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The Recruiting Question, Considered from a Military and a Medical Point of View

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Evening Meeting.

Monday, February 2nd, 1874.

COLONEL F. C. STEPHENSON, C.B., Commanding Scots Fusilier Guards, Chairman of the Council, in the Chair.

NAMES of MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 20th of January and the 2nd of February.

LIFE.

Josselyn, Frederick J., Captain 96th Regiment.

ANNUAL.

Stewart, J. H., Colonel R.M.L.I.	Jago, Arthur, Captain 2nd Middlesex Rifle Volunteers.
Whalley, Arthur T., Lieutenant 5th Kent Artillery Volunteers.	Sankey, M. H. P. R., Lieut. R.F.
Griffiths, A. G. F., Captain, h.-p., 63rd Regiment.	Fry, Henry P., Captain 15th Essex Rifle Volunteers.
Pigott, H. de R., Lieut.-Colonel 70th Regiment.	Allen, Frederic, Major Bengal Staff Corps.

THE RECRUITING QUESTION, CONSIDERED FROM A MILITARY AND A MEDICAL POINT OF VIEW.

By A. LEITH ADAMS, M.B., F.R.S., Surgeon-Major, London Recruiting District.

COLONEL STEPHENSON AND GENTLEMEN,
WHEN I had the honour of being invited by the Council of the Royal United Service Institution to lecture here on whatever experiences I might command in connection with the "best means of increasing supplies of recruits," I felt that my views and opinions, being more pertinently connected with the medical than the military bearings of the question, would accordingly have little to recommend them to your particular notice. But as with all subjects requiring close and careful attention, it is requisite, in order to accomplish one's work with anything like accuracy, that the collateral issues should be always taken into consideration, or, in other words, in estimating the physical capabilities of the recruit, it is necessary to fully realise the nature of the labour required of him, and the causes which have influenced the quantity and quality of supplies. Now although I cannot plead to what might be called a political acquaintance with the subject, as regards social influences and all the complications in relation to the labour market, and so forth, still, in connecting my daily duties for the last quarter of a century, with the best ideas I could apprehend, I do not find that this recruiting question, as regards its causation, is nearly so difficult of solution as many others which have engaged my attention. In fact any one accustomed to trace effects to their causes has an easy work before him, when he takes up the explanation of the present aspect of the recruiting market; but,

Gentlemen, it is one thing to discover an evil, and another to find an appropriate remedy. I dare say, before our discussions are ended, we shall have various impressions on this subject, and I do hope a successful issue is in store. With this view it has therefore occurred to me that by opening out the vexed question of "recruiting," as far as my efforts are capable, I would at all events be furnishing materials for the criticism of such as take an interest in what we must allow is a matter of National importance.

The question is assuredly a very broad one, and affords much scope for speculation, in which, if we do indulge to any extent, I trust the ideas advanced will have not only facts for their foundation, but be also practical in their application, inasmuch as nothing is more likely to produce nugatory results, than arguing altogether from notions; moreover, I need scarcely add, that in a free and open discussion on such an important subject, it behoves us to lay aside all ulterior prejudices, and look on the matter at issue purely from the standpoint from which all debateable subjects should be considered in this room. This leads me as a worker in a different groove of science from the generality of gentlemen who fill this chair, briefly to express my humble appreciation of the value to the Army and Navy of this admirable Institution, the aim and object of which must necessarily tend to inculcate a more extensive spirit of inquiry, and to encourage officers to exchange ideas on subjects which cannot prove otherwise than beneficial to themselves and to the public services. It has been said of the military as well as of other professions, that a scientific acquaintance with details is apt to create a dislike for practical routine, but we should bear in mind that all art is connected with science, and that no science is worthy of the name which does not serve as a foundation for practice; indeed it would seem, if there is danger of any evil, one way or the other, that the greatest disposition of the present day is either an incapacity or an unwillingness to look on one's profession in any other light than that of a serviceable craft. The gigantic progress made by science of late years has been nowhere more apparent than in the profession of arms; indeed, considering warlike inventions alone, it would almost seem, that if war and strife between nations will ever cease, they are just as likely to be made impossible by science as by diplomacy; moreover, looking at Western Africa at this moment, and at the work which is being accomplished by the distinguished Commander and his selected companions in arms, and chiefly to the great war lately played out on the continent of Europe, it might well be said, that, however much military success may have heretofore been dependent on brute force and the chapter of accidents, it is in these instances owing to a profound acquaintance with the science of warfare; not only the mere knowledge that comes to us from routine and the exercise of common sense, but from minute and careful study of the subject in all its ramifications and details. In the same way, I feel that the theme of this lecture should be treated; but I am afraid it is beyond my powers, even if time would allow, to do anything like justice to the main facts, much less to enter into particulars.

The most dismal and desperate view of the aspect of our Army at

the present time is that which associates the physical degeneracy of the soldier with a general falling off in the strength and stamina of the population.

Thus there is an impression that the British soldier is no longer the man he was, and that if England had to take up arms suddenly, she would find herself at a very great disadvantage with other armed Powers; moreover, it is also asserted that the evil portends the coming decline, not only of our military renown, but is a sign of national decay.

Now gloomy and exaggerated as are these forebodings, there is no gainsaying the fact that the numbers and quality of recruits have been steadily declining of late years, more so since the introduction of short service, and the doing away with pension and bounty on enlistment. Many of us can call to remembrance the days, now long gone by, when the recruiting sergeant, prim, and like a nine-pin, stalked down the street on market day, with his colours "gaily streaming," and the country bumpkin, in blouse, and often much the worse for convivialities, but not a little proud of the ribbons pinned to his cap, went off to join the good old *dépôt* companies, or the head-quarters. Scarcely a ghost of those times is left. A few smart lads of 5 feet 7 inches in height were then only required, now we are in need of many of a much lower standard, and cannot get them. No doubt the old *régime* had its faults and weak points, but the stratum of citizenship on which the sergeant practised was superior, both morally and physically, to that from whence the majority of recruits are now obtained. Indeed, ever since the Crimean war, there has been a steady falling off in the recruiting market, not only as regards the supply, but the physical capabilities of the men. The causes of the evils are numerous. It would be absurd indeed to ascribe them to any one cause in particular, whilst by allowing for the great social changes of the last 20 years, and the vast increase in wages and in emigration, there is no difficulty in seeing that in order to obtain soldiers, we must compete with the labour-market. Again, it must be remembered that we are not a military people, and every year is somehow, making the Briton less and less disposed to sacrifice his inherited love of freedom for the necessary restraint which, as a matter of course, is inseparable from efficient military organization.

Emigration has also contributed, especially in Ireland, to thin the superstratum of stalwart youths, who, in rags and tatters, were wont to crowd the barrack gates, begging for military service.*

The days are past and gone, some say beyond redemption, when the

* This is amply shown by comparing the total number of recruits inspected in the United Kingdom during 1872 and 1860. Thus per 1,000—

1872.		1860.	
England and Wales furnished	820.0	England and Wales furnished	566.0
Scotland	100.8	Ireland.....	321.0
Ireland.....	72.4	Scotland	107.0
Colonies	6.8	Colonies	6.0
	<hr/> 1,000		<hr/> 1,000

adjutant turned them away by dozens, and when the recruiting sergeant would not look at the aspirant he is now glad to obtain; moreover, the class of labourers who, 20 years ago, could scarcely keep body and soul together, are far above accepting military service, at all events under the present conditions. It was all very well during "the long peace," when the Army was a mere skeleton, as compared with the present, and recruits were very plentiful; then, our infantry was the finest in Europe; indeed the linesman and marine of those days was about as perfect, as regards stature and muscular development, as could be wished, seeing that the average height of many battalions was 5 feet 7 inches. By the side of such men, the French infantry soldier looked a dwarf; indeed as regards the latter no one who has seen the puny linesman of the late Imperial Army in full marching order, but must have been impressed with the belief that he was ridiculously overweighted; and from all accounts his *physique* materially deteriorated after the Crimean war, so as to contrast in a remarkable manner with his late foeman.

I have heard it repeatedly suggested, that, in order to secure perfect bodily efficiency on enlistment, no man should be taken in our Army under 20 years of age, or under 5 feet 6 inches in stature, so that we would begin with a standard of height several inches in advance of that of any of the great European Powers. The fact is, some critics, without taking the great social and political changes of late years into account, are apt to measure the requirements of the present day with their experiences of the past. Thus, I repeat, it was all very well in times gone by, when few soldiers were wanted, and there were more candidates than vacancies; but now it would appear, even with the most reasonable offers, that the demands could not be met by men of this age and height.

When we attempt to compare the relative heights of the soldiers of various countries, it is apparent that a great deal must be allowed for the constitutional or race peculiarities of a people and the system pursued. Looking at the capacities of the human frame, and judging from what one knows of the physical powers of the Anglo-Saxon, I apprehend that our minimum military standard of height, although apparently high as compared with that of either France or Germany is, considering all things, on the border line of the physical efficiency of our people. I will explain this better presently. In the mean time I beg to direct your attention to the lowest military standard of height in the British, German, and French Armies, as shown in this Table:—

	Minimum Height.	Minimum Age.	Duration in Active Army.	Duration in Reserve.
British	61·5	18	6	6
German.....	61·8	20	3	4
French	60·3	20	5	4

Now with reference to two of the most important elements of

physical efficiency, viz., age and height, it will be observed that whereas of the three armies, England employs the youngest, the French use the shortest men in warfare, both weighty considerations from a medical point of view. It must at the same time be remembered, that, however short, the conscript must be twenty years of age, whereas a large number of our recruits are under eighteen. Again, although our minimum standard of height at present is considerably in advance of every other European Army, excepting Sweden (also in part composed of volunteers), it does not prove that we would get the same efficiency by reducing our standard to their level.

In an Army dependent on a voluntary system for supplies, more especially if the service is unpopular or the numbers apt to fluctuate, it becomes necessary to extend the range to the limits compatible with efficiency so as to afford scope for selection. The limits of age in our service are 18 and 25, whereas the same in the Swedish ranges from* 17 to 30; indeed, practically the latter may be said to represent the true ages of a large number of our recruits who nominally state that they are 18 or 25 years of age. It must nevertheless be borne in mind that, whatever difficulties accompany voluntary systems of enlistment, selection can be practised to an extent incompatible with the rules of conscription.

With regard to the stature of various nations, and to what anthropologists designate race characters, there are pronounced differences in *physique* as well as in relative powers of endurance.

For instance, a people of low stature may be as physically fit to accomplish deeds of arms as a larger stock, there being differences in the relative capacities of the chest and other organs in various nations. I will give you an instance which came under my own notice. The Tartars of Thibet are a race of very low stature, yet they have in proportion very large chests, which in all probability have been acquired by breathing the rarefied atmosphere of the elevated regions they frequent. Again, a very distinguished Frenchman tells us that "if we draw a line passing by Cherbourg and Nice, we shall divide France into two distinct zones as regards the appearance and height of the inhabitants. In the south-west, the ancient Celtic population is of small height, as is proved by the great number of military exemptions."†

Now allowing the Celtic character, I cannot help believing that a height of five feet with even a fair proportion as regards weight and

* The minimum age and height in the Roman Army was 17 and 5 ft. 3 in. When the recruit had completed his drill, he was tattooed on the hand with a mark (*puncta signorum*). Vegetius lays down specific rules for the examination of recruits (*tirones*).

† Pouchet on the "Plurality of Races," and Broca "Recherches sur l'Ethnologie de la France." This author places the tallest peoples of Europe as follows:—The Anglo-Saxon, German, Norwegian, and Albanian; the shorter varieties being the Southern French and Spaniards, Irish, and Maltese. I agree with the English translation of Pouchet's work that the inhabitant of the south of Spain is not small, and as regards the Irish, the same may be said. The Maltese have a great deal of Arab blood in their veins, and although of low stature as compared with Englishmen, are wiry, and display considerable powers of endurance.

chest at 20 years of age, is a low standard for military efficiency. Indeed as regards our race as it exists in the British Isles, I feel convinced that not one man in ten of that standard would be found eligible for the wear and tear to which our soldiers are subjected. The question of tall and short races of men depends therefore on the characters natural to a people; at the same time, should the race be subjected to debilitating influences such as obtain in crowded cities, or a long and continuous drain on its youth through the requirements of war and emigration, whereby the able-bodied portion of the population is taken away, the natural consequences so far must be a deterioration of the race as regards *physique*. Now although as a nation we are yet strong and vigorous, still there cannot be a doubt as regards Ireland, that a serious flow of her able-bodied youth has been setting towards America for many years, so much so, that it may be a State question, sooner or later, how the drain could be prevented. Looking at the steady decadence in the number of recruits furnished by Ireland now as compared with the past, it might be fairly asked, is the same stamp of soldier of twenty years ago still as numerous on his native soil? Is it the case or not that our race in other lands is draining the life blood of the old country and leaving the stunted and infirm behind?

The point, however, which concerns us practically is how far emigration, coupled with political influences, have affected recruiting? As regards England and Scotland, it is quite evident that an unprecedented demand for labour of all sorts and an advancing rate of wages have absorbed the bulk of the able-bodied youth who would have enlisted in former years, so that failing them, the physical standard had to be lowered, and we have been driven more or less to select soldiers from among a class of the population notorious for containing elements of physical degeneracy; for example, the pallid yet intelligent and active lad frequently met with in cities, precocious for his years, and indicating an advance in his real age, can be easily obtained of a standard between 5 feet and 5 feet 5 inches in height. The weight of such an individual is seldom over eight stone, and considering the smallness of his bones, he is fairly covered, but there is altogether a want of vigour and that healthy promising aspect which should characterise a youth of his years. These lads attain their full growth before 20, and rarely increase an inch between 18 and manhood.

Now during war, panics and sudden augmentations, when the standard height is reduced to 64 inches, a large number of these men get admission into the service; in truth it is then more than on any other occasion that there is a danger of introducing inefficiency into the ranks. I desire particularly to indicate this type of ineligible recruit, as he belongs to that unimproveable, stunted and staminaless race met with in crowded cities, and which always indicates a falling off from the standard of physical efficiency; if therefore there is one plea for the maintenance of a Reserve more cogent than another, it is that deducible from these very facts.

Now, if I have made this aspect of the question sufficiently clear, you will perceive that it has important bearings on recruiting. Thus,

the low stature of the soldiers of France as compared with that of other countries, may not be so much a measure of policy, as of necessity, when we think of the terrible drain on the able-bodied portion of the population made by warfare alone, during the last 70 or 80 years. Moreover, it must be conceded that a competition unexampled in history has been going on for many years between the New and Old Worlds, and whilst many laugh at the very idea of exhaustion and assert that only superfluous populations are emigrating, others throw out opinions that unless this exodus is checked, our race as it exists in Great Britain will insidiously go on declining in numbers and in stamina. There is no more obscure problem than that which seeks to demonstrate the causes of the extinction of races of man, and statistics unfortunately do not bridge over the difficulty; for after all it is not the numbers we desire so much to compare as the vigour of the race, for the former might double themselves, and yet the race be inferior in physical strength. I merely indicate these points in order to show that in framing any scheme for levying soldiers by the selection of the ablest portion of a population, and more especially should the levies be volunteers like our recruits, it is requisite to weigh duly all the causes and influences which have hitherto impeded or furthered supplies. Looking at the physical capabilities of the Anglo-Saxon, it is probable that any standard under 64 inches in height would bring very few recruits of the minimum age or even up to 21 of sufficient muscular development.

A good deal of course depends on the normal standard of individuals, but, from a mass of data, I have come to the conclusion that about 3 inches is a fair allowance for growth between 17 and 26 years of age; so that a lad of 64½ or 65 inches in height at 17 or 18 should be 67 or 68 inches in height at 26 years of age. This was the average height of the finest infantry battalions before 1854. Again, no man of 21 years of age with a height of 64 inches is likely to add more than, or even as much as, one inch afterwards. It will therefore, I think, be found that our most able-bodied soldiers have shown at least a height of 66 inches before 21 years of age.

A well-nourished lad between 17 and 18 should therefore be from 64 to 65 inches in height, and 9 stone in weight; indeed, looking at the hazards incurred in accepting a lad of 17 and 64 inches in height, it should be made a rule that such an individual ought to weigh at least 130 lbs.

In estimating the physical capabilities of the soldier, there are no more important elements of proficiency than the relations of weight and height, to age. Unfortunately, however, the majority of our recruits are not in their normal bodily conditions, as every one knows, who has observed the marvellous progress frequently made in the weight of lads after joining their regiments. Of course, there is no laying down rules applicable to every case, but looking at the requirements of the various branches of the service and the general principles which seem to indicate the stamp of man best suited for them, I have from time to time made selections of such recruits as appeared to me typical specimens of cavalry, artillery, and infantry soldiers at the age of 25. As examples, the following may be of some interest:—

a. The type of the infantry soldier is assuredly best seen among the agricultural and labouring classes. His matured height is from 5 ft. 7 in. to 5 ft. 8 in., chest-girth, 36 in.; and weight from 145 to 150 lbs. The circumference of the thigh at the middle being 21 in., and the forearm 11 in. The man of 5 ft. 5 in. in height should weigh 126 lbs., and give a chest-girth of 34 in.

b. The rifleman of 5 ft. 4 in. should possess a minimum chest-girth of 35 in., and weigh 130 lbs.; the thigh and forearm girths being 20 and 11 in. respectively. Such men would form the *élite* of the 60th Rifles and the Rifle Brigade, and make excellent artillery drivers.

c. The gunner required for heavy ordnance and the heavy dragoon, should not be under 5 ft. 7 in. or 5 ft. 8 in. The former would be admirably represented in a man 5 ft. 9 in. in height, weight 160 lbs., chest 37 in., with a girth of thigh and forearm of 21 and 11 in.;

d. A splendid regiment of heavy dragoons could be made up from men 5 ft. 9 in. in height, 140 lbs. in weight, with a chest-girth of 36 in., and thigh and forearm of 19 and 10 in.

e. The lancer requires a long arm and leg, more so than the hussar, from the differences in the nature and use of their weapons. The type of the former is displayed in a man about 5 ft. 9 in. in height and 35 in. in chest-girth, with rather small limbs and weight of 140 lbs.; thigh and forearm, 16 and 10 inches. The lower limb of such a man should measure about 38 inches from the fork.

f. What may be called the typical hussar stands about 5 ft. 6 inches in height, is 132 lbs. in weight, with a chest of 35, and thigh and forearm of 19 and 10 inches.

In fact, it is the harmony between age, weight and stature, which constitutes the greatest perfection of bodily development.

I now pass on to the consideration of the age of the recruit.

It is quite a mistake to suppose that the recruit is, on an average, younger now than formerly, for during the operation of the unlimited and 10 years' service warrants, lads were taken at 17 years of age provided they were 5 feet 6 inches in height. Thus in 1815, for example, out of 1,000 recruits 750 were under 20 years of age, whereas in 1873 there were only 580 per 1,000.

Thus, more youths were enlisted in those times than now. But it must be borne in mind that there are great discrepancies in the heights and weights in these two periods. Taking the height, I find from numerous calculations that the ratio was as follows:—

	1815.	1873.
Under 66 inches	105	364
Between 66 and 67 inches	473	433
" 67 " 68 " 	204	111
" 68 " 69 " 	111	62
" 69 " 70 " 	74	15
" 70 " 71 " 	16	12
" 71 " 72 " 	17	3
Total	1,000	1,000

I will not take up time with further proofs on this head. Suffice it to say, that these youths of 17 were superior in *physique* to the majority of the recruits of 18 we are now accepting.

In addressing an audience composed more or less of members of a different profession from my own, it is not easy to simplify technical data; and yet I feel that in making assertions I should be in a position to support them by facts. I trust, however, you will accept the truth of what I am about to state with reference to the recruit and young soldier, viz., that in the whole range of science there are few data more firmly established than those which refer to the growth and capability of the human frame.* But the cumulative experiences of all great military commanders bring the matter home to us in a clearer and more practical way. Napoleon, Wellington, and all competent observers since their day, have constantly inveighed against growing lads being considered capable of enduring the hardships and fatigues of warfare; consequently, in armies raised by conscription, the minimum military age has been fixed at twenty. Now, in our service it has hitherto been impossible to meet the most ordinary demands by recruits of this age, and looking to the present state of the labour-market, it seems scarcely likely, even with the best inducements, that the majority of recruits will be over 19 years of age.

It is right, however, in estimating the physical capabilities of the young soldier of to-day, to bear in mind that, whatever remains to be done, a great deal has been accomplished of late years in improving his physical, social, moral, and intellectual qualities. The dress and accoutrements are better adapted to his duties in various climates; to wit, the old knapsack has been replaced by a better pack, less cumbersome to his movements, and not so heavily laden; his bodily powers are developed by well-directed exercises. Schoolmasters, libraries, reading rooms, and out-door recreations are all within his grasp, whilst his dietary and barrack-room have been much improved; indeed, as far as his creature wants and requirements of health are concerned, there is no doubt whatever that he is in advance of the soldier of every other country. Again, we have seen that it was the custom in former times, when the political state of Europe did not call for a large British Army, and when recruits were plentiful, to select only men of large stature; but in those days there were no camps, no manœuvres, or one-half of the trying work to which our young soldiers are now exposed, so that the lad of 17 grew up to manhood in easy country quarters with far fewer chances of getting his frame over-taxed than the youth of the present day; moreover, physically he was better fitted to withstand the strain. Now it seems to me most advisable that, for duty purposes a very broad line should be drawn between the nature of the immature and of the fully developed soldier. This is a subject on which I could enlarge to an extent that would prove beyond cavil, that it is not only pernicious to the interests of the service, but also cruel to expect a lad in his "teens" to do the work of a full-grown man. I speak emphati-

* See an excellent little pamphlet on the "Growth of the Recruit and Young Soldier," by Professor Aitken, of the Army Medical School, Netley, published by Bohn and Co. 1862.

cally on the matter from a consciousness that the evil consequences of over-work, although apparent to the surgeon, are not sufficiently estimated by many military men. At the same time there cannot be a doubt that with a voluntary system of enlistment and the requirements of the country, we shall never be enabled to obtain recruits of matured years; nor need this necessarily be a matter of regret. At present many promising lads of 17 pass themselves off as 18 years of age, and as they form the largest number of recruits who seek to enter the service from choice alone, consequently they are the more likely to remain, whereas older men having taken to remunerative employments, rarely enlist except through pressure of circumstances. Now, as Professor Parkes justly observes in his admirable work on Military Hygiene, "If the State will recognise the immaturity of the recruit of 18 years of age, and will proportion his training and his work to his growth, and will abstain from considering him fit for the heavy duties of peace and for the emergencies of war till he is at least 20 years of age, then it would seem that there is not only no loss but a great gain by enlisting men early."

The question, therefore, comes to be, "How is this to be done?" Already a step in the same direction has been accomplished by sending only men of 20 years of age to tropical service. Is it visionary to propound a doctrine of the following description? Considering that very many lads of promising *physique* can be obtained of 17 years of age, what are the objections to enlisting a limited number and (as in the Navy) training them to their profession until they are capable of serving with the colours?

If, as it appears from the views I apprehend regarding the recruit of to-day, that by the principles of a voluntary system we shall always be subject to the acceptance of lads in their "teens", why should we not look the difficulty in the face and meet it by appropriate measures? But there are other obstacles to be overcome. At present, what with all the larger recruits being taken for cavalry and artillery, and the sending men of 20 years of age to India and the colonies, the home battalions of infantry are composed more or less of lads under 20 years of age, and men of small frames.

Taking our race-characteristics into account, it seems to me that the grand aim at all hazards should be to maintain a height of not less than 5 feet 7 inches for the soldier at his prime of life, which is about six-and-twenty. This, of course, will best be accomplished by extending the field for selection, or, in other words, creating better inducements to enlist. Now I must candidly assert that the *physique* of our infantry is not at present up to the standard of our race, and I cannot conceal from myself a feeling that unless remedial measures are adopted, it will sink lower and lower. This conclusion has been arrived at mainly from my personal inspection of about 25,000 recruits, over 17,000 of whom have been passed into the Army. But it needs neither numbers nor minute observation to demonstrate the facts of the case, and I need not waste time by further demonstrations. Before, however, passing to the remedial measures, I may dismiss this portion of the subject by an aphorism established by no

less an authority than the Duke of Wellington, viz., "that the power of the greatest armies depends upon what the individual soldier is capable of bearing and doing." Indeed, if reduced to mere numbers and improvidence of life, a nation might always assemble bodies of its undeveloped youth and undergrowth, and accomplish great deeds at a reckless waste of numbers, but strength and efficiency are only to be obtained by a careful selection of the best developed, or in other words, scrupulous attention to the physical capabilities of individuals. Considering, therefore, the very varied and trying duties our soldiers in comparison with those of every other country are called on to perform, it must, I think, be justly conceded, that they should now as much as ever, be in possession of the stamina of the best of their bygone race. Better, weak battalions of able-bodied men than strong regiments of small men and striplings.

It may seem that I have dwelt at unnecessary length on the physical requirements of the recruit, and on points of small import in event of the supplies being greatly increased, so as to allow of better selection. This may be true or the opposite, and I shall be glad to find that the errors and evils I have just indicated will be rendered impossible by the provisions of some well-assorted recruiting scheme. But if there is any reliance to be placed on the signs of the times, it appears more than doubtful if the moneyed interests of this country will admit of a large number of the *élite* of the population spending the prime of their lives in military service; indeed, "the recruiting-question" has an important political element in its composition; and here it is that I feel my inability to grasp its bearings. All that anyone in such a position can hope is, that the nation, spurred on to a sense of right and duty, will not stop short in accomplishing measures which shall put an end to all makeshifts; in fact, a straightforward business transaction, when the recruit exactly knows his choice, or, in other words, a compact based on the broad sound principles which should guide every citizen in the discharge of the duty he owes to himself and to his fatherland.

It would be quite beyond the compass of an hour's discourse to detail the numerous individual schemes for bettering supplies of recruits for the Active and Reserve Forces. If I succeed in pointing out the main points at issue, and their collateral relations, I shall feel I have so far accomplished my task, which is to sum up as many facts and ideas as possible, and put them before you in a manner calculated to draw forth the impressions of individuals who have devoted attention to the "recruiting-question" in all its manifold phases. This question must in the nature of things be exceedingly extensive and complicated; indeed, the very fact of maintaining an Army equally for home and foreign service, on a system of voluntary enlistment, is singular in itself. Moreover, looking backwards into time, and into the lap of the future, and by comparing the social conditions of the past and present generations, the increased and increasing demand for skilled and unskilled labour, together with the allurements of new countries, it may fairly be asked on the threshold of our inquiry, Will any plan succeed short of compulsory service?

Now, with reference to the incentives which have hitherto guided recruits more or less on entering the Army, we find much difference. All do not argue one way. Many think less of the daily pay than their future prospects; others cannot realize Short Service and the Reserve. "Once a soldier always a soldier" is, I find, a well-known rejoinder to the recruiting sergeant's endeavours to put a gloss on the prospect by showing that after six years' service with the colours he will join the Reserve on the retaining fee of 4*l.* per diem, and be enabled at the same time to pursue the trade or calling he practised before enlistment. To me there seems a ring of prophetic import in this, I may call stereotyped, reply of the recruit of to-day; at all events, it appears to carry this meaning; that, whatever allurements are held forth, six years' active service followed by a return to civil life, should be made on better terms. Again, a very large number enlist quite regardless of any pay or prospect considerations, and altogether through pressure of some kind or other; and there is a class who, knowing the facilities in the way of desertion now-a-days, enter at one door and go out at the other. Moreover, recruiters allege that the military ardour which stimulated many a youth to take the shilling, is now gratified in the ranks of the Volunteers, and doubtless the bounty enticed not a few of the reckless, who would have willingly deserted a week afterwards and taken any number more, but for the dread of being flogged and tattooed, which explains more or less the cause of the increasing desertions. Hence, as far as a round sum on enlistment is concerned, it is extremely doubtful if such a measure should be reverted to; however, it is well worthy of consideration how far the principle might be carried out with reference to the future of the soldier. Thus, it has been suggested to give a lump sum on completion of the period of active service, whatever that should be, so as to start him when he settles down in civil life, the idea being that the recruit can safely look forward to be better off when he leaves the Army than when he joined it. One of the simplest and most feasible suggestions of this description is to add say 2*l.* a-day to the present pay. This sum is to be allowed to accumulate, and be credited to the soldier monthly in the regimental savings-bank and in his ledger, and to be only payable after discharge, or, in the case of death, to the next of kin. Again, in case of a soldier being permitted to re-engage for a second period of service, his accumulated pay should remain in the savings-bank at interest till his death or discharge, and the extra 2*l.* per diem be paid to him as an augmentation to his pay. Thus in completing his service for pension, he would have a nest-egg,* besides the pension, and, considering all things, what better prospects should he expect?

A novel and ingenious scheme, under the somewhat unprofessional designation of "co-operative enlistment," has lately been propounded. Like many other mental views of the recruiting question, it looks also very well on paper; but I must confess that I do not see how or why

* At six years' service, the sum would be about £20. There are considerations, however, in keeping interest accounts for a large number of men, not only troublesome, but in field service absolutely difficult; however, the paymaster would, no doubt, be equal to the emergency in this case.

we should rate the work to be done by the soldier in such a commercial, speculative, and actuary-like way. Surely the grandeur and greatness of this country are of some consideration, not to mention the feeling of patriotism, which, in spite of all wrongs unredressed, should be uppermost in the heart of every Briton. Now, allowing these their rightful share, however small, it next comes to be a question for consideration, what moneyed interests will best secure the services of the working man? Not by out-of-the-way projects, but 1st, by some extension of, or improvement in, the prevailing system. 2nd. In the event of the latter proving utterly impracticable, by the next best scheme, founded on experience, and recommended by persons who have devoted their best attention to the subject in all its particulars.

The Short Service and Reserve Act of 1871 aimed at, 1st, improving the social position of the soldier; 2nd, mobilising the Active and Reserve forces; 3rd, popularising the Army; and, 4th, forming an efficient Reserve. The question comes to be, How far has it met these important requirements? As to its good intentions, there can be but one opinion, and had the enrolment been compulsory, there could scarcely be two notions on the likelihood of success. With reference to the third, it is clear that the experiment of popularising the Army has yet to be tried. Indeed, of all the influences which of late years have acted with increasing strength in making military service unpopular, none have been more potent than the disparaging accounts disseminated by soldiers themselves, and in particular the very men who formed the nucleus of the Reserve, for the reason that many were indignantly discontented when serving with the colours, and thus, disliking their work, readily volunteered for the Reserve, where have done little else than grumble and dissuade others from following their footsteps. Lastly, as regards the formation of an efficient Reserve, it is apparent that the provisions of the scheme are defective in several important bearings.

It is not always safe to trust to individual impressions on affairs of life, however experienced the authority may be, and one must not reckon too much on the discernment of the past in regard to the requirements of the present generation. I believe, however, the following aspects of the recruiting-question, as regards the Short Service and Reserve Act of 1871, deduced more or less from the opinions of practical observers, and substantiated to a considerable extent by events, will be found worthy of your consideration.

Take as an example a lad nominally 18, but, like the majority of recruits, virtually about 17 years of age, without any fixed occupation. What are his prospects on enlistment? At the age of 22, just when he feels himself well up to his work, and after realising the vicissitudes of Army service, he is suddenly called upon to give up a life of certainty for one of uncertainty, with a retaining fee of 4*d.* per diem, to begin some new career without a coat to his back. Who is to employ this man, subject to be removed at any time? or is he likely to retain himself? It has been proposed to open up all available Government appointments for men of the Reserve, which, however, is only one way of employing them.

Again, if the recruit be a tradesman, he will find six years just enough to make him at all events rusty, as regards his former craft, with the same eventuality awaiting him as in the last case.

Supposing the recruit pursues a trade when in the Army, will that make him in anyway more bound to the Service when in the Reserve?

I have stated that a great many, indeed, perhaps the majority of recruits enlist through pressure of circumstances, very often within their own control, and frequently of their own making. But be that as it may, if the ranks were always the last resort, they are now more than ever the cathedra for persons who cannot or will not help themselves. Can we therefore in justice to human nature, expect great things under such circumstances? To me, one of the strangest anomalies in ethical science is the military ore before the slag has been removed, and afterwards when refined by discipline and training. Our forefathers, understanding the class of society from whence recruits were obtained, made suitable rules; we, wishing to improve the material, have suddenly abrogated these rules, and still the same, nay even a lower residuum of society has enlisted, accompanied, as might be expected, by increasing desertions. But I need not take up time in recounting what all practical observers know much better than I can tell them; suffice it to say that in looking to the past, with the eventualities of the future, to wit, war and invasion panics, however much the Act of 1871 has fallen short of its good intentions, there surely cannot be a doubt that no plan will now-a-days be more than half perfect, which does not provide for an efficient Reserve of some sort.

A good many Officers of experience are of opinion that service in the Reserve should be made optional, but in the very face of this proposition, is the danger of the latter dwindling down to insignificance. Again, it is suggested that the soldier should receive a small bounty in the first place, and that he should, when he re-engages receive additional pay. There is an opinion also that the purchase money should be reduced so that the soldier might save up his earnings and buy himself off honestly, instead of resorting to desertion. Some authorities advocate a free ration, and I have often heard a strong impression among Officers and old soldiers, that the pay, position and prospects of the Non-commissioned Officer should be materially improved, so as to make the grade worthy of the consideration of a respectable class of tradesmen.

It is also advised that railway, steam-boat, warehouse, and numerous other mercantile as well as Government appointments, should be freely bestowed on pensioners. Moreover, besides these and other suggestions in relation to the pay and prospects of the soldier, it might be fairly asked, is there any way by which his social position could be improved? I refer particularly to civil rights. Why should not a soldier who serves or has served his country, enjoy by virtue of his calling, certain social privileges beyond his compeer in civil life? Our soldiers go forth to battle, and after sweltering in deadly climates return to their native land to receive no more consideration, if actually as much, as the meanest citizen; indeed, disregard is a mild meaning for the public

mode of estimating the indebtedness towards him, who is always ready to give up his life for his country!—

“The brave poor soldier ne’er despise,
Nor count him as a stranger,
Remember he’s his country’s stay,
In day and hour of danger.”

It is a full century since this reproach was penned by one of his own order—a common ploughman! at the same time, one of the greatest geniuses of our country; and yet it is left to us and to the like of us, to be hinting that it might be well to make amends for the neglect of our predecessors.

The Militia has hitherto been the natural Reserve, indeed the fountain head of the active forces, and in times of pressure the chief recruiting mart. Its machinery also admits of much amplitude, and in consequence is capable of being made beneficial to the active Army not only in the way of ordinary supplies, but as a Reserve. This is a subject however I cannot venture to discuss at any length. Indeed, supposing I was capable, it is manifest that, considering the specific differences between the military and civil elements in both services, there are many prejudices to be overcome. I well remember during the Indian Mutiny when employed in beating up for recruits in conjunction with a military Officer, that we happened to visit a very well-known Militia regiment. After the orderly-room work was over, and we had succeeded in obtaining a few volunteers, the Commanding Officer said to us, “Gentlemen, I hope you have been successful; and “my Adjutant is reconciled to his fate; but for the last twelve months “we have always been experiencing the sad truth of Ovid’s words, “‘*Sic vos non vobis nificatis aves.*’”

Now how is this reconciliation to be diverted towards the necessities of the active Army, not only in the case of the Militia but also of the Volunteers? Certainly not by making the three services more and more independent of each other; but on the contrary, by every effort compatible with expediency to bring them into the closest relationship; that is, supposing the Militia should be considered as the mainstay of the active Army. The impressions of experienced Militia Officers on this head seem to bear all in one way. If the Militia is to be efficiently utilised, it is the opinion of several with whom I have communicated, that the Militiaman’s “enlisting bounty” should be continued, and also the “training bounty,” for the reason that he enlists usually when work is slack, and the latter is his pocket-money when he has passed through his instruction. In fact, as has been shown with reference to the soldier at the termination of his first period of active service, it is suggested that a little liberality at the proper time, and the exercise of the priceless commodities—tact and common sense—will accomplish wonders, and knowing from observation how very little turns the scale when the soldier has completed his first engagement, I can well believe that a little inducement to serve on, would in the main be of advantage to the Army. No doubt your discussions will elicit many important facts and suggestions I am incapable of even indicating, more especially the best ways and modes

of securing a regular flow of recruits from the Militia into the active Army, and how the regular soldier could complete his service for pension in the Militia, should the latter become the Reserve of the former? As regards the bond of union considered advisable to be cultivated between the Active and the Reserve Forces, it has been very emphatically represented to me by a Militia Officer of experience, that every consideration ought to be shown towards regiments when called out for training, that instead of subjecting them at inclement seasons to the discomforts of tent life, they should be placed in barracks, and that the Militia and regular recruits should be drilled together as much as possible. Moreover, that the training should not only be conducted with the regular forces, but that every exertion should be made to supply the Militia with well-instructed Non-commissioned Officers, so as to correlate the two services as much as possible.

It would be useless and uncalled for at present to enter on any discussion relating to the advisability of service in either the Regular or Reserve Forces being made compulsory; at all events until the best directed measures compatible with the interests of the country have been proved insufficient; then it will surely be full time to bring home to every citizen that he has a country to defend and colonies to protect. Be that however as it may, the military historian must always dwell with pride and satisfaction on the past achievements of our Armies raised and maintained by a voluntary system. This indeed displays the unique position England has hitherto held in regard to the formation of her armed forces as compared with other countries. How her battles have been fought! how her colonies have been captured and held by volunteers! and to those who have seen the raw material from which the British soldier is often manufactured, it must be a matter of wonder indeed, that he should turn out the splendid fighting man he has hitherto invariably proved himself to be, in every clime and in every possible emergency! But, Gentlemen! tall or short, lowly born or nobly bred, the old innate British pluck still pervades our race. All that is required is to keep up the numbers and stamina, and the valour will take care of itself; for as Cyrus said to the Greeks on the eve of Cunaxa, so might it be said of our soldiers: Ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐν Ἑλλήνεσσι οὐκ ἀνθρώπων, ἀπορίων βαρβάρων συμμάχους ἡμᾶς ἦν ἀλλὰ νομίζων ἀμείνονας καὶ κρείττους πολλῶν βαρβάρων ἡμῶν εἶναι ἐκ τούτου προσέλαβον.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is proposed to divide the discussion under two heads, as far as practicable. The first point will be, "Can a perfectly efficient system of short service and reserves be secured by voluntary enlistment?" The next point will be, "Supposing short service and the reserve impracticable, what scheme of continuous service and pensions is likely to be successful?"

Dr. CAMERON, Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, L.-P.: The observations I wish to make are entirely of a practical kind. Dr. Adams has very ably put before you the difficulties and the statistics of our recruiting service, but we may consider these for months, and at the same time never arrive any nearer the solution of our difficulties. I think the main root of our difficulties is to be found in the extraordinary anomaly which prevails in our service, and which renders it different from all the services of Europe. Anomalies are exceedingly common in the British Constitution, and however theoretically absurd, a great many of them are admirable in practice. There is one anomaly, however, which is not so, and that is the

management of a large Army comprising hundreds of thousands of men by a body of civilians. I consider that is the root of a great deal of our expense, and of the failures and blunders in our military service. If His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief were, as he would be in another country the Minister of War, and if that large building in Pall Mall were occupied by a body of Staff Officers and subordinates all wearing our uniform and having served in the ranks of the Army that they were called upon to administer, we should have a very different state of things. What do we see now? Warrant after warrant promulgated with crude haste; and these warrants are not issued tentatively, or tried upon a brigade or a few regiments, but no sooner does the service endeavour to accustom itself in all its branches to one set of regulations than they are cancelled, and out comes another set. The consequence is, nobody knows what they are to trust to; and among the causes of failure in recruiting, is the wide-spread belief throughout the country, that nothing can be depended upon. Men have entered the Service, and they have found everything that existed when they entered the Service swept away as a dream, and no one knows what may not come next. The ideas of those who draw up these warrants and promulgate them, seem to be, that the British soldier is only to be got at by pennies and halfpennies a day; they do not give him credit for higher notions. They seem to forget that the British soldier is animated by the same feelings as the British Colonel or General,—that he is quite as capable of enthusiasm for his country, and quite as capable of looking to his own prospects in life. Would any body of military men who knew what a barrack was or what barrack opinion was, have ever promulgated warrants such as those that Dr. Adams has described? They ask men at 17 or 18 years of age, when they are endeavouring to get into trade, to go and enlist to go to any part of the world, to sever all connections and all interests, and to give up the best time for establishing themselves in life, and all for what? for a bare subsistence, a miserable subsistence for the time, and then to be turned adrift a few years afterwards to endeavour to re-establish themselves and to find every avenue filled up by other people. Still more absurd is it to open the door and call upon men to take fourpence a-day and go into the Reserve. What chance is there that these Reserve men will ever be seen again? A few days ago I was speaking to an old soldier of 19 years' service, and I said to him "What about this Reserve; is it worth the paper it is written on?" He said, "No, it is not." "What do they say in your regiment; how many do you think would ever serve?" "Not one in ten," was the reply. They do not make any secret about it, but they say "Catch me here again! I will screw out all the four-pences I can get, and then I am off to America." And if that plan of storing up the twopences and giving the men £20 were adopted, what use would he make of it? Do you think he would join the Reserve to be liable to be called upon to leave his wife and children? No; he would take himself off to the Colonies. The whole secret of recruiting is simply the law of supply and demand, and of remuneration. Whatever may be said of the state of the recruiting service at present, and the indisposition of our people to enlist, I do not admit that our military spirit or pluck is in the least degree diminished. Our manufactures, our trade, and the fact of congregation in large cities, no doubt reduce our physical standard, but I do not admit for a moment that there is any diminution in the pluck, the adventurous spirit, and the bravery of Englishmen. You see it. I need not dwell upon such trite matters. Look at Sir Samuel Baker's expedition, look at five hundred other things, you see abundance of them. The state of the recruiting business at present, is simply analogous to what you see in our trades where the remuneration is not sufficient—it is the country's method of striking. Adventurous and plucky men will not enlist, and they are right in not enlisting; you afford them no inducement to enlist, or if they enlist, they desert. Fortunately for us, soldiers cannot strike, as engineers and ship carpenters, and people of that sort do. The soldier is in a false position in this country. The empire of Britain, widely spread as it is, has been founded and maintained, perhaps indirectly, but not the less exactly, by the bravery of her soldiers. It was by the bravery of our soldiers and sailors that we acquired our position, and it is by that we keep it, and the soldier, as Dr. Adams most properly pointed out, should be honoured and respected. He is in advance of the working man, he is a first-class working man—a man who does more for his country than any other class of men

whatever. But in this country the soldier is looked upon as the dregs of the population, and looking upon him as such, you come to the natural result, and you get much of the dregs of the population for soldiers. If the soldier were treated with justice, and was put in his proper position, I do not think you would have any difficulty in getting men. In all directions injustice meets you in the treatment of the soldier. It is not now as in former days; the barracks are full of newspapers; the men can read, and they contrast everything. Look at a regiment going to India. Before I went to India, my pay was about 19s. a-day, and my hospital sergeant had 2s. 3d. When I went to India my pay became £1,000 a-year. What did my hospital sergeant's become? not a penny more. The men going to India gain nothing by it, except misery. They look round them, and see their Officers with handsome salaries, whilst they, the men, get nothing additional. Do you suppose that all that does not weigh in the men's minds? Formerly, when men went into the Army, they thought at least there was a settled subsistence, and a pension. Now, what is the pension worth? I have submitted the question to the best jury in the world, to that distinguished body of old soldiers the Commissionaires, and they all say to me, "Sir, what is a shilling a-day when you get it." If you look at a shilling a-day through a long vista of 21 years, you get sick of contemplating it, and when you get it, a man cannot live on it, and if a man takes 21 years out of himself, knocking about in the Army, he is good for very little afterwards. My idea in the scheme I have drawn up, is entirely founded upon establishing the certainty of giving the soldier, as a young man, when not more than 30 or 32, the wherewithal to start with in his civil capacity, or if he pleases to transfer himself to the Reserve, and have still further prospects in it. It has been founded upon the old maxim, that gratitude means a lively sense of favours to come, and unless you can have a feeling of that sort in your ranks you will never keep your men. You must apply to self-interest. A man must have prospects, and in this country I conceive you have the finest opportunity of any country in the world for giving your soldiers prospects. You have no end of colonies. You have employment of all sorts which may be made available as the reward of military service. As for giving them pensions that they can live upon, it is an admirable theory, and I quite go with it; but you must conciliate prejudices, and our rulers must be conciliated. Of course if *carte blanche* were given to any committee of experienced Officers, no doubt they would very soon devise a scheme which would fill our ranks with recruits, but what chance should we have of seeing that scheme carried into effect? Our only chance is to devise some scheme that the Government may be prevailed upon to adopt, and that will have the effect of filling our ranks. And in drawing up one, the first thing I set myself to consider was, Why is it that we can always get any number of Officers that we please, but we cannot get soldiers? When you come to contrast the condition of the two, the question resolves itself. The Officer enters the Army as a profession for life; the soldier enters it as a makeshift, and if you can form a scheme which will provide for your men at an early age, and give them the certainty of a moderate sum and a chance of more, you place the soldier on a par with his Officer, and make the Service to the one what it is to the other, a lottery, certainly with many blanks, but with a great many well-deserved prizes. What men like, is a chance. Give them a chance of luck. Luck and fortune have been the two favourite deities of soldiers in all ages of the world, and ever must be. Every man who goes in with the true spirit of a soldier is ready to risk his life, and take his chance of what his luck may send him. But you exclude everything of that sort from your barracks; you make it a dull, miserable scene; a dreary monotony; and what do you hold out to the man? You hold out to him the prospect of getting a penny a-day at some remote period, the very man whose brother is perhaps striking because he does not get 5s. 6d. a-day. The first thing you must begin by doing is to establish a rational system of remuneration for service; but to enter on that subject at this hour of the night would be entirely out of the question.

Lieutenant-General Sir PERCY DOUGLAS, Baronet: I should not have taken part in this discussion to-night but for the invitation from the Council, because I confess that in view of all that has passed, it is a great pain to me to enter into any discussions on military subjects. But as I have been invited, I shall give expression to the few words that I have to say on this subject, and I may also introduce some

remarks upon the Militia question, because I was for some time an Inspector-General of Militia, and have strong opinions upon this subject.

The first point that strikes me arises out of these tables. I own that the figures before me somewhat surprise me. First of all I will mention what seems to me to be a deficiency. In order to know the value of that table of recruits "inspected," and to gain a correct idea of what sort of men they were *physically* in the aggregate, we should have had stated the number of rejections. In the subsequent part of his paper, the Lecturer stated that he had examined 25,000 recruits and remitted 17,000. I therefore presume the rejections closely approach to 35 per cent., and that is a very unfavourable result indeed of our recruiting operations. Another thing that surprised me was this. After what I have seen of the Prussians, I was not prepared to find that, at the age of 18, our recruits are considerably taller than the German recruits at 20 years of age. I doubt, however, the correctness of that. Judging from my own eye, I think there must be some mistake in it. The appearance of this table is, on one point, gratifying, for it shows that with all our difficulty in recruiting, we still get 45 per cent. of men of very good height, *i.e.*, 5 feet 7 inches. Now before we can place a fair estimate on the value of that table, we ought to know the number of rejections. I will endeavour to divide what I have to say under the two heads mentioned by the Chairman. I think, for instance, that the scheme of short enlistment has failed, and that hence we could not have a Reserve for the Army that we were led to expect; because it stands to reason, that this Reserve can only increase *pro rata* with the number of enlistments, and if we do not get enlistments, we shall not have the Reserve. There are many things that militate against the enlistment. Firstly you cannot buy a man for a soldier for less than he is worth, any more than you can buy anything else. The War Office may exercise their ingenuity,—and there are some remarkably clever men there!—they may shift and shuffle the cards, and make out pretty schemes, but it is impossible to get a good man for less than he is worth. There are now few inducements and some anomalies in the present mode of enlistment which militate greatly against our getting the numbers we desire for the regular Army. First of all, I think we have made a very great mistake in doing away with pensions. I gather that from our recruiters; for wherever I go, I always approach a man who is recruiting and talk to him. The universal testimony is, that it is hopeless to try and get recruits without the restoration of pensions. Whether right or wrong, the conviction remains in my mind that the pension question is at the bottom of our failure. Then there is another thing they have done away with, the bounty. I affirm that a vast number of men enlist into the Army from the want of money (10s. it may be), for a good object or for a bad object. The Secretary of State for War has done away with the bounty to the line, but has continued to pay it to the Militia. Here is an anomaly; you are positively at this moment giving a bounty to the Militia and attracting into that force, the very men that we want to pass direct into the regular Army. Then there is another element of failure, namely, the short service. I simply affirm that this is not attractive to the men. The man who enlists, in general wishes to break loose from civil life. We do not know what moves him to do so, whether vice or virtue, or whether it is from no reason at all; but still he does break loose from civil life and he has a very natural wish to arrive at a pension. But there are other inducements wanting to attract men. When the great changes were recently discussed in Parliament, if I am not very much mistaken, some of our prominent men vaunted an assimilation to the Prussian system. What a delusion that was! and I am afraid it was intended as a snare. But it is nothing to vaunt of. What similitude is there between our present system and the Prussian system which embraces all classes by forced service, whilst we continue to enlist from one class solely by voluntary service? Where is the likeness? It was hoped to tempt into the Army what they called a better class of men, the possibility of which I very much doubt. It was said "Now is the time! Purchase is done away with. Everything will go by merit." It was like telling a French soldier that he carries in his knapsack the "*bâton de maréchal*." No such thing. Why the very moment they did away with purchase, they took away the highest and first motive for a poor man of a superior class in life to enter the Army; for what was his object in entering the Army? He said to himself, "If by good conduct I rise to the rank of an Officer, and for 25 years fulfil my

"duty fairly, what shall I gain? I shall not be turned off into the world without some permanent provision for my family, for the custom of the service and the law tacitly sanctions my retiring on half- or full-pay, and with a very good bonus into the bargain." I agree with the last speaker that we have had people administering our military affairs who are totally unacquainted with military matters, who know not the needs and requirements of the soldier, and know not the habits nor sentiments of the Army one bit.

Those are partly the reasons why this recruitment has failed; and now I will say a few words on the reserve. It is no use discussing the matter if we cannot get the men for a Reserve for the Army. What, then, can we substitute for this Reserve? Every man has his hobby, and I have had a hobby for many years, and which has taken its rise in my knowledge of the Militia. I say if you cannot get Reserve men for the Army, then the next best thing you can have for the defence of your country is this—to have a real Army of Reserves, and there you have it almost cut and dried in your Militia. All that you have to pay, is the difference between the actual cost of the Militia and the embodiment of portions of it in succession 18 months or two years at a time, so that you shall always have a large body of infantry and garrison artillery prepared to be literally, as far as these two arms are concerned, an Army of Reserve, and there (in the Militia) if we cannot get reserve men for the Army, is where you can get an Army of Reserve. I do not say that they are to serve by compulsion in any foreign climes, but knowing, as I think I do, the sentiments and *morale* of the Militia, I am as convinced as I stand here that if, as I have proposed, and as I have written often in official and non-official papers, the Government will thus embody in succession portions of the Militia and create an Army of Reserve, if our country got into difficulties in whatever part of the world, you would find these Militia regiments would nobly and loyally offer to go wherever any other portion of the regular Army went. It is, as the lecturer remarked, not only the numbers of men, but the physical capacities of the men, that have to be considered. It is quite true that very often low height with us is only another expression for minor age. A boy of 16 or 17, pretty well developed, comes forward; he has a certain height, and he calls himself 18, and perhaps looks 18, and there is the great perplexity, that in times of difficulty we may have in our Army numbers of these recruits, fine fellows as boys, but perfectly useless as being under the age and not possessing the physical capacities of men. This is one of the prime recommendations for embodying in their turn great portions of the Militia, because in the Militia they have a great number of men of ascertained ages, and vast numbers, as heretofore, would in time of war join the regular Army. There is no doubt that in the Militia there are superior inducements for the men to enlist in peace; they rapidly accommodate themselves to military habits and discipline, and you have in the militia regiments not only a vast reserve of men for the Army of the proper age, of the proper physical capacities, but the infantry and artillery of an Army of Reserve. I do sincerely hope and trust that this short-service scheme for a Reserve for the Army may not fail, as I fear it will do, however. God knows how urgently I wish it were otherwise, and I am sure every military man here will go with me in really wishing that the plans of the War Office should have the most ample success; but I fear that we shall not reap what they expect, but that we shall gather in what we have sown. I am convinced, for my own part, and I have thought a great deal upon the subject, that it is utterly hopeless to pursue our present plan of enlistment for getting up a Reserve for the Army. Short and long services for pension should be optional, but the latter should be most largely encouraged; and men should not be removed from one regiment to another against their consent, and they should receive a bounty for consenting thereto.

Lieut.-Colonel EVELYN, 1st Royal Surrey Militia: The question whether the maintenance of an efficient Army is compatible with the system of short service and Reserve is one no doubt that admits of a vast difference of opinion, but I think every one agrees in this, that if it is to be attempted, the advantages to be held out to volunteers, must be increased. It is evident that the pay and the bounties, such as they are, the prospects of the soldier, are not at present sufficient to attract an adequate number of recruits. How is this to be attained? It resolves itself into a question of money, and money can only be given in three ways. It may be given

before service in the shape of bounty; it may be given during service in the shape of increased pay; it may be given after service, as gratuity or pension on discharge. Now the system of bounties has been tried. We have given vast sums of money during war; the more men we required, the more we increased their bounty and the greater number of desertions we obtained. It has been a failure. We have increased the pay of the soldiers, and have given them free rations, and I believe that has been a good thing, but I do not think we could go much further in that direction, for drunkenness is very rife in the Army, and I fear it would increase if the pay was much further increased. It then only remains to give it after service in the shape of pension. How is this to be done in short service? It is impossible to make a man a pensioner after six years' service. I do not mean to agitate the question whether it would not be better to enlist men for 21 years or for unlimited service. I wish to consider what, instead of a pension, can be given to a man after a limited period of service. It was some years ago since I first recommended publicly a system of deferred pay, on which we have heard many strictures to-night, and some months ago I renewed the subject in a published letter in the *Times*, that caused some remarks, and which I hope is vegetating in the public mind, and will bring forth fruit hereafter, for I am perfectly certain that nothing but that will meet the difficulty—a system of reserved pay to be given to men on completing their service. I feel pretty confident that in the course of five or six years that system will be at least tried; it seems to me the only plan by which anything approaching to a pension can be given with short service. And if anything is to be given, it should certainly be given in exact proportion to a man's good service, in other words, that each day's good service should carry with it a certain amount of reserved pay. The plan I proposed was very different to that of which Dr. Adams gives us a sketch in many important particulars, and was I think far better in many respects, but perhaps I had better not trouble you with it on this occasion. With regard to the system of the Militia bounty, I think there are many fancies rife about that system, and Sir Percy Douglas will pardon me for saying I did not quite agree with some of the remarks he made just now, although I have the highest possible respect for his opinion on Militia matters generally. The Secretary for War the other day, I believe, stopped the bounty on enlistment for the Army; he also wished to stop it for the Militia, and we were surprised one fine morning at the receipt of an extraordinary circular, telling us that in future we were not to give the men the usual bounty of 10s. when they offered themselves for enrolment. We had recently been told to recruit as much as we possible could, and to get up the Militia in a short time; then we receive a circular to tell us we are not to give the men 10s. on enrolment, to give them nothing in fact without special authority. It amounted to this, that a lad in his fustians or rags was supposed to go to the Militia sergeant and say to him "I want to be enrolled," was to strip, to be subject to a surgical examination, to be taken before a magistrate and to swear this, that and the other, and then to be sent away without getting one shilling to return to his home. Of course the circular, as any one practically experienced in the Militia would know, amounted to an order to discontinue recruiting, and I believe for two months not a single Militia recruit was enrolled in England. There might be one here and there, but there were not any in my county. It is a pity, I really think, under these circumstances, that the gentlemen in the War Office do not take the trouble to consult some one with practical experience. Officers of the regular Army cannot be supposed to know much about the Militia, but certainly no Militia Officer would have hesitated for a moment to say that that would be the effect of that circular. The question of recruiting for the Militia is very intimately bound up with that of recruiting for the Army, and I want now to come to the point I mentioned before. It seems to be said that it is hard the Militia should receive a bounty while the Army does not, and I saw a letter in one of the morning papers the other day from an old soldier who said, "The Militiaman gets a guinea a year, and we poor fellows get nothing." But then we must remember that the Militiaman not only serves his 27 or his 56 days, but he enters into an engagement binding himself to serve for any 56 days in the course of the year in which he may be required, and these 56 days may be broken up into two terms; so that it is not the mere pay for the days in which he serves; it is not the mere loss of time during the

term he is out on training, but the great thing is that he is unable to accept any regular employment whatever, but is bound to be at the call of his Officers during the whole year. His case very much resembles that of the Naval Reserve, who get a capital annual retaining fee. The Militiaman gets a bounty—and he ought to get a bounty on enrolment—say of 10s.; and that is the only bounty: the training bounty should properly be called an annual fee. I believe that is the term used in the Naval Reserve. When I was in the Shetland Islands two or three years ago, I was informed the men in the Naval Reserve got sufficient every year to pay the rent of their small farms. They are obliged to hold themselves in readiness, I presume, to go through their drill at whatever time is most convenient to the Government, and consequently are prevented from taking regular work. It is very unfair, therefore, to say that the Militiaman gets a bounty that he does not deserve. He does deserve it, for he is under great restrictions, and cannot take regular employment. He never can go far from home at any time. He may be called out in April or in November or December; he may be embodied at any time of the year, and I think that the pound is the very least that can be given him for that obligation.

Sir PERCY DOUGLAS: I am rather surprised at the gallant Colonel differing from me, because the tendency of what he has said is entirely to agree with me. It appears, after all, that the Militiaman does get the 10s. when he joins, and that he does get the £1; and as to the obligations of the Militia, surely they are not greater than the obligations of the men of the Line. The man in the regular Army has to enlist for twelve years, and to go anywhere and everywhere, with the chance of being shot into the bargain. Of the two, I should think he is the more entitled to the bounty. We have not to judge here what may be right or what may be wrong. We have to consult the habits of the people; and, as I say, taking the old recruiting sergeant and so forth, the answers we get are, that the men like the bounty, and if they cannot get it in the Line, they can get it in the Militia; and hence it is that so many go into the Militia.

Major WYTHREED, Paymaster, R.A.: This, sir, is a subject of vast importance. It certainly does appear that we are in a lamentable state, seeing that we are practically without any Reserve capable of being converted into a fighting force either for offensive or defensive purposes, and that we cannot even keep up our diminutive regular Army to its required strength, and further, we are assured by the Lecturer that the recruits we get in the infantry are "not up to the standard of our race." The next question is, Can we retain the men that we do get? I fear this must be also answered in the negative. We find that there are 45 per cent. of rejections. I wonder how many of those passed into the service have, after joining their regiments, been discharged as unfit. With reference to the Royal Artillery, I can give you a statement of facts. In the year 1873 there were passed into the service 3,179 men. During the same period 1,358 men deserted, and 386 purchased their discharge, making a total of 1,744, or more than half the number raised, who leave the service of their own accord prematurely, either by desertion with all the penalties attached to it, or by payment for discharge. And when we take into account the average death rate, as well as the ordinary discharges in due course, it cannot be wondered that the regiment at the close of the year stood 1,000 below its numbers. In the Royal Artillery the attractions are greater certainly than they are in the Line, and this instance proves that when we get men into the Service there is not sufficient attraction to keep them in it. It certainly does appear to me that it was a very great mistake ever to have given up the system of long service, unless we were prepared to have gone in for compulsory service. I do not see, in the position we are in in this country, how it is possible to form a Reserve, or to keep up an efficient force on the short-service principle. We must adopt one of two courses. We must either resort to compulsory service for short periods, or hold out such inducements to the soldier as will tempt men to enter the Service for the sake of the benefits really to be derived. I cannot understand how any man of the least thought would ever think of entering the Army under the conditions offered to him at present. Take, for instance, a lad of 18—very often, through our faulty way of recruiting, not more than 16 or 17. We expect that lad to enlist for six years, for a shilling a-day, three-quarters of a pound of meat, and a pound of bread, when he sees his fellow lad getting in the labour market two or three shillings a-

day, and enjoying an amount of freedom and independence. We take this man during the years when he ought to be learning some handicraft, and teach him nothing but the roving, restless life of the soldier, give him sevenpence or eightpence a-day as clear balance. He spends it—in what? Generally in drink. It goes to the canteen. I maintain, when we turn that man out of our service after six years, instead of having improved him, we have made him a more useless member of society than he was when he enlisted. He is unfit to learn any trade or occupation, and we have given him habits that certainly are not an improvement to people in his class of life, and then we expect to pass this man into the Reserve at fourpence a-day. It is simply absurd. What can be expected? We cannot get men; and, when we have got them, they are inferior. Then they desert; and yet we expect to form an Army of Reserve on this principle. It is quite impossible. If it were possible to combine the short service with some system under which every man might learn a trade, and thus be fitted for after occupation, we might expect to do some good: at present it is utterly hopeless to expect to form an Army of Reserve in the manner we are attempting to do it, and from the materials we are making use of. I certainly would commend to those in authority a portion of the title of the lecture, viz., “from a military point of view.” Unfortunately, political and civilian views prevail, and the military point of view is seldom considered. We see warrant after warrant framed, always exhibiting on their faces an ignorance of the sympathies and feelings of military men. The recent pay-warrant was to have done a great deal; but what did it amount to? A mere nothing. If they were not prepared to have given a full free ration, not only of bread and meat, but also of grocery, they had better have left the old plan in existence. It would have been much better to have given the men another $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ or $2d.$ a-day in addition to their pay, than to have gone into a kind of half-measure of this sort. It would have given much greater satisfaction to the men. If we look at the different rates of pay, it is a mere minimum of increase; but with that minimum of increase there are certain sore points opened up. For instance, the increase, as a rule, is about a halfpenny; that is to say, deducting the ordinary ration from the old rate of pay, and comparing it with the new rate, the increase has been about a halfpenny. That is the case with the privates; though in some cases it has gone as far as $1\frac{1}{2}d.$, especially in the Line; because (here appeared to be the difficulty) it was stated that no man was to have less than a shilling a-day, and that was almost impossible to be carried out. So to make it appear on the scale that every man got a shilling, he had given him his bread and meat, but not his grocery. In the Line $3\frac{1}{2}d.$, and in the Artillery $5\frac{1}{2}d.$ must be deducted from the net pay now shown to arrive at the clear balance. When it came to the private in the Line, his pay was so small before, that, to make it up to the shilling they had to give him an increase of $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ Now, if it was important to give a private that increase, it surely was important not to diminish the advance of pay on promotion; but I find that a man rising in the Line from the position of private to corporal would get a penny a-day less increase than he had before. He only gets an advance of an actual $3d.$ in his pay, and so through all the grades; so that, instead of increasing the advantages of Non-commissioned Officers, the reverse has been the case, and they have been diminished. Then we have cut off the pension. Of course men always look forward to a pension. Under the 21 years’ service system, men and Officers were bound together for long periods, their interests were mutual, and, in fact, a regiment was very like a family. Some of the best recruits that we got were soldiers’ sons. Now, however, we have lost all that; the family feeling has gone; men care little for their Officers, and the Officers as little for their men, who they know will only stop in the regiment for a short time. There is a constant uncertainty as to changes, and the Army is broken up, as far as that feeling goes, in every possible way. Then, again, there is another sore point. A man goes on furlough; he goes back to his part of the world, and he ought to put in an appearance of respectability. Instead of diminishing his pay on that occasion they should rather increase it. But here we find that they diminish his pay, for, whereas they give him a free ration, which costs the Government $7\frac{1}{2}d.$, while he is in barracks, when the man goes on furlough they stop his ration and give him only $2d.$ in lieu of this $7\frac{1}{2}d.$

Sir PEACOCK DOUGLAS: They have taken away the $2d.$ on furlough.

Major WETHERED: No; they could not do that; it is bad enough as it is. A soldier says, for instance, "If I go on pass for a month, my duty is performed by my comrades. Why should the Government desire to save upon the rations which I do not eat? That ration costs them $7\frac{1}{2}d.$, but now I am going away they only give me $2d.$ for it." In hospital a man loses a penny more than he did formerly. There are many little hardships of this kind which do not come to the surface. Under the old rule, when the man went into hospital, the ration might be drawn for the benefit of his wife. In the same way, when he went on short pass, he could draw a ration, and his wife would subsist on it; but now he cannot do it. If he goes into hospital, he has a mere pittance of balance left; his wife gets no ration. If he goes on furlough his ration is stopped, and he goes away with this minimum of pay. All these are sore points, which, if the warrant had been framed "from a military point of view," would have been avoided. Then again sufficient inducements are not offered to the soldier. There are not enough posts of advancement in his profession. I maintain that the non-commissioned grades are not what they should be: the men should be in a higher and better position. Again, many posts might be created. What can be more disreputable than our recruiting system? You take some of the smartest men in a regiment and send them to certain towns. They ally themselves to certain public-houses, as though the gin palace and the Army were inseparably connected. They pick up the refuse of the town, and, under the influence of drink very often, induce the men to take the shilling. That is a gross mistake. Then, the whole system demoralises the Non-commissioned Officers and induces them to teach deception; for they will tell a lad of 16 to say he is 18 or 19 for the purpose of passing, so that they may get their rewards. There is no occasion for this. Surely we might get some kind of general agency throughout the country. Why not have, in certain towns, your recruiting agent—a man who, himself still in the service on full-pay, would be an advertisement in his own person—a man who had risen from the ranks to a good position, and was comfortably located. He would be looked up to by the people in the villages round about, and would lead them to say, "The Army is a good thing. Look at So-and-So, what a nice position he holds!" I say if you were to turn out men in that way you would offer an inducement to the youth of the country to come into the Army. Now, however, the reverse is the case. Take our six years' service. The men, after leaving the Army, would go to various localities to be localised on this $4d.$ a-day. Would there be anything in those men to tempt the youth of the country to follow their example? I consider that such Reserve men should have written on their backs the caution to avoid the Army. Certainly it is a painful thing to see a man with medals on his breast a pauper in our poorhouses; but that has been the case over and over again. You meet with men who have shed their blood on the plains of Waterloo ending their days as paupers. That is, I think, a great scandal. The other day, in Scotland, I met a fine old fellow, 80 years of age, and on talking to him found that he had been all through the Peninsular War. He had left the service after being in it seven years; had struggled on and laboured to sustain himself; but he was now getting too old, and had no means of support, and there was nothing for him but the workhouse. The country ought not to allow a thing of that kind to happen to a man who has gone through hard service. There ought to be some provision to keep him from such extremities. In this case, where the old feeling of *esprit de corps* prevailed, I mentioned the matter to the regiment in which the man formerly served, namely, the Royal Artillery; and, in a very few days, sufficient money was raised in that regiment to keep the old man for two years on $5s.$ a-week. The Officers themselves subscribed to keep a man of their own corps out of the poorhouse. I think the prospective advantages could be improved, and the point to be considered is whether we are to return to the long service holding out inducements, or whether we are to continue the short service, holding out some greater advantages. I really do not see how the present scheme can possibly be successful, and I do not know how pressure is to be put upon the Government to induce them to set about adopting some other plan. Certainly, if they were to form a Committee of Officers capable of giving an opinion, we might arrive at some tangible method of going to work. At present, we all seem to be in utter darkness.

Colonel LYONS, Assistant-Adjutant-General, Recruiting Staff: From my posi-

tion in London as Inspecting Field Officer of the Recruits, which I have held for the last three years, I hope to be able to give you some information respecting recruiting for the regular Army, and the desertion of the recruits. Dr. Adams has pretty clearly set forth to you the *physique* of recruits; but after all, when we come to weigh the thing, it is all in a nutshell. It is a matter of £ s. d. I have been some 45 years in the service, and in my day, whilst I was in Ireland, the soldier could buy the best meat in the market at from 2d. to 2½d. a lb.; the best bread at 1d. a lb.; 14 lbs. of potatoes for a penny; the best milk at 1d. a quart, salmon at 1d. a pound, and all that. He was probably a labourer, digging turf or potatoes all day long, and therefore by enlisting in the Army, his condition was considerably altered for the better. I need not mention to you that his money went much farther than it does in the present day. In addition to that he had certain rights. On completing 14 years' service, he had an additional 2d. a-day, and a soldier in those days would say, "You may dog me, or do what you like, but you cannot take my extra pay from me." Compare that with the present day. There is additional pay; but when you take the extra expense of everything into account, the soldier has not as much money to devote to his own purposes as he had in those days. There was the further addition that, if he met with an accident on duty, if his service was short, he got a certain amount of compensation, and he was certain, when he completed his 21 years, to get a good pension of a shilling a-day. The consequence was, in those days, the service being so attractive, and men so plentiful, you had any number of splendid recruits at command. I, myself, as adjutant of the regiment, turned hundreds away from the barrack gate who did not come up to the height of 5 ft. 8 in. or 9 in. I would not take them, because we had a choice in those times, and why? Because it was an advantage to enter the Army. Since then, there has been a considerable alteration. I will not attempt to discuss the suggestion of Dr. Adams that, as a nation, we have fallen off physically, for I do not understand it. I think now, as well as then, that if you pay the men according to the present market, you will get the same size. If size is to be taken as an advantage, you will get any standard you want by paying for it. At present we have to take recruits per regulation, 33 inches chest, 5 ft. 5 in. in height, and any one of experience knows that means simply a boy or a lad. You may range from 18 up to 25 years of age. Now, I need not remark that a man of 33 inches of chest and 5 ft. 5 in. in height, at 25 years of age, is scarcely likely to make a good soldier as far as appearance goes, though he might fight well enough. Therefore, the younger you get them at 33 inches chest and 5 ft. 5 in. in height, the more likely they are to be good-sized men when they attain a certain age, say 21 or 22. At the present day, wages being so high—from 3s. to 4s. a-day for a labourer—the class of men that hitherto, as we all know, have formed the splendid infantry soldier, viz., the agricultural labourer, will not come to you for a shilling a-day. If we cannot get them, what are we to take? I am speaking particularly here, in London; but I believe it is the same throughout the country. You must take anything that offers, according to regulation. Now, I profess to be as good a judge of what will make a soldier as any man in the British service or out of it; but I am bound, by regulation, to pass these men, if considered physically fit by the surgeon, if they come up to the standard of regulation; but they are not the men I should myself, if I commanded a regiment, wish to take into it. You take these men? Why? Because you cannot help it. The whole thing is as plain as A B C. The whole discussion this evening amounts to one thing. Changes have taken place from the days I have just mentioned to you of cheap rations and of a good pension to look forward to. To what? Men come forward now. Perhaps many have a great desire to join the service, because there really is as great a military spirit extant at the present day as ever there was in the country. I have no doubt of that. Men enter the service readily, and, I must say, were the conditions six times worse than they are at present, you would get a certain number of men and a certain class of men to enlist; but then comes the question, Are they the sort you want? You get them, as I said just now. They enlist according to the conditions. We have no choice. We are told that our service is a voluntary service. Now, it has always been a puzzle to me to know what the meaning of a voluntary service is. The voluntary part begins and ends in the Act of Enlistment. No man can force a man in this country to enlist; but if he enlists, there he is—he must abide by whatever

the conditions of the service are. A fine youth comes and tells you he is 18; probably he is not so. He enlists for six years with the colours, as it is called, with the understanding that at the expiration of that term, he is to join the Army of Reserve for six years more. With all due deference to the gentleman who has spoken about the dissipations of recruiting and of public-houses, and all the rest of it, what is the recruiter to do? The recruit asks the recruiting sergeant "What is the Army of Reserve?" He says, "I do not know. I suppose it is an Army at home, and that you get 4*l.* a-day for doing nothing." Perhaps to some it sounds very well, but when the man joins his regiment, and begins to talk the thing over, he says to himself, I like my regiment, but at the end of six years I shall be turned about my business; I cannot remain in the service. What will the effect of that be? He enlists probably at the age of 17 or 18. At the expiration of six years he is only 24. According to the Regulations of the Service, men are taken up to 25. He enlists originally as John Jones. He is supposed to be in the Army of Reserve, and he comes back to the service as Joe Smith, and goes for six years more. Well, your Reserve man is lost, of course. In the cavalry and the artillery they enlist for 12 years, and they have nothing to do with the Army of Reserve, but are supposed to take their discharge. I must say, from my experience in London, that no more satisfactory class of recruit can be obtained in the world than the cavalry recruits in London, whether you judge them by their stamina, or any way you please. I could show any gentleman here these recruits, if they liked to come over to the barracks. On some days we have as many as from 12 to 20 men, 5 ft. 8 in. to 5 ft. 11 in. for the cavalry, with 36 or 40 in. chests—fine, splendid fellows. Of course the men for the light cavalry are rather inferior in size.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you think the preference for the cavalry regiments is due to the length of service?

Colonel LYONS: The men I am speaking of as enlisting for the cavalry are, many of them, educated men. Many of them are gentlemen who have failed at the examinations at Woolwich, or for the Civil Service, and there are many—I could mention certain names—who enter at the present day with the view of obtaining commissions from the ranks. I will confine myself, first, to the description of the recruits. When you hear it said that the London recruit is this and that, reference is generally made to the infantry recruit as being inferior, whereas, if you take the recruits generally in London, they are the finest recruits you obtain in the country for the cavalry service. The recruits for the cavalry are of a superior class. They are gentlemen of education, clerks, and so forth, who cannot turn to the pick-axe and shovel work with the agricultural labourers, who are required for infantry. Your agricultural labourer comes forward and says, "Halloa, sergeant, what is the pay; what is the bounty?" He replies, "No bounty; a shilling a-day." "Oh, no, that won't do: come, I can get 3*s.* or 4*s.* a-day." Pick-axe and shovel go on his shoulder, and off he marches. An educated man cannot do this, and consequently he enters the cavalry service. One of the finest regiments in the service, the 6th Carabineer Dragoon Guards, is nearly all composed of recruits raised in London, and hundreds of them have passed under my own observation, as I have approved of 10,000 recruits within the last three years. Speaking of the advantages of the service, the recruits enlist in London readily with very few desertions. They go and join their regiment, and then they begin to inquire into matters, and they find, comparatively speaking, that they have made rather a bad bargain of it. Say that it is summer time and harvest is going on, they consider sometimes like this perhaps, "We are only getting a shilling a-day, and at the end of six years shall be sent about our business." Well, what is desertion? Oh, nothing. Get three or four shillings a-day to go off for a lark. If a Captain of a company finds fault with a man on parade, or he does not like the station, he deserts. He has no dread of punishment, no letter D, and I candidly say I know I am passing deserters as recruits every day in the week. In former days when a man was discharged on account of bad character, there were the letters "B.C.;" but now they are discharged from the 50th regiment on one day, and are enlisted in the 51st the next. I believe even the Guards and the regiment to which our gallant Chairman belongs, is not exempt from that. I speak in a homely way of these things, I am not entering into politics. Politics have nothing to do with it. We are all uniting with one feeling, and our object is to give our opinions for the

benefit of the service that I have always liked and will like. Let them alter it as much they will, I will like it to the last. We have a small Army, and we ought to have a very good one. If a man likes to enlist, let him enlist for a limited period. At one time I was opposed to that myself, when I was Adjutant of one of the finest and smartest regiments in the British service, the 5th Fusiliers. I know what the old style of soldier was, and what the soldier ought to be in every sense. Those days are gone past, but there is a way in my opinion of remedying the thing at present. If in this country enlistments are voluntary, why not meet the men as far as you can. Six years' enlistment is a mistake for this reason. Even a man who likes the service, from the very fact of at the expiration of six years being able to take his discharge, will take it—why? not that he dislikes his regiment, but simply that he can have a change. It would be far better to prolong the term to ten years. Instead of keeping the fixed price for discharge as high as at present—£20—why not reduce it? Put it within a man's means if he dislikes the service to purchase himself out; thus if he enlisted for ten years, for the first five years, let the price of his discharge be £10, after that up to the completion of his time £5. At the expiration of his ten years give him the right—at present he has no rights—of either taking his discharge or re-engaging if physically fit, and go on for 11 years more. The effect of that would be that every man on entering the service would have the pleasant feeling that if he liked his regiment and the service, he could go on and serve his time, and at the expiration, would be entitled to a fair and reasonable pension. Having served 21 years in the same regiment which I left ten years ago, I found not one man out of 20, lived long enough, through the ordinary casualties of the service, to claim his pension. Nevertheless the effect was good, because it cheered every man to look forward to the end of his days, when instead of going to the workhouse he would have his pension to live on. Then again, as has been remarked, the Non-commissioned Officers in the British service, particularly the sergeants, are underpaid. I am sure every Officer will agree with me that they are about the most useful and essential men to maintain the order of a company, its discipline and so forth, of any class. What has occurred in my own experience? As Adjutant of a regiment, I was most particular in the instruction of the men, in seeing that they attended school, in getting them on for Non-commissioned Officers and so forth. Those men whom I had almost forced to attend school, when they came to the expiration of the ten years' service found that they were superior men to what they were when they entered the service. The result was, they found such inducements in civil life, in the Mauritius and elsewhere, that instead of reaping the benefit, when I became a Field Officer, and part of the time commanded my regiment, of retaining the services of those educated men, they left the service and entered civil life, receiving better pay. I could not blame them for doing so. By raising the pay of the different grades of Non-commissioned Officers you have lots of men in civil life who are educated and who would be glad to enter the service. They would be glad to come in with the object of arriving at the ranks of sergeant, quartermaster-sergeant, or sergeant-major, for 5s. a day, and a higher rate of retirement. Educated men, now that purchase is abolished, are entering the ranks with a view of getting commissions. They cannot all obtain them, and the consequence will be, that you will have a number of educated and discontented men in the ranks. With reference to the Volunteers, we find that many of the corps are dwindling down, and the Officers tell you the reason is, that the examinations are so strict, that men do not care to undergo them. My notion is that it is too heavy for their pockets. Those Volunteers who cannot support themselves might be local Militia, and supported by the State. The Officers and everybody else would be relieved. You could have an extensive, active, and local Militia and would be able to keep up the supply.

Captain COLOMB, late R.M.A.: With regard to what may be called the degeneracy of the *physique* of the Army, I do not think there are any reliable statistics to show whether the actual *physique* of the nation has deteriorated in the same degree. We should be glad to have information on this point, which is a very important one. Figures have been given by Dr. Adams to show how it has diminished in the Army, but there is nothing to show whether the population generally has deteriorated in the same degree. I think there is reason to believe that it has, for the very reason the Lecturer has given. We know that the agricultural population of the country

has very much decreased, while the town population has very much increased. With regard to one point which has been alluded to by various speakers respecting the increase of advantages which should be offered to Non-commissioned Officers, no doubt there is a great deal of good in it, but I think also, under the present conditions of the Army, a considerable amount of harm may be done in carrying out that principle, and for this reason, there is a very small margin between the advantages you offer a Sub-Lieutenant and the advantages you offer a sergeant, and under the new scheme each man is to be a professional man,—one is a professional Officer, the other a professional Non-commissioned Officer; therefore you bring the lower grade of Officers too near to the upper grade of Commissioned Officers. I think, under the new system, where you merely adopt the military code to enforce discipline instead of the old feudal feeling that existed between Officers and men, you must make some allowance for the change of system. With regard to the general question, it is complex, and requires a considerable amount of thought. It is almost impossible to keep on the subject and off your hobby. The first point is, what inducement can you offer under the voluntary system? The material point is to settle what is the force you require. It is not merely a question of £ s. d., because if your force passes a certain margin, it would become impossible financially for any country to keep it up; therefore it is not a matter that can be summed up in the three words, £ s. d. Then comes the question, what part of the Army is to be standing, and what is to be Reserve, and before you can really approach the question of the Army at all, you must settle what is to be the military policy of your country. Even supposing it to be a purely defensive policy, still it is a question of numbers, and it is a question of numbers that cannot be limited to a very small area, such as we are accustomed to hear it limited to, that is the area of the United Kingdom. The table exhibited by Dr. Adams shows one very remarkable fact. By it we see that the proportion contributed by the colonies was 6 per 1,000 in 1860, and in 1872 it was very nearly 7 per 1,000. Now the inducements to enlist in the colonies in 1860 were very much greater than they were in 1872, because you had a greater number of recruits and a larger force.

Dr. ADAMS: These are recruits born in the colonies, but not enlisted there. There are no recruiters in the colonies.

Dr. ADAMS: I am aware that there are no recruiters in the colonies, but I should have said that it is purely limited to the West India regiments?

Dr. ADAMS: No; that is probably in Canada,—Canadians enlisting in regiments in Canada.

Captain COLONN: I wish to point out that the colonies are an increasing element of the recruiting area.

Colonel LYONS: We have had no recruits from the colonies since 1865.

Captain COLONN: I merely repeat that the table shows that we have an area of recruiting which has increased. What we are dealing with now, is the present state of the Army, and it must be remembered in estimating your force, supposing even that you meant it to be simply a defensive force, you have an enormous area of the world to defend, therefore you come to an enormous force, and that being the case, you cannot put the question aside by saying it is a question of £ s. d.

Sir PERCY DOUGLAS: Whatever your numbers are, you cannot get the man for less than he is worth.

Captain COLONN: I am perfectly aware of that, but I am also perfectly aware that you cannot maintain a sufficient force in the standing Army, and therefore you have to provide a Reserve. More than that, you have to bear this in mind, that a large proportion of your Army cannot be a short-service Army. There are your cavalry, your artillery, and your engineers.

Colonel LYONS: What do you mean by "short service?"

Captain COLONN: I mean it in the ordinary acceptation of the term. We have had "long service," 21 years; we have now "short service," which is the six years' enlistment. To resume, we have three branches in the Army, and of those three, only one can possibly be called a short service. You cannot educate and train an artilleryman, and turn him back to civil life; it would be false policy to do it. The more time it takes to train a man to fill a certain position, the more valuable that man is to the country, and the longer should the country retain his ser-

vices. If you turn to the Recruiting Commissioners' Reports, you will find it takes them two and a-half years to make a gunner, and it has been said, that cavalry soldiers in the field, under two years' service, are a hindrance. Therefore if it takes a long time to train a man, when you have him, so long as he is physically fit, you are bound to keep him, and if you wear that man out in the service, you are bound to provide for him. Therefore in these branches, you cannot possibly apply the short service. But I believe, that within certain bounds and restrictions, the short-service principle can be applied to the infantry of the line, and the question of what you are going to offer the man at the termination of his service is not a question that can be looked at from a military point of view, but purely from a commercial point of view, and what you have to offer that man so as to compensate him for the loss of time in learning a profession, by his having lost so many years in the Army. That being the case, to get at what should be given to the man after a certain period of service, you must first fix your period of service from a military point of view. Then you must ascertain what are the average wages in civil life of the man when he enlisted, and what are the average wages of the man at the period of life when he is discharged. You must not only give him the balance, but something for continuing liable to return to the Army. Therefore I think it is a commercial question with regard to the trade of the country and to the labour of the country, and you have, every year, to deal with skilled labour more than agricultural labour. There is only one thing that I wish to remark in conclusion. We have heard a great deal of "measures not men," and certainly as regards the Army now, it has been given "measures," and it has not been given "men."

MR. A. HAY HILL: I feel that as it is late, I must not intrude upon you for long, but I am rather glad to support the view taken by Colonel Lyons, because whether it be called *£ s. d.*, or whether it be called the law of supply and demand, this is simply a great economic question, that is to say, whether the men can be obtained in the present condition of the labour-market. You may either call it "supply and demand," or you may call it a question of *£ s. d.* I would submit to this meeting that it is purely a trade question, and that it is not a professional question, and the sooner it is removed from purely professional considerations, the sooner will it be reduced to its real economic proportions. It seems to me it has been assumed for a long time, that the agricultural labourer was the true typical soldier; but according to the theory and the experience of Col. Lyons, I think you will see that the agricultural labourer, as a soldier, has simply been the natural product of the condition of the labour-market tending towards the Army, because he was the poorest paid worker of the labour-market. A short time since, when the great iron industry of Cleveland sprang up, it was contended that the men that had moulded iron in the past were not to be had, because the particular class of men from whom the iron-moulders and the iron workers came, were not at once to be had. But it was very soon proved that the law of supply and demand produced the men to work the iron, and I would submit that if the advantages of the Army were as well known as are the advantages of the well-paid departments of labour, assuming the Army to be better paid, that the men would follow the guns and would follow the recruiting sergeant. You find that in London, as Colonel Lyons has told you, a very considerable number of men are able to be obtained. They are now able to be obtained from the clerk population, and I have not heard it asserted that if the clerk is put into good muscular condition, he is not equally fit to be an infantry soldier as he is fit to be a cavalry soldier. Therefore there may still be a very considerable body of persons to be drawn, who will turn out, not the ignorant and useless soldier, for two years, but the man who will easily learn what he has to learn; because it is only, after all, something of the old trades-union-idea to assume that a man cannot learn a business under a certain time. If you introduce into a trade a professional man, or a man in the habit of applying scientific principles to anything, he very soon learns his business, and I think it would be found if a more intelligent class of men were invited into the Army, under fairer conditions, that the labour-market would very soon supply the men. There is one point which has been raised here to-day by Dr. Cameron, with respect to the accumulation of money in the hands of soldiers. I would submit to this meeting that any arrangement under which a large number of men had a lump sum at a comparatively early age in their career, would be most disastrous, not only to the Army,

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but to the men themselves, because I think you will find that the men who in one calling accumulate a certain sum to carry into another calling, are neither good men in the first calling nor good men in the second. You will find, as a rule, that the men who in domestic circles save a little money usually end in keeping a public-house, and I think that if soldiers on the same principle at the age of 23, or probably something under that, had what might be £20, they would think it sufficient to play with the money, and consider what they would embark it in, and whilst they were fiddling with the money, they would lose all the attributes which constitute the hard-working man, who is going to make his trade his life profession. It will be seen that the whole tendency of modern thought is against the system of pensions, and it will ultimately be found that the Army, like every other trade, will have to serve for its salary, and will have to do the best with its salary, and to make the most of that salary in the way of provision for future time. But assuming for the moment that Colonel Lyons' view is correct, and that a man had more option as to how he went in and how he came out, I think you would find, with the present growth of co-operative trade, that there would be a large number of positions entirely apart from patronage or official precedence growing up for the class of men that would come out of the Army, namely, men accustomed to method, accustomed to drill, and not desirous themselves of necessarily becoming masters. That is the particular class of men which the labour-market now requires, and I find from daily experience with large quantities of labour, that the young man of the present is not content to learn his trade, but he must needs be continually trying a number of trades, until he finds no instrument in the labour-market suits him at all. If a large number of men were during their early career in the Army trained in habits of discipline and method, they would be serviceable men, not in the sense in which Commissionaires are serviceable, because my own experience proves that in many ways they are the most unserviceable men in London, but men who have learned methods and habits of life, which they would be prepared to carry into any trade they might in after life learn for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN: There are so many other gentlemen anxious to take part in this discussion, that I think it would be desirable to adjourn it for a week.

The discussion was then adjourned till February 29th.

February 29th, 1874.

COLONEL F. C. STEPHENSON, C.B., in the Chair.

ADJOURNED DISCUSSION ON DR. LEITH ADAMS'S PAPER.

The CHAIRMAN: Before renewing the discussion which was discontinued this day week, I beg again to remind you of the necessity of limiting the two points of discussion as much as possible to the two questions mentioned, viz., "whether a perfectly efficient system of Short Service and Reserve can be secured by Voluntary Enlistment?" and "supposing Short Service and a Reserve impracticable, what schemes of Continuous Service and Pension are likely to be successful?" These two points really are the pith of the whole subject of Dr. Adams's paper, and it is exceedingly desirable that any gentlemen who wish to speak should confine themselves as much as possible to those points. One other point I should like to call the attention of the meeting to, which is the desirability of avoiding, as much as possible, any argument or expression which can in any manner be interpreted as having a political bearing. I think that is of very great importance, and also I hope remarks may be devoid of any warmth of expression which might give offence outside these walls.

Col. EWART, C.B., R.E.: I attended here last week, and listened very attentively to all that was said. It appeared to me that there were three points to which Dr. Adams directed our attention. The first was the supposed insufficiency of the supply of recruits; the second was the supposed indifferent nature of that supply; and the third was the difficulty of finding a Reserve. These all bear upon the two

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COLONEL F. C. STEPHENSON, C.B., in the Chair.

ADJOURNED DISCUSSION ON DR. LEITH ADAMS'S PAPER.

The CHAIRMAN: Before renewing the discussion which was discontinued this day week, I beg again to remind you of the necessity of limiting the two points of discussion as much as possible to the two questions mentioned, viz., "whether a perfectly efficient system of Short Service and Reserve can be secured by Voluntary Enlistment?" and "supposing Short Service and a Reserve impracticable, what schemes of Continuous Service and Pension are likely to be successful?" These two points really are the pith of the whole subject of Dr. Adams's paper, and it is exceedingly desirable that any gentlemen who wish to speak should confine themselves as much as possible to those points. One other point I should like to call the attention of the meeting to, which is the desirability of avoiding, as much as possible, any argument or expression which can in any manner be interpreted as having a political bearing. I think that is of very great importance, and also I hope remarks may be devoid of any warmth of expression which might give offence outside these walls.

Col. EWART, C.B., R.E.: I attended here last week, and listened very attentively to all that was said. It appeared to me that there were three points to which Dr. Adams directed our attention. The first was the supposed insufficiency of the supply of recruits; the second was the supposed indifferent nature of that supply; and the third was the difficulty of finding a Reserve. These all bear upon the two

questions which have been submitted to us for discussion. A number of incidental matters also bearing upon these questions were brought out by various speakers. It appears to me that, inasmuch as the *Journal of this Institution* is published and very largely circulated, and is not only circulated amongst our own Officers in our own colonies and at our own stations, but also goes into the hands of foreign Officers, and finds its way into foreign libraries, and the matter in it is introduced into discussions abroad, it is very desirable that any deficiencies in our service should not be unduly exaggerated, and that the real state of things should be brought out in these discussions. Therefore, from that point of view I would speak first as regards the supposed insufficiency of recruits. I happen to have had the opportunity of referring to some statistics upon this matter, and I have taken the opportunity of consulting the latest returns showing the numbers of recruits that have been raised, and I should wish to bring before the meeting, in opening the discussion this evening, the real state of things at the present moment, namely, that the Army is considerably over its strength. It is quite true last summer there was a great deficiency of recruits, and that the winter season is the time for getting recruits, but from whatever reasons, the fact of the matter is, that at the present moment the Army is over its strength. Some regiments—and no doubt this has given rise to the supposition that there is a great want of recruits—some regiments do want recruits; on the other hand, others are in excess of their numbers. The artillery at the present moment may want 700 or 800 men, but why? Because they have sent out large drafts to India, and have not had time to recruit up. The Highlander regiments, too, are in want of men, but that, no doubt, will be remedied in time. We must recollect that in this matter of recruiting, there have been great changes of late years; that we passed from the system of long service and pensions, to the system of general service and short service: that that again has been altered into county service, and that now men are taken for the county regiment, and when these regiments are full, recruiting is opened at the brigade depôts for other regiments belonging to other depôts which want men. Only about 28 depôts out of the 70 proposed, have as yet been brought into working order, but I believe, from all the inquiries I have made, that at those depôts which have been brought into working order, the recruiting has been most successful with very few exceptions—there are a few exceptions, especially in Scotland. The measures which were proposed within the last two years for accelerating recruiting, and for leading up to a Reserve, have hardly had time to come into force; in fact it will be some years before any men pass under these measures into the Reserve. Therefore it may be rather premature to judge of how far these measures are fitted to give the Army a Reserve. As regards the indifferent nature of the recruits now furnished, we had the opportunity of hearing from the Inspecting Field Officer of the London District last week that he was perfectly satisfied with the men who are raised for the cavalry regiments in London. The Lecturer's remarks with regard to the indifferent nature of the recruits as I apprehend, mainly referred to the infantry recruits raised under his immediate superintendence in London. The question in my mind is whether those remarks will refer to the men who have been raised at the country brigade depôts. From all I have heard, I have reason to believe that they do not apply to the same extent. I am rather more disposed to believe that the same sort of men who used to enlist for the infantry in the country, do still exist—that there is very little difference in the men. Of those who enlist in London, no doubt the superior men go for the artillery and cavalry and the Guards, and a certain number of men who come to London thinking they will get work, and be well paid, fail in these objects, and then enlist for the infantry. I am disposed to think if the statistics could be obtained as to the relative nature and stature of the men now enlisting in the country, and the men who used to enlist, it would be found that they are very much what they were before. Supposing that you get the same men, I hold—and I think the Lecturer stated so in his remarks—that the advantages that have been given to them in their barracks are very far superior to what they used to have, and I would add to what he said in his paper, the great advantage of the present gymnastic training, which has been shown by the Army Medical Reports to improve the men very much in the chest measurement, and in their general strength and power. Therefore I am disposed to think that these measures which have been introduced, such as giving them greater cubic space in

barracks, giving them gymnastic training, giving them recreation rooms and amusements in barracks—these sort of things have all tended to the improvement of the soldier. Whether or not the present measures contemplated for passing men through the ranks, and then getting them into the Reserve will answer, it will take time to show; but this must be recollected, that what you really want in the present day, when we look at what foreign nations are doing, and at the state of their organisation, is a Reserve, and you want a particular kind of Reserve. You want a Reserve that is immediately available to complete your regiments for service. Two sorts of Reserves are proposed in this country—the one Reserve is of men who have passed through the ranks, and the other is of the Militia. I think, with all due deference to the Militia, that every one must allow that the most fitting men to join the ranks and embark at once for service in the field, are rather those men who have passed through the ranks of the regular Army than the men who have only been out a month in the year, for training with the Militia. But when war once begins, then comes the great advantage of a Militia Reserve, because when the regiments of the line embark for foreign service, the Militia take their place, and by degrees, being embodied and being in barracks, become able to fill the regiments that are on service with thoroughly efficient men to join the ranks. I will not prolong what I have to say, although I might touch upon many matters dwelt upon last week, inasmuch as I think it is desirable that I should not exceed the limits which the Chairman has assigned for speakers in this discussion.

Captain ROGERS, Staff Officer of Pensioners, Longford: No one as yet has touched upon the Irish side of the recruiting question, and it is to this that I shall particularly direct my observations. My sub-division lies in the centre of Ireland, and for the last two years I have witnessed a continuous efflux of the able-bodied population to America, and I am of opinion that the allurements held forth by their relatives in America are so practical and irresistible, that it will go far to drain the population of the district where I have been recruiting. I rather think that in this great competitive age, the Irish recruit is unfairly handicapped. As a smart, intelligent soldier, he is second to none, but he is, as a rule, totally ignorant of the "three R's," and, therefore, cannot look forward to quick promotion. But the Irishman is a soldier from the shell. His very instinct teaches him to learn how to fight best, and from my own observation, I can say it is perfectly marvellous to notice how quickly a batch of Militia recruits will pick up their drill. It is while this process of training is going on that such lads begin to ask about the Army and its advantages, and that is the time in my opinion to secure their services and draft them into the Army. I therefore think that Commanding Officers of Militia regiments should be compelled in some way to encourage the transfer of their men to the line. But there is another drawback even when no objections are raised on this score. The recruiting sergeant and the Militia Staff contend about the bringing money, and so nothing comes of the privilege accorded by the Commanding Officer and his Adjutant. To my mind this bringing money has as demoralising an effect as the obsolete bounty. It is a mere premium on crimping, and it is responsible for the many perjuries spoken of by Dr. Adams when he told you that the majority of the recruits are nominally 18, but virtually they are only 17 years of age. As example is better than precept, I can instance a case myself. A Militia corporal brought a man of his company before me for enlistment. The recruit made the usual declaration, and I enlisted him, but before testing him, I made enquiries and found out that he was a married man. Of course I had to proceed against this poor dupe as a rogue and a vagabond, although he told me that it was the corporal who induced him to say that he was unmarried, and he was prepared to swear to it. Reward your recruiting parties you must, and considering the paramount importance of their duties, I think you cannot reward them too much, but this bringing money ought, in my opinion, to be accorded to the recruit and paid to him when he has learned his drill. As to the short-service system, there is no doubt that the most reckless wretch in the world will at some time or other during his six years' active service bethink himself of the future. He may bear no good character in the regiment; he may have such a number of regimental entries against him that he has given up all hope of being re-engaged. What does he say? "I won't waste my time here. I will desert, and seek some

"permanent employment." On the other hand, the appropriation warrant recently promulgated as regards the fines for drunkenness, will undoubtedly offer incalculable incentives to the well-conducted soldier. I am myself convinced by personal enquiry that there are no more powerful incentives to enlistment than pensions on discharge. My district in Ireland is a proclaimed one, and therefore you may imagine it is not considered very peaceably disposed, but I vouch for it there is one reliable and loyal element there of which little account is taken by the unthinking many, namely, the Army Pensioners, than whom a more excellent, trustworthy and respectable body of men does not exist. When I first went to Longford, I was paying my men alphabetically at an out-station when a very old man entered. "Sir," he said, "I used always to be paid first by your predecessor, for I am a 'Waterloo hero.'" I said, "Well you shall be paid first, because you were all 'heroes at Waterloo.'" And, Sir, one out of ten or twelve recruits whom, after the utmost exertions, I have only been able to pass into the Army within two years, came from the village of this Waterloo hero—a pensioner at 9d. a-day. Dr. Adams, I think, was rather hard upon little men. He seems to have forgotten the famous dictum of General Picton, which however I will not repeat here. Dr. Adams thinks an average height of 5ft. 7 inches is procurable, or at least is desirable. No doubt it is, but I rather think if you would double the pay of the Army, these men in sufficient numbers could not be obtained. Why not enlist promising boys of 17 years old, say 5 feet 4 inches in height, and send them to large camps of instruction on the chance that the majority of them will develop into stalwart men. As an instance, a young fellow came to me to enlist. He wanted a fraction of the proper height. I said "No, I cannot enlist you, but go into the Militia for a month or six weeks of drill." He did, and then he came back of the right height, and I enlisted him. There is one other point I wish to allude to as indirectly bearing on this question. A great deal has been done towards the social amelioration of the soldier, and I have no doubt it will be appreciated, but how about the married soldier? Let the single man see that his more respectable comrade has his interests looked after, and good results will follow. In connection with the Victoria Hospital at Netley, a number of cottages have been built for the accommodation of soldiers' wives whose husbands have been invalided from Colonial stations. This admirable institution is the result of a local charity that needs and deserves the support of the Army. Elevate and respect the condition of the well-conducted soldiers, and depend upon it the country will never want for recruits nor a reliable Reserve.

Lieutenant-Colonel AIKMAN, V.C., Commanding R.E. Middlesex Militia: It is with great diffidence that I venture to make a few remarks, after the observations of the many distinguished Officers who have spoken on this important subject; but from the information gathered from Dr. Leith Adam's paper, and the opinions already expressed, it would appear that, unless some means be found to make the Army Bill more effective in its results than it has hitherto been, we shall shortly neither have an efficient Army nor a reliable Reserve Force.

Our first object should be to discover the reason for the widespread dissatisfaction among our soldiers, and want of confidence pervading the minds of those people belonging to the class from which our recruits are chiefly drawn. I cannot help thinking that Sir Percy Douglas has ascribed the general distrust to the right cause viz., the abolition of pensions. When we consider how much the prospective advantage of pensions is coveted by all classes of the community, securing a zealous and honest performance of duty at a comparatively small cost, and that this mode of rewarding long and faithful service has been in operation for generations, it is not surprising that the abolition of this institution should have served as a severe blow to the interests of our poor soldiers, who, coming from a class of unsettled habits, have nothing to look forward to in the future, and therefore accept the low rate of military pay, in the hope of ultimately securing a pension, to preserve them from ending their days in the workhouse. It seems to be the general impression that pensions are not consistent with short Army service, followed by long service in the Reserve. To my mind the pension system is peculiarly essential to a mixed service of this kind, because, when you discharge a soldier from the Line into the Reserve, after a short service, he is obliged to take up some other means of subsistence, and in the absence of some prospective benefit accruing from his former military service,

he will not be forthcoming when wanted. Mr. Hay Hill, a gentleman of considerable experience in the labour-market, states, that the spirit of the age is opposed to pensions. Now, Sir, I deny that the people of this country are less disposed than formerly to reward long and faithful service, or that the Government *employés* and soldiers are less inclined to accept a moderate rate of pay, followed by this kind of reward. Mr. Hill's observations, I think, apply to the skilled operations connected with the Labour League, who wage perpetual war against capital—men who strike when their master is fixed with a contract, who change their situations periodically, and have no feeling in common with their employer. There is nothing in this relation to call for a pension, and I need not say that it would be an unfortunate day for us when these conditions existed in the Army, even though it were possible to pay our soldiers according to the labour-market rate; but, returning to the operative, whether he is engaged with this master, or that, he is employed in productive industry, and the country sustains no loss. Not so with the soldier. His training is costly, and if discharged after a short period, he becomes a civilian in every sense of the word, and the money expended upon him is lost.

I cannot help thinking that, had the Army Bill in its original intention proved successful in drafting soldiers of three years' training into the civil population, without any link with the Army or Reserve, an element of discontent would have been raised up in this country that sooner or later would have proved a serious inconvenience, and of no military utility whatever. Now, we have four distinct bodies in our Army and Militia, the Line, the Army Reserve, the Militia Reserve, and the Militia. We recruit for the Line through the Militia: this I believe to be wrong. The Militia should be composed of people of a different class, with settled homes and employments. It is from the Line and Militia recruiting in the same field, that a sufficient number of men of proper *physique* are not procurable, and that so many desertions and frauds are practised with impunity.

When men of unsettled habits make up their mind to join the Army, they first enlist in the Militia; they receive their bounty, clothes, &c., and then desert. They sell the Government property, amounting in value to £5, for what it will fetch, and then enlist in the Line. Having succeeded so well in the first instance, they continue their migratory habits in the regular service so graphically described by Colonel Lyons, the recruiting Officer. I had 48 men walk off in one morning; a few were caught and sentenced to a fine of £2 10s., or three months' imprisonment by the civil power. By this arrangement the delinquents had a balance in their favour by the transaction. I need not say that this mode of treating desertion and theft is admirably calculated to ruin the *morale* of any military body. I have made a rough sketch of a plan based on the pension system, which appears simple, inexpensive, and capable of modification, to meet the requirements of the Army and Reserve. I estimate the cost of a soldier at £50 per annum. I take 35 years, that is, from the age of 19 to 56, and divide this term into four periods of service: 1st period, seven years in the Line, at £50 = £350; 2nd period, seven trainings in the Militia Reserve, at £7 per training = £49. The soldier having performed 14 years' service, would now be entitled to 6d. per day kit and rations, while training, amounting to £13 per annum, = £91. Having concluded his third term, or 21 years' service, during which time he is available for active service in any part of the world, he would be transferred to the pension establishment on 1s. per day, and be available for home defence. The sum total for 35 years' service amounts to £745, or £21 6s. per annum. Now let us compare this with long service: 21 years at £50 = £1,050; 14 years at 1s. per day, £252, total £1,302, or nearly double the amount of the short service soldier. The Army Bill, though good in many of its features, has not yet been worked out successfully. Professional jealousy has in no small measure contributed to this result. Line Officers object to give their Reserve men to the Militia, where their services would be invaluable, and Militia Officers are loath to give their best men to the Line. The Militia, under better treatment, could easily extend its recruiting, so as not to interfere with the Line, and by this means the *physique* of both services would be considerably improved, and the men of both forces would be forthcoming when wanted. It is by treating the Reserves in a fair and liberal spirit, that the Line will become attractive, and by suitable measures the vacancies in both would soon be filled; but professional jealousy must be laid aside, and the

Officers of both services must go hand and glove together, to encourage an interchangeable system, for, as Sir Percy Douglas remarked, "it is to the constitutional force and the Reserves, properly welded together, that we must look for the strongest fighting power that this country can produce."

Major-General SCHOMBERG, Deputy Adjutant General Royal Marines: I have a very few remarks to make on this subject. It is certainly a very important one; I had the opportunity during the last year and a-half of comparing the working of very nearly the old system with the new. In the Marine corps we recruit for twelve and twenty-one years' service, and we have not had the slightest difficulty in getting recruits. The type of men we get is certainly good—they are very fair men. The standard of the Marine Artillery is a little lower than it was, but we have to recruit a much larger number of men than we had formerly. The establishment was 300 Officers and men, it is now nearly 3,000, and the corps is nearly completed. There is one difficulty that we find, I suppose in common with our neighbours, namely, that there are a set of men who go from one regiment to another, who never stay in any corps long enough to look like soldiers, and who enlist merely to desert. We have no power of marking these men; the country is at their mercy, and the recruiting Officer, however careful he may be, cannot detect that they have ever been in a regiment. I think myself the cure for that would be that we should follow the example of the Roman Army, in which every soldier was marked, as described by the Lecturer. I think if every one of us on joining, were marked with the broad arrow or the Crown, it would be a perfect cure of the difficulty. I should be quite willing to submit to the operation.

It seems to me that there are too many Reserves. I think there should be only one, barring the Volunteers, whom I wish to see encouraged, and not discouraged. I think that the two lines, the fighting one and the Reserve, should be formed of the Line and the Militia. I do not see why there should be any medium between the two. It seems to me if localisation were carried out carefully, and in its first intention, the Line regiment should be recruited from the Militia, and should send back its old soldiers to the Militia. I think that they should recruit each other. Of course there is no time to enter into detail on the subject, but such a plan seems much simpler than having a Militia Reserve and Army Reserve, and Militia besides.

I should like to say one word as to our being a military country. I think the Lecturer said that we are not a military country. If any country in the world may claim to be a military country, it is, in my opinion, England. We have, I think, won more battles and lost fewer by land than any country in the world; and when history comes to be written, I think the conquest of India, and its reconquest, and our government there, are feats not only of military but of administrative skill, which will certainly mark us as a military country.

Colonel ALCOCK, R.E. Middlesex Militia: The discussion on the last occasion turned very materially upon the labour-market, and the discussion this evening has turned very much upon the manner of procuring an efficient Reserve. I take the liberty of saying a few words, because it appears to me to be impossible by money only, to procure a sufficient force for our Army purposes under ordinary circumstances; and under extraordinary ones, such as war, you have not a sufficient Reserve. Having served in the Militia myself, I wish to give my opinion as founded upon my experience. The Militia originally was formed upon a feudal system. It was officered by the county gentlemen, and they held their appointments by property qualification, the consequences of which were, that men would follow their Officers whom they knew perfectly, who would not move a step to go with a stranger, or to go among strangers. The system of county brigade depôts has rather modified and improved the condition with respect to going among strangers, because county men are kept a good deal together. But you have entirely done away with the feudal system; you are resting entirely upon money, and are thinking nothing of social influence and social position. Therefore, looking at the subject from a philo-sophical point of view, I say, for the sake of argument, you may consider the Militia as absorbed into the Line. Then in the case of war you have no efficient Reserve. The way to meet that is to cause the whole of the schools throughout the kingdom to join military training with education, and to let them all be what was called a local Militia, officered by the sons of the gentry just entering upon life—obligatory service for two, three, or

four days in the year. The consequence of that would be, that you would prepare a better Reserve. Colonel Ewart has already told you that the formation of a Reserve is a matter of considerable time. Well, you would be prepared with a better Reserve by that voluntary system than all the nations of Europe can produce for aggressive purposes by a forced enrolment of the manhood of their nations. I say that what you cannot possibly do with money, you can do by so simple and obvious a system as bringing the social influence of one class to bear upon another. The future action and future progress of every man depend upon the associations of his youth, and education simply means the preparation of a man for the purposes which his immediate future will require in his national life. Therefore I say that we are coming to that point in which everybody must take his part in the defence of his country; and the proper manner to enable them to do so, is by beginning with the boyhood of a nation, and you will have a Reserve which will be quite equal to competing with the manhood of the nations of the Continent, who are raised by a forced conscription, and one which they are generally very little disposed to obey.

Captain ROSEASON, R.N.: I think a very general but erroneous notion prevails that a soldier who is forced by a conscription to join the Army of his country, is a much cheaper soldier to the nation than the man who joins it voluntarily. I do not think this possible, and I have certainly gone into the subject with great care, and have especially estimated the relative cost of the Austrian, Prussian, and English soldier, and found the cost nearly identical.

A great error has been committed by attempting to arrive at the individual charge of each English soldier, by dividing the total annual expenditure for the British Army by the number of regular soldiers *alone*, that are to be found in the annual vote—this false mode of computing, made each soldier cost 100*l*. But the gentleman who first made this statement, totally lost sight of the fact, that within such gross estimate is included the amount paid to the Militia, Volunteers, Yeomanry, Pensioners, and Reserve, with every fresh investment in plant, and also addition made to our valuable accumulation of military stores, not only in England, but in all the various powerful military positions we possess in every quarter of the globe.

Dr. CAMERON, Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals, h.p.: I am one of the youngest members of this Institution, and I have certainly learnt that most novel and surprising information is to be gained by attending its meetings. I allude particularly to the remarks of Colonel Ewart, who first addressed us this evening. I had imagined, from reading the military papers of the country, and from conversations with Staff Officers and Pensioners, that the general opinion of the officials of the Army was, that there was a deficiency in the matter of recruits. But now I learn that so far from there being any deficiency of recruits, we have an overplus of them. I have also learnt that my eyes have deceived me. Although I have spent my life as a Military Medical Officer, in judging of men, I now learn the fact that my eyes must have deceived me excessively. Having looked at regiments with all the feelings of an old Officer, with regret and grief I now learn, that this has been an ocular deception, and that those regiments are composed of the very same kind of men who used to enlist in the service. Well, that is a very surprising piece of information, and I hope it is correct. As regards the remarks which other Officers have made, they have referred to the subject of bounty, and pensions, and long service. One gentleman favoured us with a calculation of the cost of bringing a man up to 56 years of age in the Army. Well, evidently from the tone which the discussion assumed last evening, and from the general opinion of military society, we all regret the abolition of long service and of pensions. I do not say much about bounty, because I think the system carries with it a condemnation of the trade it is inviting. For when you have to offer a man a bounty to take a certain situation, it is some proof that the situation cannot be a very promising one; but pensions and long service, of course, we all believed in. Well, Sir, these are gone, and we have to deal here with accomplished facts. Therefore, I propose to apply myself to the first question, namely, "Whether it is possible to secure an Efficient System of Short Service and Reserve by Voluntary Enlistment?" Having devoted much consideration to the subject, I think it is possible. But to do so, we must depart altogether from

established traditions, which I need not tell you is a most difficult thing in England. We must quit the old groove, and start on an entirely new one. And to do that, successfully, the gentlemen who rule those matters must be familiar with the public opinion of the barrack-room, with the opinion of the mechanics' workshop, and of the village ale-house, and all places from which we draw our men. I took the liberty of telling Mr. Cardwell, very respectfully, that it was not for me to say who had drawn up his numerous warrants, but that whoever drew them up, though he might be a very clever civilian, he was perfectly ignorant of the public opinion of the barrack-room. They seem very nice warrants to look at, but they will not work. I propose to depart, in great measure, from the system on which the soldier has been rewarded. Accepting as accomplished facts what has been done, I say we must deal with matters as they are. To start; I should keep the period of 12 years' service. I spent the whole of last month in one of our largest garrisons, and I was there told by a medical Officer that he was enlisting men for six years' service with the colours, and six years in the Reserve, and that he was also enlisting men for twelve years' service with the colours in an infantry regiment. My friend, Dr. Adams, an authority on these matters, assures me that there must have been a mistake. That, however, is a matter of little consequence, because we are enlisting men for twelve years for the cavalry and the artillery. However, I propose to take the twelve years' service, but instead of drawing a hard-and-fast line, I shall confine myself to saying that a man after six years' service with the colours, should be eligible for the Reserve, if he chose to go into it, and if it suits the policy of the Government at the time, to permit him to do so. I confess I put that proviso in with some little idea of baiting the hook, so that a man may not be frightened at the idea of tying himself up for twelve years. We will suppose a recruit brought into barracks. I should propose to relieve him from all charges for his food. I know for a fact that this is a matter which accounts for much of the desertion that takes place among young soldiers. The recruit is told by the sergeant if he enlists he will receive bed and board and 1s. a-day. No sooner does he get into barracks, than he is called upon to pay 3½d. a-day for his groceries or small stores, and he thinks he has been done. He never was aware of that; he gets sulky, and thinks he has been cheated, and very rapidly reconciles his conscience, if he has any of that commodity, to the idea of breaking the bargain by deserting, and he does desert. I should relieve the soldier altogether from the multiplicity of accounts. Threepence-halfpenny is an awkward sum to calculate for buying groceries, and I should relieve the man from that altogether. I should give the soldier three good meals a-day, and if any circumstances, except those of field service, prevented the man from getting those rations, I should compensate him liberally for the loss of them, and should also give compensation, of course, to married men on leave. I should then alter the system of paying the soldier by the day. The men whom we enlist, have never been accustomed to be paid by the day; they have either been paid by piece-work or by weekly wages. Therefore we should pay the soldier by the week. And as we take off the charge of 3½d. which amounts to 2s. 0½d. a week, I should propose to take 1s. off his pay, and to say, "Your pay is 6s. a week, and your bed and board." That would be an addition to his present pay of 1s. 0½d. Considering the state of the labour-market, nobody can possibly complain of that addition. Then there is this to be borne in mind, that the soldier must keep up his kit, and keeping up a kit in these days, with camp life and autumn manœuvres, is a very different affair from what it was in the days of country quarters and company detachments. The soldier is now called upon to encounter in peace a great many of the hardships that he used to consider peculiar to the state of war. Graphic descriptions of the men sloudering through the mud may be very amusing, and so may pictures of the same in the *Illustrated London News* for ladies to look at in their drawing-rooms; yet it is anything but a laughing matter to the poor fellows who have to do it. Their clothes are destroyed. With regard to these clothes, I wish to make a statement, which is, that the clothing now issued from the central establishment at Pinlloe, is not nearly equal to that issued under the old system of what we called the Tailor Colonels. The Tailor Colonels were one of those peculiar anomalies of which there are plenty in the British Constitution, but, for all that, it worked admirably; for anybody who is acquainted with old soldiers who have lived long enough to try both systems, will know that two of the old brick-dust looking

coats were, for wear and warmth, equal to three of the coats issued now. I allude to that on account of the additional expense which has been entailed upon the soldier. Soldiers were my earliest playmates, and I have spent my life among them, and, as any medical soldier who does his duty, ought to be the soldier's friend and confidant, I flatter myself I have always been so, and I claim to know as much about soldiers as any man living. Now, I was talking to an old respectable soldier of nineteen years' service during last month, and he told me that, in former days, such a thing as a soldier's buying salts of lemon and cleaning drugs was almost unknown; but that now they are constantly obliged to spend small sums upon these matters in order to keep their things decent. The soldier only gets one pair of cloth trousers annually, and one pair of summer trousers biennially; and to keep these, and to keep his boots in order, will cost a very economical man as much as 4*d.* a-day. It would require him to be a very careful soldier to do it on that. No Government, I think, could object to increasing the soldier's pay by 12½*d.* a-week. I should then give him no additional pay; I should do away with so-called good-conduct pay altogether, and I could give many reasons for it. I should give him no increase of pay until he has served six years; then I should give him another shilling a-week, and there should leave him. At the same time, I take this opportunity of saying I think Non-commissioned Officers are very much underpaid. This is a matter of the highest importance. Everybody knows it is exceedingly difficult very often to get men to take to the stripes. I should propose to add to each corporal's pay 1*s.* 6*d.* a-week; to sergeants, 2*s.* 6*d.*; colour-sergeants, 3*s.*; staff-sergeants, 3*s.* 6*d.*; and to sergeant-majors, who are some of the worst-paid men in the service, 5*s.* Now, to provide for the man on his discharge. The system I propose is this. I should establish in every regiment in the service a yearly discharge fund. That is, on the 1st January, 1874, I should have opened in the regimental savings-bank ledger an account headed "Discharge Fund of 1874." To this fund I should credit 2*d.* a-day for every man who joined in 1874, and to that fund also I should credit all the fines levied upon the members of the fund, and I should substitute fines, as much as possible, for other punishments. Instead of sending men to prison and leaving others to do their duty, I should fine them to the utmost possible extent, and add the fines to the fund of the year in which the man had joined. On the 31st December in each year, I should balance that fund and add to it the regulation interest, and yearly, in January, I should publish a statement of the fund in the regimental orders. Thus, in the first week of January, 1875, I should publish an account of the discharge fund of 1874. Assuming that there stood to its credit on the 31st December the sum of £100, and there were forty men to partake in it, the share of each man would be £2 10*s.*, and I should publish the names and numbers of the men referred to. In each man's pocket-ledger, I should then credit the sum of £2 10*s.* as his share of the fund. Of course the first year would necessarily be a broken one, because men would enlist at different periods, and their daily twopences must all be put together and equally divided at the end, and in this way the youngest recruit at the close of the very first year of his service would find to his surprise—probably he had never owned 5*s.*, or at least certainly not a whole sovereign in his life before—that he had money in the bank which had got there without any exertion on his part; in fact, that he was already a man, in a small way, of property. Each succeeding year, every man in the regiment, from right to left, would find himself richer by £3 0*s.* 10*d.*, in addition to his share of the fines levied upon the members of the fund, and also his share in the casualties arising from deaths and desertions or retirements. These funds should then go on, year by year, until the close of the eleventh year, because as soon as the twelfth year comes, men would be discharged from time to time. Therefore on the 31st of December, at the close of the eleventh year, I should close the fund finally, and allot the money to those men of 1874 who were still on the rolls of the regiment, be they many or few. If there was only a single man remaining, the whole accumulated fund should be his. The fund should be finally closed, and the money should be considered the man's property, and handed over to his heirs in case he died between that period and the time when he could claim his discharge. As each man's day of discharge comes, hand his share of the fund to him. If he was a notorious character, such as could not possibly be trusted with the disposal of a large sum of money, then Government should have the

power to purchase an annuity for him. It requires some calculation to realize what sums men might possibly obtain. Multiply £3 0s. 10d. by eleven years, and you have a sum of between £30 and £40, and adding to that the compound interest, you will perceive the recruiting sergeant can tell the man with perfect truth that at the end of the comparatively short period of twelve years, when he would be a young man, and not more than 32 at the outside, he would be safe to have forty guineas in his pocket. Forty guineas, I hope, to most of the gentlemen I have the honour of addressing is comparatively a very moderate sum indeed, but to a man in the situation of most of our recruits it is an almost fabulous sum. Such men have never possessed in all probability £5 together in their lives, and the sum of forty guineas handed to a man would enable him either to emigrate successfully, or to set up in a small business, or to do fifty things. It would send him home to his friends at any rate favourably impressed towards the service from which he derived his benefits. But very much larger sums than that might be obtained. I went to the actuary of the insurance society in which I am insured, and got him to turn up some tables and calculate the percentage of deaths, and considering the changes and chances of an English soldier, serving, as he does, all over the world, military mortality far exceeds that of civil life at the same age. Supposing a regiment enlists one hundred men in one year. I see that last week's military papers mention a regiment coming home now which will require 200 recruits, and I knew one myself a few years ago that enlisted 300 men in one year. Supposing a regiment enlists 100 men this year; you have then a discharge fund of 1874 which starts with an income of over £300 a-year to be accumulated at compound interest for eleven years. That is capable of amounting to a very large sum. What would prevent any single man out of that company becoming the sole possessor of that treasure? Such a thing is quite on the cards. Suppose the regiment meets with another "Birkenhead" or Balaklava, it will go very far to realize it. Mortality prevailed to a very great extent in the colony where I served. A company was sent to a very nice-looking station—certainly it was a good many years ago, and at the end of the month there was one Commissioned Officer and three privates left out of them. So late as 1824, 113 Europeans died of fever out of 420 men in two garrisons in Ceylon. That is an extraordinary mortality, but such casualties as the "Birkenhead" and Balaklava, and many others may be met with any day. For instance, we might read and pass over without surprise, an announcement in the newspapers that at Peshawur there had been a violent outbreak of cholera, and 40 men had been carried off. That, of course, would tend to benefit the survivors. Now, however, our soldiers are called upon to enlist and to give us the flower of their life without deriving the slightest benefit. Our men have gone out to the Gold Coast. What advantage would it be to any man to come home the last survivor of his corps? There was a man in my own regiment who came home covered with medals and clasps, having gone through all the battles in Upper India and so forth—one of eight survivors of those who embarked with the colours twenty years previously. What was his fate? He was discharged on a pension of 8d. a-day. What impression of the service did that man give? He must have become a burden upon the rates, and would only serve as a beacon in his native village to warn young men who might possibly think of going to be soldiers. We experience great difficulty in obtaining recruits for the Royal Artillery. Now in a corps like the Royal Artillery the discharge fund of each year would amount to a very large sum, and as each man thinks every one mortal but himself, the men, instead of having nothing, as they have now, to look forward to but a distant prospect of getting an additional penny a-day if they can contrive to pursue a path of undeviating military rectitude for two years, each man would cherish the hope of being one of the few fortunate survivors of his year. At present men will tell you that they do not like the service, because there is no chance for a man in it. I have taken as a sort of jury upon this plan the Corps of Commissionaires in London, who must be the best judges on these subjects. I have submitted the details to them, and they have met with their approval. With regard to this particular point of pensions, a friend who took great interest in the matter told me he had been speaking to an Officer of considerable service, a cavalry Major, who told him he himself had no faith in anything but the restoration of the shilling a-day pension. I submitted that to my friends, the Commissionaires, and what was their

answer? "Oh, that gentleman knew nothing about it. What is a shilling a-day when you get it? You have to wait 21 years for it. At the end of that time you cannot work. What can you do on a shilling a-day. No, it is infinitely better to give the man the chance of getting a good sum of money when he is a young man, and the man would infinitely prefer it." On the system I have advanced for your consideration, no soldier could possibly leave the Army without being to a certain extent provided for. No man could go away and say he had not had a chance in life. That system would also put a stop to the very painful sight of men who have been hurt early in the service and discharged, because I should provide that a soldier disabled in action should carry away with him from his regiment the sum that was last credited to him on the previous 31st December. It would be impossible to extend that provision to men disabled by sickness, because that would open the door to all sorts of imposture. There can be no mistake about a man who gets a limb badly broken in action. About three years ago, at Brecon, riding in the very heart of the recruiting ground of the Welsh Fusiliers, who were then in that district, I stumbled upon a fine young man with the 23rd coat upon him sitting by the roadside ready to receive anything I might give him. I pulled up sharp, and asked what brought him there? He said, "I am a poor fellow who has got a bad leg from a wound, and I cannot do anything." I said, "You look very well; what is the matter with your leg?" "Oh," he said, "I have had a piece of bone come right out," and he pulled up his trousers, and I saw it was so. He said, "I cannot do anything." I said to him, "What did you get?" "Sixpence a-day for two years, and my leg does not get any better, and I can do nothing." I said, "What are you doing here?" "Well," he said, "the old regiment is coming up here; I was waiting to see if I could get something from them." I pitied the man very much, and gave him half-a-crown and rode on. In the same way I have met soldiers repeatedly. I met a man in 1873 who had served eight years, and got his eye destroyed with ophthalmia at the Cape, and was discharged with sixpence a-day. This system that I have sketched out would put a stop to all that. No man could complain that he was left penniless, or had not had his chance, and many men might get considerable sums of money. At the end of the 11th year, when the fund was closed, if the men continued to serve we should give them the twopence a-day till their time expired, which would make the pay 8s. 2d. a-week. If men who had completed 12 years' service chose to re-enlist for nine years more, I should certainly take them, if they were medically fit and of good character, but not otherwise. They would then be entitled to a pension, for under the present system a pension is not absolutely abrogated. A man may get permission to re-enlist and serve 21 years, and then get a pension. In that event I would give a private a shilling a-day pension, and the other ranks a fixed sum in like proportion. I think we should endeavour to get a better stratum of society for our soldiers. We have heard of the comforts of the barrack, but the real state of things is very different. We are enlisting the very scum of society. A private artilleryman at Woolwich has recently depicted the state of society in his barrack-room, and pointed out that no respectable family would think of allowing their son to join in an atmosphere of such pollution and vice. I have heard the same thing repeated, and have been told by men that others join the regiment with whom they cannot sit at the fireside, their obscenity and filth are so outrageous. I say we should endeavour to get a different class of men into our Army, and to do that, the Government should pledge itself to give the soldier who has served with a good character, a preferential claim for all manner of civil employments. If the regulations said that a soldier when he was discharged with a good character should have a preferential claim for all minor civil employments, such as in the police, railway staff, Government porters and messengers, it would act much more powerfully in bringing respectable men into our ranks than a pension would, because it would ensure them respectable civil employment for all their days. You may have noticed in the papers that a short time ago 22 postmen were wanted at salaries of 18s. or £1 a-week, and they were to be examined. Well, the Commissioners were rather surprised to find a thousand well-dressed, respectable-looking young men attending and requesting to be examined. That may give one an idea that if respectable civil employment were to be secured to men who had rendered a certain service to their

country it would be a great advantage. We have abundant means for it. There is no country in the world that has such a number of these rewards at its disposal as England. Still further, I should abrogate the present unsatisfactory system of bestowing commissions from the ranks, and should set aside a certain number of first commissions every year to be competed for by soldiers who had served three years with unblemished character, and men of strictly temperate habits. I should have these commissions competed for by papers, on the system adopted by the Staff College, of course with a degree of qualification suited to the class of people who are to compete for them, and who should be afforded every facility for qualifying themselves at our schools. Of course you would not expect these men to know conic sections, and all those things with which young men are now adding their imperfectly developed and unformed brains in these competitive examinations. I have known repeated instances in which people's heads have been quite destroyed, young lads who have been muddling their souls out over these things; of course you could not expect that. You would expect military qualification, and you would get a class of men into the service who would be fitted for it.

Col. LYONS: With the permission of the Chairman, there is a matter I wish to explain as there appears to be some misunderstanding. It is as to the term of enlistment of recruits. I have been Inspecting Field Officer in London for the last three years, and am fully conversant with all the orders and regulations and so forth with respect to the recruiting. The periods are these: for the cavalry of the line, recruits are enlisted for 12 years; for the Royal Artillery, 12 years; for the Royal Engineers, 12 years; nothing to do with the Reserve up to the present. For the infantry of the line recruits are enlisted for six years with the regiment and six years in the Army Reserve, with the exception of boys, who are in all cases enlisted for 12 years. A warrant came out about April or May last to the effect that men would be authorised to be enlisted for 12 years in such numbers as from time to time should be directed by the Adjutant-General. From that time to the present no order has been received by me in London to enlist men for infantry at the 12 years.

General Sir WM. CODRINGTON: There certainly is nothing so important to the Army as the first enlistment of the recruit, to obtain him with his *physique* not requiring hospital treatment, to be able to do duty as soon as he has done his drill. Every Officer who has been in the Army knows that this is most important. Those who were in India during the mutiny, or in the Crimea, found that when young recruits came out, you might reckon on one-third or one-half, not doing their duty during that Indian mutiny, or not going down to the trenches when they came before Sebastopol; many of them as soon as they were brought up went into hospital. Just trace the effect, which the Lecturer will know perfectly well—they go out from home, they have to be put into hospital, and other people have the care of them, either in hospital on shore, or in the hospital ship. They are then sent away, have to go back to England perhaps 2,000 miles, at an enormous expense to the country, taking the place of the really good men that you ought to have enlisted at first. It must therefore be perfectly clear, that in the first enlistment the *physique* of the men is one of the most important things we have to deal with. Something was mentioned just now, I think as a quotation, about our not being a military nation. That expression, I believe, comes from the celebrated historian of the Peninsular war, that we were a warlike, but not a military nation, merely meaning that we had all a tendency to fighting and to war, but that we had not the organization which perhaps other nations have; but I do not think it was intended to represent that we were not a good soldier-like nation, when it came to the push. I think the instance Dr. Cameron mentioned about it costing the soldier fourpence a-day to keep up his kit must be a mistake. I think that must be fourpence a-week; but that is a very minor point. The first point put down for discussion is, "Can a perfectly efficient System of Short Service and Reserve be secured by Voluntary Enlistment?" It is a sheer question of money. It is so, not only in the Army but in every class of life; if you ensure a man being paid by an engagement for twenty years with a pension, we know very well that he can do with less money than if you only hire him for a week or a fortnight. The same principle applies to short service. If you pay the soldier up to the price of the labour-market, I will be bound to say you will get

men in England as you got them before. I remember the Secretary for War of the day said, on the question of a conscription—"No, we will not have a conscription, "we would rather pay for the labour we require." Now, if we did pay for the labour we require, we should get the men, but we do not pay at all up to the labour-market; and as long as you do not pay up to the labour-market, what is to induce a man to become a soldier? He does not get his pension, he is put in a barrack-room, he has to give up his liberty; half the Army is in India, which means banishment from his friends; there are many disadvantages to be considered, and the man's father and mother, particularly in the country, think twice before they will allow him to enlist. There is no doubt, if you require men and it is a matter of importance to get them, you must pay for them; if you choose to insist upon short service without pension, you can get men if you pay more for them. The other question is—"Supposing short service and a Reserve impracticable, what "schemes of continuous service and pension are likely to be successful?" What schemes of continuous service and pension are likely to be successful I really do not know, except this, that we have known the time when there was an attachment to the service, when the men entered a regiment and remained in it as their home, until they were discharged and got their pension. That shilling a-day undoubtedly prevented a man starving; he was enabled to live in his parish in the country, and was not pointed out as being in positive distress. Taking that away and giving comparatively no equivalent, you certainly do not attract the men, and I rather apprehend, the class of men that you get, is not equal to those who formerly enlisted for permanent service. I believe that is the tendency of the lecture, that you get an unformed young lad who is of no service to you for some time; whereas in former days you were more able to pick your men. I think, if the Army is to be a profession, with regiments localized, we ought to have no recruiting parties at all; the men ought to come to us, instead of our going to them. There are regiments in the service at this moment, namely, the Household Cavalry, which never have recruiting parties—and why? Because there is such a demand for the situation, why or wherefore I do not know, that they always have men on their lists; and if a man misbehaves, they say, "We do "not want your service any more," and they get another in his place. The Officers in the Army will be exceedingly glad if the Army were so well paid, or its advantages were so great that we could imitate that system, and we could do as other employers of labour do, namely, that the different head-quarters, particularly the dépôt centres, should be the local establishments for recruiting, so that you would be able to say, "here is the centre, you must come to us," and when a man comes to you, whom you do not know as of good character, do not take him; that would be the best way to get good men in the Army, and if you pay them well, I believe there are plenty of men in this country who would make you very good soldiers yet.

Major WETHERED, Paymaster R.A.: I think those gentlemen who have taken part in the discussion, as well as the Lecturer, so far concur in saying that the Short Service Act has not been a success, but a disappointment. There is one point, I think, which has not been very much noticed, and that is, with regard to the way in which the recruits are taken. It is admitted that about 60 per cent. of the recruits we raise, are under 18 years of age, possibly a large majority are not more than 17 years of age. We take these men into the regular Army from 17 up to 23, and at the very time they become effective soldiers, we turn them out of the effective Army, and hand them over to the Reserve. It is well known to all military men, that no soldier is so effective as a man who has been about ten or eleven years with the colours, providing he is a trustworthy, steady man; and if we are to take men for merely six years, and then turn them out into the Reserve, I think we are upsetting the whole system. A great deal has been said about the matter being merely a question of £ s. d. So it is to a large extent. If we go into the labour-market and make our bid for the material we want, we should get that material, provided we pay the price for it. But when we come into the labour-market, we must remember that the soldier is a distinctly separate class from every other. An employer goes there and finds a labourer fit to perform the work he requires, pays him his price, and that labourer enters into an engagement with him. After he has served his em-

ployer, he is in a better position to go and seek employment elsewhere; but we go into the labour-market and buy the rough material. It really is not of so much consequence what we pay, the great expense is in the education of that material. It takes two or three years to make a man a soldier, he then becomes of great value to us, and it is not so much a consideration what we have to pay him, but how, when we have gone to this great expense, we are to retain him as a contented member of the service. There must be the advantage of progress in his position, and we must hold out some hope of advancement. I think it is very important that the man should have something to look forward to, he should be assured that, when he is worn out in our service, he will have a certainty to fall back upon. The pension, certainly, will cause a man to cling to the service, and it has always been an inducement to good conduct, because a man increased his pension by his continued good conduct. I am sure, if any suggestion thrown out at this lecture can be beaten into shape, we shall confer a great benefit upon the State. So far, I have not heard of any proposal which appears to me to answer all the purposes. I have no doubt a committee, quietly discussing the matter, would be much more likely to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion as to the best scheme to adopt.

I cannot say that I agree with any proposal that I have heard. I do not think it is a wise plan to lay by a certain sum daily, and to accumulate a fund, so that the men will be able to get a certain sum when they leave. We should have to look after them, to see that the men were provident with it, because, in nine cases out of ten, the money would be thrown away. Then, again, we want to keep these men in this country. If you take a soldier after fifteen years' service, and give him a lump sum of money, that man would not be fit for employment in this country; he would simply take his money and go off to America, and so we should be losing the very man we want to retain. If the man has a pension, and can look forward to an increase, by good conduct, he remains in the country, and we have him to fall back upon; therefore, I think it is much better that a man should be able to look forward to a pension than to a bonus sum, created by a daily increase of reserved pay. The great thing is to hold out inducements to soldiers, and we should increase the advantages of Non-commissioned Officers. Dr. Cameron proposed that you should hold out certain commissions for those men to compete for. Of course, in that case, we must raise the pay of the Commissioned Officers, for, otherwise, I do not think the advantages appertaining to the commissioned rank would induce a man to enter into the service. If we were to open up more positions to them, it would be an advantage. With regard to the subject of fines, I think they may be carried beyond a prudent limit. I do not think it is wise to create fines in all directions. The men will get dissatisfied, and desert. No doubt desertion at present is very rife, and it is a pity that we have departed from the custom of branding the deserter. A man who deserts, deserves to be branded, and I do not see why we should be so delicate about it. I think we shall not benefit much unless some committee of practical Officers is appointed to consider the whole subject. No doubt, if some scheme can be proposed on the basis of short service, it will be a very great advantage as regards the creation of an efficient reserve.

Dr. ADAMS: In reply, I wish to point out with reference to the supposed defect referred to by Sir Percy Douglas, with regard to the table of the nationality of recruits raised in the United Kingdom, in 1872, and in 1860, that the numbers furnished by Dr. Barclay, Army Medical Department, are produced merely to illustrate the statement in the lecture, "that the supplies of Irish recruits have much deteriorated of late years;" the data, therefore, are altogether disconnected with "rejections," which have no bearing on the point under consideration. The same observation is applicable to my statement, of having examined 25,000 men, and remitted 17,000 into the Army, this being advanced merely to show my experience of the *physique* of the recruits inspected by me during the last two and a-half years. The table showing the minimum heights of the British, German, and French soldiers, was compiled from official data in the War Office, the French being taken from a late report on the Reform of the French Army, translated by Major Home, R.E., and the German data were furnished by Captain Cooke, who, being present, can vouch for their accuracy. It should be understood, however, that although the minimum height in the German Army is as low as 61·8 inches, this does not imply that the figure is to be

considered in any other light than showing the lowest possible standard of height admissible, indeed, unless during great emergencies, the probability is, that not ten men are taken annually of this low standard—the usual minimum height standard in peace time being 63 inches, and that even is believed to be exceptional, and requires an otherwise unusual good *physique*, to which the Germans pay the greatest attention in the selection of soldiers, as they do to all military details. It is therefore absurd to compare minimum standards of height without taking the age into account, seeing that our lowest age is 17 or 18, and that of the conscript 20, the former being a lad, and the latter a matured man. With reference to the figures 6 and 6·8, representing the ratio per 1000 of colonists who entered the Army in 1860 and 1872, these embrace colonists who enlist in their own country or in the home Army, or even half-castes; for instance I examined lately a magnificent man, whose grandmother was a Maori. The table showing the comparative heights of recruits raised in 1815 and 1873 is furnished altogether with the view of showing the large number under 5 feet 6 inches in height who enlist now, as compared with thirty years ago. It was taken from returns in my office, and I believe it to be under the mark as regards the entire force. One gentleman inquired whether the falling off in the *physique* of the linesman was not a sign of a deterioration of race. My opinion is that this is not so, and that the loss of the Irish element, and the high rate of wages and demand in the labour-market, have required a corresponding reduction in the standard of height, and other physical requirements, so that recruits have to be taken from a lower physical stratum, which abounds with inefficient men of poor *physique*.

Colonel Ewart has said that the *physique* of the soldier is as good now as it used to be, but in this opinion I cannot agree with him, and the tables just described, together with the general opinion of all competent observers, show that there has been a regular and decided falling off, which had been gradually increasing of late years. The experience of the recruiting district in London is great, as it furnishes about one-third of the entire annual supplies of recruits for the whole Army: indeed, one has only to look at the infantry soldier now and think what he was thirty years since, to feel convinced that there is deterioration in his *physique*, for which a remedy has been indicated. Captain Rogers is mistaken in supposing that I said that no recruit should be taken under 5 feet 7 inches in height, the idea being that only promising men should be accepted who would come up to this standard at the prime of life. I am not averse to accepting recruits of low stature so much as I have the fear of getting many unpromising lads, of a low standard, who will never improve afterwards; to wit, the wretched undergrowth of cities. I agree with Dr. Cameron and others, that not only the pay, but the position of the non-commissioned staff may be improved, with the object of inducing a superior class of tradesman and the like to enlist. I also perfectly agree with all the valuable opinions and suggestions that have fallen from Sir William Codrington: indeed I feel that I have become a much wiser man by this able discussion, which, although it may not indicate any particular scheme for recruiting and the formation of a Reserve, there can be little doubt that it has fully established the necessity for remedial measures.

THE CHAIRMAN: Before we part I have a very few remarks to make. The first is to the effect that there seems very little doubt that we are all of opinion that it is a simple matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, as to the solution of this great difficulty in getting efficient recruits. I think we are also very nearly, if not entirely, unanimous upon this, that the best way of employing the money of the country is by applying it to pensions. The discussion has been very ample, and the subject pretty well exhausted, and I only hope that it may be turned to good account. It only remains for me to propose a vote of thanks to Dr. Adams for the very able lecture that he has given us upon a subject of such deep interest to the Army generally.