Conference paper Open Access

Monopolies on Social Network Services (SNS) Markets and Competition Law

Baran, Katsiaryna S.; Fietkiewicz, Kaja J.; Stock, Wolfgang G.

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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.17957</identifier>
      <creatorName>Baran, Katsiaryna S.</creatorName>
      <givenName>Katsiaryna S.</givenName>
      <affiliation>Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany</affiliation>
      <creatorName>Fietkiewicz, Kaja J.</creatorName>
      <givenName>Kaja J.</givenName>
      <affiliation>Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany</affiliation>
      <creatorName>Stock, Wolfgang G.</creatorName>
      <givenName>Wolfgang G.</givenName>
      <affiliation>Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany</affiliation>
    <title>Monopolies on Social Network Services (SNS) Markets and Competition Law</title>
    <subject>Information markets;</subject>
    <subject>Social Network Services;</subject>
    <subject>Competition law;</subject>
    <subject>Art. 102 TFEU;</subject>
    <subject>EC merger regulation</subject>
    <date dateType="Issued">2015-05-26</date>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="ConferencePaper"/>
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    <rights rightsURI="">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;Research questions: (1) How can we explain the development of monopolies&lt;br /&gt;
on SNS markets? (2) Are monopolies possibly temporarily limited? (3) What&lt;br /&gt;
does this mean for competition (or antitrust) law?&lt;br /&gt;
Results: (1) Direct network effects (number of users) and indirect network&lt;br /&gt;
effects (complementary products and advertising) facilitate the development&lt;br /&gt;
of one standard und thus a quasi-monopoly. There is empirical evidence that&lt;br /&gt;
there are indeed standards on SNS markets (Facebook in the U.S. and Germany,&lt;br /&gt;
Vkontakte in Russia). (2) The standards seem to be temporary monopolies.&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, no innovator survived as a standard. (3) The dominant market&lt;br /&gt;
position of a standard on the SNS market alone is no problem for Article 102&lt;br /&gt;
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). But if a&lt;br /&gt;
dominant company tries to immunize its leading position (e.g. by mergers&lt;br /&gt;
and acquisitions), such behavior can be scrutinized. On two-sided markets, it&lt;br /&gt;
would be possible to define the relevant market much broader than the small&lt;br /&gt;
SNS market. When we consider the whole online advertising market as relevant,&lt;br /&gt;
many of Article 102&amp;rsquo;s problems are avoided.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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