logical moment in the Hegelian dialectic, but it is really nothing more. It has no special interest as throwing light on the problem of the constitution of experience, towards which it stands in just the same position as any other branch of empirical science, and is really no more akin to philosophy proper than is, for example, physiology. The individual has, for Hegelianism, two sides; one, in which it transcends and exists apart from time, and is of interest as a logical moment in the system of the absolute; the other, in which it is known as existent in time, and in which it belongs more or less to the sphere of nature and contingency. It is in this latter aspect alone that it is an object of experience, and it, ipso facto, is, as such, dialectically unintelligible.

It may be quite true that in the constitution of the most indefinite sensation there are involved intelligible relations, but these relations, on Hegelian principles, can never be exhausted or systematised, nor can empirical psychology either deny their existence or take account of them. It may be true that thought constitutes its object by processes which do not lie within the sphere of time, but for empirical observation, which can take account only of temporal co-existences and sequences, this fact has no significance. The two views of mind belong to different spheres, and the onus probandi of showing that they come into any conflict, or even contact, lies upon those who say that it is a fault in empirical psychology that it looks at no method but its own. It is enough to say that its justification as against the post-Kantian German philosophy appears to rest upon precisely the same grounds as the justification of every other branch of empirical science.

R. B. Haldane.

The Rule of Three in Metaphysics.—I expected to see in a later number of Mind some reference to the argument set forth in the concluding section of Prof. Clifford's article "On the Nature of Things-in-themselves," contained in No. IX.; but such expectation not being realised, I venture to take the matter up myself.

I cordially agree with the whole of the article in question except the section above-mentioned; but in that section there seems to me to be a glaring non-sequitur. Towards the close of the preceding section Prof. Clifford enunciates the proposition "that every motion of matter is simultaneous with some ejective fact or event which might be part of a consciousness". Note the word "motion" not only here, but also in Prof. Clifford's corollary, No. 2, in the same section.

The proposition which prefaces the last section is the most important one in the whole article, being the one the author aims to prove. The first objection I have to raise is to the following phrase:—"A moving molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness; but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff". I presume Prof. Clifford here means that the mental eject corresponding to the motion of a molecule of inorganic matter is not a conscious one; but his proposition, in the way he states it, implies that each molecule carries about with it in its travels something that would still be attached to it if it ceased to move. Here lies a fallacy. Prof. Clifford seems to
have forgotten his own statement that the motion of matter is the concomitant of the ejective fact.

The same fallacy lurks in the subsequent argument. The supposition is made “that I see a man looking at a candlestick”. A “cerebral image” is formed in the neighbourhood of his optic thalami. “This cerebral image is a certain complex of disturbances in the matter of these organs”; and yet we are told in the next breath—“Both the candlestick and the cerebral image are matter”. Here again is the fallacy. The cerebral image is not matter but a complex of molecular movements—an important distinction.

Prof. Clifford then proceeds to point out that, besides the cerebral image and the candlestick, there are a mental image and an external reality, and that “the external reality bears the same relation to the mental image that the (phenomenal) candlestick bears to the cerebral image”. So far all is well. But now Prof. Clifford repeats the fallacy above-mentioned, viz., that “the candlestick and the cerebral image are both matter; they are made of the same stuff”. But even apart from this objection, his conclusion—“Therefore the external reality is made of the same stuff as the man’s perception or mental image, that is, it is made of mind-stuff”—does not follow at all. This will be seen more clearly if we put the argument in symbolical language:

Let \( A = \) the external reality,
\( B = \) the candlestick, or my perception of the external reality,
\( C = \) the man’s cerebral image as a possible perception of mine,
\( D = \) the man’s mental image.

Then as \( B : C : A : D \); and therefore \( B \) and \( C \) being made of the same stuff (matter), \( A \) and \( D \) are also made of the same stuff (mind). The general proposition implied is that, if the same relation subsists between any two things, \( A \) and \( D \), as subsists between two others, \( B \) and \( C \), then, if \( C \) is made of the same stuff as \( B \), \( D \) must be made of the same stuff as \( A \), or vice versa. This general proposition Prof. Clifford does not attempt to prove, though it stands in need of proof.

Again, even if the general proposition were true, it does not apply here, because \( B \) and \( C \) are not made of the same stuff, one being matter and the other motion.

The only tenable conclusion that Prof. Clifford can, in my opinion, arrive at, is that (quoting his own words), “as the cerebral image represents imperfectly the candlestick, in the same way and to the same extent the mental image represents the reality external to his consciousness”. In other words, the agreements and differences obtaining in consciousness correspond to agreements and differences obtaining in a world outside (or rather independent of) consciousness.

Jno. T. Lingard.

The Foundation of Arithmetic.—“Wherein (asks Mill) lies the peculiar certainty always ascribed to the sciences” of Geometry and Arithmetic? “Why are they called the Exact Sciences? Why are mathematical certainty and the evidence of demonstration common