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Diels's *Herakleitos* *Herakleitos von Ephesos, griechisch und deutsch*. Von Hermann Diels. Pp. xii, 56. Berlin, 1901. 2 M. 40.

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unyielding distinctions on Greek and Latin, insisting that each concrete case of the use of a mode exemplify the rule laid down? Such a procedure seems quite misleading when applied to the use of the indicative, subjunctive and optative in future conditions. Again, on this same principle, if-clauses and *si*-clauses encroach upon the province of the concessive clause; the concessive *tone* in which the words are spoken may render unnecessary the more explicit 'even if' or '*etsi*.' Pronouncing the following sentences will make clear the difference in tone that exists between the pure and the concessive if-clauses. 'If I had ten thousand books, I would give some away'; 'If I had ten thousand books, I would not give one away.' On the written page we may have to wait until the apodosis is reached before we can interpret the if-clause with certainty, but in the spoken language the tone of the speaker settles the question at once, and also prepares the hearer for the kind of apodosis that is to follow.

A still further instance of tone and manner as defining elements is furnished by the language of Plautus. He is still using the present subjunctive largely for the present unreal conditional sentence, thus making this mode and tense a common speech-form for it and the ideal. Despite the ambiguity of the verbal form used, one person has no difficulty in making his thoughts clear to another.¹ Just as in English the tone of apology of 'If I had any, I would gladly give it' would clearly distinguish it from 'If I should get any, I should be glad to give it,' even though we expressed the two by the use of the same

¹ See *Class. Rev.* xv. p. 52.

speech-form, as Plautus did for the most part.²

The factors of tone and manner are largely lost on the written page. Sometimes a hint is given by the order of words, and, again, the reply of a hearer may make clear just the cast of thought conveyed to him. In a careful literary style influenced by the need of communicating in writing, naturally those elements³ which may appear on the written page are utilized to a greater degree than is necessary in the spoken language of every-day life; in this latter style the 'irregularities' are doubtless to be explained largely by the presence of the (to us) more intangible, but not less real elements of the speech-form. However, I believe that these elements affect profoundly even the most careful written style; for we write largely as we *think* and *speak*. Cicero's orations seem to afford a striking illustration of this. It will be found that about one-seventh of the *si*-clauses there found in unreal conditional sentences are concessive.⁴ It is possible that this large proportion is due to the fact that, in the preparation of his speeches, Cicero wrote unconsciously in the style he would use in speaking. In the delivery, as shown above, the tone used in speaking, rendered a specific introductory particle unnecessary.

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² Greenough makes still another application of this principle in an article on 'The Contrary to Fact Construction,' *Harv. Studies*, Vol. vii.

³ *E.g.*, careful discrimination in the use of the modes.

⁴ *A.J.P.* xxi., p. 270.

REVIEWS.

DIELS'S *HERAKLEITOS*.

Herakleitos von Ephesos, griechisch und deutsch. Von HERMANN DIELS. Pp. xii, 56. Berlin, 1901. 2 M. 40.

ALL students of Greek philosophy will welcome an edition of *Herakleitos* from the hands of Professor Diels, even though they are warned that it is not in any way meant to supersede Professor Bywater's exemplary

edition (Einl. p. x.). It is certainly true that the few additions that have been made to the fragments are of no great intrinsic value, nor has much been done since Bywater for the settlement of the text. A master like Diels can hardly, however, handle any document without clearing up some of its difficulties, and there are many brilliant things hidden away in the modest

footnotes. Noteworthy is the reading of fr. 10 (=59 Bywater) *Συνάψεις ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα κ.τ.λ.* 'Couplets are: whole and not whole etc.' This is based on a recension of the manuscript testimony (see Berl. Sitz. 1901, 188), and will very likely be adopted; but one misses the Homeric optative *συνάψεαις*. Diels gives up the attempt to arrange the fragments, and places them in the alphabetical order of the authors who quote them. This plan has some advantages from the critical point of view; but it hardly does justice to the statement quoted by Diogenes Laertius (ix. 5) that there were three *λόγοι*, one *περὶ τοῦ παντός*, one political and one theological. This is Stoic formalism, of course, but there must have been something in the book to justify it. Further, it seems to have been quite the regular thing to start with cosmology, to go on to man, and to end up with man's relation to God or the world. Empedokles certainly did so.

The most valuable parts of Diels's work are, beyond question, the introduction and the translation. He rightly refuses to believe that the system of Herakleitos was obscure. On the contrary, Herakleitos is 'dark' only in form, while Parmenides never made his system thoroughly clear even to himself. For that very reason Herakleitos had no successors, but only imitators, while the philosophy of Elea developed in every direction. As to the form of Herakleitos, his hierophantic tone is common to him with all the great men that grew up during that period of storm and stress, a period which can be compared only to the Reformation and the French Revolution. With all their differences of origin and temper of mind, Pindar, Aeschylus, and Herakleitos are attuned to the same hieratic note. On the other hand, the subjectivity of Herakleitos enlivens this hieratic stiffness. 'Never did prophet swing the lash in so refreshingly individual a manner as the black-galled Basileus of Ephesos.' 'He opens the series of lonely men that have set down their proud thoughts of contempt for the world in the only suitable form, the Aphorism.' "Thus spake Herakleitos" was probably the beginning of his work, and "also sprach Zarathustra" is the latest shoot put forth by the *genre*. So Diels has translated the Ephesian into the style of Nietzsche, and that with great skill. Take, for instance, the following:—

'Denn alles, was da kreucht, wird mit Gottes Geißel zur Weide getrieben.' (fr. 11=55 Byw.).

'Die Zeit ist ein Knabe, der spielt, hin und her die Bretsteine setzt: Knaben-regiment!' (fr. 52=79 Byw.).

'Die Sibylle, die mit rasendem Munde Ungelachtes und Ungeschminktes und Ungesalbtes redet, reicht mit ihrer Stimme durch tausend Jahre. Denn der Gott treibt sie.' (fr. 92=12 Byw.).

Diels says 'Uebersetzen ist Spiel oder, wenn man will, Spielerei.' This is true, no doubt, but such translation as he gives us is the highest kind of interpretation. There are, however, two points of interpretation on which I feel bound to maintain my own view until the arguments put forward in my *Early Greek Philosophy* have been shown to be inconclusive. I do not say that I am right, and that Zeller, Diels and Gomperz are wrong; but I cannot see my way to give in at present. Hitherto the reasons I adduced have been ignored; they have not been met.

The first point is the interpretation of the word *λόγος*. In 1892 I ventured to say that *λόγος* never meant 'Reason' (*Vernunft*) in Greek philosophy strictly so-called, and I am still waiting for an unambiguous example of such a use. Diels certainly does not translate the Herakleitean *λόγος* by *Vernunft*, but he says things which imply the common interpretation. He speaks, for instance, of 'the omnipresence of the guiding "Word" (*Logos*),' which is 'at once the law of Nature and of Man' (p. vi.). This can only be justified from fr. 92, 93 Byw. With regard to fr. 92, it is clear that, even if Herakleitos did say *τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνού*, he must, on Diels's own showing, have meant exactly the same by *λόγος* as he did in fr. 2 *τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεί*, for Sextus quotes fr. 92 after fr. 2 with the words *ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει*, and for that reason Diels makes these two fragments his first and second. But I suppose that no one now doubts Zeller's interpretation of *λόγος* in fr. 2 (cf. E.G. Ph. § 52, n. 13). Fr. 93, on which Diels's statement seems to be more expressly based, comes from Marcus Aurelius iv. 46 *μνησθαι δὲ... ὅτι ᾧ μάλιστα διηλεκτῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι τούτῳ διαφέρονται*. But, when we turn to his text, we find that Diels himself does not ascribe *τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι* to Herakleitos, and surely Bywater is right in giving *λόγῳ* to Marcus as well. In any case, there is not a scrap of evidence to justify us in ascribing to the Ephesian any 'Logos-doctrine,' in the Jewish or Christian sense, or even anything that can be historically connected with it. Diels says (p. x.) 'Den Proteus λόγος in irgend einer andern Sprache zu fassen ist ja ganz vergebliches Mühen.' This seems a little too strong. So far as I can see, Herakleitos uses the word *λόγος* in

two senses only, neither of which is at all remote from its meaning in everyday Greek. In the first place it is his own theory. It is not merely his 'discourse,' however, or 'what he has to say'; for 'everything comes to pass according to it' and it is 'common to all.' It is 'the word that came to Herakleitos of Ephesos,' and may fairly be written with a capital letter, 'the Word.' This is an idiom of the prophetic style, and Diels's translation 'das Wort' is quite adequate. On the other hand, I cannot accept his rendering of fr. 30 (=23 Byw.) *θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρίεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*, κ.τ.λ. 'Es zerfliesst das Meer und erhält sein Mass nach demselben Wort u.s.w.' Surely no Greek would understand *μετρίσθαι εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* in any other than the quantitative sense, which I have tried to bring out in my translation 'is measured by the same tale' (E.G. Ph. p. 135). There are no other uses of *λόγος* in Herakleitos, and the English renderings 'Word' and 'tale' seem quite adequate to these.

The other point is the old question of the *ἐκπύρωσις*. On this Diels says: 'Die Weltverbrennung als Ende dieser Weltperiode, die ein grosses Weltjahr von 10,800 Jahren abschliesst, steht für H. jetzt fest.' This is said in a note on fr. 66 (26 Byw.), to which Gomperz also alludes as 'decisive' ('Greek Thinkers,' p. 536, Eng. trans.). The words (quoted by Hippolytos) are *πάντα γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται*, and I admit that my scepticism as to the words *κρινεῖ καὶ* was unjustified. The aorist participle expresses time coincident with that of the leading futures; the *ἐφοδος* is the *κρίσις* and *κατάληψις*, and these in turn are judicial metaphors. The translation, then, should run: 'Fire coming on all things will judge and convict them.' But this no more proves a world-conflagration than 'All trespassers will be prosecuted' implies that trespassers will all be committed to prison on the same day. The best commentary is the solitary fragment of Anaximander (E. Gr. Ph. §§ 12, 13).

It cannot be said too often that there never was anything about an *ἐκπύρωσις* in the book of Herakleitos. I still hold that Plato, Soph. 242 d, 6 sqq. is quite inconsistent with any such idea, as even Zeller has to admit (cf. E. Gr. Ph. §§ 55, 62). Marcus Aurelius was a diligent student of Herakleitos, and his Stoic teachers would tell him that Herakleitos believed in the *ἐκπύρωσις*. But he did not find it there; for he says (x. 7) *εἶτε κατὰ περίοδον ἐκπυρούμενον εἶτε αἰδίοις ἀμοιβαῖς ἀνανεούμενον*.

Kleombrotos in Plutarch (de def. or. 415 f.) says *ὁρῶ τὴν Στωικὴν ἐκπύρωσιν...τὰ Ἑρακλείτου...ἐπινεμομένην* (E. Gr. Ph. p. 166). These passages could not have been written if Herakleitos had ever definitely countenanced the theory of a periodical conflagration. Diels, like Zeller, admits that the doctrine in question is a 'scheinbare Inconsequenz,' and certainly the greatest thinkers have been inconsistent at times. But, before we charge one of them with an inconsistency, we ought to have proof that he actually maintained the view we allow to be inconsistent. The negative evidence of men who could not find the *ἐκπύρωσις* in Herakleitos far outweighs that of all the Stoic handbooks which ascribe it to him.

In my chapter on Herakleitos, I referred to certain fragments which seemed to me to contradict the conflagration theory. In fr. 20 (Bywater) the *κόσμος*, we are told, *ἦν αἰ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰέζων, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα*. I do not quite understand Diels's translation of this, 'sein Erglimmen und sein Verlöschen sind ihre Masse.' He seems to take *μέτρα* as nominative, but I still think it is internal accusative, and that the translation should be 'with measures of it kindling and with measures of it going out,' and that the 'measures' are to be interpreted in the light of *μετρίεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* (fr. 23). When one 'measure' of fire is kindled an equivalent 'measure' goes out. This is the *ἀνταμοιβή* (fr. 22), the *αἰδίοι ἀμοιβαί* that Marcus Aurelius found when he looked for the *ἐκπύρωσις* and could not discover it, and the *μέτρα* mean just what they meant to Diogenes of Apollonia (fr. 4. E. Gr. Ph. § 156). Nor will the equivalence of these *μέτρα* ever be violated; for *ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν* (fr. 29). I can only read these words as a denial of the possibility of any *ἐκπύρωσις*, and this view is confirmed by the mention of *δίκη*. For, in early Greek philosophy, the meaning of *δίκη* is just the observance of an equal balance between different forms of being, 'opposites,' 'elements,' or whatever they are (cf. E. Gr. Ph. pp. 51, 73, 147).

I may, perhaps, have dwelt too much on these two points; but I think they are really important, and they have never been properly discussed. I cannot agree with Diels's views upon them; but I believe that the literary criticism of his Introduction will profoundly modify our whole attitude towards the fragments we still possess.

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