book is theological. But he is careful to show that that theology which is divorced from life is worthless and worse.

Messrs. Seeley, Service & Co. have published a second edition of *The Holy Spirit and the Prayer Book*, by the Rev. James Haughton, M.A. (6s. net).

To Messrs. Elliot Stock's 'Purple Series'—small quartos, bound in purple cloth with white lettering—Archdeacon Basil Wilberforce has contributed a volume containing four sermons and entitled *Mystic Immanence* (1s. 6d. net).

Mr. Fisher Unwin has issued a cheap edition (1s. net) of *The Unfolding of Personality as the Chief Aim in Education*, by Thiselton Mark, D.Lit., B.Sc. It is sure to reach a great circulation in this form, for it takes a leading place in that rapidly growing volume of literature on the psychology of childhood.

Those who cannot master Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, for want of time or other reason, may be directed to a volume of Messrs. Williams & Norgate's 'Home University Library,' entitled *The Literature of the Old Testa-*

ment (1s. net). It is written by Professor G. F. Moore of Harvard University, whose position differs from Dr. Driver's only in those details which an independent and accomplished scholar is entitled to.

Two more of Professor Rudolf Eucken's books have been translated into English and published in the 'Crown Theological Library' of Messrs. Williams & Norgate. The one is *Present-Day Ethics in their Relations to the Spiritual Life*. This is the Deem Lecture which Professor Eucken delivered in 1913 at New York University. It has been translated by Margaret von Legdewitz (3s. net). The translation is into vigorous and perspicuous English, and on the whole the volume is the easiest entry into Eucken's philosophy that has yet been published in this country.

The other volume is rather larger and rather more difficult to compass. Yet its subject is Euckenism at the very heart. Those who have gone a little way with the philosophy will pass by the other book, but sooner or later every one must read this. Its title is *Knowledge and Life* (5s. net). The translator is Dr. Tudor Jones, who has done so much to make Eucken accessible to the English student.

The Interpretation of St. Paul.

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THIS paper is an attempt to trace out some of the most notable methods of interpretation which have been applied to the letters and life of St. Paul, and to inquire if any one method of approach offers the promise of a consistent account of the apparently conflicting elements in St. Paul's thought. The existence of conflicting elements hardly needs proof. The habit of treating St. Paul's thought as a system of definite dogmas, which can be classified and labelled, and subjected to separate treatment, has certainly obscured the fact that the problem of conflicting elements exists.

But the modern application of historical method to N.T. theology, the study of origins, the attempt to recover the atmosphere of the times in which St. Paul moved and lived his life, has made it impossible to ignore the existence of elements

which refuse to combine according to received formulæ, which offer continually the phenomenon of perplexing faults breaking through the orderly lines of theological stratification.

The existence and nature of these conflicting elements in St. Paul's thought will appear as we examine the different methods which have been applied to its explanation.

i. *Psychological*.—First of all there is the ever-green psychological method. This method seeks to explain by the nature of St. Paul's religious experience all the constituent elements of his theology as we find them in his letters. Such studies as Sabatier's, Mr. Anderson Scott's in the *Camb. Bibl. Essays*, the able little monograph by Johannes Weiss entitled *Paul and Jesus*, and notably Miss Underhill's analysis of the mystic

element in St. Paul in her recent book *The Mystic Way*, are examples of the valuable aid which psychological analysis can give towards the understanding of St. Paul. To quote Miss Underhill's words: 'The living, growing creature Paul, as he reveals himself to us "in process of being saved," is a more valuable subject of investigation than the intellectual formulæ under which he tried and often failed to communicate his intuitions of the independent spiritual world.'

The words '*often failed*' reveal the weakness of the method. It undoubtedly throws much light on certain fundamental differences between St. Paul's religious experience and that of our Lord. But it assumes without sufficient proof that many of St. Paul's so-called formulæ were not understood by his own time. Hence the method tends to gather up all the passages which reflect the inward experiences of St. Paul, and to neglect the passages which do not readily yield to this key, as being 'the hopeless attempt of the mystic to communicate by means of artistic symbols his actual and supernal experience to non-mystical men.' For example, '*justification by faith*' is dealt with as being 'really an artistic image, half poetic and half practical, by which Paul strove to communicate one of his deepest intuitions, and which springs from the very heart of his inner life. It is the intellectual expression of another inward experience, and represents his sudden flashing comprehension that the world a man lives in—his vision of the universe—is the central fact of his existence and the best of all indications of character.' This is extremely suggestive, but one may be pardoned for doubting whether it really represents St. Paul's own view of justification.

Again, we find a similar treatment of another of those perplexing and conflicting elements in Pauline thought, the apocalyptic. Thus: 'Paul's deep prophetic vision of ultimate perfection, his intuitive sympathy with the movement of life towards some rapturous consummation in God, took at first an apocalyptic form.'

These examples are sufficient to show at once the strength and weakness of the purely psychological method. Seeking to find the permanent element in St. Paul's thought it has not paid sufficient attention to a patient analysis of the 'formulæ,' as they are called, it has not sufficiently sought to understand the relation of the form of Pauline thought to its content.

ii. *Hellenic*.—The next great line of interpretation is not open to the same charge, although on other counts it too has been tried and found wanting. This is the method which the great name of Ferdinand Baur represents.

For Baur Paul was the founder of Christianity. Paul it was who transformed the crude Judaistic sect into a religion dominated by the great ideas of Greek philosophy and capable of conquering the Western world. The Hellenization of Christianity begins with Paul, and explains the characteristic elements in his teaching. The dualism of *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is selected as the key motive of St. Paul's thought, and derived from Platonism. Since the method has been worked out to its *reductio ad absurdum*, leaving nothing of Paul's to us but Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians, and even in the happy land of its birth has been consigned to the limbo of dead theories, we need not linger over it. And there is the less need to do so since the Hellenizing line of explanation has reappeared in a new form and has attracted many worshippers. Of this we must take some notice.

iii. *Mystery Religions*.—The modern Hellenizing interpretation of St. Paul has taken the guise of an application of the features of the Græco-Oriental mystery-cults to the solution of the problem. The rise of the scientific study of Comparative Religion, together with the large amount of material recently rendered available from the papyri and other sources, have brought to light so many parallels in language and conception to some of the great Pauline ideas, such as *σωτηρία*, *τέλειος*, *πνευματικός*, etc., together with many important parallels to St. Paul's view of the ritual element in religion, that the new line of interpretation seemed very full of promise.

However, in their eagerness to establish parallels and to prove the dependence of Paulinism on the Græco-Oriental mysteries, those scholars who have adopted this line have overlooked two important points. They have taken it for granted that the fundamental idea of new-birth, which is the central thought of the mysteries, is also characteristic of St. Paul.

But the idea is never found in his writings, except in the metaphor, 'in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel.' It is a Johannine conception, and the confusion of what is Pauline and what is Johannine is surely not

helpful towards the elucidation of St. Paul's thought.

Further, it has been overlooked that the fully developed forms of the mysteries belong to the beginning of the second century, and it is tolerably certain that St. Paul cannot have known the mystery cults in the form in which they are known to us. Even Cumont, who cannot be suspected of any apologetic tendency, repeatedly warns us against assuming any influence of the mystery cults upon primitive Christianity. 'Resemblances,' he says, 'do not always imply imitation; and the resemblances of views or usages must often be explained by community of origin, not by any kind of borrowing.'

This method, however, breaks down most completely when it attempts to explain St. Paul's sacramental doctrines from the mystery conceptions. Not only does Paul know nothing of new-birth by baptism, but he knows nothing of the idea found in Johannine theology of eating and drinking the flesh and blood of Christ, answering to the mystery conception of eating the God in order to partake of the life of the God and become deified.

Indeed, though it may appear paradoxical to say so, the mystery conception of a Redeemer God is not Pauline at all, and Paul's doctrine of transformation into the *εἶκων* of Christ has no real connexion with the mystery ideas of deification.

It is generally recognized that even if the influence of the mystery cults upon St. Paul be admitted, this influence is far from explaining all the elements of his teaching. Even Heitmüller sees in the magical sacrament view which he attributes to St. Paul only a kind of boulder in the structure of Paul's thought, without organic connexion with his teaching as a whole. Professor Gardner thus sums up his examination of St. Paul's use of the mystery ideas regarding baptism and the Eucharist: 'In each case an existing rite of Jewish origin was taken up and interpreted in a manner *parallel* to that of the Mysteries.'

On the larger question of the relation of mystery ideas to the whole range of Pauline teaching, Professor Kennedy says in a passage of admirably balanced judgment: 'It was inevitable that Paul should become familiar, at least from the outside, with religious ideas current in these influential

cults. Sometimes, as, e.g., in the case of *γνώσις* and *δόξα* these ideas found remarkably close parallels in the thought of the O.T. So he would become impressed by their capacity for holding a genuine spiritual content, and would use them in circumstances in which their earlier history would tend to make them all the more effective. Certain important terms like *τέλειος*, *πνευματικός*, *σωτηρία*, etc., were in the air. They meant one thing, no doubt, for a Christian, and quite another for a pagan. Yet their fundamental significance for both had elements of affinity, sufficient to link together the respective usages. The essentially religious meaning, for example, of *πνεῦμα* and *νοῦς* in documents of Hellenistic mystery religion provided a common standing ground for Paul and many of his readers. What holds of separate terms may be occasionally affirmed regarding groups of ideas. Thus the combination of *συμμορφιζόμενος* with *γινώσκειν* in Ph 3¹⁰ seems to suggest a background for the Apostle's conception akin to the Mystery doctrine of Transformation by the Vision of God. But it has become clear that we dare not make far-reaching inferences from terminology as to the assimilation by Paul of Mystery ideas. For we are able to show that the central conceptions of the Mystery Religions belong to a different atmosphere from that in which the Apostle habitually dwelt. There is no principle determining their relations which in any sense corresponds to the Cross of Christ in the realm of Paul's thought and experience.'

It was not my intention to offer any extended and detailed examination of these methods, but only to point out that none of them succeed in giving a consistent account of Pauline thought. Each method might well afford material for a separate paper, and this is my apology for rather summary treatment of many important and interesting points connected with each method.

Before turning to the fourth line of explanation, which is the principal object of this paper, it may be permitted to point out two broader problems which any explanation of St. Paul's thought must face. First, the nature of St. Paul's relation to, and advance upon, the teaching of our Lord must be explained without ignoring 'the middle term,' as Schweitzer calls it, namely, Primitive Christianity.

Secondly, the sharp break between St. Paul and the early Greek Fathers must be explained.

We turn then to the last line of interpretation, the

iv. *Eschatological*.—It is clearly impossible within the limits of a paper to work through the whole of Pauline theology in order to test the adequacy of the Eschatological method of explanation. Hence I have confined myself to the two problems mentioned above, and to an examination of that side of Paul's doctrine which has been most used by the expounders of the psychological method, and which seems most alien to eschatological modes of thought.

(a) *Primitive Christianity*.—It has been made very clear by recent studies on the subject that the dominating interest of Primitive Christianity was not doctrine but apocalyptic. That much-abused book *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* has at least made it clear that a more thoroughgoing acceptance of the apocalyptic outlook of our Lord and His disciples explains many difficulties in the Synoptic Gospels. The record of the first preachings in Acts also shows that both for the Apostles and for their hearers the salvation presented was eschatological; it was salvation from wrath to come, with the promise of participation in the approaching Messianic kingdom. The phenomena of Pentecost are interpreted as the fulfilment of the eschatological prophecies of Joel.

It is hardly necessary to labour the point that Primitive Christianity shared, with the later Judaism from which it sprang an apocalyptic world-view which overshadowed every other interest. The Epistles to the Thessalonian converts, the earliest of the Pauline letters unless the new date of Galatians be accepted, show clearly that in his second missionary journey, and therefore many years after his conversion, St. Paul's instruction to his young churches was very largely eschatological. This eschatology of St. Paul's is evidently a thorn in the side of expositors. For Weinell and Heitmüller it is 'an erratic boulder' in Paul's thought. For Miss Underhill it is 'the fruit of a collision between the profound intuitive conviction of ultimate Perfection and its imperfect earthly realization, a collision taking place in a mind of strongly artistic cast, which was saturated with the myriad apocalyptic fancies born of the political miseries and religious restlessness of the Jews.' Professor Gardner will have it that 'the eschatology of Paul, however it may at times have

overshadowed his mind, has in effect no great influence upon his ethic.' We are everywhere met by the tacit assumption that ethics and eschatology are two incompatible terms, and this assumption is in great measure the cause of the confusion prevailing in the interpretation of St. Paul's teaching.

The fact is, that though the modern mind may feel the incongruity between the two, yet in the time of the primitive church eschatological hopes formed the very dynamic of the ethical teaching; the eschatology was ethical through and through. Hence the teaching of St. Paul demands at least an attempt to interpret it from the eschatological side. St. Paul's doctrine of righteousness and the connected doctrine of what theologians call 'sanctification' form the central point both for the Psychologists and the Hellenists. Hence it is as fair a test of the eschatological method as can be suggested. If the eschatological method of explanation succeeds in exhibiting clear and logical lines of connexion between St. Paul's doctrine of righteousness and that Primitive Christianity whose dominant characteristic we have described, then the method may at least be said to have vindicated its right to an extended trial.

(b) *Righteousness*.—We may then first examine briefly the teaching of our Lord regarding this point. The following passages bear directly on our inquiry:—

Mt 5²⁰. 'Except your righteousness exceed,' etc.

„ 6³³. 'Seek first his kingdom and righteousness,' etc.

„ 13⁴³. 'Then shall the righteous,' etc.

„ 21³². 'John came to you in the way of righteousness,' etc.

In these passages our Lord connects righteousness with the Kingdom. Righteousness of a particular kind is needed to enter the Kingdom; the Pharisaic type will not avail. It is the righteous who shine in the future Kingdom. The baptism of John, which was most certainly eschatological in character, is described as 'the way of righteousness,' by which publicans and harlots entered into the Kingdom of God.

No doubt we have a new conception of righteousness here, but it is clear that this righteousness is essentially connected with the

Kingdom and its hopes, and is an object of desire because of its connexion with the Kingdom.

We may turn next to a passage in Ph 3⁸⁻¹⁰, which is not so much doctrinal as the expression of personal experience and aspiration, and therefore the more interesting and illuminating: 'That I may gain Christ and may be found in him, not having my own *righteousness*, which is from the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ; the righteousness which comes from God on the ground of faith; to know him and the power of his resurrection, and the sharing of his sufferings, being conformed to his death, if I may somehow reach to the resurrection from among the dead.'

Here St. Paul connects his future position, the condition in which he desires to be found at the Parousia, with the possession of a particular kind of righteousness, not Pharisaic. He connects together the conception '*in Christ*,' '*God's righteousness*,' and '*the resurrection from among the dead*.' In Gal 5⁵, a curiously condensed and elliptic verse, he says: 'For we by (the) Spirit (which comes) from faith await a *hope of righteousness*.' In his opening statement in Romans he tells his readers that he is not ashamed of the gospel which has been entrusted to him, because it is God's means of saving people, God's power unto salvation. But this is because God's righteousness is revealed and available for faith. And this is illustrated by an eschatological quotation from Hab., 'the righteous shall live by his faith.' He then explains what lies behind these thoughts of salvation, and the need of righteousness, by immediately adding, 'for the wrath of God is being revealed.' All his ethical conceptions, his doctrine of righteousness, salvation, life, etc., stand out against a background now dark and lurid with the coming wrath, now brilliant with the coming glory of Messiah's Kingdom. 'Those who are justified can boast in hope of the glory of God.'

It may not be out of place to discuss very briefly in the light of our line of inquiry the force of the much disputed *δικαιόω*. Sanday and Headlam on linguistic grounds sum up in favour of the sense '*count righteous*.' Now the eschatological view of righteousness as a state absolutely necessary for admission to the Kingdom of God requires that the stronger meaning '*make righteous*' should be given to the word. The argument against this is

that although verbs in *-όω* which relate to material processes, e.g. *τυφλόω*, 'make blind,' and many other common verbs, do admittedly mean to make a person something, verbs in *-όω* denoting moral state only have the sense to reckon or count a person something. Now this, while true, is simply the result of the limitations of human action, and not inherent in the nature of verbs in *όω*. One can make a man blind, but one cannot make him righteous. When we think of God's action the limitation ceases to exist, and it can hardly be doubted that St. Paul thought of God as making people righteous, not merely counting them so.

Immediately following this account of righteousness as connected with salvation from coming wrath, we find the exposition of righteousness as the result of a vital process, *δικαίωσις ζωής*. Here the new element in St. Paul's thought appears. This new element is not an idea, but for St. Paul at least, a fact, the fact of a Messiah who had died and risen again in order to bring about the realization of the future Kingdom of God. It is strange that the bearing of the Damascus vision upon St. Paul's eschatology has not been more clearly seen.

In late Jewish thought the Messiah is entirely an apocalyptic figure. John the Baptist had before him the Apocalyptic Messiah, as the Person whose way it was his task to prepare. Our Lord undoubtedly accepts the general apocalyptic outline, although He introduces a new element in His conception of the nature of the righteousness which gave entrance to the Kingdom. But the fundamental change took place when it was admitted that the Person who was known on earth as Jesus of Nazareth, had by death and resurrection become the Messiah of Jewish hopes. Hence the Damascus vision, introducing this conception as a fact of the most tremendous import into the eschatology which St. Paul as a Pharisee already held, completely polarizes, so to speak, its constituent elements.

It is not so much that the general outlines of current eschatology, at least at first, are greatly changed, as that the conception of a vital process directly connected with the present and future form of the kingdom is introduced into it.

It is not easy to express the form of this doctrine briefly, but it is somewhat as follows:—

By the sacrament of baptism there is a real participation in the effects of Christ's death; the

believer dies to sin, he is to reckon himself dead henceforward because the fact is regarded as accomplished. But, further, this death by baptism is followed by an equally real participation in the present life of Christ, who is spoken of in terms interchangeable with the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of Christ.

The consequences of this participation in the life of Christ are—

(a) Ethical: righteousness is manifested in life, the believer has his fruit unto holiness, *and the end is eternal life.*

(b) Eschatological: the mortal body of the believer is ultimately quickened through the spirit of the indwelling Christ.

These two results are not separated in St. Paul's thought, and should not be separated in exegesis. Conformation to the image of Christ included for St. Paul both elements. Those who are predestined and called are both justified, made righteous, and glorified, made like Christ in his present mode of existence. Hence a quasi-physical conception of life runs through St. Paul's thought. The outward man is perishing, but the inward man is being recreated daily. He desires to be clothed upon with the house which is from heaven. And the whole doctrine of life and the Spirit, with all its ethical implications, were for St. Paul inseparable from the eschatology. It may be permissible now to separate the ethics as the kernel from their somewhat repellent husk. But unless our line of interpretation has gone wholly astray, it will be necessary to pay much more attention to the husk than has yet been done, if we are to understand truly the genesis of St. Paul's deepest religious conceptions.

It would be interesting, but would carry us beyond the limits of such a paper as this, to examine the Christology, the sacramental teaching, and other points of St. Paul's doctrine, to test this line of inquiry. But this paper does not aim at more than drawing the fire of the Psychologists

and Hellenists, and suggesting the line of approach. Schweitzer has promised us a book on the subject, and if it is in any way equal in interest to his latest book, *Paul and his Interpreters*, it will be certainly worthy of more attention than the slightly contemptuous allusion with which Dr. Charles has passed him by in the preface to his last edition of his own *magnum opus*.

(c) *Paul and the later theologians.*—With regard to the last point which we undertook to examine, namely, the reason of the apparent inability of the Fathers who built up the theology of the Church to understand St. Paul, may it not be that it is this dominating eschatological outlook and interest of St. Paul which links him inseparably with Primitive Christianity and fixes a great gulf between him and the theology of the Apologists?

Conclusion.—In conclusion, it has been finely said by a prominent modern theologian that the Christian function of Criticism is not simply death but resurrection. But death is painful, at least in anticipation, and we have not always faith in the resurrection; perhaps we doubt whether we shall recognize our old beliefs in their resurrection bodies.

But we need faith. We are faced with no mere question of academic criticism. The problem of our time is, Can we recover the dynamic which the eschatological hope of the Primitive Church supplied to its ethics? We hardly feel nowadays that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation, for we feel no pressure of coming wrath, and the Fabian visions hardly thrill us into ecstasy.

Yet we can hardly resign ourselves to the Stoicism, however noble, that sings—

It may be that the gulfs will wash us down,
It may be we shall touch the happy isles.

It is possible that the process of criticism, and the patient reconstruction of the conditions of that old enthusiasm, may be one of many means which will help us to rediscover the lost secret, 'When the Son of man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?'