17957
doi
10.5281/zenodo.17957
oai:zenodo.org:17957
user-isi2015
Fietkiewicz, Kaja J.
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany
Stock, Wolfgang G.
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany
Monopolies on Social Network Services (SNS) Markets and Competition Law
Baran, Katsiaryna S.
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
Information markets;
Social Network Services;
Facebook;
Competition law;
Monopoly;
Art. 102 TFEU;
EC merger regulation
<p>Research questions: (1) How can we explain the development of monopolies<br />
on SNS markets? (2) Are monopolies possibly temporarily limited? (3) What<br />
does this mean for competition (or antitrust) law?<br />
Results: (1) Direct network effects (number of users) and indirect network<br />
effects (complementary products and advertising) facilitate the development<br />
of one standard und thus a quasi-monopoly. There is empirical evidence that<br />
there are indeed standards on SNS markets (Facebook in the U.S. and Germany,<br />
Vkontakte in Russia). (2) The standards seem to be temporary monopolies.<br />
Yet, no innovator survived as a standard. (3) The dominant market<br />
position of a standard on the SNS market alone is no problem for Article 102<br />
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). But if a<br />
dominant company tries to immunize its leading position (e.g. by mergers<br />
and acquisitions), such behavior can be scrutinized. On two-sided markets, it<br />
would be possible to define the relevant market much broader than the small<br />
SNS market. When we consider the whole online advertising market as relevant,<br />
many of Article 102’s problems are avoided.</p>
Zenodo
2015-05-26
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferencePaper
609913
user-isi2015
1579537421.720109
246123
md5:6e40a12c972911c54a6287ed290b4b44
https://zenodo.org/records/17957/files/S6_1.pdf
public
isVersionOf
doi