is a mere sign of the action performed by me, the perceived Subject. The perceptual arm, moving within the conscious content of the observer, can certainly not be the real arm of the Subject who performs the action. If there were a thousand observers, each would realise, as his own percept, a moving arm. The extra-conscious existence and activity of the one Subject would be accurately signalised within the conscious content of a thousand other beings. Now, it is evident that I myself, the Subject, as a sense-stimulated observer, am in exactly the same position as any other outside observer. When I perceive my arm moving, this perceptual revelation is merely the conscious sign of an actual performance emanating from my extra-conscious being. When I say, 'I am moving my arm,' the true meaning of such an assertion is, that my extra-conscious Subject is actuating a certain part of my being, which actuated part is consciously signalised to myself and others as a moving arm. What in the world could a perceptual arm moving within my conscious content signify to me, if it meant nothing substantial and efficacious beyond itself, if it were merely without extra-conscious significance the forceless, evanescent thing it actually is in a dream? Taken as a mere consti-

tuent of the conscious content, in connexion with nothing but other constituents, the perceptual motion of a perceptual arm would be uncaused, unconditioned and meaningless. And as with this perceptual arm, so with every other psychical phenomenon. Nothing whatever of conscious consistency has, as such, meaning in itself and for itself; nor can it ever be a cause or condition of any occurrence. It has meaning only in reference to extra-conscious existents, and is always caused by extra-conscious activities.

The belief that something within us of a conscious or psychical nature moves our limbs is one of those fundamental illusions of the intuitive mode of interpretation which lead to an entirely erroneous conception of the nature of our being. The ideas and feelings that in our conscious content stand for the volitional forecast and fiat, are merely the immediate central and inner awareness of the same organic process, whose peripheral outcomes are perceived as the movement of limbs by means of the eminently circuituous way of sense-stimulation and consequent awakening of specific percepts in observers. Surely our own inwardly realised ideal forecast and volitional fiat cannot possibly produce the movement of those perceptual limbs now present in the conscious content of any observer who chooses to witness the performance. Nor is it likely that ephemeral psychical phenomena, arising out of ideal latency, can have power to set going those definite molecular brain-motions of whose necessarily pre-organised matrix they are utterly unconscious. Evidently the same organic process within my extra-conscious being, whose central outcome is for myself an inner awareness of certain voluntary ideas and feelings, is also perceivable in the conscious content of an observer—first at its central starting-point as molecular motion of brain-particles, and then in its peripheral outcomes as the mass-motion of limbs.

The intimate connexion existing between emotions and thoughts and their peripheral expressions, a connexion so delicate and definite that, quite apart from its facial phenomena, so-called mind-readers are able to make out definite thoughts by merely noticing their unconscious expression through the muscles of the hand,—this one fact alone indicates with sufficient clearness that both phenomena—the inner awareness of the observed subject and the perceived muscular movements—are outcomes of one and the same organic process. No less indicative of the same kind of dependence is the connexion between thought and speech, a connexion so close that these two totally disparate

phenomena, the inner awareness and outer expression, are rightly looked upon as two different aspects of one and the same fact of nature. The one underlying fact is, however, not anything forming part of the conscious content of the thinking subject, nor is it the articulate expression as an observed perception, but the gradually established and definitely organised extra-conscious nexus, whose actuation gives rise to both.

Various psychological subterfuges are resorted to in order to obtain a permanent and efficient *psychical* matrix of conscious existences. It is, for instance, quietly assumed that the matrix of conscious emanation is composed of all possible psychical existences, having a nature identical with the constituents of actual consciousness. And these latent psychical existences are declared to be only partially or inadequately realised in each moment of actual consciousness; or they are considered too weak to rise above the threshold of such actual consciousness without being reinforced, either by actual stimulation or by the spontaneous activity of the subject. Surely it must be looked upon as a desperate stretch of introspective interpretation to suppose that something non-existent as constituent of the conscious content can be of the same nature as something whose existence and essence consists in forming part of the conscious content.

But if, on the one hand, it must be deemed a momentous mistake to maintain that something of the nature of the constituents of our conscious content is actuating what we call our body, it must, on the other hand, be deemed just as momentous a mistake to maintain, with some of our most prominent physiologists, that what we call our body is actuated by molecular motions starting in the brain and propagating themselves through the nerves to the muscles. These molecular motions are certainly out-and-out only perceptual signs in the observer, and they can, therefore, nowise be producers of the actions performed by the perceived subject.

Here it is relevant to remark that not all molecular brain-motions, which an observer might perceive as signs of those extra-conscious activities of the observed Subject that are accompanied by psychical awareness, signify sensorial or perceptual phenomena having reference to what we call physical nature. The most complex of those perceptual signs would, on the contrary, signalise such states of activity in the extra-conscious nature of the observed Subject as correspond to what is more exclusively called mental or spiritual life, which life is principally evinced by social emotions and their

expressions. The enormous incongruity obtaining, especially in this latter case, between the mere stir of material particles and the exalted feeling accompanying it, has led most thinkers to discard the idea of these two so disparate occurrences being connected by any necessary and indissoluble bond. Yet we have ample reason to conjecture, that to the meagre perceptual signs of the observer there correspond as their awakening cause in the observed Subject a marvellously high-pitched activity of a marvellously high-wrought existent, of which wondrous activity the Subject's own exalted mental experience is, moreover, another far more direct and adequate sign.

As signs conveying information regarding the characteristics and activities of extra-conscious being, the distinct percepts and their localised motions are, however, of the greatest importance to knowledge. We cannot doubt that our perceptual revelation—with all its vivid and minute distinctions, compelled in us by influences emanating from extra-conscious existents—does, so far as its nature allows, faithfully signalise specific characteristics of the compelling influences. Our being, wholly formed and specialised in living interaction with the outside powers, is sure to have its reactive efficiencies correctly attuned to the stimulating influences.

This is practically proved by the correctness of our work wrought upon *outside existents*, but executed under the guidance of our own *perceptual ideas*. The outside effect of such work, eventually signalised to us through changes in the compelled percepts, is found to agree with our ideal forecast. Our idea of a building to be erected, for instance, taken along with the compulsory percepts of the building when erected affords by itself sufficient proof of the accurate correspondence of our perceptual world to the world of extra-conscious and sense-stimulating existents. It would be absurd to maintain that it is the ideal forecast or anything else forming part of the conscious content that has wrought the changes in the outside existents. And it would be just as absurd to maintain that the changes had been wrought, not upon the outside extra-conscious existents, but upon our own percepts.

It cannot be too often repeated that all instructive science has reference to extra-conscious agencies. And this because without such reference there can be found no meaning in the congeries of facts and occurrences of the conscious content, nor can there be established any valid connexion between them. The assumption, for instance, that

our body as a mere *perceptual existence* stands in effective connexion with the rest of our conscious content, or, in other words, that the true modes of interaction and interdependence between body and mind are ascertainable as direct phenomena of the conscious content,—leads to inextricable psychological and philosophical confusion. It should be obvious that it is a slowly acquired knowledge by means of compelled percepts, presupposing the existence, and signifying the characteristics, of a permanent, extra-conscious reality—a knowledge present in the conscious content merely through remotely representative marks—that can alone enable us to draw valid conclusions regarding the connexion of what we perceive as our body with the rest of our conscious content. And, as all constituents of the conscious content are only specific marks of the characteristics of either outside existents or of the Subject's own extra-conscious nature, it is clear that all instructive interpretation of the conscious content has to take notice of what these more or less remotely representative marks in reality signify.

How, without extreme realistic suppositions, could we possibly conclude that our body, which as a perceptual phenomenon can never constitute more than a fragment of our conscious content, is, nevertheless, the true bearer of the entire conscious content? And, surely, this realistic conclusion can well stand its ground against the speculative conception, that our body has its true existence, and displays its true powers, during the time and in those relations in which it appears to us in casual glimpses as part of our conscious content.

From the considerations brought forward in the course of this discussion, it follows that the term "mental activity," if at all retained, has to be construed as signifying, not anything happening within the conscious content itself, but the functional play of all that part of our extra-conscious being, from which such conscious content is the supreme emanation.