memory-consciousness appears almost exclusively among the sane, encourages me to suppose that this new form of double memory, once verified as an existing fact among the insane, may be found to be an incident of normal life sufficiently frequent to explain a large number of 'telepathic' incidents. At all events, if there is any fair chance of such an explanation for stories that are not based upon purely documentary evidence, nearly the whole mass of narrative facts in the *Phantasms of the Living* will have to be reviewed with this hypothesis in mind.

The foregoing suggestion, as soon as formulated, seems so simple and commonplace that I should not have ventured to bring it forward here had I found Messrs. Gurney and Myers apparently well aware of the force of such a consideration. I have looked in vain in *Phantasms of the Living*, as well as in Mr. Gurney's reply to Prof. Preyer, for evidence of any consciousness of this hypothesis. I need not say that the value of the collection of stories in *Phantasms of the Living* is in no wise affected for scientific purposes by the discovery that these stories may prove rather the existence of a typical hallucination of the human memory than the reality of 'telepathic' communication between mind and mind. If it is the truth as such that we want to 'bag,' it is not ours to decide whether the truth shall turn out to be a wild goose or some other fowl.

ON "FEELING AS INDIFFERENCE".

I. By JAMES SULLY.

The discussion on the alleged indifference of certain feelings, begun by Prof. Bain in No. 48 and followed up by Mr. W. E. Johnson in No. 49, is to be specially welcomed as promising to render a little less obscure one of the most perplexing points in psychology. My excuse for joining in it is not that I am likely to have anything conclusive to add, but that, my name having been mentioned by both writers, I feel in a manner obliged to express my view of the subject more fully than I have yet done.

Before entering upon the special question, I should like to put myself right with respect to a point related to this which is touched on by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Ward would, I think, be the first to admit that, though he has freshly emphasised the fact of the connexion and co-implication of the three constituents of mind, others before him have called attention to the fact. As regards myself, I stated the point insisted on by Mr. Johnson in almost his own words when I wrote, "Feeling, knowing and willing are *properties* of mind, and cannot exist in perfect isolation from one another any more than the colour, form and odour of a plant" (*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 22).

To quote but one other writer, G. H. Lewes describes every mental phenomenon as a "triple process" in very much the same way as Mr. Ward himself does, though no doubt he conceives the factors in this process somewhat differently (*Problems of Life and Mind*, 3rd Series, Prob. iii. ch. 2). But while psychologists have seen that the constituents are always present in every concrete mental state, they have seen also that they are not uniformly present in the same degree of distinctness and prominence. Were it otherwise, there could, it is safe to say, be no such thing as psychological analysis at all. The present difficulties, which are great enough, would then prove to be quite insurmountable. This fact is brought out by all schemes of psychological classification, which seems to me a thoroughly legitimate process when understood to be just what it aims at being, and not more than this. Even Mr. Ward himself, by the way, cannot help winding up his analysis by a rudimentary classification when he gives his two "forms" of psychosis as "more or less distinct".

To come now to the real point of dispute. The discussion has already been of service by resolving the problem into two: (1) Is there in addition to the well-recognised qualitatively distinct varieties of feelings, *viz.*, the pleasurable and the painful feelings, a third variety distinguished by the qualitative differentia of neutrality or indifference? (2) Even supposing that all feelings are qualitatively marked off by the characteristic colouring of pleasurable or its opposite, is there not another aspect of feeling, *viz.*, Excitement, which, since it does not uniformly vary with the degree of pleasurable, requires to be specially considered? The differentiation of this second question was begun by Prof. Bain in his note, but was only completed by Mr. Johnson. It may be as well to say at once that if the problem be thrown into the second form, this amounts to a serious shifting of the ground. Obviously if this is the only point of dispute, the expressions "neutral" or "indifferent" feeling, "indifference of feeling" and the like are out of place. In the following remarks I shall assume that Prof. Bain at least holds by the contention that many feelings, if not, as he formerly said, a large majority, are strictly or approximately neutral, that is, destitute of all specific colouring from agreeableness or disagreeableness. It will be my chief business to dispute this proposition. On the second question, I have only one or two conjectural observations to offer.

1. Are there feelings which are neither agreeable nor disagreeable? This question, it may be observed at the outset, is independent of the other question, whether every psychical phenomenon contains an appreciable constituent of feeling. For although, as Prof. Bain points out, Reid based his plea for neutrality on sensations in which the feeling-tone, to say the least, is very inconspicuous, he need not have done so, and Prof. Bain himself evidently thinks the safer ground to be mental states where the feeling-tone is highly conspicuous. With him

we may best begin by considering the clear undisputed instances of feeling that are said to be hedonically colourless.

If we question the common consciousness, we seem to find, what perhaps Prof. Bain would not dispute, that feeling is commonly described in language that points to the distinction of the agreeable and disagreeable. Pleased and displeased, attracted and repelled, satisfied and dissatisfied—these and similar terms are the current symbols by which we indicate the effects on us of the various impressions of our surroundings. It may, no doubt, be said that we frequently speak of being excited without distinctly referring to the mode of the excitement. But this is hardly conclusive; for it may be rejoined, that what is commonly meant by such a state of excitement is a condition of feeling of a decidedly pleasurable hue. This seems to be implied in such current expressions as the 'love of excitement,' a love sufficiently attested in the case of most healthy young people by the amount of painstaking gone through beforehand to secure it, even when it is known that the indulgence will probably be followed by a disagreeable sense of fatigue.

While popular language thus suggests that excitement is in the main pleasant, it clearly points also to another side of the experience. The distinctly unpleasant flavour connoted by the terms 'shock,' 'shocking,' suggests that excitement so far as it means the effect of sudden and violent stimulation is disagreeable.

Lastly, I think no one will dispute the proposition that when ordinary persons talk of feeling indifferent, what is meant is absence of feeling altogether. To be indifferent about others' opinion or some political question is not to be affected by it at all. Plain folk do not say they are indifferent when excited.

So much for the appeal to the unanalysed consciousness of the vulgar. In passing to a scientific analytical consideration of the subject, two points must be made clear at the outset. (a) Pleasant or agreeable, together with its opposite, must, as in discussions of Hedonism in Ethics, stand for all discoverable degrees of this quality, and not merely, as is apt to be the case in the common use of language, for the higher degrees of intensity. (b) A mental 'state' is in reality a movement involving a continual change of elements, and a constant fluctuation in the accompanying feeling-tone.

Bearing these points in mind, it seems to me that the instances of feeling relied on by Prof. Bain fail to warrant his conclusion. I at least know nothing of a state of mind called surprise which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant in some degree, though it may very well be both. Surprise means first of all shock, which is momentary disturbance, involving incomplete 'apperception' and sense of confusion. In ordinary cases, however, when something short of a miracle is happening, the disagreeable feeling of disturbance begins at once to give way to a pleasant form of consciousness, the accompaniment of the acceleration of the mental processes due to the stimulus of the new and strange impression. Thus the whole experience is best described as a

transition (or rapid series of transitions) from a feeling of confinement or contraction to one of liberation or expansion, an experience that is decidedly exhilarating. Hence probably the craving (in vain objected to by Lessing) for surprise in the drama and in fiction. In truth the feeling of surprise seems to very well illustrate the general conditions of pleasurable feeling as formulated, to quote a recent authority, by Mr. Ward.

The essential circumstance here, a transition from an unpleasant to a pleasant consciousness, seems to enter into and to determine other feelings which at a first glance might appear to be colourless as regards agreeableness. Thus all anticipation of a known result which we desire involves vivid pleasurable ideation interrupted, and one may add intensified, by momentary sense of non-realisation. Such anticipation is pleasurable as a whole within certain limits, thought, as we know, "hope deferred," &c. The fascination of uncertainty again, as illustrated in the popularity of games of chance, of a well-constructed plot, and so on, is probably to be explained as the result of the intensified activity called forth by a teasing sense of ignorance and incapacity. Similarly, a good deal of the excitement springing from nervousness and timidity, as in undergoing an examination or speaking in public, seems to be a specially exalted form of consciousness provoked by a sufficient and not excessive painful stimulus.¹

Such states of emotional excitement, then, may very well be regarded as mixed states of feeling, analogous to states of pity and those feelings of fear and pity excited by tragedy, which are confessedly not indifferent, and where (as Hume plainly showed) a subordinate element of painful consciousness is the condition of an intensified pleasurable consciousness. The essential circumstance throughout is a transition from a low to a high hedonic level of consciousness.

So far as to the indifference said to be discoverable in clear and undoubted instances of feeling. We may now turn for a moment to the more ambiguous examples of feeling, as ordinary sensations of hearing, sight, and possibly certain forms of intellectual and volitional consciousness. As already hinted, I do not consider the determination of the question whether these have a colouring of pleasurable feeling necessarily involved in our discussion. I should be quite ready, in spite of Mr. Johnson's protest, to agree with Prof. Bain that they might be viewed as cases where the feeling-element becomes evanescent, and so might be disregarded in the discussion. Nevertheless, it may be as well to observe that in the measure in which these mental states are wanting in hedonic character they seem to be wanting in all the characteristics of feeling. Most people, I imagine, would say that a common recurring sensation, say the sight of a very average bit of dully-lit

¹ Mr. Kinglake in *Eothen* gives a striking instance of this exaltation of pleasurable consciousness by a sub-conscious fear in the description of his state of mind at Cairo when the plague was raging. Going about sight-seeing was rendered the more exhilarating.

grass, or the touch of a book cover, does not apparently affect us at all, and certainly has nothing exciting about it. I may, however, add that I am privately of opinion that all sensations (according to their quality and quantity) are fitted to please or displease, though, owing to the well-known effects of repetition, inattention and diversion of attention to their signification, we overlook and may grow insensible to the effect. This seems at least to be clear in the case of sounds, where the great distinction between musical tones and noises certainly answers in the main to a pleasant and unpleasant mode of excitation. And the effect of artistic education in extending the range of sensuous pleasure points to the same fact. I am disposed to think too that all intellectual activity tends to be agreeable or disagreeable according to its varying conditions, and that Prof. Bain's feelingless absorption in the pursuit of some end is attended with a very distinct feeling-tone, which again may fluctuate according as consciousness of advance or of arrest preponderates. Hence I am disposed to conclude that all feeling exhibits one of the two contrasted colourings, and that since all varieties of consciousness have some feeling-concomitant, however faint, pleasure and pain are coextensive with our mental life.

2. Is Excitement another aspect of feeling, which, though always coexisting with hedonic quality, is in a manner independent of this?

As already hinted, I do not propose to discuss this question fully. I think before the point can be satisfactorily settled the idea of excitement must be rendered clearer. How, for example, is excitement to be distinguished from quantity of consciousness, *e.g.*, from intensity and mass of sensation, or rapidity of ideational process? Again, is excitement anything more than the higher degrees of intensity of feeling itself? And here it becomes necessary to investigate very carefully the relation between intensity and colouring of feeling. I should be very slow, for example, to concede to Mr. Johnson, except after a searching investigation, that all feeling runs up at last like colour into a neutral white. Is the ecstasy of a devotee or of a martyr colourless? Once more, do all feelings alike exhibit this excitement, the so-called depressing emotions as much as other varieties?

These are some of the difficulties that I experience in trying to conceive of excitement as an additional "dimension" of feeling. But in truth the shifting of the problem in this way seems to point to the impossibility of conceiving of feeling otherwise than as hedonically coloured, and this may well satisfy those who deny the alleged indifference of feeling.

That no feeling can be strictly indifferent seems to me to follow from the definition of it as that which when thought about always appears in a peculiar sense as a subjective affection, an alteration of our condition. For any such alteration must, it would seem, be in the direction of elevating or depressing, of furthering or hindering, our conscious life.

II. By FRANCES A. MASON.

What Mr. W. E. Johnson has said on this subject, in *MIND* No. 49, seems to me all valuable and nearly all true; but there are one or two points which it may be useful to consider more closely.

Prof. Bain's case does not appear to be proved (as indeed Mr. Johnson says) by the indisputable fact that we can "produce instances of states of mind which may be considered as equally pleasurable or painful, but which have a different degree of excitement"; for the question remains: What is this excitement? Is it a distinct element in a state of mind, or can it be resolved into Cognition, Volition, or Feeling as Pleasure and Pain?

Let us make the experiment, roughly, in the cases offered to us by Prof. Bain and Mr. Johnson.

Reid's "intellectual sensations" are merely cognitions in a state of mind of which they form the main element, leaving little room, or affording little occasion, for either feeling or volition. And in this state of mind there is little neutral excitement.

On the other hand, the strong excitement of anticipation of the result of an election appears to consist largely of volition. It is what Dr. Ward would call a complete state of mind, an emotional state; and it might be analysed into—(1) a great deal of desire to know the result, &c.; (2) a little cognition, or acts of imagining the results, &c.; and (3) quickly alternating pleasure and pain depending on these represented results.

Much the same analysis might be made of rage, as Mr. Johnson describes it, in which there is much neutral excitement. The pain in this emotional state is caused by representation of the injury done by the object of the rage, while the pleasure which is said to be found in it must be due to representation of future acts of revenge; *i.e.*, there is a great deal of volition, not baulked but working itself out.

Again, in falling asleep, and in quiet despair, where pleasure and pain are "saturated," we find a minimum of volition. The despair here spoken of is, of course, despair proper, *i.e.*, hopelessness: nothing to be hoped for, and therefore nothing to be done or willed; directly hope is admitted, the despair becomes "violent despair," full of volition and action, and at the same time comes in neutral excitement.

In all these representative instances we find neutral excitement varying with volition so far that volition sets a superior limit to excitement. Suppose that this relation holds universally. Is the excitement a cause of the volition? Or can we say that it is itself volition in its most rudimentary form—the raw material of what we recognise as volition, something implied in the Uneasiness of Locke and in the *Conatus* of Spinoza?

If so, then, as regards Mr. Johnson's third point, excitement is simply nascent action. As regards his first, we find more difficulty. But we may say that we do not attribute volition to material things, and that, as being merely the raw material of

volition, neutral excitement is too indefinite either to be associated with presentations or to attach to separate elements in presentation. And, if considered as widely distributed or scattered attention, it would be subjective in Dr. Ward's scheme.

As to passivity, though it looks like a contradiction in terms to speak of passive excitement, yet such a contradiction often means merely that one of the terms is ill-chosen; and this may turn out to be the case here. If neutral excitement is feeling, excitement will be a misleading name for it. The question is best decided by introspection. Is "neutral excitement" passive or not? If not, then it is volition without more ado. If so, there is apparently in our experience an element which, not being pleasure or pain, is yet distinguishable from any mode of volition.

I think the two alternatives must be analysed together, for this reason—that neutral excitement itself admits of analysis. We have seen how closely on the one hand it is connected with volition; and analysis of my own mental states seems to yield this raw material of volition as one distinguishable element in neutral excitement, but as not the whole.

What is left, then? A *tertium quid*, distinct from pleasure and pain, but more like them than like anything else, and therefore to be classed with them under the head of Feeling? I think not; for I think what is left *is* pleasure and pain.

Working from one end, Prof. Bain and Mr. Johnson have shown how much it has in common with pleasure and pain. Now in what does it differ from them which may not be accounted for by its being a mixture of the two? I think we shall find that its special characteristics are just such as we should expect from this admixture. There is not space to attempt to show this in detail; but it may be worth while just to point out that there seem to be, as Prof. Bain says, different "modes" of neutral excitement. There ought, indeed, to be as many modes as there are varieties of admixture of pleasure and pain; some of which Mr. Johnson touches upon, noticing their "fusion" in certain emotions, and at other times their rapid variation, dependent on the alternate intensifying by attention of the presentations involved.

And, to begin from the other end, what happens when pleasure and pain are experienced together? Do they annihilate each other? Do they not rather neutralise each other, and is not the result simply neutral feeling?

It may be denied that pleasure and pain are ever experienced together. And I would not say that pleasures and pains are experienced at all; it may be quite true that all pleasure, as such, is one and alike: that feeling, as Dr. Ward says, varies only in sign and quantity. But though we may have Feeling and not feelings, no one doubts that we have cognitions and not Cognition, which is a concept and not a concrete experience. Presentations are continually experienced together, each of which, taken alone, would cause a certain amount of pleasure or pain. What, in actual experience, happens to these amounts?

An attractively simple answer would be to add up the respective amounts of positive and of negative hedonic effect, and subtract one sum from the other, leaving a surplus of either pleasure or pain, or a hedonistic zero. And, no doubt, there is a great deal of truth in this answer. If a man, at a given moment, could be made to choose between being annihilated next moment or going on living *ad indefinitum* with exactly so much pleasure or pain as he was then feeling, no doubt his best plan would be to make some such calculation, and live or die accordingly. But the fact of his being able to make such a calculation implies that this result of addition and subtraction does not really represent the actual state of his consciousness. The actual amounts of hedonic effect are what he somehow gets hold of and manipulates. The well-known difficulty—how we can estimate what is not presented, need not disturb us here; for we cannot in either case escape it except by denying it: if the several amounts of feeling cannot be estimated because they are only felt and not presented, the same must apply to their result. And what we seem to find by introspection is an indefinite number or mass of simultaneous presentations, few, if any of them, hedonically indifferent, but each causing a certain amount of feeling which keeps varying with the intensity of the presentation; this intensity itself varying, other things equal, with the amount of attention directed to it.

But since attention cannot be concentrated wholly on one presentation, we are, at any one time, attending, more or less, to them all, and are hedonically affected by them all. Some of them give pleasure, and some pain; therefore we are, at any one time, hedonically affected both positively and negatively. That is to say, our feeling, at any one time, consists of both pleasure and pain, is both pleasure and pain, is, then, so far as neither predominates, neutral feeling.

If this is true, then Prof. Bain is right in saying that there is neutral feeling as well as pleasure and pain; only we recognise in his neutral excitement an unanalysed element of volition. And Dr. Ward is right in saying that feeling is nothing but pleasure and pain; only, in our view, feeling may be, at any one time, pleasure *and* pain, not necessarily pleasure *or* pain.¹

It only remains for me to say that if this suggested solution of the difficulty appears presumptuous, it would appear so to no one more than to myself if I did not intend it merely as a suggestion. I have stated it as baldly and unreservedly as possible; first, because I have so many doubts about so many points in it that it was useless to mention the few for which there might have been space; next, because the simpler the form of an error, the more easily is it exposed. And I hope some one will take the trouble to refute this, if it is wrong. For like reasons, I have not thought it worth while to enter on other lines of argument which seem to me to lead to the same result.

¹ If there are states of mind in which there are no pleasant or no painful presentations, we are not concerned with them here.