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On the Financial and Executive Administration of the British Indian Empire

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Wednesday, March 23d, 1859.

The Right Hon. the EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH, G.C.B., in the Chair.

ON THE FINANCIAL AND EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH INDIAN EMPIRE.*

By Lieut.-Col. J. P. KENNEDY,

Formerly an Officer of the Royal Engineers, Military Secretary to the late General Sir C. Napier when Commander in Chief in India, and Consulting Engineer to the Supreme Government in India for the Railway Department.

1. MORE than a year has elapsed since I had the honour of addressing the members of this Institution on the subject now under review.

That period has brought forth events as creditable to the character of the British Empire as they promise to be promotive of its broadest interests.

2. We have witnessed the transfer of British rule in India to the direct and responsible authority of a single Minister of Her Majesty's Government; and the intelligible exposition just offered to Parliament, by this first responsible Minister for India, is a *hopeful earnest of prospective benefit from the change so long and earnestly invoked.*

3. We find that social order has succeeded to the anarchy which for a time existed in India, and that, in the process of this change, not only has a *ferocious army of mutineers been overthrown*, but a host of bilious lecturers upon "human deterioration," and "the wane of British power," been practically answered.

4. It has been proved that a culminating point of moral and physical excellence characterizes the British people of the present day; *for the annals of the world do not offer another ordeal so searching as that by which our countrymen have been triumphantly tested in their long Indian struggle.*

A struggle not confined to our glorious soldiers and their prescient and gallant leaders, but unflinchingly sustained by all our race there, without restriction to profession, sex, or age! Assuredly, so long as a nation is peopled by such a race it must be invincible and progressive! A faithful record of British resistance to the Indian mutineers will offer the brightest page in history, as proving the most indomitable perseverance, courage, and

* In consequence of the very great importance of this Paper at the present juncture, and the high interest taken in all matters connected with the future peace and security of the Indian Empire, and the organization of the Indian Army, the Council have considered it expedient to print Colonel Kennedy's Lecture out of its regular course, in order that it may be sooner brought before the public.

fortitude of which the human race has shown itself capable under such unexampled and protracted difficulties; whilst, on the other side, in analysing the producing causes of the events, it must exhibit the most dismal picture of those disasters which nations undergo from an irresponsible and improvident administration of public affairs.

FINANCE.

5. The object of my former address was to stimulate the application of a remedy for the past omission to furnish the Indian territories, at the fitting times, with the first essentials of civilization,—*the means of intercourse and transport*. I sought to prove that this grave omission was *ruinous to the public finances*, obstructive to industry, trade, and commerce; impedimental to the administration of justice, education, police, as to all other civil objects of State superintendence; and, finally, *HAZARDOUS* to the English inhabitants, to our military reputation, and to British power, by the difficulties that were thus left opposed to the concentration of the limited number of European troops so thinly scattered throughout that enormous and populous Empire.

6. These propositions were broadly stated in principle, so far as relates to the financial question, by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in his lucid exposition made to the House of Commons on the 14th of last February (1859).

He shows the revenue of India to be about £32,000,000, under four principal heads, viz.:—

1. Land Rent, about	£19,000,000, or 60 per cent. of the whole.
2. Opium	6,000,000, „ 20 „
3. Salt and Customs	4,300,000.
4. Miscellaneous	3,000,000.

He shows that the expenditure of the two years 1857–8 and 1858–9 left an actual deficit of £21,600,000, wholly attributable to the Insurrection.

He gives the military expenditure of 1856–7, as an average year prior to the Mutiny, at . . . £11,546,000
 Do. 1857–8, first year of Mutiny . . . 18,212,000
 Do. 1858–9, second do. . . 22,598,000*

Finally, he shows for the last two years an average annual revenue deficiency of about £9,000,000.

7. In speaking of the Land Rent, which he describes as contributing 60 per cent. of the entire revenue, he says, “and we must therefore consider this branch of the revenue as *being comparatively inelastic*. The increase of which it is capable arises principally from two causes. One cause of increase, which has been very active in times past, but of which we may hope there will be no more just at present, is addition to the British territory, and consequent increase of the area over which the tax is levied. The other cause is the taking into cultivation of lands hitherto

* The rupee is calculated here at 2s,

waste. THAT PROCESS IS LIKELY CONSIDERABLY TO *increase*, as *Railways*, and other means of communication, open up the interior of the country; and we have therefore, in its results, a probable source of GREAT WEALTH at some future time."

8. The second large item of revenue, derived from Opium, one-fifth of the whole, he considers, for excellent reasons assigned, as fluctuating and precarious.

The Salt Tax he defines as in effect a poll tax.

9. Having gone through the general subjects of revenue and expenditure he makes the following statement:

"If we can hardly hope for any great augmentation of Indian revenue, nor any large reduction of Indian expenditure, the problem of Indian finance is reduced to this: How to keep, in future years, the military expenditure within its former limits."

10. "The British Army in India is now only one portion of the entire army of England. When telegraph communication is complete, with the facilities which steam is giving every day, it is obvious that the distance is lessened, and that our whole resources are in a position to be brought to bear on any Indian disturbance much more rapidly than before. So again in *India itself the great system of railway communication*, to which I shall presently advert, which at present is only commenced, will in a short time bring together the entire peninsula, and the troops there will then be efficient in many quarters almost simultaneously."

11. Here, then, we have the high authority of the Secretary of State for India admitting that his chief dependence *for increasing the revenue of that country is an extension of railway intercourse*, as the means by which waste lands are to be made productive. And in like manner that his *hope of reducing expenditure is nearly limited to a diminution of the military establishment, which the extension of railways will enable, by bringing together the entire peninsula, so that the troops there will then be efficient in many quarters almost simultaneously.*

12. This brings the question of Indian Finance within the following narrow limits. That an annual deficit in the revenue must be provided for by loans until a sufficient quantity of railway shall have been constructed to admit of a large reduction in the military force.

This inevitable fact I brought before the Institution a year since, in *hope of stimulating railway construction.*

The head of the Government having taken the same view, we me-
confidently hope that a vigorous course of construction will now be made to replace the dilatory progress which has hitherto been the rule.

13. The effect of rapid railway construction in tending to bring the public expenditure within the revenue may be measured as follows:

Assuming that the gross number of the forces, and the ratio of British to Native troops, as stated in the latest Return, prior to 14th Feb. 1859, were what the Government consider safe and fitted to the existing circumstances of India, viz.:

Europeans.	Natives.	Total Troops.
91,590	243,956	335,546.

And assuming, also, that the acknowledged defects in the Police Force shall have been thoroughly corrected, I consider that the Government can reduce 346

British and 1616 Native troops for every 100 additional miles of railway which shall be opened for traffic, until the army shall have been brought down to a permanent establishment of 50,000 British and 50,000 Native troops, keeping the Artillery, Engineers, and Sappers, all British.

14. We are now in the Spring of 1859, and the process MAY be completed as follows, taking the present cost of the army to be £14,000,000, and its strength 91,590 Europeans, and 243,956 Natives.

	Miles of Railway opened.	Troops Reduced.		Troops Remaining.		Army Cost.	
		British.	Native.	British.	Native.	Reduced.	Remaining.
1860	2,000	6,920	32,320	81,670	211,636	1,210,601	12,789,399
1861	4,000	6,920	32,320	77,750	179,316	1,210,601	11,578,793
1862	6,000	6,920	32,320	70,830	146,996	1,210,601	10,368,197
1863	8,000	6,920	32,320	63,910	114,676	1,210,601	9,157,596
1864	10,000	6,920	32,320	56,990	82,356	1,210,601	7,946,995
1865	12,000	6,920	32,320	50,070	50,036	1,210,601	6,736,394
		41,520	193,920	100,106		7,263,606	
		235,440		335,546 men		£14,000,000	

If this course can be pursued, in six years the army expenditure may be reduced progressively till it reaches a gross reduction at the end of that time over £7,000,000, leaving the permanent cost something below that annual amount.

15. If it be argued that 2,000 miles of railway per annum are more than can be opened in India, the simple answer is, that a much more rapid rate of progress was accomplished in America, with *iron materials principally, and capital to a considerable extent supplied from England*, and without any approach to the urgent need that should now stimulate our progress in India. *What Americans HAVE DONE, Englishmen CAN DO!* The railway mileage opened in America was, in 1848, 932 miles; in 1849, 1258 miles; in 1850, 1506 miles; in 1851, 2022 miles; in 1852, 2437 miles; in 1853, 2196 miles; in 1854, 3927 miles; in 1855, 2009 miles; in 1856, 2841 miles! In those nine years the aggregate value of iron carried from England to the United States was £27,155,152—from England to the East Indies only £3,840,230. In 1857 it was ascertained that an aggregate of 26,000 miles of railway had been opened in America from the commencement in 1830! whilst up to 1857 only 358 miles had been opened in India; and the mileage open there at the present time is but 559 miles.

16. In my former address to this Institution I stated, "that the construction of a sufficient portion of well selected lines of railway, say 12,000 miles, at a cost of £72,000,000 (which may be accomplished in six years), will admit of a reduction in the numerical strength of the Indian armies of occupation from 325,000 men to 100,000, with a cor-

responding reduction of military expenditure from over £18,000,000 to £6,000,000 annually; and will convert an annual revenue deficiency of £5,000,000 into a surplus of £2,000,000. 2nd. They will likewise enable a force of 50,000 men to be concentrated to any given point of any railway, from a distributed army of *only* 100,000 men, *costing only* £6,000,000 annually, *IN ONE-SEVENTH OF THE TIME* required to concentrate, *by marching*, an equal force from a similarly distributed army of 325,050 men, costing £13,000,000 annually."

We find, from the experience of the past year, that the excess of expenditure over revenue, and wholly attributable to the military establishment and charges caused by the Mutinies, has largely exceeded what I had anticipated; and hence, *the importance of the principle urged as a remedy*, and ADMITTED BY THE BEST AUTHORITY TO BE THE RIGHT REMEDY, *becomes the more urgent*.

IRRIGATION.

17. The financial subject next to be considered is that of Irrigation; which, after the opening up of railways or other intercourse, is undoubtedly the most important question of territorial improvement and finance. It is certainly *second* to railways, because the additional produce which it enables the land to yield would be of no value unless the requisite means of communication and transport be previously in existence, *by which it can be conveyed to market*; and this axiom holds good in reference to every other description of produce which that vast empire can be made to yield.

18. The Secretary of State has exhibited the enormous profits which the Government have actually derived from irrigation.

That of the *Cooleroon*, in the Madras Presidency, opened in 1836-7, at a cost of £21,700, he states to have given an average net yearly profit for sixteen years of £27,700, or about 120 per cent. per annum. That of the *Godavery*, in the Madra. Presidency, opened in 1852-3, at a cost of £203,000, he states to have produced an increased revenue of £44,000, or over 20 per cent.

The Fordack Canal, in Seinde, he states cost £2,700, and paid £5,000, nearly 200 per cent. in the first year; another paid 58 per cent. of its cost in the first year; and a third, which cost £3,600, produced £5,000, nearly 150 per cent. in the first twelve months; yet with all these palpable proofs of the certainty by irrigation investments, *effected by Government*, on their own fee property, can be made to relieve the embarrassed Public Revenue of the State, we find that a portion of this valuable birthright, to the extent of £1,000,000, has been assigned to a private Company in Madras, giving besides a guarantee of 5 per cent. upon the million of capital thus to be expended!

19. Taking the profits realised by the Government themselves at only 40 per cent. upon the investments, which is palpably below the real average, this transaction amounts to their having assumed the *entire risk* of the enterprise, whilst they have relinquished the prospect of enormous gain, and given away the opportunity of realising £400,000 a-year, with a certain large annual deficit of revenue to be provided for!!!

20. This was not a good financial arrangement, yet it was precisely

what has been done to the extent of about £30,000,000 of capital in the railway investments! *The true principle of finance is, where a party assumes all the risk, that he should likewise appropriate the profits, and make his arrangements accordingly for executing the undertaking through his own agency.* The Government have much greater facilities for making good arrangements in those matters than private companies.

21. The boards of direction of companies, however fitted for deliberative investigation, are necessarily the most unsuccessful class of administrators that has yet been placed to direct any executive operation. This fact has been proved, *even to a proverb*, in English joint stock companies.

22. Irrigation in India is a fitting subject for Government investment on their own account, and to a large extent. If they think fit to invest £10,000,000 on that account, within a moderate period and on sound principles, they may fairly expect to realise 40 per cent. annually; which would enable them to wipe away the salt monopoly, justly defined by the Secretary of State as a poll tax. It is not only a poll tax, but a monopoly which shuts out from general commercial use one of the most important articles in nature.

23. It is true that the Indian Empire has been handed over to Her Majesty's Government in a most lamentable condition, with—

First. A native army of 100,000 men in revolt, and undergoing the process of annihilation;

Second. A disorganized police force of 600,000 men, whose practice, as described by the highest Government authorities, is rather to outrage than protect the laws and the people;

Third. A most harassing system for the administration of justice in the criminal and superior civil courts;

Fourth. A territory teeming with products, *which cannot be reached by commerce, capital, or industry*, owing to the absence of roads of intercourse;

Fifth. The remuneration of the labourer only 3d. per day;

Sixth. A public expenditure which must exceed the revenue, although happily in a decreasing ratio, for two or three years to come.

24. Here we have undoubtedly a *murky political horizon*, but there is one ray so bright shining through it as to give the statesman not only a hope, but certainty, that the gloom is but temporary, and must rapidly pass away.

25. Whatever may have been the results in other respects, it were an unfair omission to pass in silence one most important financial principle of the former Rulers which redounds to their honour as administrators of Indian affairs,—one for which both the British and the Indian people must acknowledge their lasting obligations,—one also which the practice of England and nearly every other country would have justified them in withholding—

They did not alienate from the state its public property!!

They did not give to private individuals the fee of the land, which now yields a legitimate revenue amounting to nearly four-fifths of the entire state income, including that class of produce, opium, which they reserved the exclusive right to cultivate.

26. Had the fee of the land been handed over in large estates to feudal proprietors in India, it would have been sub-let to occupiers at probably

much higher rents than are now required by the state. The rent would have become, as at present, a charge upon the produce, and an equal additional amount must have been levied in taxes upon the industry of the country to meet the Government expenditure. Every sound political economist must therefore see that it has saved the necessity of imposing burdens on the people to its own amount without pressing upon any occupier, or on the produce of the land, in a way which it would not have pressed, and perhaps much more heavily, had it been given in large fee grants to private proprietors.

27. The Indian system properly executed offers vast public benefits, but it entails in its administration vast additional duties and responsibilities. It concentrates under one authority the functions of the most important classes in civilized life,—the legislative and executive direction of public affairs; the detailed administration of the entire landed property of the country; and those comprehensive developments of wealth and industry emanating from the class of capitalists first created by the accumulations of rent.

28. The task of Indian administration is truly Herculean. It has to regulate by sound forethought and timely action, not only the public affairs of the empire but the individual industrial proceedings of its 130 millions of subjects. As this concentrated power *wisely directed* would offer the most rapid and effectual opportunity of conferring general benefits, so must its omissions be in proportion fatal. There are no secondary means by which such omissions can be supplied or their consequences mitigated. Yet the Indian administration could scarcely have divided its responsibilities, or restricted its existing powers, without producing even greater evils than those that exist. The requirements are becoming day by day more palpable, the desire to apply the fitting remedies more general and intense.

The organic changes which have already taken place will give the best security for sound administrative action in future. We may now look forward to that full development of industry so urgently called for, that, under the circumstances of India, it amounts to the most stringent administrative obligation; an obligation, however, which there should be no disinclination, on the contrary a strong desire, to fulfil, because it has already been shown that the required investments, if judiciously conducted, must return enormous profits for their outlay.

Had the administrators of Indian affairs taken this view of their position at an early date, the condition and public finances of their empire would at the present day offer a reality far beyond the imaginings of the most enthusiastic political economists.

Conceive the Indian Government on their own account to have commenced and kept pace with the Americans in railway construction from the year 1830; to have executed on their own account, at about £6,000 per mile, 12,000 miles of line, giving a net return of 8 per cent.; to have commenced at the same date a judicious investment of £10,000,000 on irrigation works, giving them a return of 40 per cent.; finally, to have been sustained by the credit of the British Government in borrowing the money thus required at 3½ per cent.,—they would have been able to offer such a balance sheet as follows:—

		£
PUBLIC INCOME.		
1. Permanent Revenue.		
Land Rent as returned in 1856-7	.	16,004,282
Opium do. 1857-8	.	9,863,718
Subsidies from Native States do.	.	507,804
Post Office as returned in do.	.	177,706
Electric Telegraph do.	.	22,108
Marine & Pilotage do. 1856-7	.	161,488
Judicial Receipts do.	.	191,834
Sale of Presents do.	.	18,452
Revenue from Prince Edward's Island 1857-8	.	119,766
Courts " " 1856-7	.	19,013
Interest on Debts due by Native States do.	.	60,506
Toll and Ferry Collection do.	.	62,225
Mint Receipts do.	.	246,000
Miscellaneous Receipts, Revenue Dept. do.	.	151,723
Small Farms, Madras do.	.	12,330
Miscellaneous Receipts, Civil and Political Dept. 1856-7	.	72,862
Total		24,203,817
2. Taxes, temporary, till they can be removed.		
Salt, exclusive of Custom Duty on Salt imported, 1856-7	.	2,517,726
Excise Duties in Calcutta do.	.	42,820
Customs do.	.	1,061,759
Stamp Duties do.	.	983,280
Sugar do.	.	382,021
Alkarna do.	.	859,131
Naturphra, Malabar do.	.	101,642
Total present Income		6,449,288
Total		30,743,105
3. Permanent Revenue Estimated to accrue from Investment.		
Additional Land Rent to be expected from opening Railways	.	5,000,000
Irrigation Investment of £10,000,000 return at 40 per cent.	.	4,000,000
Railway do. £72,000,000 do. 8 do.	.	5,760,000
Total		14,760,000
Total		£45,503,105

Note.—In this Statement the Rupee is calculated at Rs. 10½d.

In the preceding financial view I have classified the public income under two general heads—Revenue and Taxes.

Revenue in the sense here meant may be defined as a return for something substantial and valuable given, which not being a necessary of life no one need contribute to unless at his own option. The Government in this case becomes the furnisher instead of some private speculator or contractor, who would for certain profits to himself be willing to supply the public demand for the article in question if the Government assigned to him the right so to do.

Tax on the other hand is a mere charge extorted by some ingenious method, without any portion of value given by Government in reference to the particular article on which the charge is made, but simply as a state necessity, to meet expenditure incurred under other heads.

Taking the future normal expenditure of		£	£
India at	.	.	26,089,737
The Revenue is actually	.	24,293,817	
Do. Prospective	.	14,760,000	
Taxes	.	6,449,288	
Balance Income	.	.	19,413,868
		£45,503,105	£45,503,105

30. It were of little avail now to show what might have been done if the power of still doing it had passed away. This financial policy however may still be adopted, and when adopted will produce a large reduction of expenditure with a large increase of revenue. It will enable the repeal of the onerous salt tax—of the excise—the import and export duties; in short, of every impost, direct and indirect. It will provide for a proper establishment of the police, the judicial and education departments. It will liquidate not only the existing public debt, but likewise the large investments required for the construction of railways and of irrigation canals, leaving a *surplus* annual revenue exceeding £19,000,000 to be ultimately applied to the reduction of the land rent, &c.

31. Assuming that, after completion of the indispensable improvements all the state incumbrances may be liquidated in a period of about twelve years, whether those heretofore incurred to meet deficiencies of revenue, or those still required for a similar object for the next two or three years, as well as for the contemplated reproductive investments; assuming, also, every direct and indirect tax to have been removed; the application of the large surplus revenue afterwards to the reduction of the land rent would then indeed become a vast benefit, in diminishing the charge upon land produce or the first necessities of life.

32. This benefit would be felt even beyond the British territories. The rate of rent paid upon our vast extent of surface must in fact regulate the rates paid in the territories of Native states, where overcharges would produce emigration to the British territories.

33. It is clear that no such benefits could be hoped for were the fee of the land in the possession of numerous individual inheritors. Not even if it were possible to imagine Indian sirdars on a par with our own unparalleled, enlightened, and chivalrous nobility and landed gentry.

Land must in such a case be dealt with as any other private property, and therefore be rented at its full market value. The revenue necessary for a state must be regulated to meet a certain indispensable expenditure, whilst the revenue looked for by individuals, *even when most conscientious*, has no such limitation.

34. The security for the fulfilment of this financial principle rests upon four assumptions, that few will venture to controvert, viz. :—

First. That a large proportion may be added to the productive surface of India by the extension of Railways and Irrigation Canals.

Second. That the revenue from Railways, if *executed judiciously*, on account of Government, should give a net return of 8 per cent, on their cost to the public revenue. British Railways give about 4 per cent. on a mileage expenditure, five fold more than is required in India *with the experience now available*, which would thus, on the more limited scale of expenditure, be 20 per cent. The American Railway revenues have reached 8 per cent, on their cost in an agricultural county having a population of only nine souls to the square mile, whilst India, with richer resources, has 124 souls per square mile.

Third. That the returns upon judicious irrigation investments should average 40 per cent. It is to be recollected that works of this class cost less comparatively than any others, whilst their reproductive effect must be the greatest; and those who have considered the subject will not be surprised at the enormous profits realised in practice by the Government of India in the cases which they have dealt with. But, with such experience, all must be surprised that it should not have been undertaken on a scale commensurate with its importance, and solely upon Government account. Such a scale would secure for the fertilization of the land, within a certain ratio of expenditure, all the water that is now wastefully permitted to flow into the ocean in the dry seasons of the year.

Fourth. A most advantageous principle would be,—that the British Government should so far enlarge their policy in dealing with their Indian Empire as to join in the security on which the required loans may be obtained to bring about the rapid industrial and financial development here contemplated in that country. The question is whether for a mere point of etiquette they will put themselves (for I treat British interests as identical with the interests of India) to an unnecessary cost of about £5,000,000 a-year, for some years to come, by forcing upon India the necessity of borrowing, at 5 or 6 per cent., what might, under a British guarantee, be obtained at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

35. India is the only Foreign British Possession which yields to this country large and direct profit, whilst every other colony causes considerable direct outlay. It would not only be *equitable but possible* to have a return for the accommodation here suggested by placing a fair proportion of the British fleet on the Indian establishment, as the Army in the East already is; assuming that the Indian finances were on the wholesome footing of which they are susceptible.

36. No reasonable statesman could object to such a portion of the general expenditure of the United Kingdom being borne by the respective colonies as their circumstances, taking them as integral portions of the Empire at large, might warrant, and recollecting that they all enjoy the

security of the British flag: a security valid in the exact ratio that it is sustained by an expenditure that shall provide an efficient naval and military armament as compared with the forces of other empires.

37. Such a contribution upon our colonies, if *equitably calculated*, could not be objected to as unfair. *There is, however, a strong practical objection:* that, with the exception of India, it could not be paid; and the exception in the case of India is entirely due to the wise policy of having in that country preserved the public property of the State, or fee of the land, without assigning or alienating it to private individuals! Had the rest of the Indian policy been in keeping with this exceptional example, its rulers would have proved themselves the most beneficent that ever governed a country.

38. Bearing upon this point, there is a subject which at present excites much popular attention, that of introducing the settlement of Europeans in India by means of grants of territory in that country. It is earnestly to be hoped that any measure adopted with this view may be strictly limited by justice as regards the natives, and also within the sound financial policy which has heretofore governed this branch of the administration of India,

1st. By reserving a fair rent to the Government.

2nd. By giving no privilege to strangers which shall not be as equally and as generally applicable to the natives of the soil.

39. If this principle be strictly maintained, and followed up to its full development by an energetic fulfilment of those responsible duties inseparable from the ownership of landed property, a very few years must place the Indian population in a most flourishing condition, and must exhibit that which has never before been recorded in the annals of any Government administration,—an overflowing exchequer without a single tax, direct or indirect.

POLICE AND CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE.

40. Having thus far dealt with the general principle of finance in India, we shall now proceed to consider some of the leading subjects of the Government executive administration in that country.

The two last years have given abundant proof that the military department is the first in importance, but it is a no less undeniable fact that the number, the organisation, the discipline, and the efficiency of our Indian armies must mainly depend upon such a police organisation being established in aid of the civil authorities *as shall enable the latter to enforce a due administration of the laws*, and as shall relieve the troops entirely from civil duties.

41. However military the form of Government may be, there must be a magistracy and police force sufficient for the ordinary control of the population, irrespective of the regular military force. The organisation and functions of these two classes of force should be on totally different principles. The police for individual action, or to be employed in small bodies, as the moral representatives of order and law. The military to act in large physical masses, *only to be used as an agent of internal government*, when the barriers of law and order have been seriously invaded by

some anarchical tendency in the people, and when moral restraint, backed by the minor police force, has been overcome or seriously threatened.

42. The ablest commanders and authorities on military matters have at all times resisted the employment of troops in those ordinary duties that ought to be executed by a well organised police.

This subject has been a source of much *bitter discussion and irritation*, from time immemorial, between the civil and military authorities in our Indian empire; of *innumerable ruptures and misunderstandings* where the public interests require *the most cordial sympathy and co-operation to exist*.

43. The records of the Irish Government administration would exhibit similar effects from similar causes. So long as deranging influences and defective police in that country forced upon our army the duties of a constabulary, so long were the people rebellious, *the regiments employed there ill-disciplined*, and the *military commanders dissatisfied and remonstrant*. As soon as the police organisation introduced under Colonel Mc'Greggor had time to produce its effects *the evils vanished*, and the principle is as applicable to India as it was to Ireland, but more important would be its application in the ratio of the respective populations whose interest would be thus affected.

44. It is necessary here to give some idea of the police department throughout India, and *in doing so we shall scrupulously avoid* the description of men opposed to or desirous of criticising the administration of public affairs, and quote only the best informed and highest authorities in the Government itself from time to time.

45. The earliest record to which it is requisite to refer on this subject is the Report of the Committee formed by Lord Auckland when Governor-General, in 1838, to investigate the state of the Bengal Police. The present Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal was a member of that Committee.

46. At Par. 4, speaking of the improvements urgently required in the police, the Committee state, "*That urgency is admitted on all hands; but it arises more from the unpopularity of our system, AND THE GRIEVOUS OPPRESSIONS CONNECTED WITH ITS OPERATION, than from any increased disposition to crime on the part of the community at large,*" &c.

47. At Par. 5, the Committee say, "The defects in question pervade every grade of the (police) establishment. . . . The magistrates are overwhelmed. The daroghas and their subordinate officers are corrupt; the village watchmen are poor, degraded, and often worse than useless; and the *community at large, oppressed and inconvenienced* in various ways, are not only disinclined to afford aid to the police, but in most cases *had rather submit quietly to be robbed* than apply to the police officers for assistance to *apprehend the thieves, or to recover the stolen property.*"

48. At Par. 8,—"*To the union of the office of magistrate and collector injurious effects are generally attributed. The union which formerly subsisted between the offices of judge and magistrate was not as prejudicial, because POLICE was the primary object of the judge and magistrate, but it has been SECONDARY WITH THE MAGISTRATE AND COLLECTOR. Civil business, it has been observed, can wait; but the Government cannot wait for its revenue. In neither case, however, is such a union desirable. If there be more business upon the whole than one man can perform, a part must be neglected; and it has happened in both instances, and must be invariably the*

case, *that the neglected portion is that in which the Government for the time happens to take the least interest.*"

49. At Par. 9, they say, "Mr. W. A. Pringle, in his letter of the 7th Feb. 1837, has remarked upon this point as follows:—'While the revenue department is, as it ought to be, considered of such primary importance, it is in vain to expect that police will be anything but a secondary consideration with a collector and magistrate.'"

50. At Par. 10,—"*Moreover, a deputy is not always afforded, and in such cases the whole of the double duty falls upon one and the same individual, who is likewise in some districts collector of customs, superintendent of salt chowkees, deputy opium agent, and has charge of the abkara and stamp departments.*"

51. At Par. 12, speaking of the offices of magistrate and collector, they say, "The majority of the Committee, in concurrence with almost the whole of the gentlemen both in and out of the Service who have been asked their opinions on the subject, think decidedly that the efficiency of both departments would be much better secured, generally speaking, by intrusting the superintendence of each to a distinct functionary."

52. At Par. 18,—"*The next defect we have to refer to as exercising a very baneful influence on the efficiency of the police, and the comforts of the inhabitants, is the great extent of country over which the jurisdiction of each magistrate extends. This not only places it out of his power, except very rarely, to hold any personal communication with the people under his charge at their own homes, or to become acquainted with the remoter localities of his district, but it also prevents him from exercising ANY EFFECTUAL CONTROL OVER THE CONDUCT OF HIS THANADARS, his only instruments for preserving peace and good order, who are, in consequence, NOTORIOUSLY CORRUPT, and often THE OPPRESSORS OF ALL AROUND THEM. It is also in a great measure the source of that dislike so generally entertained to having anything to do with police matters, inasmuch as the intolerable inconvenience to which prosecutors, witnesses, and defendants at a distance are exposed, from the necessity in every case of attending the magistrate's cutcherry, is owing to that cause.*" On the latter point Mr. Ross observes, in his Minute of the 22nd May, 1832, "Not only are there no inducements held out to the people to give their aid in support of the police, but, on the contrary, *our REGULATIONS have the effect of making them endeavour to conceal offenders. This is really the effect of the existing provisions for administering criminal justice, which effect they produce by subjecting the people to the most serious hardships whenever offenders happen to be apprehended. The hardships alluded to are much more severely felt than would seem to be supposed; and their effect is not only to prevent the establishment of a good police, BUT TO CREATE DISLIKE TO GOVERNMENT. Under the existing regulations, IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS the prosecutor and witnesses must give their evidence in the magistrate's cutcherry. IN THE MOST TRIVIAL CASES they are compelled to undergo the fatigue of a journey to the station of the magistrate, in many cases exceeding a distance of 100 miles, to submit to THE HARASSMENT OF A DAILY ATTENDANCE IN THE MAGISTRATE'S COURT FOR WEEKS TOGETHER,—it being in almost every case found necessary, in order to procure the attendance of those who are required to appear as prosecutors and witnesses, to seize and send them to the magistrate's station under the charge of burkundazes, and, while there, to KEEP.*"

THEM UNDER RESTRAINT, AND SOMETIMES IN CONFINEMENT, *on the pretext of accommodating them with lodgings.*"

VILLAGE POLICE.

53. At Par. 45, the Committee observes: "We now come to the most important subject connected with the police of Bengal, namely, the state of the chowkedaree establishment. *In some districts their numerical strength appears to be very great, yet they are utterly inefficient, and have been described in the most unfavourable terms.*" Mr. W. T. Hawthorn, Judge of Zillah Cuttuck, in his letter already referred to, observes, "*That from the total absence of any supervision over the village police for a series of years, it may be said that at present such a body does not exist. The race of people denominated chowkedars retain the name apparently to blind the people as to their real character. They are employed during the day to assist the zemindar in collecting his rents, and at night they act as the agents of notorious characters to point out where property is to be found. They seldom realize by honest means above one or two rupees per mensem at the utmost, and are therefore always ready to connive at offences on the promise of getting a share of the stolen property. It is not an uncommon trick amongst the chowkedars to apply for leave of absence before a burglary or dacoity takes place to quiet suspicion against them, after having informed where property is to be found, and the time and manner in which the theft can be accomplished with the least chance of detection to the parties concerned.*"*

54. At Par. 46.—Mr. Hawkins, in his letter dated 11th January, 1837, says, "*Many a magistrate must have observed that a man has turned chowkedar merely because it gives him an excuse for leaving his home at night, in order that he may go upon his thieving expeditions.*"

55. In a Minute by Sir George Clerk, when Governor of Bombay, on the subject of police in that presidency, and dated 28th April, 1848, we find the following:—

At Par. 1.—"It seems to me that the police throughout this presidency is on a footing in several respects most unsatisfactory."

At Par. 4.—"Here we have signal proofs of the influence of our present system of police, &c."

At Par. 5.—"Thus the insecurity of the high roads throughout the greater part of this presidency has become lamentable."

At Par. 9 to 15 is given the numerical force of police in the Bombay Presidency, amounting to 71,989 individuals, and costing £244,269, exclusive of some irregular corps then employed on police duties.

This Minute makes some very important suggestions for the correction of abuses.

56. The present Lieut.-Governor of Bengal, in his Minute of 30th April, 1856, states at Par. 3, in reference to the Tanna Police, numbering about 9,000, placed at 484 stations, in a territory of 150,000 square

* In Lower Bengal alone this branch of the police numbers 161,877. See Despatch from Government, 14th May, 1857, page 54. This gives over one of these police bandits to the square mile, as they are pretty equally distributed.

miles, having a population of 35,000,000. "For what after all has been done to improve the police during the last thirty years? We have ceased, it is true, to expect integrity from daroghas, with inadequate salaries and large powers, surrounded by temptation and placed beyond the reach of practical control; and we have somewhat curtailed the excessive and unmanageable extent of our magistrates' jurisdiction by the gradual establishment of thirty-three subdivision magistrates."

57. At Par. 10, referring to the village police, of whom there are 164,877 in his districts of 150,000 square miles, he states, "Village watchmen are now declared to have no legal right to remuneration for service, and (the help of the magistrate being withdrawn) they have no power to enforce their rights, even if they had any right to enforce. *Hence they are all thieves or robbers, or leagued with thieves and robbers, inasmuch that when any one is robbed in a village it is most probable that the first person suspected will be the village watchman!*"

58. And at Par. 13, in referring to the general statistics of three given years, he shows that 1130 of the village police were convicted of crimes, when, according to the ratio of their numbers, as compared with the crimes committed by the entire population of the same districts, the number for the police would have been but 321, or little over one-fourth of what they were; whilst of the 1130 crimes committed by the police, 19 were murder and Thuggee; 39 burglaries; 357 robbery and theft,—that is to say, "nearly one-fourth more in proportion to their number for these heinous crimes than were convicted in all the lower provinces of Bengal for all offences of every kind."

59. On the 24th September, 1856, the Court of Directors addressed a Despatch to their Governor General in India from which the following are extracts :—

Par. 1. "Our attention has been directed, on various occasions of late, to the character and proceedings of the police in different parts of India, and the reports, which from time to time have been laid before us, have combined, with many incidental notices of failure or abuse, to *deepen the conviction, that an immediate and thorough reform of police in ALL THE OLD PROVINCES OF BRITISH INDIA IS LOUDLY CALLED FOR.* Par. 7. "*That the police in India has lamentably failed in accomplishing the ends for which it was established is a notorious fact; THAT IT IS ALL BUT USELESS FOR THE PREVENTION, AND SADLY DEFICIENT FOR THE DETECTION, OF CRIME IS GENERALLY ADMITTED. UNABLE TO CHECK CRIME, IT IS, WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS, UNSCRUPULOUS AS TO ITS MODE OF WIELDING THE AUTHORITY WITH WHICH IT IS ARMED FOR THE FUNCTIONS WHICH IT FAILS TO FULFIL, and has a general character for corruption and OPPRESSION. There is, moreover, a want of general organisation; the force attached to each division is too much localised and isolated, and the notion of combination between any separate parts of it, with the view of accomplishing the great objects of a body of police, is seldom entertained.*"

60. The most important documents connected with this subject, because they deal with remedies for the defects they expose, are those accompanying a Minute by the present Governor General, dated 14 May, 1857, relating to the system of police in the Bengal Presidency; and amongst these the very admirable Minutes by the Honourable J. P. Grant,

Member of Council of the Supreme Government in India, are of inestimable value.

The following are extracts from his Minutes of 23rd November, 1854:—

61. At Par. 11, Mr. Grant says, "I do not think that those general and obvious objections to the union of *fiscal, police, and judicial powers, in the same hands*, which are admitted to have weight, and which rule the practice in all the well-governed countries of the West, are inapplicable in any part of India. At this moment, in the Madras provinces, an inquiry is on foot into the truth of a charge that has been made formally in Parliament, to the effect that, in those provinces where magisterial and fiscal power are in the same hand, the Government revenue is systematically raised by the use of torture inflicted by the native officers vested with these double powers."

62. At Par. 20,—"*According to my ideas, it ought to be our fixed intention, as soon as possible, to dis sever wholly the functions of criminal judge from those of thief-catcher and public prosecutor, now combined in the office of magistrate. That seems to me to be indispensable as a step towards ANY great improvement in our criminal jurisprudence; and ANY change of system to be made meanwhile, should be contrived, I think, with regard to this fundamental reform.*"

63. At Par. 27,—"*In one way only has any progress been made towards supplying the one grand want of the Bengal system, namely, in the establishment here and there, in excessively large districts, of a small number of subdivisions, presided over by an assistant to the magistrate or a deputy magistrate. I would work out this one sound improvement to the utmost.*"

64. At Par. 28,—"*Every district is already divided into several moon-siffships. I would give every moonsiff criminal judicial powers to a certain extent.*"

65. Par. 29,—"*Every district is already divided also into thannas, but these thannas are often very large. I think no thanna station should be more than ten or twelve miles from its neighbour on any side.*"

66. At Par. 30,—"*Every district should be wholly cut up into subdivisions. Over every subdivision there should be either an assistant or an officer such as is now called a deputy magistrate,* to superintend the thannadars, and to control the police of the subdivision, BUT WITHOUT ANY JUDICIAL POWER WHATSOEVER. These appointments should be reserved for the future as rewards for the best conducted of the thannadars. If we make this service as hopeful as the native judicial service, why should we not have as good native deputy magistrates as we now have principal sudder ameens, and as good thannadars as we now have moonsiffs? If we do not make service hopeful, what right have we to expect it to be good?"*

67. At Par. 31,—"*Sudder ameens are now located at the sudder stations, exactly where respectable officers of their sort are least wanted. I would increase their number and place one in each subdivision, with jurisdiction over the whole subdivision, and with criminal judicial powers to a certain extent,—say up to one year.*"

68. At Par. 32,—"*At the sudder station, at his head quarters, I would*

* This literally means a *police sub-inspector*, who ought not to be termed a *magistrate*.

place the officer now called magistrate,* denuded of all criminal judicial powers whatsoever, and restricted to the duties of looking after the subdivision officers, and the thannadars and subordinate policemen, of discovering crime and of prosecuting it in heavy cases to conviction. At the sudder station also would be tried, by principal sudder ameen, assistants, joint magistrates, and deputy collectors, and judges (by collectors also having powers for the purpose, if any collectors have time enough to spare), all the cases of too grave a nature to be tried by moonsiffs and sudder ameens in the thannas and subdivisions."

69. At Par. 34,—*"If any one acquainted with the Mofussil will endeavour to realize to himself the state of things such as it would be under the above system, and then to compare that with the existing state of things in which nobody can be lawfully tried for stealing an egg or for giving an impudent boy a cuff on the head without coming in perhaps 70 or 100 miles, with all the witnesses, to the sudder station, I think he would admit that my plan would be an improvement. My system of criminal procedure would not be perfection, but it might be introduced in three months' time with the greatest ease and at a small expense. The existing system of criminal procedure, to speak of it in moderate language, is not like the system of a country administered by rational beings."*

70. The following are extracts from the Honourable J. P. Grant's minute of 9th April 1857:—

At Par. 20,—*"There is no longer any question as to the necessity of separating the functions of revenue and those of criminal justice, so far as native functionaries are concerned. This one decisive effect the torture report has had upon the European mind universally."*

At Par. 21,—*"I see not how incongruity of system and invidious and offensive class distinctions are avoidable if the union in European hands is persisted in."*

71. Such was the objectionable character of the police force, as put forth in the preceding Government Reports, and brought prominently before the public and Parliament of England by the revelations of the Madras Torture Commission, as to determine the late Court of Directors that a reform must at once be established. The question was, what that reform should be? Mr. Grant felt that the evil went deeper than a mere police derangement; that it seriously impaired the administration of criminal justice by the union of incompatible functions in the same individuals,—the magistrate or criminal judge holding the office of chief of police, and in some districts the three offices of tax collector, police officer, and criminal judge or magistrate. His recommendations urge, most vehemently and unanswerably, the necessity of severing those functions wherever they are combined, and placing each department under a separate control, totally distinct from the others.

POLICE REFORM.

72. Sir Charles Napier was the first to prove in his practice, that a sound principle of police organisation could without difficulty be applied

* This means a county or chief inspector of police, not a magistrate.

to India. His earliest efforts in the administration of Scinde were successfully devoted to effect that vital improvement, and his example has been more or less adapted on the subsequent acquisitions of territory.

In a communication addressed by him in 1846, when Governor of Scinde, to the President of the Board of Control, we find the following: "To secure the peace of the country, and avoid disseminating the troops, which would render them familiar with the people, and possibly diminish the wholesome fear of our power, I established a police of 2400 men, well armed, drilled, and divided into three classes,—one for the towns, two for the country,—the first all infantry, the two last infantry and cavalry, called the Rural Police. They assist the collectors, *but form a distinct body* under their own officers.

Again, "Meanwhile, I have to say, the large force in Scinde has not been *for* Scinde, but for the Punjaub. I have for two years constantly said, that 5,000 men are sufficient and more than sufficient for the defence of, and for the maintenance of tranquillity in, Scinde."

73. Sir Charles Napier knew that an undisciplined, underpaid, or ill-controlled police are most insufferable oppressors, instead of what they ought to be under a proper organisation, the most efficient protectors of the people; and that upon their conduct, as representatives of the Government, *ramified into every hamlet*, they must be most active promoters either of loyalty or disaffection towards their Sovereign. Hence a perfectly sound principle of police he aimed at as the most critical and important of all Government departments. He would never consent to corrupt or deteriorate his troops by imposing upon them police duties, because he knew it to be the most costly as well as the most impolitic course he could adopt, whether as regarding the interests of the people, the government, the police, or the army. Thus, in proportion to the sound discipline and correct principle of action with which he could inspire his police, he was enabled to propose reductions in the numerical strength of his troops, as regarded the requirements of internal government.

74. It is an undoubted axiom, that if the laws affecting a country be proximately equitable in principle, and that the agency by which they are executed be vigorously controlled, so as to prevent and detect the abuse of executive power, the result will be a loyal and contented population, with light burdens; whilst the most perfect laws, executed by a corrupt or ill-controlled subordinate agency, must produce popular discontent, large military establishments, and heavy Government expenditure.

75. The first essential principle, therefore, *far before railways or any other object*, whether as regards the interests and loyalty of the people, or the future efficiency and limitation of the military force, should be at once to convert both the thannah and village police force of India, which may be estimated at about 600,000, and have been described by the high authorities above quoted as a scourge upon the inhabitants,—to convert these brigands *into one thoroughly controlled and organised police force*, reduced to less than one-fourth of that gross number. The present crisis has brought about the opportunity and means to this end.

76. If the principle of organising our native auxiliary troops in irregular regiments be adopted, there would be a surplus number of well-trained

British officers at once available as inspectors and sub-inspectors of districts to control and discipline the police.

77. Referring back to Mr. Grant's valuable recommendations, there appears to be one most important omission made by him in the future administration he proposes for the police and criminal justice; the omission, too, of a requirement equally called for *by every other judicial and executive department of the State*—

CIRCUIT COURTS.

78. Looking to the enormous extent of territory and population, and to the very limited comparative amount of administrative European supervision which can by possibility be applied, we at once find a difficulty which can only be met by the establishment of circuit courts and sessions in every department, to be presided over by European functionaries. This system, and this only, can afford the amount of British supervision required as a safeguard to the Indian people, whilst extending the judicial and executive powers of native agency, without which it is palpably impossible to administer an efficient Government suited to the requirements of 130,000,000 of people.

TERRITORIAL DIVISION.

79. To apply this circuit system requires that a general territorial division of districts and sub-districts should be made on a well-digested principle, calculated to provide for the due supervision and requirements of every judicial and executive department.

The most generally understood and influential district division in India at present, and to which everything else is made subordinate, is that of collectorate. The name itself is objectionable, as calculated to convey the notion that the first object of British rule is to gather up taxes. Our own British nomenclature is preferable as conveying more generally the idea of government. The collectorate may be compared with the English county in its general bearings, and we find that the inequalities or unfitness of the districts in India as compared with the respective administrations of departmental superintendence are even more striking than in England.

80. Such inequalities, although very objectionable at home, are comparatively innocuous; because much of our public business is effected through the various systems of gratuitous local or municipal representative administration, emanating from an active and enlightened people, and operating for well-understood objects.

In India, on the contrary, every important or useful measure must emanate from and be superintended by a distinct official Government agency, conducted by a very small and costly class of officers, whose acts and motives are frequently uncongenial to the feelings, if not unintelligible to the apprehension, of the millions under their rule.

Hence the power of minute and efficient superintendence on the part of the few governing officials becomes the only solid security for the due exercise of that enormous responsibility which the British nation has

taken upon itself in India ; and it requires, as an essential preliminary, that the division of departmental districts and sub-districts should be based upon the most comprehensive and convenient system of which the circumstances will admit, instead of the anomalous, unconnected and impracticable principle which is their present character.

81. An analysis of the old provinces of British India shows the disproportion between the smallest, the medium, and the largest collectorates to be as follows: viz.

		Minimum.		Mean.		Maximum.
In Bengal	a ratio of	1	to	5	to	60
„ N. W. Provinces	do.	1	„	7	„	11
„ Madras	do.	1	„	2	„	4
„ Bombay	do.	1	„	6	„	20
„ Punjaub	do.	1	„	3	„	6

82. This would appear to be a fitting juncture to establish the whole of that subject on a footing that shall be free from the anomalies which we find operating at home as well as in India, where the territorial divisions appear to have grown up by chance. In England we find some counties manifold the size of others, both in area and population, although the general administrative arrangements in certain respects may be on an equal footing in each,—as Lincoln 2,776 square miles, and Rutland 150 square miles, or 18 to 1. These incongruities have forced in some egregious cases a division of the larger counties into sub-counties, as Yorkshire, Cork, &c. They are still so preposterous as to render necessary, with each successive legal enactment of certain classes, new and special divisions of the country suited to the particular requirements of each enactment.

83. These inequalities, however, in England are of comparatively slight importance, because every facility exists by which the inconvenience consequent to the larger districts is, to a great extent, neutralised. In India it is just the reverse. If a superintendence there be excessive, or beyond the reach of very reasonable exertion, as is generally the case, the functions of the office must be neglected, and the effect is most injurious to the interests of the people and the character of our Government. This tells upon districts of police, of magistrates, of justice, of education, of revenue, of public works, and of all other subjects, as it has told upon the military districts during the last conflicts. All departments are overstrained from the magnitude of the districts, the oppression of the climate, and the disproportion of the duties to the agency and means available for their execution.

84. A diagram will best explain how the judicial, police and all other districts having in view circuit courts and sessions, with departmental supervision and subordinate control, can be best formed to produce a general harmonious and mutually sustaining action throughout [*see Diagram, p. 70*]; how, in fact, Mahomet is to be taken to the mountain instead of continuing the effort to bring the mountain to Mahomet.

85. The British Indian territory of 837,412 square miles at present contains about 166 collectorates or departmental districts, answering, in their general objects, to English counties. Their defects are, first, great inequality in their comparative size and the duties they impose; second, deficiency in their combination into superior government districts or

provinces; third, deficiency in their sub-division into inferior departmental and subordinate districts, as baronies, petty sessions, police districts, &c.

COUNTIES.

86. In seeking to establish order out of the elements now existing, it is requisite to keep within the most moderate limits (that will admit of practical supervision) the number of superior districts requiring able and highly-paid heads of departments. These we shall term counties, and estimate their number at 104, each having a radius of about 45 miles, and each being furnished with a head of every principal department, judicial and executive, whose jurisdiction and control would be respectively limited within the county boundary, the most distant point being within a six hours' ride or drive from the centre, and the stations of the subordinate deputies about four hours distant.

PROVINCES.

87. Four such county districts would form one convenient sized province of 32,400 square miles, under the general charge of a Government commissioner, thus making 26 separate Government provinces for the entire British Indian territory, each commissioner being within about eight hours' ride of the centre of each of the four counties under his charge.

BARONIES.

88. The first sub-division of the county or departmental district would be into nine baronies of 900 square miles each, or spaces 30 miles square, the centre of which would be within two hours' ride of the extreme boundary.

PETTY SESSION DISTRICTS.

89. The sub-division of baronies [*see Diagram*] might be either into nine of 100 square miles, or five of 180 square miles, or four of 225 square miles each, as petty sessions districts, elementary police districts, &c. according to the density of population. These are respectively shown on the diagram. Nine would, of course, be the most convenient, as bringing the central point within 5 miles of the district boundary; five would bring the central point within an average of $6\frac{3}{4}$ miles from the boundary; four would bring the central point within $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the boundary. As regards the numerical strength and cost of the constabulary force, the division of the boundary into nine, five, or four police districts would make each county contain 81, or 45, or 36 police stations, and, allowing 25 men per station, with the requisite reserves, the cost for the entire territory of British India would vary from $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions per annum for 81 stations per county to 2,721,533*l.* per annum for 36 stations per county, the latter sum being about the aggregate cost from all sources of the present defective thannah and village police of India taken together.

This financial comparison would probably be conclusive as to the adoption of a division of the barony into four petty sessions and police districts, a division of which no one would have a right to complain, as,

regarding the administration of justice, it would bring the inferior circuit civil and criminal courts within $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the most distant inhabitants of the land, and, as regarding the efficiency of the police and other executive departments, it would bring those in charge of the districts within $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles of their boundary.

We shall, therefore, adopt for further detailed consideration the plan of dividing the barony into four sub-districts for police, petty sessions, and other administrative purposes.

POLICE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION.

90. The principal officer in charge of the entire police of the county might be called the county inspector. Of these there might be three classes, of which the salaries might be respectively 1,000, 800, and 600 rupees per month, giving one first-class inspector, one second-class, and two third-class inspectors to the four counties of each province; these might be in the first instance selected from field-officers or captains in the army.

Under the county inspector there should be nine sub-inspectors, one in charge of each barony. They should stand in three classes, of which the salaries might be respectively 500, 450, and 400 rupees per month, giving to each barony one sub-inspector of the first-class, one of the second, and seven of the third.

Under each barony sub-inspector there should be four chief constables, each in charge of the police party of twenty-five men in an elementary police district of $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles radius, co-terminous with a petty session district. The chief constables should be natives, promoted by merit from the inferior grades, and being eligible, if deserving, of promotion to the higher ranks of sub-inspector and inspector. There might be three classes of chief constables: the salary of the first-class being 150 rupees per month, the second 100, and the third 80; and their proportion being one first-class, one second-class, and two third-class for the four stations of each barony.

Under the chief constables there might be three classes of constables, receiving 16, 14, and 12 rupees per month, and three classes of sub-constables, receiving 9, 8, and 7 rupees per month respectively. There would be also a proportion of mounted constables and sub-constables, receiving 20 rupees additional to the pay of their rank and class per month. This classification would have an important effect, by keeping constantly before the men the fact of frequent promotion for meritorious conduct, with a perfectly understood principle that the highest position in the force would be open to the exertions of every man in its ranks. The following Tables give the details in a general view:

TABLE of DETAILS showing the ESTABLISHMENT

		Elementary Police Station. District 225 miles square and 7½ miles radius. No. of Men.	Barony, 500 square miles, con- tains 4 Stations and Reserve.		
			Distributed at 4 Stations.	Reserve at Centre.	Total in Barony.
MOUNTED POLICE.					
County Inspectors	1 2 3				
Total	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .
Barony Sub-Inspectors	1 2 3			 1	 1
Total	. .	. .	. .	1	1
Chief Constables	1 2 3	 1	1 1 2		1 1 2
Total	. .	1	4	. .	4
Constables	1 2 3				
Total	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .
Sub-Constables	1 2 3				
Total	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .
Gross Total Mounted	. .	1	4	1	5
FOOT POLICE.					
Constables	1 2 3	1 1 1	4 4 4	1 1 1	5 5 5
Total	. .	3	12	3	15
Sub-Constables	1 2 3	1 1 19	4 4 76	1 1 19	5 5 95
Total	. .	21	84	21	105
Gross Total Foot	. .	24	96	24	120
Gross Total Horse and Foot	. .	25	100	25	125

Diagram to Illustrate a Division of Territorial Districts in India
 Suited for Civil, Criminal and Appeal Circuit Courts.
 Police organization and Control, Revenue Collection, General Government
 Supervision of all Departments, Military occupation of the Country
 And for the acquirement of Statistical Information

Diagram contains one Province of 32,400 Square Miles Average Population 5,000,000
 British India 837,412 Square Miles would form 26 similar Provinces.

- Centre of Province. Radius of Inscribed Circle 90 Miles. A Government Comm⁷
 District and a Military Brigade district contains 4 Counties.
- ⊗ Centre of County, Radius 45 Miles contains 9 Baronies. A Circuit for Superior
 Civil Criminal and Appeal Courts, to sit at Centre of each Barony.
- Centre of Barony Radius 15 Miles, contains 9.5 or 4 Petty Sessions Districts.
 A Circuit for Inferior Civil and Criminal Courts, to sit at Centres of Petty Sessions
 Districts
- Centre of Petty Sessions Districts, Radius 5.6 $\frac{1}{4}$ or 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ Miles, Petty Sessions
 District to contain 9 Elementary School Districts.

	Mounted Police.						Foot Police.			Gross Total.
	County Inspector.	Sub-Inspector.	Cliic Constables.	Constables.	Sub-Constables.	Total.	Constables.	Sub-Constables.	Total.	
One Police Station for district of 7½ miles radius	..	..	1	..	..	1	3	21	24	25
BARONY.—Police Force in one Barony containing 4 Stations, and a reserve at centre.	..	1	4	..	..	5	15	105	120	125
Radius of Barony 15 miles	..	1	..	..	..	1	3	21	24	25
Reserve at centres of Barony	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
COUNTY.—Police Force in one County 45 miles radius, containing 9 Baronies, and a reserve at the centre	1	10	39	12	84	146	159	1,113	1,272	1,418
Reserve at centre of County	1	1	3	12	34	101	24	168	192	293
PROVINCE.—Police Force in one Province 90 miles radius, containing 4 Counties	4	40	156	48	336	584	636	1,452	5,088	5,672
BRITISH INDIA.—Police Force in British India, area containing 26 Provinces	104	1,040	4,056	1,248	8,736	15,184	16,536	115,752	132,288	147,472
WAR CONTINGENT.—Proportion of Police Force which might be temporarily detached in aid of military for objects of war, viz. Cavalry.	..	78	104	1,248	8,736	10,166	2,496	17,472	20,150	} 30,316
Infantry	..	78	104	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Monthly rates of pay in rupees (1st class	Rupees. 1,000	500	150	36	29	..	Rupees. 16	9	..	
2nd	300	450	100	34	28	..	14	8	..	..
3rd	600	400	80	32	27	..	12	7	..	..
Cost.—Total yearly cost of proposed Police Force for British India	£ 93,600	£ 517,920	£ 50,917	£ 280,790	£ 1,439,691	£ 239,803	£ 992,039	£ 1,281,842	£ 2,721,553	£ 2,721,553

91. Such an organization would enable the sub-inspector of any barony to concentrate to the most distant point of his district, within six hours; 100 men.

It would enable the county inspector to concentrate rapidly 900 men to any one point of his district.

It would enable the Government commissioner of the province to concentrate rapidly 8,000 men on any point of his district.

It would enable the Government on any urgent emergency of war at once to reinforce the regular military reserve by a well-organized force of 10,000 police cavalry and 20,000 police infantry, and by recruiting to repeat such reinforcements to any extent required.

92. The gross cost of this police force, numbering 147,472 men, upon a liberal scale of pay, placing them beyond the necessity of committing depredations for their livelihood, would be 2,721,533*l.* per annum, or about the aggregate of what is now paid in different ways to the 600,000 depredators comprising the present village and thannah police. But from this estimated amount there would be the saving of the pay of the military officers—whose regiments having deserted them in the mutinies, leave them available for this most important organization. Thus we may calculate that the improved police and their officers, taken together, would produce a saving of about half a million annually, as compared with the former expenditure under these heads.

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE.

93. Having corrected the most dangerous and oppressive system that exists in India, by disbanding the 600,000 village and thannah police, and organising a well-controlled and disciplined protective constabulary force of 147,472 men, the next subject in importance would be to improve the administration of justice, both civil and criminal—

First. By taking all judicial power out of the hands of revenue collectors and police officers.

Second. By establishing a moonsiff's barony circuit court in each barony, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction to a limited extent, for the trial of minor cases; such court to hold a session monthly at the centre of each of the four petty sessions districts in the respective baronies, and thus to decide all minor cases, both civil and criminal; within a maximum distance of $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the suitors, &c. instead of forcing them, as at present, to travel long distances to sudder stations.

Third. By establishing a superior county circuit court for the trial of graver cases, both civil and criminal, and for hearing appeals from the minor or moonsiff's circuit courts. The superior county circuit court to hold quarterly sessions at the centre of each of the nine baronies; thus making the maximum distance for suitors, &c. to look for justice in the heaviest cases fifteen miles, instead of the present radius of the sudder district.

94. Taking the average annual number of persons apprehended on criminal charges in the provinces of Lower Bengal for ten years, ending 1852, at 91,261, as recorded at page 76 of Despatch from Government of India, dated 14th May, 1857, we may compare proximately the oppression

of the fixed sudder station principle with the relief that would be afforded by circuit courts and rotating functionaries.

The proportion of the above-quoted 91,261 criminals due to an average county of 8,100 square miles, as shown in the diagram, would be about 16,290, equally distributed throughout the county; and allowing the due proportion of witnesses and others engaged on the prosecution and defence, say ten individuals in each case, to have made two journeys between the places where the offences were committed and the places of trial, the comparison would stand thus as regards the miles travelled by the various parties: viz.

If tried on the old principle at the one centre of each large or county district, 15,228,000 miles.

If tried at the nine centres respectively of baronies, 7,531,000 miles.

If tried at thirty-six points of the nine inferior circuit courts, which is the principle we have adopted for economy in our calculations, the miles travelled in each county for the trial of criminal cases in one year would be only 3,758,000.

It is clear that the great mass of the cases would have been within the jurisdiction of the minor courts, and therefore the saving of oppressive embarrassment to the people of a single district, amounting to only 1-28th part of Lower Bengal, in a single year, and in but one branch of the administration of justice, would have approached 11,469,600 miles of journeys. We may fairly consider that this saving may be increased three-fold by taking into account the superior civil court business, and the attendance of the people upon the various other public departments, making a total saving to one county of 34,408,800 miles travelled, which, multiplied by 104, the number of counties of the same size proposed for British India, would reach the enormous amount of 3,578 millions of miles of harrassing journeys that British Indian subjects would be relieved from in the year if circuit courts and sessions were established at convenient points, as in England, at which the public functionaries should periodically meet the people in their own districts instead of dragging them to the one fixed centre of each large district.

95. It must be kept in mind that the diagram county contains 8,100 square miles, or what would be nearly equal to one-sixth of the entire surface of England, whilst the next class of district or barony is about three-fourths of the area of an average English county.

Until circuit courts, applied to a convenient territorial division, shall have been established, it is idle to expect that justice can be duly administered in India.

To effect upon the old principle of fixed functionaries the degree of relief here proposed as regards government departmental supervision, it would be requisite to multiply by nine the existing number and consequent cost of the most expensive class of functionaries, whereas, with the alteration proposed, a considerable reduction of the existing expenditure might probably be effected.

Hence the due administration of justice, and of an efficient executive government in its various departmental functions, must remain impossible problems until the authorities shall move round their districts holding their sessions periodically at fixed places and times. There is no other

means of meeting the physical impediments interposed by vast distances and areas as compared with the largest amount of competent Europeans that can practically be supplied.

MILITARY FORCES.

96. Assuming the four great essentials to security, justice, industry, and good government to have been accomplished—

First. By disbanding the 600,000 "unscrupulous" men denominated police in all the old provinces of British India, and by organising instead of them a well-controlled and disciplined constabulary of 147,472 men, closely superintended by their own officers, who shall have neither judicial, tax-gathering, nor other conflicting duties to divide their attention.

Second. By entirely separating the incompatible functions of joint collector, police officer, and criminal judge.

Third. By establishing a new division of districts and sub-districts with *circuit* courts, which shall bring the administration of justice into every man's immediate neighbourhood, instead of forcing all those engaged in the more important civil suits, and in every class of criminal case, whether as parties or witnesses, to travel to fixed sudder stations at the centres of large districts.

Fourth. By constructing a sufficient amount of railway intercourse to permit the full development of productive industry, and the rapid movement of troops towards any given point.

97. Assuming these indispensable preliminaries effected, and the incentives to popular discontent to have been thus removed, we can fairly consider the number, the composition, and the organization requisite for a military force suited to such altered circumstances.

98. The regimental organization, discipline, and drill of the British army are probably as perfect as it is possible to make them. But the minute distribution of the forces in times of peace renders it very difficult to maintain the aptness requisite in dealing with combined bodies of troops, their movement in masses, means of transport, commissariat supplies, and military stores.

99. The effective police force above suggested for India will render unnecessary in that country the minute fragmental distribution of the military, which may have been heretofore unavoidable; and the smallest corps which under the improved system need be detached, with a view to the most effectual military occupation of the country, we may consider as a brigade composed of one European and one Native regiment of infantry, one European and one Native squadron of cavalry, one nine-pounder field-battery of European artillery, and one company of European engineers: on the aggregate 2,500 men, one-half being Europeans. According to the territorial divisions already proposed, one brigade so composed would be stationed at the centre of each province or Government commissioner's district, having a radius of about ninety miles, and three such contiguous brigade districts might form a divisional command.

100. The entire territory of British India would thus be comprised in

twenty-six brigade districts, co-extensive with the Government provinces already described, and distributed as follows: viz.

In territories now under the immediate management of the Governor-General of India				8 brigade districts.
Territories under Lieut.-Governor of Bengal				7 do.
Do.	do.	North-west provinces		3 do.
Do.	Governor of Madras		4	do.
Do.	do.	Bombay	4	do.

Total 26 brigade districts,

occupied by 2,500 men each, would absorb, for the general occupation of the country, 65,000 men. The radius of the district of each brigade of 2,500 men would thus be about 90 miles, or four forced marches, which would likewise be the measure in time required to concentrate any two contiguous brigades upon their mutual boundary, thus bringing together 5,000 troops, on an emergency, in four days: four brigades, comprising 10,000, could, in an equally short period, be concentrated from four contiguous provinces at or near their common angular point.

101. In addition to this distributed force, a disposable reserve of say fifteen brigades, comprising 37,000 men, would be requisite to meet every contingency that could arise, making the total military force about 100,000 men. The reserve force would naturally be posted in strong bodies of a division, each at strategic points, on our principal line of defence, guarding alike our most populous districts, and the north-western, the northern, and the north-eastern frontiers; and our general position would be still further improved if Scinde, the important flank of this great military line, were put in close relation with the supreme civil and military authorities that regulate the Punjaub, North-west provinces, and Bengal, instead of being attached to Bombay as at present.

102. This distribution would correspond with the precautions required for some time to come as regards the principal localities of the past disturbances. It would meet in every respect the requirements of an efficient military occupation of the country.

It would secure a constant practice and training, to every branch of the army, in all those elements most essential to military success in the field, as well in reference to the staff as to regimental fitness.

It would place the location of a large portion of our British troops more within the discretion of their commander as regards the questions of climate and health.

103. Each presidency has within or near to it sanitary stations, with an elevation varying from 4,000 to 7,000 feet above the sea, and offering the most desirable change as affecting the health and comfort of Europeans in the summer heats: in the Madras Presidency the Neilgherries, 7,000 feet; in Bombay Presidency a continuation of the same range to Poona and northwards, 4,000 feet.

The central districts of India have their Vindhya and Aravulli ranges; Bengal, the North-west provinces and Punjaub skirt the Himalayas from Darjeeling to Simlah and the Indus, affording ample selections as to climate and strategic fitness along the whole line.

We have therefore a right to look forward, after a matured settlement

of the deplorable disturbances which lately existed, and which happily are now crushed, to a future state of things that will admit of a very large proportion of the European troops in India being enabled to preserve their health during the summer in cool stations, from whence in any emergencies the train (when established—and much hangs upon this) will rapidly convey them to any required points of action.

COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY.

104. The composition of the army has been hitherto about 1 European to $5\frac{1}{2}$ natives. In future the proportion would probably be 1 to 1, or nearly so; artillery all Europeans; engineers, sappers, and pioneers all Europeans.

The whole of the privates of the engineer corps should be trained as overseers and foremen, in order that, instead of acting as individual labourers or mechanics, they may be able to direct the labours of large masses of men. Thus the establishment of 2,000 sappers would admit of the profitable and well-organised employment of half a million of labourers, whether in military or civil works of utility or emergency; and one of the greatest deficiencies in India is the proper application of industry, which this organisation would tend to improve.

The army of India might consist of—1st. British troops from home establishment; 2nd. British troops on permanent Indian establishment, in equal or nearly equal numbers; 3rdly. British colonial troops, not natives of India, commanded by British officers; 4thly. Native irregular troops, commanded by British officers,—the number of the latter class not materially to exceed the aggregate of the three former classes. Every British regiment and colonial regiment not Indian, or from a tropical climate, should have two companies of natives attached to it, to be for the time under the orders of its commanding officer,—such attached companies belonging to certain native regiments allocated for this special duty. All native troops, both cavalry and infantry, hereafter to be raised should be Irregulars, and their commanding officers should have restored to them their former powers.

105. A Table is here necessary to offer a general view of the strength and distribution of the forces, both military and police, under the contingencies both of peace and of war.

The protection and defence of a people necessarily embrace the consideration of these two classes of force as complements of each other, and under the various political circumstances to which States are liable.

TABLE showing the STRENGTH and DISTRIBUTION in PEACE and in WAR of the MILITARY and POLICE ESTABLISHMENTS proposed for BRITISH INDIA.

	Brigades.	Artillery, 9-pounder Field Batteries.		En- gineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total of all Arms.		Total Europeans and Natives.
		Guns.	Men.				Guns.	Men.	
PEACE DISTRIBUTION.									
<i>Concentrated.</i>									
Military force guarding frontier	15 { European Troops } Native Troops }	90 .	3,000 .	750 .	2,550 6,000	12,000 12,750	90 .	18,910 18,750	37,660
<i>Distributed.</i>									
Military distributed for protection of 26 Provinces, one brigade at centre of each Province.	26 { Europeans } Natives }	150 .	6,240 .	1,300 .	3,840 10,400	20,800 22,100	150 .	32,180 32,500	64,680
Total Military, European and Native	41	246	9,840	2,050	22,800	67,650	246	102,340	102,340
<i>Police.—Native Force under 1,144 European Officers, viz.—</i>									
Reserves of 104 Counties, 293 men in each, Natives	.	.	.	.	10,504	19,968	.	30,472	147,472
Reserves at centres of 936 Baronies, 25 men in each, ditto	.	.	.	.	.	23,400	.	23,400	
Force at 3,744 Police Stations, 25 men at each, ditto	.	.	.	.	.	93,600	.	93,600	
Total Police, Natives	.	.	.	.	10,504	136,968	.	147,472	147,472
Total of Military and Police forces for British India	.	246	9,840	2,050	33,304	204,618	246	249,812	249,812

Concentrated.

Total available for war	•	•	Europeans
	•	•	Natives
Total ditto Europeans and Natives	•	•	•

Distributed in 26 Provinces.

Total Military distributed, European and Native

Police under European Officers.

Total distributed Military and Police, European and Native

Total concentrated for War, ditto, ditto

Gross Total Military and Police, Europeans and Natives.

WAR DISTRIBUTION.									
<i>Concentrated.</i>									
<i>Military.</i> —Ordinary Reserve force concentrated.	90	3,600	750	2,550	12,000	90	18,910	37,660	
1st Reinforcement from Provincial Military Establishment.	120	4,800	1,300	6,000	12,750	120	18,750	34,670	
2nd Reinforcement from Police Forces				5,200	11,050		16,250		
				10,504	19,968		30,472	30,472	
Total available for war	210	8,400	2,050	4,480	22,400	210	37,330	102,802	
Total ditto Europeans and Natives	210	8,400	2,050	21,704	43,768		65,472	102,802	
<i>Distributed in 26 Provinces.</i>									
Military distributed for protection of 26 Provinces, one brigade to every two Provinces	36	1,440		1,920	10,400	36	13,760	30,010	
Total Military distributed, European and Native	36	1,440		5,200	11,050		16,250	30,010	
<i>Police under European Officers.</i>									
Reserves of 104 Counties									
Reserves of 936 Baronies, 25 men at each centre, ditto					18,720		18,720	117,000	
Force at 3,744 Police Stations, 20 men at each, ditto					23,400		23,400		
Total distributed Military and Police, European and Native	36	1,440		7,120	138,450	36	147,010	249,812	
Total concentrated for War, ditto	210	8,400	2,050	26,184	66,168	210	102,802	249,812	
Gross Total Military and Police, Europeans and Natives.	246	9,840	2,050	33,304	204,618	246	249,812	249,812	

106. From this Table it appears that the mutually sustaining forces of military and police would, by the establishments proposed, amount on the aggregate to 249,812 men, of whom 102,340 would be military, one-half being European, having 41 nine-pounder field-batteries of artillery, or 246 field-pieces, and 22,800 cavalry. The remaining 147,472 would be native police under British officers, of which 10,504 would be mounted and organised as irregular cavalry, and 19,968 as irregular infantry.

That their distribution in peace would be as follows:—

Military.—Concentrated Reserve Force, 15 brigades . . .	Men.	37,660
„ Distributed in single brigades at centres of 26 provinces . . .		64,680
Police.—104 County Reserves of 293 men each, one-third cavalry, two-thirds infantry, armed and organised as irregular troops to furnish gaol and treasure guards, &c. . .	Men.	30,472
„ 936 Barony Reserves of 25 men each ditto . . .		23,400
„ 3744 Police Parties of 25 men each with side-arms . . .		93,600
		<u>147,472</u>
Military and Police distributed during peace for protection of 26 provinces . . .		<u>212,152</u>

The distribution during war would be as follows:

FORCES which can be concentrated for war:—

Military concentrated for war, ordinary reserve . . .	37,660
Do. do. 1st reinforcement, 26 brigades taken from distributed military force . . .	34,670
Police do. 2nd reinforcement from County Police Reserves, one-third cavalry, two-thirds infantry . . .	30,472
	<u>102,802</u>

REMAINING FORCES distributed in Provinces:—

Military distributed in 13 brigades remaining in 26 Provinces . . .	80,010
Police.—104 Fresh County Reserves, drawn from stations to replace those sent to reinforce war force . . .	18,720
„ 936 Barony Reserves, at ordinary establishment of 25 men each . . .	23,400
„ 3744 Police Parties, reduced to 20 men each instead of 25 . . .	74,880
	<u>147,010</u>
Total Military and Police distributed for protection of 26 Provinces during war . . .	<u>249,812</u>
Gross Total Military and Police . . .	<u>249,812</u>

107. The power of reinforcing the army from the ranks of the police may be carried to any required extent, provided the police be recruited, as they ought to be, for general service. Such reinforcements would naturally be furnished from the county reserves, which would be filled up again as regards the infantry by drafts of selected men from the barony reserves and station parties. The police cavalry would be recruited from practised horsemen, and the recruiting for the army through the police, spread over every district of India, would be a much safer principle than that heretofore adopted in Bengal.

108. The county police reserves we have estimated at about 100 cavalry and 200 infantry for each county, and, as there would be four counties to each Government commissioner's province, this would give a total county reserve force to the entire province of about 400 cavalry and 800 infantry. We have suggested that the centre of the province, or head quarters of the Government commissioner, should be the station for the military brigade; and, as the best protected point in the province, it should likewise be the position for the principal treasury and gaol, placing these establishments and the barracks for European troops, if not the entire brigade, within an earthwork redoubt or citadel.

109. Under this consideration the best position for—say two-thirds of the county reserves of the province, would probably be secured by concentrating them at the central provincial station or angular point where the four counties meet. This would provide an ample force of police for the gaol and treasury-guards, treasure-escorts, &c. and it would give the requisite security of a large force of military to those departments when particular emergencies might demand the presence of the police reserves in other parts of the province.

110. In fixing the permanent numerical force and composition of an army intended to protect the British Indian population and territory, an important subject for consideration would be the relative and aggregate strength and composition of the military resources of native states not under British rule. We find, and with reason, that the military forces of neighbouring states in Europe regulate more than any internal necessity the amount of force that each must maintain—relative weakness provokes aggression. Our capacity to resist aggression is the precise measure of our protection against provocation.

It is the only peace-preservation principle of any value in the present state of the world. In this view we must not overlook the statement given in a Parliamentary Return of 15th April 1852, which describes the forces of native states in India as amounting to 12,962 artillery, 68,303 cavalry, and 317,653 infantry, making an aggregate of about 400,000 men, or four times the number which is here proposed for the British Indian territory, although those states possess little over one-third of our population and about three-fourths of our area. Hence, according to our scale, the aggregate military of native states, instead of being 400,000 men, should only be 37,000 in reference to comparative populations, or 75,000 in reference to comparative areas. And giving a margin of 33 per cent. beyond the largest amount that either basis would bring out, as the aggregate military establishment of native states, we may admit 100,000 men as a reasonable limit to which they could scarcely object.

112. The question of whether the military forces of native states are to stand at 400,000 men, or to be reduced to 100,000, is not so important as affecting the absolute results of future collisions between the British power in India and any combination of native states against that power, as in the effect that it would have in reducing the chances of any such collisions taking place. If they do occur, there can be little doubt of our success, whatever the numerical preponderance of their nominal troops may be.

Yet still, if they can see upon paper that a combination of their forces would be four times the amount of ours, such a view might easily mislead ambitious and designing chiefs to embroil the country in most fatal and destructive conflicts.

There can be no doubt that a calculation of the vast disproportion between the natives and Europeans, $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 composing the British Indian armies, was the real source of the late mutinies, with all their consequent horrors and waste.

If, therefore, our negotiations with native states can produce a reduction of their 400,000 nominal troops to 100,000, such a result would tend to secure the permanent tranquillity of India, whilst it would confer immediate and permanent financial benefits on the rulers and people of those very states, by the reduction of nearly three-fourths of their present military expenditure, whatever that may be. The mode of dealing with this question will no doubt be a matter of extreme delicacy, but it is assuredly one of paramount importance, and as the paramount power in India it is one with which we are bound to deal; because, whatever we may do or leave undone there, we shall be charged, *and justly*, as the "paramount power," with whatever evils arise, whether in our own territories or in the native states.

113. Political clouds, portentous of a European war, have for months past overshadowed our commercial horizon with their inevitable and mischievous consequences upon the industry of the empire and the well-being of the world; and it is of the utmost importance that such a permanent and healthy basis of government should at once be established in our distant Eastern territories as shall enable our statesmen to turn their undivided energies and means to avert the threatening catastrophe and protect our central interests, which act and re-act between the heart of the empire and its remotest extremities with the most sensitive precision, each vibration to and fro conveying its particular quantity of good or evil with scrupulous accuracy throughout.

EUROPEAN BARRACKS.

114. One important point for consideration in the arrangements for an altered system in reference to the future military occupation of India is the subject of barracks for European troops. The first desideratum should be to render it impossible to overcrowd them. This can only be done by limiting the width and regulating the height, so that, when the utmost amount of beds has been introduced that the floor will admit of, there must still be the regulated number of cubic feet of interior space for each soldier, whatever that regulated space may be fixed at.

If we assume 6 feet by 4 feet for each bed and its side space, and allow

8 feet between the opposite beds for the table and forms, and take 1,500 cubic feet as the interior space per man, we shall have 20 feet as the width of the rooms in the clear, and 37 feet the height.

If 1,200 cubic feet be assumed as the required breathing space per man with good contrivances for ventilation, then the height would be 30 feet.

If 1,000 cubic feet be the regulated breathing space, then 25 feet becomes the height. And, in all cases in the plains in India, barracks for Europeans during the summer should be furnished either with the punka or thermantidote.

There should be a ceiling of some description, with a free circulation of air between it and the exterior covering, to prevent the direct heat from the roof striking down on the men's heads. The roof should be carried down and similarly ceiled to within 8 feet of the ground, to form a verandah.

EUROPEAN OFFICERS' QUARTERS.

115. There can be no question that regular barracks should be provided by Government for the European officers as well as the men. There can be no security or strength in the old principle of laying out cantonments which cover miles of ground, and render their defence impossible by any moderate force, when the contingency occurs of considerable proportions of the troops of a cantonment being suddenly required elsewhere.

116. The whole of the costly buildings required for Europeans ought to be compact and defensible, with a small force, against any sudden assault; and officers' quarters ought to be included.

It is often a source of considerable loss to officers to be obliged to purchase or build their bungalows in a cantonment. Their allowance in lieu of lodgings is no doubt on a very liberal scale; still there is no certainty of an officer remaining at the same cantonment until that allowance shall have reimbursed him for the building or purchase of his bungalow, which he may be unable to sell at his departure in consequence of a reduction in the strength of the relieving force.

117. This contingency sometimes embarrasses officers very much indeed. It should be taken into consideration, together with the heavy subscription to which young officers are subjected in the first years of joining their corps. Their allowances, however liberal for their rank as compared with English pay, are unable to meet such charges.

118. Debts to banks are contracted at usurious interest, and a plausible excuse is thus offered for commencing what grows into a discreditable, a ruinous, and, from the above causes, almost an unavoidable, habit in India.

This entire subject of officers' debts and their origin is well deserving of the closest investigation, with a view to the application of effectual remedies. There can be nothing more injurious to the character of Englishmen in the eyes of native Indians than the frequent exposures which it entails at courts of request.

It has had the most earnest attention of our best commanders, but its source was beyond their reach under the existing regulations.

119. The very gratifying transfer of the Company's army to the service

of their Sovereign will necessarily render them subordinate to Her Majesty's Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards. His influence may enable him to remedy this and other existing evils, to remove all shadows from the brilliancy of the British character and achievements as exhibited to the numerous Eastern nations. There is no doubt that ascendancy won by military prowess can only be consolidated by high moral qualities in the victors, incessantly directed to ameliorate the condition of the people subjugated.

120. The government of India has been and must be practically a military government.

The Governor-General has been and must be practically Commander-in-Chief in India.

The nominal Commander-in-Chief has been and must be practically the lieutenant of the Governor-General.

Practically the functions of Commander-in-Chief in India have hitherto been limited to Bengal; they should extend to India generally.

There are some cases on record in which the offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief were absolutely vested in the same individual.

121. I have now only to regret my short-comings in treating as it merits the discussion of these important subjects.

To the broad principle inculcated probably few will demur. That the removal of all that is oppressive or objectionable, and the establishment of all that can promote the easy administration of justice, and the free action of industry, trade, and commerce, will best secure to Her Majesty a loyal and prosperous population in India, and enable the future military force there to be brought within the lowest safe amount; whilst soundness in the composition, relative proportions, organization, and discipline of that mixed force will be the only security that the restless British portion of it shall not again be provoked to so revolting and unequal a struggle, as they have just triumphantly undergone, in the defence of their Sovereign's honour, and of the vital interests of her British and Indian subjects.