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Naval Brigades

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Friday, June 30, 1882.

VICE-ADMIRAL H. BOYS, Member of Council, in the Chair

NAVAL BRIGADES.

By Captain H. J. FLETCHER CAMPBELL, C.B., R.N.

The CHAIRMAN: I have much pleasure in introducing to you Captain Campbell who is going to read to us a very interesting paper. I will not make any remark present, further than to say that I do not think any person in the Service in a better position to write a paper on the subject of Naval Brigades.

THE term Naval Brigade is applied to the crews of two or more brigaded together for service on shore; it cannot be correctly applied to the crew of any one ship; this should be designated as a Detachment of the Naval Brigade; the same rule would apply to port companies of the brigade when detached from the main force.

The term "Officer Commanding" should only be applied to the Officer in chief command of the brigade, whether present or not.

Naval forces have frequently been employed on shore in conjunction with the military; they co-operated in the wars in America, at the early part of the century five hundred seamen and marines assisted at a successful attack on the Dutch intrenched camp in the island of Java; later on, over three thousand men assisted at the siege of Sebastopol; in the Indian Mutiny, in the Abyssinian and Afghan Expeditions, as well as in China, New Zealand, and South Africa the Navy has contributed its share to swell the aggregate of the land forces.

The force should, if possible, be organized before leaving the ship, and the more perfectly and completely this is done, the more easily it will be to maintain discipline and order when the time for landing arrives.

Two complete changes of clothing are required by all, and with other necessaries, be carried in a black bag; one bag being a sufficient supply between every three men, or three bags to a tent.

The head-dress for Officers and men may be the uniform cap or cover, and in warm climates, curtains to shade the head and light sun helmets might be used if they can be got, but the men should like them, and they work much better in their caps.

Officers should wear a single-breasted pea-jacket, with stiff collar buttoning close up to the throat, and having distinguishing marks on the sleeves; the men should wear serge jumpers and trousers should be provided with leggings coming well above the calf of the leg so that they cannot slip down when wet; ankle gaiters may be worn very well on parade, but they are quite useless on active service.

men are liable to be wet for days together, and where they have to ford rivers on the line of march.

Officers and men should be provided with a military great coat, and it would be well to make application as early as possible to the Commissariat in order that a sufficient number of these may be available also one or two blankets and a waterproof sheet; the sheet should be used to lie on at night and the blanket should be wrapped in it when on the march.

If possible, military boots should also be provided, as the nava boot soon wears out when used on shore; a white working dress is also most useful, and should be taken if the transport will admit of it.

It should be noted that all white articles of dress should be dyed some dark colour, as when white they form a most conspicuous mark for the enemy's riflemen, and can be seen in the distance or in the bush when a dark-coloured article of dress might have permitted the wearer to remain unobserved; in the fight with the Zulus at Inyezane the blue-jackets were in white with white helmets, and to this may be attributed the great number wounded, nearly ten per cent. of those engaged.

The white clothing was afterwards dyed brown, and this renders it less easily discerned than even the jet-black bodies of the natives themselves.

Officers should be provided with either a small uniform tin case or a black ship's bag, anything that can keep out the wet being the principal object; those who are mounted should, if the campaign is to be of any duration, provide themselves with cord breeches, as nothing in the shape of cloth will stand constant wear in the saddle.

As few non-combatants as possible should be landed, but an armourer and shoemaker are indispensable. No Paymaster's Staff or Police are required, but the principal medical Officer should take such of his staff as he may require; the senior Officer from each ship should be furnished with lists showing the amount which may be paid monthly to each person, and lists of all sums so paid, as well as of all clothing issued, or other charges incurred, should be forwarded to the ship as opportunities occur. All payments must be made on account only, and in round sums; the fair accounts being kept in the ship's office.

Every man should be armed with a rifle. I unhesitatingly condemn the idea of landing men in war armed with swords and pistols, and the idea of taking them into action so armed should not be entertained for a moment. Every Officer should carry a revolver of improved pattern, which should always be with him; it may be carried in a holster attached to the sword-belt.

The sword-bayonet is an arm that might well be improved; it is unnecessarily heavy, being seven ounces heavier than that carried by the Royal Marine Artillery. It is most inconvenient in skirmishing, as a man cannot kneel without using one hand to look after it; and the large clumsy handle is extremely inconvenient when marching, as it interferes greatly with the working of the arm; such as it is, however, a young signalman of the "Active" defended himself with one, so I have

been told, at Isandula, killing four Zulus before being himself assailed from the back by a savage who crept under the wagon against which he was standing. Still, as single-handed encounters with the sword are rare in these days, I think a light bayonet would be a good substitute.

Men are usually required to carry seventy rounds of ammunition in their pouches, but it must be remembered that in skirmishing or moving at the double, if the pouches have been opened, single cartridges or even packets are liable to fall out; many are lost in this way, and, unless pouches are made deeper, I see no remedy, as in the heat of action few will stop to button their pouches.

It is very important that arrangements should be made for the supply of spare ammunition in action, as with breech-loaders spare rounds are soon expended. Men must be specially detailed for this duty, which may be well intrusted to kroomen in ships carrying them; they might also be employed to carry wounded men to the rear, and no person must be permitted on any account to leave the ranks for any purpose.

The men should be divided into companies of fifty each, in the proper proportion of Officers; the Officer in charge of the company being held responsible for his men in every respect, on duty or otherwise. The company should be divided into tents in the proportion of five to each; there must be a leading man in each tent who is held responsible for it and for the conduct of its inmates; each tent and all gear appertaining to it must be numbered.

A proportion of entrenching tools should be issued to each tent. When encamping, the companies' tents should be pitched in line, with the Officer's tent, of which there may be one to each company, in the rear at one end.

The tent of the Officer in command should occupy a central position and invariably have a distinguishing flag flying, so that orderlies and others may know where to find the headquarters of the corps, and at least where to lodge their communications.

The Royal Marines should be similarly divided, and form separate companies. It occasionally happens that seamen and marines are ordered on detached service, and while the latter are under the Discipline Act, one Officer must be in command of the whole: it is to me not only unjust but unadvisable that an Officer of the Marines when on shore should take command after a naval Officer who may be, and very probably is, very much younger and less experienced. I therefore advocate the rule that all Officers, whether naval or marine, should take command according to *seniority*. This arrangement would, I think, be of great advantage to the efficiency of the Service.

The strictest discipline should be maintained, and uniform dress insisted on; a general inspection in the forenoon, the same on board; every punishment awarded should be entered in the default book, and the men made to understand that any misconduct is duly recorded against them.

Summary punishments are easily made applicable to service on shore. Extra work of all sorts is plentiful about camp, and def

should be called upon at all times, the oftener the better, for any job which may turn up. Almost the first thing done in a military camp in the morning is to sound "defaulters fall in," a custom which is well worthy of imitation; cleaning and making latrines is also their special province, indeed, there is no lack of means for punishment, and I venture to think corporal punishment is not required; it was only once inflicted during over eight months' service in Zululand, and then on a stoker for possessing himself of a bottle of brandy from a sutler's wagon.

Should any irregularity occur in a tent, all that has to be done is to have it struck the first thing every morning and kept down all day; this operation repeated, will soon bring the inmates to order. Of course the limits of the camp must be defined, and no one allowed to pass them without permission. A public-house should invariably be put "out-of-bounds," and have sentries over it, who should allow no one to pass without a written order from his Commanding Officer.

Spirits are rarely issued to the troops, at most twice a week, and sometimes not at all; to stop this great treat is a punishment which I am sure is severely felt.

Soluble cocoa should always be provided for issue in the mornings as an extra ration and independent of the allowance of provisions.

Temporary arm-racks should be fitted round the tent-poles and rifles kept in them ready for immediate use; two sticks tied to the poles like cross-trees, will answer the purpose.

A tent should be considered much the same as a mess on board ship. Each should have a cook of the mess, who should not be required to perform any other duty; unless a whole company is required for duty, a tent should be the unit for any work, except guards the men for which should be taken from a general roster of the whole force; men having been on guard for twenty-four hours should not be called on for duty until a similar time has elapsed after their having been relieved.

In selecting a camping ground three points have to be chiefly considered, viz., a clear view all round, so that no one can approach unseen, and ready access to wood and water.

Having pitched the tents, select a place for the kitchen, and let the cooks prepare to light fires while the remainder are constructing the usual entrenchments, detail parties for fetching wood and water, tell off a "guard" and have a guard-tent pitched a little separated from the general camp.

If unaccompanied by cavalry, picquets must be thrown out, and sentries placed on commanding positions round the camp.

Sentries must be placed on the drinking water, and care taken that if it is a running stream no washing is permitted or animals taken to water above the drinking places. It is advisable to select places for both these purposes, and to have notices posted showing where men are to wash and animals to drink.

A place for latrines should also be selected and pits dug; separate ones for Officers and men: and it should be generally understood that these are the only places to be used. Indiscriminate littering about

camp is most objectionable if the stay is only for one night, will be more prolonged, it becomes an intolerable nuisance.

These details would be arranged by the Quartermaster-General's Department if with an army, but if detached, would be the duty of a naval staff Officer.

The principal medical Officer should consider it a special part of his duty to bring to the notice of the Officer commanding any detachment any defect he may observe in the sanitary arrangements of the camp; he should also cause the water in the vicinity of the camp to be examined with a view of prohibiting the use of any which he may find likely to be detrimental to health, and of suggesting that which he may consider most desirable for drinking purposes.

It is too late to think of drill when a campaign has commenced. There is always as much other work to do as can be done; it is therefore of the utmost importance that this should be attended to by the commanding hand.

To be a good rifle shot is perhaps the first requisite, and this can only be attained by careful tuition at a rifle range, under the supervision of the Officers of the company, and to be cool and steady under fire is of equal importance.

Nearly all movements are conducted in fours; it is therefore of the utmost importance that men should be thoroughly drilled into the fighting line either to the "front," "rear," right, or left from that position, so as to be brought face to face with the enemy in the shortest possible time, as in wars with uncivilized nationalities all their attacks partake of the nature of a surprise, and if immediately met and checked are seldom pushed further. I know one commanding Officer when escorting a convoy, marched half his men "right" and the other half "left" in front, so that "front" would bring them to the frontwards, on whichever side of the wagons they were marching.

The system of "attack and defence," as laid down in the *Exercise Book*, should be constantly practised, and in attacking should be conducted with supports and reserves. During the fight at Inyezane, on the advance to Echowe, a Zulu position was attacked and the final assault led by the blue-jackets of H.M.S. "Active," which had been well grounded in the system of attack prescribed in the book. It must be understood that to attack an enemy in position without supports and reserves should rarely be attempted, and on a *dernier ressort*, as if unsuccessful, it will surely lead to repulse and disaster.

Perhaps the most arduous duty of a campaign is that of a "picquet" at night, and Officers would do well to study the "Soldier's Pocket Book" on this and other subjects connected with a soldier's duties while on active service in the field. The picquet should have instructions what to do in case of attack, how and where they are to retreat on the main body, as if they rush in anyhow, they are to be received as enemies, and perish on the bayonets of their comrades.

The system of encamping in the Zulu war was first to form an enclosed space by packing the wagons in a circle, to place in

NAVAL BRIGADES.

enclosure all the horses and cattle, and to construct a trench outside the wagons, and four to five yards from them, which was manned by the fighting men of the force, guns being placed in position. At eight o'clock every evening the force was mustered at the alarm post, and each man lay down in his place fully accoutred with his rifle beside him, and so passed the night. About one hundred and fifty yards in advance of the trench the picquets were placed, with the sentries slightly further advanced, so that a complete circle of pickets was established round the camp. Tents were rarely used in the presence of the enemy, as it was found that men could not get out of them quickly enough in case of an alarm at night.

I do not propose to enter into an account of the history of Naval Brigades generally, but shall confine myself to making a few observations on the one with which I was personally connected.

This force consisted of 40 Officers and over 800 men, with an armament of 2 12-pr. Armstrong guns, 4 field guns, 5 Gatlings, and 6 24-pr. rocket tubes; in addition to these, in the early part of the campaign there were 2 7-pr. mountain guns.

The 9-pr. guns were drawn by 8 oxen, and for each gun there were 2 carts drawn by 6 oxen each, and containing together 160 rounds of spare ammunition.

Each rocket-tube had 1 cart drawn by 6 oxen for itself and rocket

Each mule carried in bags 1,500 rounds of spare Martini-Henry ammunition.

Mules are to be preferred to oxen for guns if they can be obtained.

Ships' limbers are not generally fitted for being drawn by animals; it is therefore necessary to have shafts fitted, if horses or mules are to be used, and a dissel-boom if oxen.

A stand is also required for rocket-tubes, and may be constructed like a tripod of light iron.

The Officer in command of the brigade was assisted by an experienced Gunnery Lieutenant, styled "Staff Officer," who performed the duties of Adjutant.

All official communications with the Army passed through the Staff Office, and none were permitted through any other channel, and no official communication was held with any but the recognized staff of the Army.

The Naval Officers and seamen were equally divided into two divisions, called right and left wings; to distinguish them from the Army divisions, the Royal Marines and Royal Marine Artillery formed a third and distinct division under their own Officers.

Ships' companies were kept as much as possible together; in this case it happened that the crews of "Boadicea" and "Active" about equalled the crew of the "Shah," therefore the latter composed one wing under the commander of their ship, while the former formed the other wing under the commander of "Boadicea."

The artillery was equally divided between the two wings, taking care to keep similar guns together, so as to avoid confusion with the ammunition.

The principal medical Officer had entire charge of the Medical Department, having hospital tents and means of transport, independent of the other portions of the brigade. Those who became sick unfit for duty passed into the charge of the Medical Department, remaining so until again fit for duty, being, while sick, entirely separated from their companies.

The means of transport is a most important part of the Service; an active Officer, who must be mounted, should be specially detailed for this duty. All baggage animals, and those used for drawing guns or wagons, as well as their drivers and conductors, should be under his charge, and he should be in constant communication with the Transport Department of the Army. Some idea may be formed of the work cut out for this Officer when I state that, at the advance into Zululand, the number of animals attached to the Natal Brigade at one time exceeded four hundred.

It is out of the question that guns can be dragged by men on march, or spare ammunition be carried by them; they should be reserved in all their strength and vigour for fighting purposes, and taken into action as fresh as circumstances will admit.

Mules carrying fifteen hundred rounds of spare rifle ammunition attached to each company, and always accompanied it.

The following were the regulation weights carried by different vehicles:—

Description of vehicle.	Drawn by	Regulation load.
Wagon	16 oxen	3,000 lbs.
Cart	6 mules	1,000 „

The amount of spare ammunition accompanying the Army was 80 rounds in regimental wagons, and 50 rounds in the ammunition column, making, with 70 rounds carried by the men, 200 rounds in all.

Considering the question of transport, I cannot think 24-pr. rockets a desirable weapon to accompany an army on the march, although they may be used with advantage in fortified positions. The weight of 50 rockets and 2 tubes would be about that of a field gun or 30 shell, or of no less than 12,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. A rocket is more calculated to frighten than hurt, although I once used it with signal effect against a kraal occupied by the Zulus, coming through the fence, and scattering the defenders in fine style; there is no reason why a field gun should not have done the same.

The Gatlings were used at Inyezane and Gingilhovo with considerable success, and no difficulty whatever was found in the working of the machinery connected with them.

I will now attempt a description of the method adopted to transport Colonel Pearson's column across the Tugela River, as it was a task entirely designed and executed by the Navy.

At the place selected, the river was 200 yards broad, and although easily crossed by a pontoon, or by wading up to the armpits in fine weather, became quite impassable when swollen by the rains commonly prevailed at the season, remaining in this state several days at a time. Obviously some plan must be arranged which

enable the Army with all its stores, and something like 200 wagons, to cross on the day appointed, whatever the state of the river, and one which would also secure constant communication between the two sides of the river during the continuance of the campaign, for the purpose of forwarding supplies and reinforcements.

Two systems were proposed; one was to place an anchor in mid stream, considerably above where it was desired to effect the crossing, and to carry a rope from it to the pontoon, which was to swing from side to side, pivoted as it were on this anchor, and aided by ropes from each bank, as occasion required.

Another plan was the one which was adopted and was found to work successfully for several months, sometimes night and day, until the water became too shallow for the pontoon to float, and until many bridges had arrived from England.

A wire 5-inch hawser was stretched across the river, and secured on one side to an anchor deeply buried in the bank, and on the other set up by a purchase, after being passed over the fork of a large tree to keep it out of the water; it could thus be tautened or slackened at pleasure. The hawser was run through two iron thimbles, allowed to travel along its entire length, long lizards being spliced into them, which were secured to bollards in the pontoon; hauling lines were attached to the thimbles close up to the hawser and carried to each bank of the river, by means of which the pontoon was pulled from one side of the river to the other, small docks being cut in each bank to receive it.

SKETCH PLAN OF PONT CROSSING TUGELA.

- A. Anchor.
- H. H. Wire hawser.
- L. L. Hauling lines.
- R. R. River.
- B. B. River bank.
- D. D. Small docks to receive pont.
- M. N. Lizards, which can be lengthened or shortened at pleasure.
- D x D. 200 yards.

In the first instance the hauling lines were worked by men afterwards the work was well and easily done by oxen.

To illustrate the dangerous nature of this river after rains, I mention that shortly before the day appointed for the passage of the Army, the hawser had been got across, the pontoon tried, and all nounced ready, when in one night the river rose and swept the away, dragging a 9 cwt. anchor out of the bank where it was brought into the middle of the river.

To underrun the wire hawser, detach it from the anchor, and haul it out again, was a work of no small difficulty and danger, and such was the velocity of the stream, that during this operation several men were swept from the pontoon into the river, where one lost his life and the others escaped with difficulty.

In a General Order, Sir Charles Pearson alluded to the conduct of two seamen who endeavoured to save the life of their comrade, as an act of bravery deserving to be publicly noticed," and continues, "The Officers and men were at the Drift yesterday, and know what dangerous rapidity the river was flowing."

So strong was the stream that it was with the utmost difficulty the hauling lines could be got across the river: indeed the only way was accomplished was by mooring a boat in the centre of the river and running the lines from her to each bank, all attempts to take the lines direct across failed, the boats carrying them being swept down the stream.

Of course iron blocks would have been better than thimbles to run along the hawser, but none suitable were to be had; the thimbles wore out and had to be frequently replaced, especially when the stream was strong and the friction great.

Later on, came the work of establishing a landing place on the East African Coast, where there is nothing in any way approaching a harbor or even a sheltered place.

A spot was selected called Durnford, where the beach was wide and clear of outlying rocks, but exposed to the full force of wind and swell from the South Indian Ocean.

Cargo boats were procured specially for the purpose, and men were to work them trained for this particular service by long experience on the dangerous bars of the East African Coast. The boats were ordinarily used for passing through the surf on this coast; they are capable of being closely battened down as the water frequently runs over them; they were fitted with strong timber heads at bow and stern, through which the hawser worked.

Three anchors were laid out, outside where the surf was breaking and strong hawsers carried from each of them through the surf to the beach, and there secured to sand anchors, buried above high water mark; the hawsers were buoyed inside the sea anchors, and the boats brought to these buoys by a steam tug when loaded. They were picked up the bight of the hawser, passed it into the places prepared for it in the bow and stern, and slipped along it to the beach, where men were in readiness to remove the freight.

The ships anchored about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles off the shore, and remained

fortable enough while the weather was fine, but had to put to sea when the breakers got up. A large quantity of stores were safely

LANDING AT DURNFORD.

- B. Shows lighter waiting to pass through surf.
- C. On the way in.
- A. Unloading.
- D. Buoys.

landed in this way, and sick men embarked, in fact it had the effect of transferring the base of operations from Durban to within a few miles of the Army itself.

Of course the men unloading the cargo boats had to work in the water. This duty fell on the Navy, whose province it is to deposit stores on the beach; but although the men were working in their flannels every alternate day from daylight to dark, no serious sickness occurred therefrom, indeed it seemed to agree with them much better than digging trenches, which seemed always detrimental to health. It is, I believe, generally allowed that constantly turning up fresh ground which contains decayed vegetable matter, is very liable to generate fever, and it is still worse if men have to sleep on ground thus newly exposed to the action of the air. This is one reason why I advocate the waterproof sheet being slept on, instead of being used as a covering.

The greater part of the Naval Brigade embarked here in July, 1879, having been landed over eight months; it had taken an active part in the war throughout, having been largely represented at the actions of Inyezane and Gingilhovo, and at the defence of Echowe, and was not unrepresented at Isandula and Ulundi. Its services were thus acknowledged by the different military commanders, viz.:

Lord Chelmsford himself came to Simon's Bay, and visited different ships, and highly complimented their crews for the work had rendered during the war.

General Crealock wrote: "I cannot part without thanking the N Brigade for their valuable assistance in bringing the campaign to end, and last, but not least, for their good work on the beach at Dford."

Sir Charles Pearson wrote: "The good services they performed most conspicuous."

Sir Garnet Wolseley, after reviewing the Naval Brigade previous embarkation, handed the Officer in command an order of the day which he expressed his very high appreciation of the services it rendered while acting on shore, stating that the conduct of all been admirable, and their bearing in action worthy of the Service which they belonged; and that in returning to their ships they will have the satisfaction of knowing that all recollections of the war would be ever associated with the Naval Brigade, which had so distinguished a part in it.

I cannot conclude this paper without a word of sympathy regret for my old comrade Commander Romilly and his gallant companions who fell in the Transvaal.

The CHAIRMAN: If any gentleman would like to offer any remarks on Captain Campbell's paper, we shall be glad to hear him, or if he wishes to put any question with reference to the subject before us, I am sure that Captain Campbell will be glad to answer them.

Captain VERNEY, R.N.: I am sure we must all thank Captain Campbell for his paper, and for the exhaustive manner in which he has dealt with the subject. I should think that no naval Officer would care in future to land men without being himself acquainted with the paper. Captain Campbell's account of the way in which they crossed the river was very interesting. I have seen in America the way in which they cross a river by means of a hawser, and I daresay many gentlemen know there is no necessity for hauling a vessel across, but by keeping her askew of the stream, the action of the water gets her across. You haul in the bow or stern hawsers, and she is carried across by the action of the stream. I should like to ask Captain Campbell whether that was not the case. The only reason for hauling that occurred to me was that it was owing to the thimbles not travelling sufficient facility, because in America they have blocks which travel. I remember a party of men landed in British Columbia; we were away from the ship three or four days, and we were all day long crossing and recrossing a rapid stream by means of a hawser, and there was never any question of hauling the pontoon across because the action of the stream always carried the pontoon across. But with every facility, and were not above 10 or 12 miles away from the ship, so that we could get all we wanted. I am sure that everyone who heard the paper must be satisfied that it shows a great deal of knowledge of the subject which Captain Campbell brought before us, and it contains a vast amount of valuable information which only gets from a practical man who has carried out the work with so much determination as Captain Campbell has.

Commander W. F. S. MANN: One point in the interesting paper we have heard seems to me very important. Captain Campbell said, "When the training action arrives training must cease." I quite agree in that, and should like to ask from Captain Campbell whether he considered the Officers and men under his command, during the operations in question, were sufficiently well trained for service on shore. I have had some experience with a Naval Brigade, and believe that the war's men, as a general rule, are good enough. A large number have been

continue to be, thoroughly trained in the gunnery ships, while the remainder receive some training in ships in commission, it being obligatory that they should be trained, to a certain extent, for service on shore. But it does not appear that such requirements are obligatory for the Officers, many of whom are not conversant with what their men have been taught; consequently, it is only those who have passed through the gunnery ships, and become great authorities on so-called gunnery matters, who know how to handle men on shore. I speak with deference before older men, but it seems to me that many of the senior Officers do not keep up such knowledge—if ever attained—so that when a Naval Brigade or detachment has to be landed for service, the command—the practical command—has often to be given to a much younger Officer than ought to be appointed; probably to a so-called Gunnery Lieutenant, because no senior Officer present “knows the drill.” I am of opinion that to prepare for shore fighting, both Officers and men should be trained on shore.¹ If it is clearly acknowledged that men-of-war’s men are to be prepared to take part in land operations, they should be trained beforehand to do so efficiently—their value would then be great. At present under the existing system—or want of it—I do not think we are in as fit state for fighting on shore as we easily might be made to do.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to ask Captain Campbell one or two questions with regard to detail. He has given us a very interesting description of the brigade to which he belonged, and his views of the necessity of Naval Brigades generally. He mentioned, as a matter of detail, that Officers and men should be provided with leggings, “coming well above the calf of the leg, so that they cannot slip down when wet.” I want to know what description of material he recommends for those leggings or gaiters, for the information of Officers in future, so that we may know what is the best material. Then, he says, “as few non-combatants as possible should be landed.” Now, Captain Campbell has not mentioned, except in the encounter with the Zulus, the signalmen. No doubt he had some signalmen with him. Perhaps he will tell us—first, how they should be armed, and, secondly, as to the necessity of their duties in the field, and the implements they employed for signaling purposes,—whether they used banners or flags or semaphores. Then, he says, “the sword-bayonet is an arm that might well be improved.” I agree with him there, but we must bear this in mind. This question has been considered before; it was not passed over, and the sword-bayonet was adopted in its present form and size to correspond with the cutlass, because, though on land the bayonet may be preferable; the primary duties of seamen are afloat, and it was thought that the short sword-bayonet, which corresponds with the cutlass, was better adapted for boarding or boat service than the bayonet. I quite know the objection he speaks of in skirmishing. Men have to keep sidgiting about to keep the sword from between their legs, and it is a great inconvenience to them; but on the whole, for naval service, I think the sword-bayonet is the better weapon of the two. Another point that I should like to ask about is the accoutrements. Within the last two or three years new sets of accoutrements have been approved for the Navy. I should like to know whether any of these were issued to Captain Campbell’s men, and if so, if he could suggest any improvements. In the old accoutrements the seaman’s belts crossed the chest, and in many cases this was found very inconvenient on the march, especially in hot weather, and men have sometimes taken them off and carried them over their shoulders. To remedy this there are now two parts to each set of accoutrements, one part for ship-board, consisting of the belt round the waist with the cutlass, and the other part is arranged in the shape of braces supporting the belt, so that they never cross the chest. I wish to know whether, if Captain Campbell had experience

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¹ I look forward to the time when proper naval barracks will be established at the principal naval ports, one of which will be the headquarters of every Officer, where he will be required to qualify in all drills after every commission; and where young seamen, after serving their time in the training ships (harbour) and squadrons at sea, will be thoroughly disciplined and trained in the use of the rifle, field-gun, &c., and how to get them into action, before joining the “sea-going” ships for service.—W. F. M.

of these, they answered the purpose for which they were intended. Then Captain Campbell says, "The 9-pr. guns were drawn by eight oxen, and for each gun there were two carts drawn by six oxen each, and containing together 160 rounds spare ammunition." Was that spare ammunition 160 rounds per gun, or for the guns landed, and what was the actual number of guns? The paper says, "out of the question that guns can be dragged by men on a march." That is perfectly true. Everybody who has had anything to do with field-guns on shore must be to that. Then, what were the vehicles alluded to—service vehicles or the ordnance vehicles of the country? I am sure we must all be very much obliged to Captain Campbell for bringing this subject before us. We all know in England at least the value of the Naval Brigades with which he was connected; and although we have heard an opinion expressed by Officers that there is no necessity for Naval Brigades, that they have no business to be landed at all, the fact is this, with our large Colonial Empire and enormous commerce all over the world, we must occasionally get into small wars, and the Navy being on the spot must be the first to commence operations. Then, of course, if the matter expands, they must be assisted when it comes to a large affair, the Army must take it up to settle it. I am sure we must all feel with Captain Campbell in his closing remarks, viz., "I cannot come without a word of sympathy and regret for my old comrade Commander Ross and his gallant companions who fell in the Transvaal."

General Sir WILLIAM CODRINGTON: May I ask a question with regard to the ammunition which was carried—I think it was mentioned that 1,500 rounds carried on pack-mules—was it in the square boxes usually used for infantry ammunition? And I should like further to ask whether they were carried sufficiently so as to be got to the troops when they were wanted up steep places, as well as the march?

Captain VERNEY: I wish to say a word about the sword-bayonet. Certainly in India our blue-jackets liked the sword-bayonet very much indeed, and were to leave the rifles behind, and to do a great deal of work with the cutlass. My experience was that their power with the cutlass was at the point, and not cutting weapon. They found in India that the natives are accustomed to cut with their swords. If you met them with the cutlass attempting to cut they would stand, but if you met them with the point they would turn and run. So there is some advantage with the cutlass. A man can leave his rifle behind and go on with the cutlass. We found our band of the greatest possible use in India. When the men were tired they could always march two or three miles further with the band. The band had a wonderfully inspiring effect on the men, under all circumstances we found them of great advantage. But the band were told that they could only go up the country if they were drilled. After the capture of Lucknow, a military Officer came to say they had captured a gun wanted some of the Naval Brigade to work it. The First Lieutenant said to me, "You take the band and work it." We went down and worked this gun. The Sepoys' own gun, and blew open the gate they were defending: so that band may be of real use in action. Then we had some engineers with us, who were invaluable, and so were the stokers. They sighted the guns, made tangent for the guns, and acted as armourers, and we found them extremely valuable. All sorts of fine work that I do not think blacksmiths could have done. Carpenters also were invaluable. They picked up all sorts of trades. They became wheelwrights, and repaired tent-poles. Of course they were drilled like the other men. Then with regard to the drill, I do not know that one ought to lay much stress upon the importance of drilling men before they go on shore. I doubt a certain amount of drill is necessary, but our men used to drill everywhere, not on the line of march. We had 40 men to a gun—they were 68-cwt.—and these men were drilled to run these guns about as hard as they could throw their legs to the ground: and at the action of Cawnpore a sight was seen that has never been before. The 68-pr. was in the front with the first line of skirmishers was remarked in the despatches that that sort of thing had never been known before. Of course that sort of drill could not be taught on board ship, but it suited to the exigencies of the time. From the experience I have had in Crimea, in India, and other places, Naval Brigades are always kindly welcomed.

the Army, and I should like to see an increase of Naval Brigades, and then I should not want so many soldiers.

Captain CAMPBELL: I have no particular objection that any company should be called a Naval Brigade, but in a large force if you permit this thing to be done you will find constant confusion; you will find Officers commanding a Brigade of so and so, and the Officers of the Army will not know who is the chief. It was found very necessary to adopt that rule. I cannot give an opinion about the method of crossing the river which Captain Verney referred to. I have never seen the plan adopted. I know it would have been quite impossible where we crossed the Tugela, for one simple reason, that the river was 200 yards broad and extremely shallow in the centre. If you had attempted to cross the river with a long hawser, and the pontoon swinging backwards and forwards at an angle to the tide, the bight of the hawser would catch the bank in the middle, and would not travel. I can understand the system being successful in a deep and narrow stream, but in that particular case it was not possible to adopt that plan. I entirely concur with the remarks of the Officer who spoke as to the training. I decline to state further whether the men who served with me were sufficiently trained or not, but there can be no doubt that the training of the Officers is very much behindhand for the purposes of landing. I should like to see the Officer on board ship detailed with the company of men with which he is to land. In the same way as the men are stationed to a gun, so the Officers should be stationed to a company. They should always be required to drill it. Take the drill out of the hands of the instructors, and insist on the Officer drilling them, and in fact let the men and Officers become acquainted with each other. Unless this is the case, you can never land in a hurry with any degree of confidence in the men and Officers. Supposing you want to throw your men on shore, unless the Officers have been in the habit of working with those men in taking command of them, you will not succeed, in my opinion. I was asked to describe the material for the leggings. We used thick canvas coated with paint, but I should think any other material would do equally well. A sailor wears heavy trousers and no braces, and it is imperative you should keep the weight off the shoulders. They were made on board by the men. The signalmen were landed with the other men, and they were extremely useful. The same signals were used as at sea. I still stick to my own opinion as to the sword-bayonet, notwithstanding the unfavourable criticisms it has received. I think for some purposes the light bayonet would be preferable.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you recommend the sword-bayonet?

Captain CAMPBELL: Those were the things we used for cutting down brushwood and grass, but I would hardly encumber a man with those things for that little use. Then something was said about the men leaving their rifles and taking the sword bayonets to fight with. That is a thing I should never consent to. The man and the rifle ought never to be parted, in my opinion. The new accoutrements were not issued to the men in my ship. I have seen them, and I think them a vast improvement. Instead of cross-belts we adopted the plan of having the belt suspended from the shoulder. The amount of ammunition carried per gun was what I stated in the paper. It was per gun and not the whole amount. The wagons and vehicle used were those hired in the country. The ammunition carried on mules was carried in canvas bags made by the sailors. I really cannot exactly remember how it was carried at this moment, but the mules travelled about with the company, always with about 1,500 rounds. I think they were carried in bags, but I cannot remember quite. They would travel anywhere and do anything. The band would be very necessary, and if the engineers and carpenters were all armed with rifles I should have no objection to have them, but any man is an encumbrance who is not armed with a rifle. As to extra Officers, they require extra servants, extra attendants, and unless they are fighting Officers they had better be left behind too I think. I cannot speak about the 40 men who were accustomed to drill in the Indian Brigade. I always found that every man that could possibly be spared was wanted for other purposes. There were no men to be spared to drill or anything else. Perhaps in another war they will have less work to do.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure you will all pass a vote of thanks to Captain Campbell for the interesting paper he has given us.

NAMES OF MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 16th Sept. and 31st December, 1882.

LIFE MEMBERS.

Sieeking, F. S., Lieut. R.N.	Neville, George, Lieut. R.N.
Swan, Joseph, Lieut. R.N.	Freeman, F. H. P. W., Lieut. R.N.
Meade, J. P., Capt. Oxford L.I.	Gildea, James, Major 4th Batt.
Pirie, George, Lieut. R.N.	Warwickshire Regiment.
Hicks, C. P. G., Commander R.N.	Wickham, H., Lieut. Scots Guard.
Horton, S. G., Lieut. R.A.	Paterson, A. M., Maj. Bedfordshir
Casement, John, Lieut. R.N.	Smith, G. R. F., Lieut. Coldm. G.
Roberts, C. F., Col. N.S.W. Artillery.	Belfield, H. E., Lieut. Rl. Munst.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Adamson, B. J. H., Lieut. R.N.	Greene, W. G., Esq., Admiralty.
Gordon, C. H., Capt. E. Kent Regt.	Jones, Harry, Mid. R.N.
Talbot, J. S., Lieut. Shropshire L.I.	Castle, E. S., Lieut. 2nd W.I. Regt.
Hawkshaw, H. B., Lieut. R.N.	Holmes, A. L. E. H., Major Ben.
Wilford, E. P., Major 3rd Battalion	Morrison, G. H., Major 5th Lanc.
Gloucestershire Regt.	Murphy, M., Major N.S.W. Artil
Byrne, Henry, Lieut. 21st Middx. R.V.	Tapper, Reginald, Lieut. R.N.
White, H. S., Lieut. R.A.	Ardagh, R. D., Major-Gen., unatt
Everard, H. E. E., Capt. 3rd Batt.	McKechnie, A. G., Commander R
Worcestershire Regt.	Nugent, G. C., Lieut. 3rd Batt. 1
Willoughby, J. F., Major 3rd Bo. Cav.	Regiment.
Montgomery, H. J. B., Paymaster R.N.	Balfour, O. B., Lieut. Scots Gds.
Buck, W. T., Lieut. Durham L.I.	Bowen, C. E. H., Lieut. Scots Gd
Anderson, J. A., Major late Victoria R.V.	Hay, Hon. A., Lieut. Scots Gds.
Carleton, G. A., Lt. Rl. Lancaster Rgt.	Morgan, H. J., Lieut. R.N.
Morris, A. W., Major Northd. Regt.	Macpherson, Sir H. T., U.C.,
Beley, C. H. H., Lieut. D.S.C.	R.C.S.I., Major-General.
Landon, Frank, Capt. 1st Essex R.V.	Lawrence, G. D. A., Lieut. Gren
Mortimer, H. B., Capt. N. Stafford. Rgt.	Finnie, R. B., Lieut. Scots Gds.
Cox, George, Major Royal Irish Fus.	Rouse-Boughton-Knight, C. A.,
Verschoyle, J. H., Lieut. Duke Corn. L.I.	Scots Gds.
Bagwell, Purefoy W., Lieut. Durham L.I.	Wigram, H. H., Lieut. Scots Gd.
Aldrich, Felham, Commander R.N.	Drummond, L. G., Lieut. Scots
Vane, F. P. F., Lieut. Scots Guards.	

ERRATUM.

No. CXVII, page 600, line 3, for ship-keeping read *log-keeping*.