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Remote Deliberative

A. Sidgwick

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MARCH 1893.

REMOTE DELIBERATIVE.

IN the December number of the *Classical Review*, a writer signing the initials J. D. adduces reasons for rejecting an account (given in my school edition of *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*) of certain optatives without *ἄν*, which I have termed the Remote Deliberative. His lucid and careful argument deserves gratitude: for it is by such discussion that these perplexing and exceptional points of syntax have the best chance of being cleared up.

J. D.'s view may be briefly summarized as follows:—

(1) He first (following Prof. Jebb on *O.C.* 170 and *Antigone* 604) sifts the instances which I have adduced of the optative without *ἄν*; and, as the result of this, he would correct all the prose examples and also *Philoktetes* 895 by inserting *ἄν*; and in *Ar. Plut.* 438 (*ποῖ τις φύγοι*;) and *O.C.* 170 (*ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθοι*;) he would (with Prof. Jebb and most editors) read the subjunctive.

(2) There would thus remain for comment two instances of direct interrogative optatives without *ἄν*, namely *Antig.* 604 (*τίς ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι*;) and *Choeph.* 595 (*τίς λέγοι*;) and five instances where the optative occurs in a subordinate clause, viz. *Agam.* 620 (*οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι*), *P.V.* 292 (*οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτω ...νείμαιμι*), *Cho.* 172 (*οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις...κέιραιτο*), *Eur. Alc.* 52 (*ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως...μόλοι*), *O.C.* 1172 (*τίς ἔστιν ὃν...ψέξαιμι*).

(3) In all he would explain the optative as *potential*: and the omission of *ἄν* he would regard as a poetic use adopted (like so many others) from Epic, or from other dialects.

(4) The subordinate instances he would explain as *relative* clauses; arguing that they all might be relative, and one of them

(*O.C.* 1172, which has *ὃν* not *ὄντινα*) would most naturally be so.

With regard to (1) I may say at once that Prof. Jebb has convinced me that the prose examples ought to be given up. The omission of *ἄν*, I now agree, is so much more likely to be an oversight of the scribe in those cases, that I should now regard them as manuscript errors to be corrected; and in any future edition of Aeschylus I should modify my statement accordingly. I further think it very probable that Prof. Jebb (and J.D.) are right in reading *τί δῆτ' ἄν δρώμ' ἐγώ*; for *τί δῆτα δρώμ' ἐγώ*; in *Philokt.* 895.

In the other two poetic instances, *Plut.* 438 and *O.C.* 170, I still hold that the optative should be retained. For the reading is supported by the best MSS. and being opposed to the ordinary use would be certain to be altered in the copies to the commoner subjunctive. Moreover (as I have said in my discussion referred to), being the expression of terror and perplexity, they come under the same head as the examples which Prof. Jebb admits: the remoter opt. is appropriate.

On (3) and (4), which contain the gist of J. D.'s contention, he has not convinced me, and I will try briefly to explain why.

Even if we assume with J. D. that in these examples the optative is potential with *ἄν* omitted, it still has to be asked—Why is *ἄν* omitted in just these two kinds and no other? We have in Homer *ῥεῖα θεός γ' ἐθέλων καὶ τηλόθεν ἄνδρα σάώσαι* (*Od.* iii. 231), a fine Potential affirmative: *οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι* (*Il.* xix. 321), a Potential negative: *κτῆματα δ' αὐτὸς ἔχους* (*Od.* i. 402), a Concessive: in Pindar *οὐ μιν διώξω, κεινὸς εἶην* (*Ol.* iii. 45), a Conditional:

why in Attic is it only the Interrogative, and one other very special form (about the analysis of which we differ) that are found without *ἄν*? It seems to me that a careful observer of language will suspect that he has not got to the bottom of the usage by simply saying '*ἄν* is omitted': but that there is probably some other instinct at work which *restricts the exceptional omission of ἄν* to just this class (or these classes) of cases.

And when we go further, and find that the corresponding use of the subjunctive as a principal verb survives in Attic (where a number of older uses do not appear) precisely in interrogative sentences, this suspicion is confirmed. *Τίς κατάσχοι*; is much more naturally allied to *τίς κατάσχη*; that to *τίς ἂν κατάσχοι*; Attic Greek, which said habitually *τί εἶπω*; *οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι εἶπω*, *οὐκ εἶχον ὅ τι εἶποιμι*, would more easily extend *τί εἶπω* to *τί εἶποιμι*, than omit an *ἄν* from a potential.

The question I am arguing is not *what is the meaning* of the phrase: on that all are agreed. It is not a question as to the *original use* of the optative: J. D. himself reminds us that in older Greek it was used without *ἄν* in various ways. What I am endeavouring to discover is the answer to the much harder question: Given an exceptional Attic use, what are its *grammatical affinities* in the normal usages?

When we pass from these to the subordinate instances, the language seems to me to give us quite as strong a lead towards the correct explanation. If these are simple cases of an *ἄν* omitted in a relative potential clause, why are they all of one kind? Why do we never find them in positive clauses? On J. D.'s principle of explanation you ought to be able to say *εἰσὶν οἱ λέγοιεν* or *ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι*, usages of which there is in Attic no trace. In the examples the principal verb is always *negative*, or, what comes to the same thing, interrogative. Why again do we find this omission of *ἄν* with the optative, not merely in subordination only to clauses actually or virtually negative, but only to *one special form* of negative phrase, *οὐκ ἔστιν* (or the logically identical *τίς ἔστιν*;)? You would expect, on J. D.'s theory, to find this abnormal optative after every variety of principal verb; and certainly (if his theory be true) on the doctrine of chances it is nothing short of startling that the principal clause in all the five instances is always of one very special kind.

The explanation I have suggested seems

to me to throw light on this restriction. It is true, as I have been careful to point out, and as J. D. further shows in a detailed analysis, that these subordinate usages are not strictly indirect interrogatives. They are, I submit, developed by analogy from the oblique deliberative: and, as frequently happens in such extensions (especially in the elastic but subtle Greek, and above all in Sophocles), while they have lost somewhat of their true character in the process, the modification still takes place along the line of the original use. It is not therefore an accident (as it would be on J. D.'s theory) that they stop with *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι*, *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις κείρατο*, and do not further extend to *ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι*, still less to *πέμπω ὅστις ἀγγεῖλαι* or any such usage. The subtle feeling of the analogy on which they are formed is still present, and arrests development, if I may so phrase it, at the recognizable point.

It may be asked why, if I maintain that the sentences are deliberatives, I attach any importance to the fact that the instances before us are all *negative*. If they are deliberative at all, it may be argued, the positive form is just as much deliberative as the negative. This of course is perfectly true; *οἶδα ὅ, τι δρῶ* is logically and grammatically as good a form as *οὐκ οἶδα ὅ, τι δρῶ*. But as a matter of fact the oblique deliberative is far more frequently found in the negative form, and it is not difficult to see the reason of this. It is inevitable that these forms should be most wanted to express the feelings of difficulty, hesitation, and embarrassment; that we should find—as we do find—'I don't know what to do' ten times as often as 'I know what to do.' And my argument is accordingly this: when we meet cases of disputed optative which are alleged on any ground to be deliberatives, and when we further find that they are all of the negative form, this is an additional argument in favour of their being deliberative, because the negative form is one into which the deliberative is from its very nature peculiarly liable to run.

The above are all the passages quoted or discussed in this connection by Prof. Jebb; and J. D. adduces no others of this class. But I should like to add two further usages, closely allied to the one I am dealing with, which I have not referred to in my Aeschylus, but which for a full treatment should certainly be brought into the discussion. They present certain fresh difficulties: but for that very reason throw (I think) fresh light on the points at issue.

I. In *Thesmophoriazousai*, 871, Euripides, in the character of Menelaos, and speaking in tragic style and diction, says

τίς τῶνδ' ἐρυμῶν δωμάτων ἔχει κράτος
ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο...;

Here it will be seen at once that, though the form is the same as τίς ἔστιν ὃν ψέξαιμι, a real difference of character exists in the sentence. He is not saying 'there is none to receive': he says 'who is king here, to receive the guests?' If this example stood alone, I dare say I should have accepted J. D.'s contention: it is far the most favourable to his view of all the examples dealt with. But having regard to the other passages quoted, and observing that the main clause is still interrogative, I think it a truer judgment to consider this example as a further development of the oblique deliberative, where the original character of the sentence is still more, nay is in reality wholly, lost. It may seem to J. D. a bold statement; but I feel confident that this further extension did really arise, again by analogy (though this time verbal and not logical), from the former extensions. In putting forward what may seem a paradox my support is this: Aristophanes *could* say τίς...ἔχει κράτος ὅστις δέξαιτο; but he could *not* have said (what on J. D.'s theory he *could* have said) Πρωτεύς ἐρυμῶν δωμάτων ἔχει κράτος ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο. No Attic example of any such optative has been adduced by J. D. or by any one else.

II. In Sophocles, *Phil.* 280, we find

ὁρῶντα...ἄνδρα οὐδὲν ἔντοπον, οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν...

and in the same play an exactly similar instance, 695,

οὐκ ἔχων...τινα...παρ' ᾧ ἀποκλαύσειεν, οὐδ' ὅς...
κατευνάσειεν

a third exactly similar, Eurip. *Iph. Taur.* 588

οὐδένα γὰρ εἶχον ὅστις ἀγγείλαι μολών

and again, *Phil.* 938

οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω.

In the two first examples the principal verb (which lies outside my quotation) is historic. The four instances therefore differ obviously from all the previously quoted examples in that the ordinary sequence is observed. We have not to explain an optative following a primary tense as we had to do in the others.

But I adduce them as examples of another, and a different, subtle modification of the

indirect deliberative, which throws light particularly on the question of interrogative *versus* relative.

The point of course is this: if they were normal deliberatives, and therefore the subordinate clause interrogative, there would in none of the sentences be an *antecedent*. The normal deliberatives would be

οὐχ ὁρῶν ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν
οὐκ ἔχων ὅς (or ὅστις) κατευνάσειεν
οὐκ εἶχον ὅστις ἀγγείλαι
οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω.

[I say ὅς or ὅστις, because the use of ὅς in indirect questions is in poetry admitted.]

But these clauses have all of them antecedents: and the presence of the antecedent obviously makes them *illegitimate* deliberatives, as it converts their oblique interrogatives ὅστις, ᾧ, ὅτῳ, *practically* into relatives. They are modified out of their proper grammar: but if I am to pronounce on their grammatical affinity, and on *the way they came into being* (which is all throughout my object), I am disposed to class them as modifications of the deliberative. I may be mistaken, but I venture to think that careful observers of Greek would agree with me that, while Sophocles allowed himself to say without misgiving ὁρῶν ἄνδρα οὐδένα ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, because of its resemblance to οὐκ εἶχεν ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, he would *not* have allowed himself to say παρῇν τις ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν or any other simple relative use aloof from the deliberative. In other words, the affinity to the deliberative was still present to his mind: and, in spite of the departure from the strict deliberative form, it should determine our classification.

My strongest point of course is the last example. It is exactly on all fours with the three optative instances in having an antecedent, and therefore in modifying the character of the ὅτῳ into a practical relative. But J. D.'s theory will wholly break down here. With the three first he might say, as before, *an* is omitted. What can he do with the *subjunctive* instance? Surely here the analogy is plain. From the common οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω comes by natural (though illegitimate) extension the exceptional οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω. λέγω is therefore, if we regard its true affinities, a deliberative modified. If so, then the other instances, which have the optative, are deliberatives modified. And in that case we only darken counsel by talking about the omission of *an*.

A. SIDGWICK.