try where I met with so much kindness and such uniform courtesy.

C. LLOYD MORGAN.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, BRISTOL, ENGLAND.

THE SUBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

EDITOR SCIENCE: Referring to the review of my 'Lehrbuch der Allgemeinen Psychologie' in your valuable magazine for September, 1895, which has but recently come to my notice, I sincerely regret that the reviewer should have fallen into so manifest an error as to suppose the 'subject of consciousness' of my 'Psychologie' to be equivalent to 'self-consciousness;' though he expresses himself with some hesitancy when he says 'it seems most nearly,' etc. As I have pointed out in my work, the misunderstanding is quite apt to arise, from the fact that the word 'subject' is often used in the sense of the 'Ego' or 'Self,' as even shown by the reviewer when he says, 'the consciousness of self or subject.' But that is just the very sense in which I do *not* use the word 'subject.' With me, the 'subject of consciousness' does not designate the 'Ego' or the 'conscious mental individual,' but only its fundamental unifying general abstract element, which always exists in the closest union with the other element, which I call *attribute* of consciousness, and *with which* it constitutes the individual unit 'consciousness' or 'conscious individual.' When this is distinctly understood it will be impossible to mistake the 'subject of consciousness,' *i. e.*, the psychological foundation of *all* mentality, for 'self-consciousness,' which is but a later development of the *individual* mind, the 'mental individual.' It is a source of great satisfaction to me to have been the first to call attention to this fundamental unifying element. I call it 'subject,' though I shall gladly give up the name if any one will suggest another that is not so liable to be misunderstood. In my 'Psychologie' I lay particular stress upon the fact that, if this 'subject' were not originally present in mental life as the unifying element, together with the attributes of consciousness (sensations, feelings, etc.); if, therefore, as the associationists think, mental life were possible without a subject of consciousness, it would be impossible to explain 'self-consciousness,' which makes its

appearance later; for it is precisely this self-consciousness, which is based primarily upon the existence of the 'subject' as an element of consciousness; but *for that very reason* it is far from being identical with that 'subject.'

JOHANNES REHMKE.

GREIFSWALD, April 16, 1896.

THE PREROGATIVES OF A STATE GEOLOGIST.

EDITOR SCIENCE: In connection with the communication of Dr. Keyes, published in SCIENCE, April 24th, page 365, permit me to say to any who may have a passing interest in the subject that I sent the impression paper copy of the original manuscript to the Editor of SCIENCE with a copy of the publication as it appeared, with a request that he kept the two for some months in order that any one wishing to look into the matter might have an opportunity to do so and judge for himself whether I wrongfully represented matters in my communication published in SCIENCE of April 3d last. I might also state that I sent Dr. Keyes a copy of the letter nearly three months before it was published, with a statement that I would publish the same if he did not do something to give me credit for that which was mine, but which had been published under his name.

ERASMUS HAWORTH.

A CORRECTION.

It is unfortunate that although the figure from Dr. Mügge's paper which I reproduced in SCIENCE last week (p. 698) was expressly marked 'top' on one side, it has been inserted upside down by the compositor. In its present position the figure is meaningless and even misleading.

T. A. JAGGAR, JR.

THE ABSOLUTE AND THE RELATIVE.

TO THE EDITOR OF SCIENCE: Your correspondent 'M.,' in the number of SCIENCE for April 24th, raises a new issue with me; one which has only an indirect bearing upon the subject matter of my article on the 'Illusion Concerning Rest.' In that article I attempted to demonstrate that motion cannot be created or destroyed by collision, but that the body in motion can be only deflected thereby. Now my friend abandons that demonstration and