guishes it from a definable term. The author works out for the benefit of his pupils a number of well-known principles underlying scientific discovery and the definition of concepts.

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Pensare senza coscienza. G. SERGI. (Reprinted.) La Rivista Moderna, Vol. II, Fasc. I. 1899. Pp. 18.

This is an amplification and in some respects an advance on the author's doctrine of the unconscious, as developed in his *Psychologie physiologique*. Professor Sergi starts out with the view that conscious thought is merely the last term in a series of unconscious brain states. In support of this theory he cites, from his own experience and others', numerous examples in which a problem has been solved or a train of reasoning worked out to a conclusion while the mind was occupied with something entirely different. In some instances the process extended over an hour, in others over a day, week, month or more. In his own case he finds many instances of this unconscious brain work proceeding during sleep; at one time it was so pronounced that he grew accustomed to read up the theme of any paper he was to write, and then immediately dismiss the whole question from his mind, without working out the plan of the paper: in the morning he would begin the writing at once with no hesitation or difficulty, the subject having apparently been analyzed and arranged for treatment during the night.

Professor Sergi reviews the theories of Kant, Leibnitz, Hamilton, J. S. Mill and Carpenter, on obscure ideas, subconsciousness and unconscious cerebration. He gives preference to Hamilton's view, that 'latent agencies—modifications of which we are unconscious—must be admitted as a groundwork of Phenomenology of Mind.' The author, however, goes further, holding that this "unconscious cerebral and physiological work constitutes the whole phenomenon, not merely one side of it, and that the consciousness of the phenomenon is merely its superficial revelation, which adds nothing to the essence and completeness of the phenomenon in question." He claims to solve the problem of psychological dualism, by making the physiological process the sole 'essence' and the state of consciousness a mere 'manifestation'. In spite of the brevity of the paper and the lack of novelty in its standpoint, it calls for attention on account of the new observational data which the author has brought forward.

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