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PLATO AND ORPHEUS.

πανταχοῦ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων παρῳδεῖ τὰ τοῦ
'Ορφέως.

Olympiodorus.

The object of this paper is to trace in the mythical setting of some of the Platonic dialogues certain religious conceptions which Plato borrowed from Orphism, and to show how he transformed them to his own philosophical uses.

THE GOLDEN AGE. GUARDIAN SPIRITS.

We shall begin with a passage in the *Cratylus* (397 B) in which Socrates, under the inspiration of his morning colloquy with the pious Euthyphro—the Euthyphro of the dialogue on the characteristically Orphic conception of 'Holiness'—begins, with Hermogenes, the systematic investigation of the correctness of names. They discuss the derivations of the four terms θεός, δαίμων, ἦρως, ἄνθρωπος. After deriving θεός from θεῖν, Socrates proceeds :

S. What shall we take next? Spirits (δαίμονας), I suppose, and Heroes, and Men?

H. Yes, Spirits.

S. What can be the real meaning of the name 'Spirits'? You must tell me if you think I am right.

H. Go on.

S. You know who Hesiod says the Spirits are?

H. I do not remember.

S. At least you remember that he says the first race of mankind was golden?

H. Yes, I know so much.

S. Well, then, he says about it :

'This race, now Fate's dark veil hath shadowed them,

Are called pure Spirits ranging over earth,

Kind guardians of man, averting ill.'¹

H. And what then?

S. This : I think that by 'golden race' he means not 'made of gold,' but good and beautiful. The inference is supported by his calling us a race of iron.

H. True.

S. Do you not think, then, that he would say that anyone, even in this present age, who is good, belongs to that race of gold?

H. Probably.

S. But the good are nothing if not wise.

H. Yes.

S. This, then, above all, is, in my opinion, what he means by 'Spirits': he calls them spirits (δαίμονας) because they are wise and intelligent (δαήμονες)—in our archaic language the actual name is found. Hesiod then is right, and so are all other poets who say that a good man, after his death, is destined to high honour and becomes a spirit, being so called after his wisdom. And I agree that every man who is good is of a spiritual nature (δαιμόνιον), whether living or dead, and is rightly called a spirit.'

Socrates, still under Euthyphro's inspiration, goes on to derive ἦρως from ἔρως εἶρειν ἐρωτᾶν and ἄνθρωπος from ἀναθρῶν ἀδωπειν, and finally to improve on the Orphic σῶμα σῆμα by suggesting that the body is the prison-house in which the soul σφύζεται till it shall have paid the debt of its sins. These passages will be considered later.

The familiar lines of Hesiod (*O.D.* 109) cited by Socrates may be rendered as follows :

A golden race of mortals first was made
By the high gods who on Olympus dwell.
When Cronos yet was king in Heaven, they
lived

The life of gods with careless heart, afar
From pain and grief; nor even weakling
age

Came on them, but with lifelong youth of
limb

They knew not cares: life was a joyous
feast,

And Death's hand soft as sleep. All gifts
of good

Were theirs—gift of the grain, rich fruitful-
ness

Of earth, unlaboured; gift of quiet life,
Busy with country works and loving ten-
dance

Of the fair flock, in happy Heaven's eye.
And when this race at last was lapped in
earth,

By God's high will, as Spirits beneficent
They range the earth, watching o'er mortal
life.²

² αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψεν
τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλὰς
ἑσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

It will be noted that Plato inserts ἀγνοί and ἀλεξίκακοι, both in the *Cratylus* and at *Rep.* 468 E. For the latter epithet cf. Pollux. *Onom.* V. 131 οἱ δὲ

¹ αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ' ἐκάλυψεν,
οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοί ἐπιχθόνιοι καλεῖνται,
ἑσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.
ἐπιχθόνιοι (not ὑποχθόνιοι) with Par. G. Steph.
Stallb. Hes. *O.D.* 123, Plato *Rep.* 469 A.

The just deed and the unjust. Robed in air

They walk invisible through every land,
Givers of wealth—this too their kingly hest.

These lines are quoted again by Plato in a significant connection. In the *Republic*, at the end of the digression about war, Socrates proceeds (468 E):

‘And when any die upon service, shall we not, in the first place, give out that he who has fallen with honour belongs to the golden race?’

—Certainly.

—And shall we not believe with Hesiod that when any of this race die

“Pure spirits they become, to range the earth,

Kind guardians of man, averting ill”?

—Yes.

—We shall then inquire of the God with what ceremonies and distinctions men of spiritual and godlike nature should be interred, and so proceed in the manner he prescribes?

—By all means.

—And ever afterwards we shall think of them as spirits and pay reverence and worship at their sepulchres accordingly. And we shall hold the same custom when death from old age or any other cause comes to any that have been esteemed good and true men while they lived.

—It is but just, he answered.’

When this passage is taken in conjunction with the etymological equivalence *δαίμονες* *δαήμονες*, the inference is irresistible that in calling the rulers of Callipolis ‘Guardians’ (*φύλακες*), Plato was not merely influenced by a desire to avoid the associations of terms in common use (*ἄρχων*, *ἔφορος*, etc.), but had definitely in view the Guardian Spirits¹ of mythology. The source of the term seems to have escaped notice. The reason for the choice of it lies in certain far-reaching implications of which Plato was glad to avail himself.

Before following out these implications, we may look at another passage in which Hesiod’s symbolism of a golden, a silver, an iron age, etc., is adopted by Plato.

When the natural qualities of a good guardian—those of the watch-dog—have been corrected or fortified by the discipline of musical and gymnastic education, those

δαίμονες, οἱ μὲν λυόντες τὰς ἀρὰς ἀλεξίκακοι λέγονται, ἀποπομπάιοι, ἀποτροπαῖοι, λύσιοι, φύσιοι· οἱ δὲ κυρούντες ἀλιτῆριοι, ἀλιτῆριωδεῖς, προστροπαῖοι, παλαμναῖοι.

¹ *δαίμων φύλαξ* in its ordinary sense of *tutelary genius*, *Rep.* 620 E.

who by various tests have proved themselves most worthy to rule are to be selected and called ‘guardians’ in a narrower sense. The remainder are to be ‘auxiliaries,’ whose business is to support the guardians’ authority. The selection is to be justified by a mythical account which Socrates propounds with much hesitation (414 B). The youths are to be taught that their nurture and education by us was a dream. Really, they were being formed and moulded, and their arms and equipment forged, within the earth beneath.² When they were perfected, Earth, their mother, sent them up into the light. Hence they must defend their country and take thought for her as for a mother, and for their fellows as for brother children of Earth. Further, they will be taught that the reason for the three classes of citizens is that God, in moulding them, mixed gold in the nature of some—and these are worthy to rule; silver in others—these are auxiliaries; and iron and bronze in those who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen. But the distinction does not go by birth: the children of one class may belong by intrinsic worth to another.

We have, then, besides the gods (*θεοί*), three orders of men in the Platonic State, symbolised by (1) gold, (2) silver, (3) iron and bronze; as in the *Cratylus* there were, in all four orders of beings: Gods, spirits, heroes, men. Plutarch³ observes: ‘Hesiod first clearly and definitely set forth four kinds of rational natures, gods, then spirits many and good, then heroes, and finally men: the demigods are assigned to the class of heroes.’ Proclus, plainly with the *Cratylus* in mind, follows Plutarch. He says⁴: ‘Those who depart from life and are guardians of human life, Hesiod calls spirits, either because they are all-wise (*παρὰ τὸ δαῖναι τὰ πάντα*), or because they allot (*μερίζειν*, i.e. *δαίρειν*) good and bad to men. . . Or does he mean to divide all rational natures (*πᾶσαν τὴν λογικὴν φύσιν*) into four: (1) gods, (2) spirits, (3) heroes, (4) men? And does he mean that while the divine has no converse with us, those who watch over human things are spirits, as Plato said?’

It can, I think, be shown that there is a certain correspondence between Plato’s three orders and Hesiod’s five ages. The equivalence of the highest Platonic class—the philosophers—with Hesiod’s Golden race

² A hint of this subterranean nurture may have been taken from Hesiod, *O.D.* 130 (of the silver race): ἀλλ’ ἕκατον μὲν παῖς ἔτεα παρὰ μητέρι κενὴ Ἐτρέφετ’ ἀτάλλων . . .

³ *de Def. Or.* X.

⁴ On Hesiod *O.D.* 121.

who become guardian spirits, has already been noted. To describe each of his remaining two classes, Plato has combined traits borrowed from two of Hesiod's remaining four. These four are: A. *prehistoric*: (1) silver race; (2) bronze race; B. *historic*: (3) heroes; (4) the present iron race, of men. The silver race and the heroes answer to Plato's auxiliaries; and the bronze and iron races to his third class, of husbandmen and craftsmen. The symbolism of the metals guarantees these

equations, except in the case of the heroes, 'the race *divine* of heroic men who are called half-gods,'¹ who fought at Thebes and Ilium. But, even apart from other considerations, their devotion to *war* which in Hesiod is their salient characteristic, connects them with Plato's warrior class. We must leave the further significance of the heroes to be brought out later.

These results may be tabulated as follows:—

HESIOD.	PLATO, <i>REPUBLIC</i> .	CRATYLUS.
Gods (<i>theoi</i>).	Gods.	Gods.
(1) Golden Race (Guardian-spirits).	Guardians.	Spirits.
(2) Silver Race. (4) Heroes.	Auxiliaries.	Heroes.
(3) Bronze Race. (5) Iron Race.	Craftsmen, etc.	Men.

It would hardly be worth while to point out this correspondence, if it were not for the remarkable lines in which Hesiod describes the destination of the three 'prehistoric' races after death. These lines contain the germs of certain ideas which carry us beyond the mere superficial adoption of the symbolism of the metals.

The Golden Race, as we saw, become 'spirits beneficent, ranging the earth to watch o'er mortal life' (*δαίμονες ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες*).² Of the Silver race, whose insolence and atheism bring on them the anger of Zeus, we are surprised to read:

'But when this race was likewise lapped in earth,
As blessed mortals in the underworld
Second they rank; yet have they honours too.'

They become *μάκαρες θνητοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι*—a phrase which might be taken as a precise description of the 'heroes'³ of Greek religion—the deified *mortals* worshipped with *chthonian* rites.

The Bronze race was given up to insolence and violence. They slew one another, and

'Went to the dank, chill, gloomy halls of Death,
Nameless. Mighty they were; but Death's black hand

¹ ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, οἱ καλέονται Ἡμίθεοι, *O.D.* 159.

² The extant Orphic poems have little about *δαίμονες*. In the proem to the Hymns (line 32) we read of *δαίμονας, οὐρανίους τε καὶ εἰναλίους καὶ ἐνὶ ᾧδρῶν καὶ χθονίους καὶ ὑποχθονίους ἢ δ' ἡριφολίτους*.

See Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* p. 956.

³ Hesiod does not use *ἥρωες* in this sense. See Rohde, *Psyche* p. 101.

Clutched, and they left the sunlight for the dark.'

They inhabit Hades, far from the light of the Sun.

THE CAVE.

These passages will be found, I think, to throw some light on the symbolism of another Platonic myth—the Cave-myth of *Republic* vii. The *Line* has given us a quadruple division of the objects of knowledge and of the corresponding faculties of the soul. The *Line* is divided first into *νοητόν* and *ὁρατόν*; and each of these parts subdivided proportionally. To speak roughly, the relation of the lower to the higher subdivision in each case is the relation of image to reality. The four faculties or activities of the mind are *νόησις* *διάνοια* *πίστις* *εἰκασία*. Above all is the Idea of the Good, compared to the Sun.

Following upon this, the myth of the *Cave* illustrates the process of education. Four stages can be distinguished: (1) the state of the prisoners in the cave; (2) their deliverance and ascent to the outer air; (3) their looking at shadows and reflections, then at the objects which cast them, and at the stars by night; (4) their contemplation of the Sun and perception that he governs all things and is in a sort the cause of all.

My concern is not with the philosophical or psychological content of this myth, but only with the mythical setting. I shall take the four stages in ascending order.

I.—The Prisoners in the Cave.

In the subterranean cavern the prisoners are bound by a chain so that they can see

nothing but shadows on the back wall, cast by models (like marionettes, *θαύματα*) which are carried by men between the prisoners' backs and a fire placed nearer the entrance of the cave.

The idea that the body is a prison is associated, in the context of the passage above translated from the *Cratylus*, with the Orphic *σῶμα σῆμα*:

Socrates . . . For some say that the body is the sepulchre (*σῆμα*) of the soul, which is as it were buried in its present state. Again, because the body is the means by which the soul signifies (*σημαίνει*) things, on this account also it is rightly called *σῶμα*. But to my thinking the Orphics gave it this name chiefly with the idea that the soul is paying penalty for whatever offences may require a penalty, and has this enclosure, the semblance of a prison house, for safe-keeping (*τοῦτον δὲ περιβόλον ἔχειν, ἵνα σφύζηται, δεσμοτηρίον εἶκονα*, 400 c). So the body is just what it is called—the *σῶμα* of the soul, until the soul shall have paid its debt. . . .

To the Orphic physical death is an escape from the bodily tomb—a rising from the dead. The idea is familiar from Euripides' famous lines, from the phrase *οἱ ἄνω νεκροί* applied by Aristophanes' mystics to 'living' men (*Frogs*, 420), and from many other passages. Plato adopts the notion, but gives it a new content. To him also the body of the natural man is a sepulchre and a house of bondage; but, like S. Paul, he realises that the escape from the prison, the resurrection from the body of this death, is not physical death (or not only that), but a 'conversion.'

'From flesh unto spirit man grows
Even here, on the sod, under sun.'

Unlike S. Paul, however, Plato conceives of the process which begins with conversion—the ascent of man from flesh to spirit—as accomplished by a systematic training of the intelligence. There is no need to dwell at length on the use made of this idea in the *Phaedo*. The body with its senses and lusts hinders the clear perception of truth by the soul. The soul must be delivered from the body 'as from bonds' (67 d) by philosophy, which is a 'rehearsal of death.' The philosopher who has emerged from the Cave, when he thinks of the prisoners' life, will echo Achilles' preference: Better the life of 'serfdom to a landless man' than

any honours in the kingdom of the *dead*. The bronze race dwell in the chill and gloomy house of Death; the present race of men are fast bound in misery and iron.

The prisoners are employed in 'conjecture' (*εἰκασία*) or 'divination', what shadows are likely to fall on the cave-side, from observation of those which have passed already (*ἀπομαντεύεσθαι τὸ μέλλον ἦξεν* 516 d). The shadows are cast by *θαύματα*, carried by men behind the prisoners' backs. It seems probable that this procession of images carried across the fire-lit cave was suggested by the exhibition of religious symbols (*δεῖξαι τὰ ἱερά*) in torch-lit darkness at the Eleusinian ceremony of initiation.¹ The *ἐκπληξίς* caused by these exhibitions,² and by the sudden changes from light to darkness³ has its parallel in the dazzled and distressed vision of the 'converted' prisoners (*Rep.* 515 c). Even the questions put by the priest to the votary at the *παράδοσις τῶν ἱερῶν* may be compared with the questions into the nature of the *θαύματα* put by the 'someone' of *Rep.* 515 d. We shall note further parallels later.

There can be little doubt that the hierophants of the Cave are the Sophists. In a passage which has many points of contact with the *Republic* (*Sophist*, 233 d foll.), the Sophist is called *θανματοποιός* (235 b), *εἰδωλοποιός* (239 d), *ἀπατητικός* (240 d). When we remember the analogy of *Iris* (*εἶπεν* dialectic) daughter of *Thaumas*, with *philosophy* the child of *wonder*,⁴ we may infer that Plato means that the puzzles of eristic and epideictic sophistry, if they have any educational value, are of use in exciting that preliminary feeling of wonder which first stimulates inquiry. Aristotle must have this in mind when he says;⁵ *ἄρχονται γὰρ . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν θαυμάτων ταῦτόματα τοῖς μήπω θεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν . . .*

The lowest class in the state—the bronze and iron class of husbandmen and craftsmen live on the level of the prisoners in the Cave. They are immersed in the passing shows of Being; their 'customary' virtue is a *σκιαγραφία*. Thus Plato, by combining Hesiod's bronze race who dwell in *Hades* with his iron race of living men, points the moral that unregenerate 'life' is really death.

¹ The ceremony alluded to, *Phaedrus*, 250 A.

² Ael. Arist. Eleus. 1. 256.

³ Dio. Chrys. xii. 387.

⁴ Theaet. 155 D.

⁵ Met. A. 983 a 12.

II.—*The Deliverance and Ascent. Purification.*

The second stage in the Cave-myth begins with the first step in genuine education.¹ The chain is loosed: the prisoners are turned round to look at the light, which at first distresses their unaccustomed vision. If 'someone' were to tell them that they now saw objects which were nearer reality, and 'compelled them to answer questions' as to the nature of each, they would be puzzled and inclined to believe that the shadows were more real. To correct this delusion they are to be forcibly dragged up the steep and rugged ascent of the Cave towards the sunlight.

The figure of the 'someone' who *compels people to answer questions about what things*

are is thinly veiled: plainly enough it is Socrates. The interesting point here is the connection of the Socratic *ἔλεγχος* with the idea of *purification*. To the Orphic it is by purification that the deliverance from the bodily tomb is accomplished. Ceremonial purification preceded the initiatory rite: physical death was a fuller purification from the muddy vesture of decay. The transformation of this notion by Plato is an instructive example of his method.

The identification of the *Cathartic* sophistry analysed in *Sophist* 226 A ff. with the Socratic *ἔλεγχος* is due to Dr. Jackson: it will not, I think, be questioned. The analysis is of great interest. We may tabulate the sixth diaeresis of the *Sophist* as follows:

The function of cathartic sophistry is to purify the soul of ignorance and of that false conceit of knowledge which obstructs true knowledge. It is a 'purification in the fullest sense' (ἡ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων). The deliverance of the prisoners is, for Plato, not a matter of ceremonial lustration and of the washing of cup and platter: it is a purging of the soul.²

We may compare the Pythagorean's description of the preliminary purification of the mind prescribed by the rule of his community.³

'It were well to reckon the length of time we have spent in scouring away the stains that were deeply engrained in our breasts, until at last, as the years went by,

¹ The Socratic method is to be used in that first stage of the higher education which is described at *Rep.* 522 E, to produce *ἀρετή* (524 A) about the union of opposite sensible qualities in the same object.

² It is worth noting here that in the *Clouds* Socrates is represented as initiating a novice in the *Orphic mysteries*. The whole ceremony is travestied (lines 222 ff.). Compare also *Birds* 1555, where Socrates is *ψυχαγωγός* in a *λίμνη ἄλουτος*.

³ *Lysis* ap. *Iambl. vit. Pyth.* 76.

we became able to receive the master's words. As the dyers first completely cleanse and use alum upon the garments they are to dye, in order that they may absorb the dye indelibly for ever; so also did that divine man (*δαμόνιος*) prepare first the souls of those who became lovers of philosophy, that he might never be deceived about one who he hoped would turn out a good man.'

Another passage in the *Cratylus*⁴ associates the ideas of *deliverance* and *purification* with certain other notions which have an important bearing on our subject. Apollo, says Socrates, is not the Destroyer (*ὁ ἀπολλύων*), but his name combines, as no other name could do, his four functions: music, divination, medicine, archery. The process and ceremonies of purification (ἡ καθάρσις καὶ οἱ καθαρμοί), whether (a) by the physician's drugs, or (b) by mantic lustrations, etc., make men pure (a) in body and (b) in soul. The purifying god is the Washer-away (*ἀπολούων*) and the Deliverer (*ἀπολύων*). As Washer-away he is *physician*.

⁴ 404 E—406 A.

As *diviner*, the object of his art is τὸ ἀπλοῦν, the simple truth: hence he is called in Thessaly Ἀπλουν. As *musician*, his name signifies ἡ ὁμοῦ (= α) πόλῃσις περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, and the harmonious movement of the heavenly bodies. *Music* is derived from μῶσθαι and means *search* and *philosophy*.

Three kinds of purification are here distinguished:

- (1) Physical purgation by medicine.
- (2) 'Mantic' lustration, purifying the soul.
- (3) Purification by enthusiastic exaltation.

Upon this third kind our attention must now be concentrated.

Our principal authority here is, of course, the classification of the four species of divine (non-morbid) madness in the *Phaedrus* (244). They are (1) *inspired divination* (μαντική ἐνθεος); (2) *the madness of initiation* (μανία τελεστική) which through purifications and initiatory rites (καθαρμοὶ καὶ τελεαί) divines ways of delivering men from diseases and sore afflictions such as existed in certain houses because of ancient wrath; (3) *possession by the Muses* (ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή καὶ μανία); and finally (4) *Love* (ἐρωτική μανία)—of which more presently.

In this passage, as above in the *Cratylus*, the close association of medicine for the diseased body with medicine for the guilty soul, of physic with ceremonial purification,¹ and of both with divination, is remarkable. But to the Greek it was more familiar. To the primitive mind the sick body and the sick soul alike require φάρμακα—'medicine' in the magical sense; and the discoverer of the proper medicine is the medicine-man, the diviner. The ideas are associated in the ancient rites of hero-worship. There we find *purification* identified with the placation of the angry ghost; and in his benigner aspect the hero is often a *healer*, man's helper in his direst need. The most famous instance is the ἥρως ἱατρός at Athens.² Whether Lucian's legend of Toxaris be invented or traditional, it was plainly credible that the hero should appear from his tomb in the season of plague and prescribe the magical remedy—the lustration of the streets with wine, to lay the microbesprites of disease. The hero's tomb moreover was regularly used as a place of divination in general. Not only in war were the heroes ἵποχρόνιοι φύλακες καὶ σωτῆρες.³

¹ Compare also the analysis of καθαρτική above, in which ἱατρική appears side by side with cathartic sophistry.

² Dem. xix. 249.

³ Aristides, *Or.* 2. 171.

When the worship of Apollo superseded the primaeval chthonian cult at Delphi and elsewhere, the incoming divinity assumed the mantic functions. The prophetess of Earth's oracle becomes the *Pythia*. Apollo henceforth is the Washer-away and the Deliverer, καθάρσιος and ἱατρόμαντις:

ἱατρόμαντις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τερασκόπος
καὶ τοῖσιν ἄλλοις δωμάτων καθάρσιος.⁴

The connection of prophetic with poetical and musical inspiration is obviously close.

ἡ σέ γε Μοῦσα' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς παῖς, ἡ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων, says Odysseus to Demodocus (*Od.* 8. 488). Here perhaps Apollo is thought of chiefly as the god of prophecy,⁵ the Muse as the source of poetic afflatus: but the two kinds of inspiration are hardly distinguished.

The interesting point is the association of the ideas of madness, enthusiasm, ecstasy, inspiration, with the idea of *purification*. By enthusiasm the soul is lifted out of itself; the loss of *self-possession* is the condition which must precede possession by the divine. This 'distraction' (ἐκπληξίς) comes upon the soul when it beholds the earthly images of unearthly realities. 'For as we said, every human soul has by nature beheld the things that are—else it would not have come into the earthly animal: but not for every soul is it easy to recover the memory of them from things on earth. It is hard for such of them as had then but a brief vision of the things yonder, and for those who after their fall hitherward had the ill-fortune to be turned by evil conversation to unrighteousness and to be in oblivion of the holy things (ἱερῶν) which then they saw. Few indeed remain, in whom the power of memory is sufficient: but these, whenever they see some likeness of the things yonder, are amazed and lose their self-possession, though for want of sufficient discernment they know not what this condition means. Now Justice and Temperance and what things else are of worth to souls have no indwelling lustre in their likenesses on earth; and few, when they approach the copies, behold, darkly, through dull organs, the features of the original. Beauty, however, was then visible in its splendour, when in happy company, ourselves attending Zeus, and others following some other divinity, we saw a spectacle of beatific vision and were initiate in the most blessed (as it may lawfully be named) of all revelations. In that rapt worship (ὠργιάζομεν) we were

⁴ Aesch. *Eum.* 62.

⁵ See Roscher, *Lex.* p. 435a.

whole and untouched of all those evils that were awaiting us in the days to come: whole, likewise, and clear, unterrifying and serene were the mystical appearances (φάσματα) whereby we were initiate unto the full revelation, in a blaze of light pure as we also were pure and unencumbered by this tomb which we bear about with us and call a body, being fast bound as a shellfish to his shell.¹

'They are amazed and lose their self-possession': ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ' αὐτῶν γίνονται. This very word ἐκπλήξις is used of the state of awe and terrified wonder produced in the initiated novice by the 'mystical appearances' (φάσματα above) in the ceremonies at Eleusis; appearances with which Plato here contrasts the 'un-terrifying and serene' manifestations of reality. And, no doubt, in the mysteries the intention was precisely to produce this loss of self-possession, to prepare the soul for becoming ἐνθεος, god-possessed, one with the divine.

There is evidence that the Lesser Mysteries at Agræ included dramatic representations of the Rape of Pherephatta and the sufferings of the wandering Demeter, and of the Passion of Dionysus-Zagreus. In these δρώμενα may we not see the origin of the tragic δράμα, and the explanation of the connection between Tragedy and the religion of Dionysus?² If we adopt this suggestion, and further remember that these Lesser Mysteries were related to the Greater Mysteries at Eleusis as προκάθαρσις καὶ προάγνευσις,³ it seems possible that when Aristotle associates κάθαρσις with Tragedy, there may be some reference to the 'purifying' effect of the mystical Passion-play. The ancient reader of the *Poetics* would himself have witnessed the spectacle and experienced the emotions of pity and terror which it excited; and the whole proceeding would already be linked in his mind with the idea of purification.

With this in mind we may return for a moment to the *Cave*, to the 'loosening of the prisoners' bonds and the *healing* of their un wisdom' (515 c). The released prisoners are compelled to look up to the light, and dragged up the steep ascent of the *Cave*, out into the dazzling sunlight. Compare with this Themistius' description⁴

of those initiatory rites (τελεταί) which 'in fact, as well as in name, resemble death' (τελευτᾶν): 'At first wanderings and toilsome circuits and awful and mysterious passages through a darkness; then before the actual accomplishment (τέλος) all the forms of terror, shuddering and quaking and sweat and amazement (θάμβος); and thereafter a wondrous light⁵ meets him, and pure regions and meadows receive him, with solemn voices and dancings, sacred sounds and holy visions (ἀκουσμάτων ἱερῶν καὶ φαντασμάτων ἁγίων); and among these he who is now fully initiate and has become free and is delivered (ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἄφετος) goes to and fro with a crown upon his head, joining in the rapt worship (δργάζει) of companies of men holy and pure (δσίοις καὶ καθαροῖς). And there he looks down upon the un-initiated and impure multitude of the living (τὸν ἀμύητον τῶν ζώντων ἀκάθαρτον ὄχλον), trampling one another and huddled in a great mire and thick mist, abiding in evils through fear of death and disbelief in the good things yonder.'

Aristophanes gives a parallel account. Dionysus, in the *Frogs*, is told that he will come first to an enormous lake (tenanted by the Frogs, who are the worshippers at *Limnae* before the procession to Eleusis); next he will see 'snakes and countless monsters terrible to behold' in the darkness (line 273), then the mire with its wallowing sinners:

'Then you will find a breath about your ears

Of music, and a light about your eyes

Most beautiful—like this—and myrtle groves

And joyous throngs of women and of men

And clapping of glad hands. . . .'

These are the initiate.⁶

It is plain, I think, that in the *Cave-myth* the ceremonies of initiation are in Plato's mind and suggest the imagery. What is more important is the meaning of the symbolism. We are to understand that education in the highest sense is an initiation; it involves deliverance from the prison of the senses, a vision purified to apprehend truth, a death into life, an exaltation of man's spirit to unity with the divine.

Eros and Heros.

We must now return to the fourth kind of divine madness—Eros. The *Cratylus*

¹ *Phaedrus*, 249 E.

² See Miss J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*.

³ Schol. ad Aristoph. *Plut.* 845.

⁴ Them. *περὶ ψυχῆς* ap. Stob. *Flor.* 120, 28.

⁵ The αὐγὴ καθάρᾳ of *Phaedr.* 250 c.

⁶ *Frogs*, 137–158. Trans. Murray.

will help us here. After the passage translated at the beginning of this essay follows the derivation of *hero*.

Hermogenes. But what may *hero* be?

Socrates. That is not at all difficult to perceive. The name is only slightly disguised and betrays its origin from *Eros*.

Hermogenes. How do you mean?

Socrates. You know that the heroes are demigods?

Hermogenes. Well?

Socrates. They are all, then, the offspring of the love, either of a god for a mortal woman, or of a mortal for a goddess. Here too the old Attic tongue will help you to an understanding and show you that the word is but slightly varied from the name of that *Eros* whence the heroes sprang. Either this is what is meant by heroes, or else that they were eloquent rhetors and dialectical, with a capacity for *εἰπεῖν*, which means 'speaking.' To repeat then, the heroes are found in the Attic tongue under the name of *rhetors* and *questioners* (*ἐρωτητικοί*); so that the heroic race become a class of rhetors and sophists.

The conjunction of the alternative derivations, (1) *ἔρως*, (2) *εἰπεῖν ἐρωτᾶν*, is transparently significant. The two meanings meet in *φιλοσοφία*. The best commentary is the discourse of Diotima in the *Symposium* (201 D).

Eros is not a god, but like all that is spiritual (*δαιμόνιον*), 'between mortal and immortal' (202 E). His function is to act as intermediary between gods and men, 'interpreting (*ἐρμηνεύον*) and transmitting to the gods what comes from men and to men what comes from the gods.' 'He is the channel of all *divination* and priest-craft and of all that concerns sacrifices and *initiations* and charms and all *divination* and magic (*γοητεία*). The man who is wise in these things is spiritual (*δαιμόνιος*). 'These spirits are many and of many sorts, and one of them is Eros.' His mixed nature is derived from his parents, *Poros* and *Penia*. From *Penia* he has his 'neediness' (*ἐνδεΐα*), from *Poros* his craft. He is 'one that desires and purveys wisdom, a lover of wisdom (*φιλοσοφῶν*) all his life long, a wondrous magician and wizard and sophist' (*γῶγς καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής*). He is neither wise nor unwise, but *φιλόσοφος*, between the two; neither mortal nor immortal, but a Desire of Immortality, the impulse in the mortal which reaches out to the divine.

Then Diotima comes to 'the full revelation' and shows how from a love of beautiful

forms the soul may pass into the great ocean of the Beautiful itself, pure, untainted, and divine, and so achieve the Friendship of God and such immortality as the mortal may attain (212 A).

Eros as *ἐρμηνεύων* explains the second derivation of *hero*, from *εἰπεῖν* (dialectic), which it has in common with the messengers of the gods, *Iris* (*Theaet.* 155 D) and *Hermes* (*Crat.* 407 E *Εἰρέμης*). The son of Hermes is twi-natured *Pan*, who is *λόγος* or the brother of *λόγος*; his upper, human half being truth, his lower, goat nature, falsehood.

Such is the meaning with which Plato invests the phrases which Hesiod applies to his silver race, who become 'blessed mortals in the underworld' (*μάκαρες θνητοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι*), and to his heroes, *ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος*, 'a race divine of heroic men.' Plato's silver race do not rise above this second stage of education, the preliminary *purification* by music and gymnastic. Their's is the region of *δόξα* intermediate between *γνώσις* and *ἄγνοια* (*Rep.* 476). Their attitude of mind is *πίστις*. Their characteristic virtue, courage, is defined as 'the perpetual preservation of a right and lawful *opinion* about what is, or is not, to be feared' (430 E). Temperance, too, for them is loyal subordination to the rulers (see 432 A).

But the philosophers, under the conduct of Eros, go on to higher regions. The education which is to 'draw them towards Reality' begins with an application of the Socratic method to the problems—called 'childish' in the *Philebus*—of the combination of opposite sensible qualities in one object. The method will produce its familiar result—*ἀπορία* (524 A). So they are led on to the study of number, and through mathematical training to dialectic—to *θεωρία*.

III.—*θεωρία* and *εὐδαιμονία*.

We must now say something of *identification with the divine*, which again is an idea borrowed by Plato from orgiastic religion and adapted to his own philosophic purposes.

Outside the Cave, in the light of heaven, the novices train their unaccustomed sight for 'looking upward' by viewing, first, shadows and reflections in water of men and other objects; then these objects themselves, and the moon and stars in the heavens by night. Lastly they contemplate the Sun himself as he is in his own place, and consider how he governs the seasons and the years and all things visible, and is in a sort the cause of all.

The stars by night are evidently the ideas; the Sun is the supreme Idea of the Good, which is 'the cause of knowledge and of truth' (508 E). That the Sun was a symbol of peculiar significance to the initiate is well known from many passages in literature.¹ 'Upon them shines the might of the Sun, while here below it is night' (Pindar, *Frag.* 95, Böckh); 'A sun they know which is not ours, not ours the stars they see' (Vergil, *Aen.* vi. 641). The mystics in the *Frogs* end their series of songs with the words:

'For ours is the sunshine bright,
Yea, ours is the joy of light
All pure, without danger:
For we thine Elect have been,
Thy secrets our eyes have seen,
And our hearts we have guarded clean
Toward kinsman and stranger!' ²

So the mystic song ends. The Chorus of initiates in the *Cretans* of Euripides claim that *they have become one with their god*:

'I am Set Free and named by name
A Bacchos of the mailed Priests.

Robed in pure white, I have borne me clean
From man's vile birth and confined clay,
And exiled from my lips alway
Touch of all meat where life hath been.' ³

The initiate who has reached *δσίωνσις*, the supreme consecration, is a bacchos: the god has entered into him.

That the higher, divine life may have been symbolised by the Sun is suggested by a comparison of these passages with the fragment of Sophocles ⁴:

ὥς τρισόλβιοι
κείνοι βροτῶν οἱ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη
μόλωσ' ἐς ἄδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
ζῆν ἐστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.

At any rate we hear of the Sun as *φύλαξ* in an Orphic verse quoted by Proclus (*in Tim.* v. 308) *τοῦτον (τὸν ἥλιον) ἐπέστησε τοῖς ὅλοις ὁ δημιουργός*,

καὶ φύλακ' αὐτὸν ἔτευξε κέλυσέ τε πᾶσιν
ἀνάσσειν,

ὥς φησιν Ὀρφεύς. From Macrobius (*Sat.* i. 18. p. 333) we learn of a Helios-Dionysus:

¹ Helios is, of course, familiar as the all-seeing avenger of wrong (cf. Plat. *Crat.* 403 B), and as the *ἀγνὸς θεός* (Pind. *Ol.* vii. 58) who being *pure*, can *purify*: ὁ ἀγνί(ειν τῇ ἀκτίνι δυνάμενος (Schol. ad loc.).

² *Frogs* 455 trans. Murray: μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρὸν ἐστι. Cf. also *Clouds* 225.

³ Eurip. *Crat.* frag. trans. Murray: τῶν Κουρήτων Βάκχος ἐκλήθη δσιωθεῖς.

⁴ ap. Plut. *de aud. poet.* v.

Solem Liberum esse manifeste pronuntiat Orpheus:

ἥλιον ὃν Διόνυσον ἐπὶ κλήσιν καλέουσι.

Lobeck (*Aglaoph.* p. 498) compares Diodorus (I. 11), who cites Orpheus and the *Bacchica* of Eumolpos to support the equivalence, (Osiris)—Helios—Dionysus—Phanes.

We can now see the significance of Socrates' last derivation of *Apollo*.⁵ In respect of his *musical* art he is ἀπολῶν (where α = ὁμοῦ). The meaning is ἡ ὁμοῦ πόλῃσις, both in regard to the sky (the so-called *poles*) and in the harmony of song, called accord. This god presides over all harmony, causing all things to move together (ὁμοπολῶν) alike among gods and among men. *Muse* and *Music* are next derived from μῶσθαι—'search,' 'philosophy.'⁶

The word πόλῃσις recalls the magnificent allegory of the *Phaedrus*. 'Soul universally cares for the soulless (ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου) and ranges throughout all heaven (περιπολεῖ), passing into various forms. So, when it is perfect and winged, it voyages aloft and governs the whole Kosmos; but the soul which loses its wings falls till it meet with some solid thing which it takes for a dwelling.' When it is compact with an earthen body, it is called an animal, and mortal. The soul which is not wholly immortal can follow in that majestic procession led by the winged car of Zeus who 'orders and cares for all things,' and it can behold the blessed visions that are *within* the firmament. But it is the *immortal* soul, unencumbered by the flesh, which rises to the region *above* the firmament (ὑπερουράνιος), the place of formless and invisible substance, which only Reason, the soul's pilot, can contemplate. There, outside the οὐρανός, Reason beholds (θεωρεῖ) the vision of Truth. This is the life of the gods (θεοί).⁷

The words θεωρεῖν and εὐδαίμων so frequently used in this passage and its context are both adopted by the philosophers from religion⁸; and with them is adopted their significance, that in the beatific vision man achieves union with God. 'If then Reason is divine as compared with man, so is the life of reason divine as compared with human life. We ought not to obey those who exhort man to keep to a man's thoughts

⁵ *Crat.* 405c.

⁶ We know from Paus. i. 80. 2 that the Academy contained 'an altar of the *Muses*, and another of *Hermes*.' The juxtaposition is significant.

⁷ *Phaedr.* 247.

⁸ Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* p. 14^a; Thompson on *Phaedr.* 250 B.

(ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν) or a mortal to those of a mortal; but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality (ἀθανατίζειν) and do all we can to live according to the highest element in us.¹

'For into the company of the Gods it may not be that any should come, that hath not loved wisdom and knowledge and departed in perfect purity.'²

Plutarch,³ also, has a fine passage on the ascent of man to the divine: 'Many improbable legends are told' of the translation of mortal bodies 'by those who would deify what is mortal in nature. It is indeed impious and illiberal altogether to reject the divinity of virtue; yet to confound earth with heaven is ignorant. Let us then cling to the truth and admit, in Pindar's words, that the body of everything 'follows the prevailing might of Death, but something living is left, an image of eternity'; for that alone is from the gods. Thence it comes, and thither it rises upward—not with the body, but precisely when it is delivered and severed from the body and becomes altogether pure (καθαρόν) and incorporeal and holy (ἄγνόν). This is the 'dry soul' which Heraclitus says is best, sundering the body like the lightning which flies from a cloud: but the soul which is weighted with bodily admixture, like a heavy and dank vapour, is hard to kindle and to convey upwards. There is, then, no occasion, against nature, to send the bodies of the good to heaven with their souls; but we must think that the virtues, the souls, by nature and divine justice, rise from men to heroes, and from heroes to spirits, and at last, if as in the mysteries they be perfectly cleansed and consecrated (τέλειον καθαρῶσι καὶ ὁσιωθῶσι), shaking off all mortal passions, then they attain the fairest and final bliss and ascend from spirits to gods.'⁴

¹ Aristotle, *Eth.* K. 7 1177^b 30.

² *Phaedo* 82 B. Compare the derivations of Zeus, Kronos, Ouranos, *Crat.* 396: Zeus, the ruler and king of all is δεινὸν ζῆν (Δία Ζῆνα) αἰεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις ἐπάγχει, his father is a great understanding (διδνοία); his name means τὸν καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ. He is son of Ouranos, ἡ δὲ ψὺς ἡ δρώσα τὰ ἔνω, whence οἱ μετεωρόλογοι say they acquire τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν. The allegory is transparent: the wisdom that looks upward begets pure reason, the source of all life. I cannot agree with Lobeck (*Aglaoph.* 510 [f]) that Plato's intention is merely derivative.

³ *vit. Rom.* 28.

⁴ (Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* iii 2. p. 192, ed. 4. 1903). For Plutarch's demonology see *de Is. et Os.* xxv–xxvi. Compare also *de Def. Orac.* x, where after the passage already quoted (p. 434 note 3) he continues: 'But others hold an analogous transformation for bodies and for souls. (For bodies) out of earth comes water, out of water air, and out of air fire is seen

THE RULE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS.

Plato is well aware that it will be hard to induce the philosopher who has reached this ἐποπτεία to go down again into the Cave and 'take care of' (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) his fellows. And yet 'states will never have rest from evils until the philosophers rule in them.'⁵ He who has been θεός must descend and become φύλαξ, instead of yielding to the desire ἄνω αἰεὶ διατρίβειν.

These words are echoed in a curious passage in Plutarch.⁶ After describing how the δαίμονες (souls of the departed) inhabit the hollows in the Moon's face, he continues:

'But the Spirits do not always pass their time in the Moon (οὐκ αἰεὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν αὐτῇ). They come down to earth to take charge (ἐπιμελησόμενοι) of oracles; and they assist at the worship of the highest rites of initiation; and become watchers (φύλακες) and punishers of unrighteous deeds, and preservers (σωτῆρες) in war, and they shine over the sea. If they do these offices ill, whether in anger or with unrighteous partiality, they pay the penalty; for they are thrust down again to earth and compact (read συμπηγνύμενοι) with human bodies. But to that better sort the people of Cronos said that they themselves belonged, together with in former times the Idaean Dactyli of Crete, and the Corybants in Phrygia, and the Trophoniads in Lebadeia, and countless others in many parts of the world, whose rites, functions (τιμαί), and titles yet remain. But the operative functions of some cease, who win the highest translation into another region. Some win it earlier, some later, when the Reason is separated from the soul. This separation is accomplished by love of the solar image (τῆς περὶ τὸν ἥλιον εἰκότος), through which shines that which is Desired and Beautiful and Divine and Blessed, whereunto every nature yearns diversely after its kind.'

The condition of the δαίμονες is not wholly divine: their reason is not yet com-

generated, the essence being carried upwards. Similarly the better souls take their transformation from men into heroes, from heroes into spirits; and from spirits a few, after long time, being altogether purified through virtue, participate in divinity: 'but others cannot master themselves, but enter again into mortal bodies, and have a dim and murky life, like vapours'. See also the experiences of Timarchus, a contemporary of Socrates, in the Cave of Trophonios (*Plut. de gen. Socr.* xxii). Whatever view we take of this passage, it is a most important commentary on the vision of Er.

⁵ *Rep.* 487 E.

⁶ *de fac. in orbe Lun.* 30.

pletely separated from soul. The mention of 'the people of Cronos' (οἱ περὶ τὸν Κρόνον ὄντες) recalls a passage in the *Laws* (IV. 713 c):

'A report, then, has come down to us concerning the blessed life of that age, how it had everything in spontaneous abundance; and the reason given is something of this sort. It would appear that Cronos perceived the truth we have just laid down, that no human being is capable of a general and absolute control over human life without becoming full of insolence and injustice. So, with this truth in mind, he set up in that age as kings and rulers over our cities, not men, but beings of a higher sort and a more divine, namely Spirits: just as we now do with flocks of sheep and all the tame kinds of animals; we do not in their case make an ox ruler over oxen, or a goat ruler over goats, but we are lords over them ourselves, being a higher race than they. In the same way, then, the God out of his love for mankind set over us in that age a higher race than we, the Spirits, who with no less comfort to us than to themselves took care of us, bringing peace and reverence and good government and justice without stint, and so made the generations of mankind united and happy. Now this legend contains a true meaning for us even to-day, that in whatsoever city the ruler is not a god but some mortal, for them is no escape from evil and trouble,¹ but we ought, it implies, by all means to imitate the life which it describes in the age of Cronos, and in all the public and private ordinance of house and state to obey whatever element of immortality is in us, and give the name of Law to the disposition of Reason.'

In the state, as in the individual, Reason is to be the guiding genius, because it is divine. The *Timaeus*² says: 'As to the supreme form of soul that is within us, we must believe that God has given it to each of us as a guiding genius (δαίμονα)—even that which we say, and say truly, dwells in the summit of our body and raises us from earth towards our celestial affinity, seeing we are of no earthly, but of heavenly growth: since to heaven, whence in the beginning was the birth of our soul, the diviner part attaches the head or root of us, and makes our whole body upright.' The man who is busied with appetites and ambi-

tions will become 'utterly mortal'; but he who has loved learning and true wisdom has reached such immortality as man may have; he has cherished his divine part and his guardian spirit, and must be happy (εὐδαίμων) above all.

In the *Phaedrus* the souls which sink to earth under the encumbrance of mortality are classified in nine degrees, according to the measure of their participation in the vision of truth:

I.—	(1) φιλόσοφος, φιλόκαλος, μουσικὸς καὶ ἐρωτικός
II.—	(2) βασιλεὺς ἔννομος, πολεμικός, ἀρχικός
	(3) πολιτικός, οἰκονομικός, χρηματιστικός
III.—	(4) φιλόπονος γυμναστικός, ἱατρικός
	(5) μαντικός, τελεστικός
	(6) ποιητικός, μιμητικός
IV.—	(7) δημιουργικός, γεωργικός
	(8) σοφιστικός, δημοτικός
	(9) τυραννικός

I venture to suggest a grouping of these nine heads under four classes roughly answering to the four orders θεοὶ δαίμονες ἥρωες ἄνθρωποι. The first class needs no comment. The second contains the *guardian* and the *ruler* in all his forms. In the third the notion of purification runs through all the three subdivisions. It contains three of the four species of divine madness; ἔρως alone being raised to the highest class. The μιμητικός, the most objectionable kind of poet, links this class with the fourth, which contains that other μιμητικός, the sophist, ranked below the honest craftsman and husbandman.

THE MYTH IN THE *Politicus*.

With these ideas before us, it may be worth while to take account of the light they throw on the strange myth of the *Politicus*. The *statesman* has been traced down the chain of a long *diaeresis* which has led us to ἀνθρωπονομική, the rule of featherless bipeds. To mark off the βασιλεὺς from other ἀνθρωπονόμοι we resort to myth.

Formerly the sun and the other stars rose in the west and set in the east. But at the strife of Atreus and Thyestes, the god testifying to Atreus, reversed this order. We also hear of a reign of Cronos, and of an earth-born race of men. These legends arise out of the same occurrence, but the reason has been forgotten.

The Universe, an intelligent animal, has a body, and therefore cannot, like things

¹ The very turn of the phrase echoes *Rep.* 487 E οὐ πρότερον κακὸν παύσονται αἱ πόλεις πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρξωσιν, with significant substitution of θεός for φιλόσοφος.

² 90 A. trans. Archer-Hind.

purely divine, abide in the same stay. Hence this reversal of its revolution (*ἀνακύκλῳ*). It is not due to two gods with opposite intentions;¹ but in the one case the universe is 'conducted by a divine cause external to itself, gaining life and renewed immortality from the artificer'; in the other, it is released, and reverts by its own motion through countless revolutions.

Such a reversal must have been attended by great destruction of life; but the most marvellous result is the reversal of the course of life itself. Men grew younger instead of older. Birth was a return out of the earth: the dead revived and rising up were called earth-born.

To this former order belongs the Age of Cronos with its spontaneous generation of the fruits of earth. The revolution itself was controlled by the care of God (*ἐπιμελούμενος ὁ θεός*), and animals, after their kinds, were allotted to a sort of divine shepherds, spirits, of whom each was absolute lord over his flock, so that there was no fighting or preying of one upon another. This explains the legend about the spontaneous subsistence of mankind. God himself was their presiding shepherd, as man, the diviner animal, shepherds the lower creatures. They had neither politics, nor wives and children; all came back to life out of the earth, remembering nothing of their former state. Earth gave them fruits spontaneously. They lived naked and houseless, sleeping on soft grass in temperate seasons.

Were they happier than we of the reign of Zeus? Yes, if they used their leisure in 'philosophy,' enquiring of every nature, human and animal, what its distinguishing function is, and so gathering wisdom. No, if filled with meat and drink, they only discoursed fables (*μῦθοι*), as legend reports of them.

Here I may pause for comment. We know now what is implied by the reign of spirits. This description of the Golden Age is plainly an allegory of the Platonic state of society. (No doubt Plato realised that the revolution needed to set that society going was little less than a reversal of the whole order of Creation.) It is not then fanciful to connect the account of life in the Golden Age with the imagery of the *Cave*.

We may note first the strange idea of birth as resurrection out of the earth.² We

have seen what uses Plato makes (*Rep.* 414 D) of the notion, inculcated by myth, that the citizens of the ideal state, while they dreamed they were being educated, were really being 'formed and nurtured, as all their arms and other equipment were forged, in the earth beneath.' Only when they are wrought to perfection (*παντελῶς ἐξεργασμένοι*) does their Mother send them up into the light.

The earliest stage of education takes place *inside the Cave*. The emergence from the underworld obscurity begins where that stage of education ends. The opening of the eye of the soul to upper-world reality is the beginning of a new life, compared with which the old life in the kingdom of shadows seems like death.

We can now interpret the last paragraph of the above summary. Two possibilities are suggested as to the occupation of the earth-born:

(1) If, as legend relates, they spent their lives filled with meat and drink, discoursing fables, their state was not gracious.

We think at once of the primitive society described in *Rep.* II. 372, the City of Pigs, where men spend their lives 'in banqueting and drinking, crowned with garlands and hymning the gods.' This will not make a happy state (420 E). We remember also the sensual paradise offered by religion to the pious, the *μέθη αἰώνιος* of Hades (363 D). The state of innocence, if this be all, is really the state of the prisoners in the Cave, bound in the chain of bodily senses and lusts.

(2) But the earth-born may have been better employed. They may have spent their leisure in 'philosophy,' gathering wisdom from enquiry into the distinguishing function of every nature.

If the age of Cronos possessed a Socrates, the earth-born may have been freed from their chain and turned towards the light by 'someone' who 'compelled them to answer questions concerning the nature of each of the objects they saw.'

Finally, the emergence from the Cave is not only a birth, but a *resurrection from the dead*. A resurrection, because the world above is the true home of the soul—the imperial palace whence it came. Education is recollection of lost knowledge, lost when the soul died into what we call life: *ἐκ γῆς ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες οὐδὲν μνησμένοι τῶν πρόσθεν*, (*Pol.* 272 A).

drawn my attention to his interesting discussion of this myth in his edition of the *Republic*, vol. ii. pp. 295 ff.

¹ Like the *φιλία* and *νεῖκος* of Empedocles.

² Plato rarely invents the imagery of his myths. Even this notion of living backwards will be found in a curious legend preserved by Theopompus, frag. 76. Since I wrote this Dr. Adam has kindly

We may now return to the *myth*, which goes on to describe the present reign of Zeus :

When the earth-born race was exhausted, each soul having accomplished all its appointed births, the pilot let go the helm, the reversal came, and the universe turned back by its 'destined and innate impulse' (272 E). The gods who had provincial authority under the Highest Spirit ceased from their watching. Earthquakes followed, and destruction of life. Then the world settled down into its course, 'remembering the instructions of its creator and father.' But its corporeal admixture gradually obliterates this memory and is the cause of disorder. As forgetfulness grows upon it, its living creatures likewise show more *ἀναμνηστία*, and it goes nigh destruction. The creator perceiving its dissolution imminent, lest it 'sink into the infinite region of unlikeness,' resumes the helm and restores it to order, making it exempt from age and death. That is the end of all (273 E).

During this reign of Zeus, mankind, orphaned of their shepherding spirit, were left weak and unguarded (*ἀφύλακτοι*).

Ignorant of arts, they had to be rescued by the divine gifts, of fire, of handicrafts, of seeds and plants. Then the care of the gods was withdrawn, and men were left to care for themselves, as the world was left to its own guidance (274 D).

The myth is then applied to correct the foregoing diaeresis. The essence of all kingship is the care (*ἐπιμέλεια*) of human society. We ought to have distinguished the divine ruler of the age of Cronos from the human, of the age of Zeus. The figure of the true shepherd king surpasses the measure of mortal governors.

By way of moral, it is enough to repeat the words above quoted from the *Laws*: 'Now this legend contains a true meaning for us even to-day, that in whatsoever city the ruler is not a god but some mortal, for them there is no escape from evil and trouble; but we ought, it implies, by all means to imitate the life which it describes in the age of Cronos, and in all the public and private ordinance of house and state to obey whatever element of immortality is in us, and give the name of Law to the disposition of Reason.'

F. M. CORNFORD.

POLYBIUS' CONCEPTION OF Τύχη.

I go back from the consideration of Caesar's conception of Fortuna (*Classical Review*, April 1903), to trace the history of the same idea at Rome during the period of revolution which came to an end with Caesar. Of the history and meaning of the cult of Fortuna I have said something in my *Roman Festivals* (pp. 161 foll.), and much more will be found in works there cited. But the idea of Fortuna as a cosmic influence is quite distinct from that of the cult, or only occasionally touches it in poetry, as *e.g.* in Horace *Od.* I. 35; it is a Greek rather than a Roman idea, in so far at least as the Greeks reasoned upon a feeling which is the common property of mankind, while the Romans, so far as we know, did not do so until they came under Greek influence. The Greeks discussed this idea in the course of philosophical enquiry; the Romans, *more suo*, left it in the hands of a priestly aristocracy, which from time to time founded new cults of Fortuna under new cult-titles. But in the second century B.C. the Greek speculations about τύχη began to penetrate the

educated Roman mind, and the cults ceased to be of any real significance until they were revived by Augustus and used for Imperial purposes. Hence it is of especial interest to get some idea of the conception of Fortuna held by a man like Polybius in the second century B.C.—a Greek long resident at Rome, intimate with the leading Romans of his time, a practical man and no professed philosopher, and one whose particular delight it was to search out in the scientific spirit the causes of the stormy and startling events of which he wrote. The Roman who opened Polybius' work would find himself confronted with new ideas of Fortuna in the first four chapters of the first book: the circle of his Roman friends would absorb and disseminate these ideas: and his Greek friend Panaetius, and later Posidonius and Cicero, kept the discussion alive for nearly a century. At present I must confine myself to Polybius himself.

The subject is no new one, and has been touched upon of recent years more especially by Hirzel in an excursus to his *Untersuchungen*