tranquilly spin theories without regard to facts, is rapidly disappearing. There is every appearance of hard work in the books we have thus shortly considered, and very little appearance of undue theorising and classification. But their principal value to English philosophy, apart from the special knowledge they give us of the men and ideas they discuss and criticise, is that they bring home to our mind the solidarity of human thought as that is revealed to us in the history of philosophy, and that they insist upon the synthetic unity, the organic oneness, of the mind and of knowledge.

T. M. LINDSAY.

IV.—PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY.

It was not without hesitation that I agreed, at the request of the Editor of *MIND*, to give an account of the present state of philosophy in Germany, and I did so only in the hope that the reader would not expect from me anything like a complete review of our latest philosophical literature. All I shall attempt is a short description of the principal currents composing the present philosophical movement in Germany. I shall of course refer to some of the most striking productions in which it finds expression, but I cannot touch on everything that may lay claim to philosophical significance. Should, therefore, this article be read by German philosophical writers, many will doubtless find their names passed over, while perhaps some less important works than theirs are mentioned. I can only hope that I shall be pardoned for the omission, partly on the ground of the declared object of the paper, and partly because (as I think no philosophical writer studying the works of others will deny) our time is so fruitful in literary production that it is impossible even for the most active reader to take account of everything of value that appears. This might not, indeed, be so difficult in itself, were it not necessary to wade through so much that is mediocre; unfortunately, the worth of books does not stand written on their fronts. Then it is just that which does *not* possess permanent scientific value, that may be most specially characteristic of the time; for a very inadequate picture of the history of science would be given if the history of errors were excluded. And I have besides to direct attention not only to our philosophical literature, but also to the state of philosophical instruction, of which perhaps still less is known.

In undertaking to describe the main currents of German philosophy at the present day, we must first of all be prepared for an objection, that will make the attempt seem a very

questionable one. "Are there then," the expert will ask, "any such main currents? Is there not rather merely a number of little streams, each one taking its own course?" At first sight this may well seem to be so. Our philosophical literature is not more bulky than it is many-sided in its views and tendencies. In this, it appears to me, our present development differs essentially from the condition of German philosophy in the first half of this century. Then well-defined schools, some one being dominant, stood opposed to each other, and to one or other of them every student of philosophy belonged. Now it almost seems as if every writer on philosophical subjects had his own system; and if any one follows the earlier philosophers, such as Kant, Herbart or Schopenhauer, it is done with all kinds of reservations emphatically stated, so that no one may think of questioning the originality of the author. A philosophical writer came forward some years ago, with a proposal, seriously intended and on many sides seriously discussed, for eternal peace in philosophy, and one could not help thinking how, also in the political sphere, utopian dreams of peace are never more rife than in times of war. The natural result of his well-meant proposal was a hot controversy which left everything as it was.*

The break-up of opinions is evidently connected with two well-marked features in our later philosophical development—on the one hand, the decline of the speculative systems so long prevailing, followed by the rise of no new theory of the universe obtaining a similar general acceptance, and, on the other hand, the transfer of philosophical production from the Universities to the wider circle of cultivated men. This last phenomenon especially is too characteristic for us not to examine it somewhat more closely.

At the beginning of this century it was in the lecture-rooms of our Universities that metaphysical systems first saw the light, and they gained enthusiastic adherents among students before they sought a larger public in the printed form. Thus Fichte first unfolded the various aspects of his *Wissenschaftslehre* before an academic audience; also the successive phases of Schelling's system originated as college-lectures, and at last did not get beyond this stage, so that we know his later views only from the papers he left. In like manner Hegel's philosophical lectures were all either summaries of his whole system or parts of it, for this most systematic of thinkers knew how to force even the history of philosophy within the frame of his dialectic. Finally we know that Herbart's favourite subject for academic

* A Spir, "Zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie," in *Philos. Monatshefte*, XI. p. 273. For the controversy, see pp. 362, 422, and XII., pp. 133, 207. (Cf. *MIND*, No. III., p. 420.)

prelection was his metaphysical system, which he also made the basis of his psychology. The disciples naturally followed the example of their masters, and thus Metaphysic was at that time the principal subject of instruction in the German universities. It had taken Psychology, Ethic, Æsthetic and Philosophy of Nature into its service, while Logic also was either absorbed by it or treated merely as a propædæutic. History of Philosophy was little regarded. What is the use of historical knowledge, when all truth is believed to lie within the four corners of a single system? It was chiefly through Hegel's masterly, if one-sided, treatment that this department acquired a standing in the academic discipline.

How different it now is in our Universities! Perhaps the following table describes more eloquently than any detailed statement the present condition of our Academic Philosophy. In this table, with the help of Ascherson and Seelmann's *Calendar of German Universities* (Berlin), which appears every session, I give the statistics, for the last few years, of such lectures as will best show what has been doing in philosophy. As such I have selected those on History of Philosophy, Logic, Psychology, Metaphysic and Ethics. My statistics extend to all universities speaking the German language (German, Austrian, Swiss, and the Russian University of Dorpat), but only to the lectures in the philosophical faculty; thus, for instance, theological ethics is not taken account of, as this is a subject confined to theologians, and therefore gives no indication of the general philosophical interest. Further only those lectures are noticed that treat of a whole department or the greater part of one (as for instance the History of Ancient, Modern, or the Latest Philosophy). The total number of lectures is as follows:—

	Hist. of Phil.	Logic.	Psych.	Metaph.	Ethics.
Winter 1874-5 . .	34	21	17	7	6
Summer 1875 . .	39	22	23	5	3
Winter 1875-6 . .	37	27	18	8	9
Summer 1876 . .	35	17	23	6	3
Winter 1876-7 . .	39	24	22	8	9
Summer 1877 . .	32	20	17	5	2
	<hr/> 216	<hr/> 131	<hr/> 120	<hr/> 39	<hr/> 32

As we see, History of Philosophy is throughout predominant. The number of lectures on it is little less than those on Logic and Psychology together. The two last are pretty evenly balanced, with a slight preponderance in favour of Logic. The predominance of History is the more significant when we consider that where there are exercise-classes (*Seminare* und *Uebungen*), these really form a supplement to the historical

lectures, since they are almost invariably occupied with the interpretation of particular philosophical writers. Also it must not be forgotten that more lectures—four or five hours a week—are always devoted to History of Philosophy (whether General or Ancient or Modern), whilst not a few academical teachers are satisfied with from two to three hours for Psychology and Logic.

The number of lectures on Metaphysic and Ethics is very small; at the same time Ethics is perceptibly behind Metaphysic. According to our table, indeed, they are about equal, but this is due to the prominence given to practical philosophy in the Austrian universities. Thus, for instance, out of the nine courses on Ethics delivered in the two winter sessions of 1875-6 and 1876-7, six were given in the four Austrian universities, whilst the remaining three were furnished by the twenty-four universities of the German Empire and Switzerland. It might thus seem as if Austria were animated by a far more living interest in Ethics than the rest of Germany; but the fact has a much less exalted reason. In Austria a course of lectures on Ethics must be attended by every one desirous of passing the state-examination in law. However, if in Germany proper Metaphysic in some degree prevails over Ethics, it must always be remembered that, out of the six to eight courses on the subject given in every session, at least half treat of Logic at the same time; while the rest either are delivered by older men, the last surviving pillars of the once prevailing metaphysical systems, or consist of lectures which might perhaps be better described as *against* Metaphysic.

Now what is the meaning of these statistics? First manifestly this, that a complete revolution has taken place in the course of our philosophical instruction. Formerly Metaphysic had the upper hand, and if the academic teacher had no system of his own he attached himself to a particular school, into which he introduced his students. Now History of Philosophy prevails; that is, Metaphysic is treated historically and critically in the succession of philosophical systems, as a science, so to speak, that has passed away. At the same time a moderate interest is bestowed on those bodies of doctrine which, to a certain degree at least, are placed above the strife of systems by the possession of a small number of generally recognised principles and facts, and which at the same time possess practical importance—Logic and Psychology. Significantly enough, of these two Logic is the more ardently cultivated, being treated for the most part, as the greater number of our manuals show, in the traditional formalistic way, in which it can be taught entirely without reference to metaphysical views—which cannot be the case to the same degree with Psychology. That both subjects

are much less cultivated at the Universities than History of Philosophy is, however, partly due to the circumstance that some hours are given to Logic and Psychology in the highest classes of our Gymnasiums. Not, by any means, that students enter the university as perfect logicians and psychologists; on the contrary, their knowledge of these subjects is extremely small. Indeed, the dry and tedious manner in which the subjects are treated at school by the philologists to whom they have in general to be confided, is quite sufficient to drive out of young heads any liking for them or for philosophy either. Our more intelligent schoolmasters are now agreed that philosophy belongs to the work of the university; but who does not know that *vis inertia* is nowhere so powerful as in school-matters? I shall never forget a school-examination in Psychology at which I had to be present some years ago. The master, otherwise an excellent man, had brewed his own psychology, and had imparted it to the schoolboys by means of dictations learnt by heart. The answer was always forthcoming; hardly once was there any mistake. The nature of soul, life, mind, and body—all this, with much besides, was explained with the utmost exactness. "Are not our pupils well up in Psychology?" I was asked by another master. "Yes, indeed," I replied; "out of all these questions I could not have answered one."

The philosophical knowledge of our students, when they pass to the University, in those favourable cases where there is not left a general impression of utter weariness, consists of a few scholastic definitions and logical rules learnt by heart. That young men who fancy such things to be philosophy do not enthusiastically flock to philosophical lectures is intelligible enough. The German student does not, like his English compeer, reside at the University simply with the object of general scientific culture, but first and foremost he pursues a *Brodstudium*. He has chosen a profession which is to procure him a future living as doctor, practising lawyer, clergyman, master in one of the higher schools or the like, and for which he must establish his fitness in an examination at the close of his university-career. But how enormously have the subjects of instruction increased in the majority of these professions, owing to the progress of the special sciences! It needs therefore either compulsion or a specially lively interest to bring our doctors, lawyers, and philologists to the philosophical lectures. But of late compulsion has for the most part ceased, partly in consideration of the large demands of professional subjects, partly in just deference to the principle of freedom of study. Even for the examination that precedes the granting of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, most German universities do not absolutely

require philosophical knowledge, so that the very title that takes its name from the subject, is often granted to those who practically know nothing of Philosophy.

These facts are very significant as to the present state of our Philosophy, yet it would be rash to conclude from them that the subject is on the decline. For in the first place it cannot be overlooked that of late years the interest in Philosophy has again increased even in the universities, a symptom all the more valuable that, by the present academic regulations, the attendance at philosophical lectures depends more than it formerly did on the option of the students. But secondly, and this is the main point, the state of philosophical instruction is the less to be confounded with that of Philosophy in general, because philosophical study is nowadays pursued in far wider circles than formerly. In this as in other respects we have become a more practical nation. We no longer consider it indispensable that the doctor who would heal the sick, or the advocate who would help his clients to their rights, should be familiar with speculations on metaphysic or on the philosophy of nature and law. We leave it more than we did to the voluntary interest of students, whether they should pursue philosophical studies or not, and certainly, in consequence of this absence of constraint, the quality not only of the hearers but in the end also of the lectures is improved. It also not seldom happens that men who till their entrance on practical life are wholly engaged in preparation for it, devote themselves later with all the more interest to philosophical work, or that those standing altogether aloof from academic professional learning take part in it. This is most of all matter of congratulation, because it has brought about a freer expression of opinions than was always attained when philosophical discussion was confined within the limits of our academic bodies. The philosopher, who knew himself watched in his political and religious utterances by the authorities in whose hands his promotion lay, was too easily led, even when otherwise an honourable man, to accommodate his views in some measure to the external circumstances upon which he saw himself dependent. The private inquirer, on the contrary, is perfectly free in this respect, great liberty of expression in scientific matters having been long enjoyed in Germany. But the gradually acquired independence of philosophy and the emancipation of many of its representatives from the injurious influence of the learned bodies, have necessarily reacted favourably, if slowly, even on these. In the universities, Philosophy now reckons numerous representatives, who do not feel in the least constrained in the expression of their scientific views by the position they occupy, partly no doubt because

of the greater strength and liberality of public opinion. Against the preponderating advantages of wider circles sharing in philosophical work, must on the other hand be set a dilettantism which shows itself more in Philosophy than in any other branch of scientific literature, and which often threatens to destroy its credit in the eyes of the representatives of the more exact sciences, as much as the metaphysical aberrations of a Schelling or a Hegel. As dilettantism always prefers to attack the highest and most difficult problems, our popular philosophical literature takes up especially with metaphysic; and in this it is strikingly opposed to our Academic Philosophy. At the universities those lecturers are principally run after whose tendency, whether historical or critical, is towards agreement with the experiential sciences; our learned education seems in fact to have passed, in conformity with Auguste Comte's stages of the development of knowledge, from the metaphysical to the positive stage. Far other is the aspect of our Popular Philosophy, of which Schopenhauer, with his great contempt for university-philosophy, may be considered the head and type. It is still deep in the metaphysical stage. If the statistics could be given of our philosophical literature, so largely contributed to by non-academic writers, the result (omitting works of an historical nature which are rather philological than philosophical) would probably be the exact opposite to that of the statistics of our university-lectures. The engrossing subject would prove to be Metaphysic, having in conjunction with it Ethics, and the proportion of works devoted to Logic, Theory of Knowledge and Psychology (after the deduction of school-manuals, mostly of no independent scientific value) would be small.

In now passing to give a short description of the main currents of philosophical thought in Germany, it will perhaps be best to keep separate the Non-Academic and the Academic Philosophies, in each of which again various currents are perceptible. At the same time the division must not be conceived as a perfectly strict one. The inter-action between the universities and the outer world is so manifold that the academic movements often operate in wider circles, and on the other hand the non-academic currents sometimes overflow into the universities, though generally affecting only the non-professional representatives of Philosophy.

I.

The Non-Academic Philosophy, which we will take first, began its course about the middle of the century, with a series of *materialistic* books of a popular cast. Materialism here, as in

France in the previous century, was partly a symptom of the decay of the metaphysical systems, and partly depended on the social and political movements of the time. One important thinker, himself issuing from the school of Hegel and still in some measure conforming to its spirit in his manner of dialectic, had great influence on the emancipation of cultivated people from the prevailing systems, namely, Ludwig Feuerbach. He cannot be ranked with materialists in the proper sense of the word, and yet no other philosopher has stimulated so strongly as he the development of modern German materialism. Man is to him the measure of things, both as regards theoretic knowledge and moral endeavour. Thus he arrives theoretically at a Sensualism which everywhere considers perceptibility as the criterion of truth, and ethically at a Humanism, which is strenuously turned against the egoistic aberrations of human nature. His thoughts on the development of knowledge, on religion, and on morals often come wonderfully near to those of Auguste Comte, although he certainly knew nothing of him. But Feuerbach never got so far as to work up his thoughts into a finished system, for which reason the present generation scarcely knows more of him than his name. It was therefore an opportune undertaking when Carl Grün, some years after the philosopher's death, determined to exhibit at length his import for German philosophy.* Feuerbach worked most powerfully upon Jakob Moleschott, perhaps the most thoughtful and certainly the most suggestive of our materialist writers. Although his *Kreislauf des Lebens* only went through four editions, whilst Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* has already reached its thirteenth or fourteenth, yet it is easy to see that it was mainly from Moleschott that Vogt, Büchner, and Czolbe, the chief representatives of scientific materialism between 1850 and 1860, received their impulse. In Albert Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus*, the third edition of which has now appeared after the lamented death of its author, we possess such an excellent account and criticism of modern German Materialism, that we may content ourselves with this short mention of it, all the more that the development of that tendency, which proceeded partly from the decline of the speculative systems and partly from the rapid advance of the natural sciences, especially physiology, belongs already to the past rather than the present. The last of the above-named writers, Heinrich Czolbe, struck out the most original path. His latest work,

* Ludwig Feuerbach, in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass, so wie in seiner philosophischen Characterentwicklung, dargestellt von Carl Grün. Leipzig und Heidelberg, 1874. 2 Bände.

recently published after his death,* shows, in a very instructive way, how extreme Naturalism is brought almost irresistibly to a point of view not very unlike Berkeley's Idealism. Thus, according to Czolbe, the real essence of the universe consists of sensations which must have in and for themselves a spatial character, and are thus extended in three dimensions, or rather in four, since time may be considered the fourth dimension of all that is real. Czolbe retained to the last an opinion to which, about the middle of the present century, our scientific materialism was generally inclined: he believed, namely, not only in the eternity of the universe, but also in its essential unchangeableness, and sought in this simple way to evade the difficulties of the question as to the origin of organic species. How much these theories are opposed to all scientific experience is clear, though they are evidently a consistent development of sensualism. It may here be remarked that amongst academic philosophers Ueberweg, a writer highly valued for his excellent philosophical manuals, inclined to similar opinions, at least in reference to the spatial and real existence of sensations, and thence was led in his last years to a materialistic view of the universe.† The older scientific materialism, as appears most clearly in Czolbe, had no notion of Evolution, which now forms an integral part of every naturalistic theory of the world. Whilst the other writers belonging to it for the most part acquired the notion later,‡ Czolbe remained true to the philosophical tradition in which he was trained, and to the last would have nothing to do with it. On the other hand, Darwinism has of late years had the effect on not a few thinkers of leading them from other speculative systems to materialistic views. This was the case with Ueberweg, in whom Darwin's development-theory helped to overthrow the Aristotelian teleology. But the most striking example of this is David Friedrich Strauss, the celebrated theological critic, who set out from Hegel's philosophy and ended with a confession of faith that unreservedly recognised the results of natural science as alone giving the measure of our theoretic knowledge.§ The

* *Grundsätze einer extensionalen Erkenntnistheorie*, herausgegeben von Dr. Johnson, Plauen, 1876. An extremely good summary of Czolbe's views and their development is given by Dr. Hans Vaihinger in the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, Bd. xii., s. 1.

† Compare the account of Ueberweg in the 2nd edition of Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* (1875), Bd. II., s. 516.

‡ Compare the description that Carl Vogt gives of his changes of opinion, *Vorlesungen über den Menschen*, Giessen (1863), Bd. II., s. 256.

§ *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, Leipzig, 1872; see also the postscript to the 2nd edition, Bonn, 1873.

edition of the collected works of Strauss, now appearing under the direction of Ed. Zeller, will place us for the first time in a position to survey the interesting development which gradually led this eminent critic to his final point of view.* For the rest it is very doubtful whether Strauss's last confession of faith, which is as radical in point of theory as its tendency is conservative in practical and social questions, is properly denoted by the often misused name of Materialism. One of the ablest and boldest representatives of Darwinism in Germany, Ernst Hæckel, has, certainly not without reason, repudiated the name, because it implies an immoral tendency, from which the present representatives of Materialism know themselves to be perfectly free. But even on the theoretical side the name is perhaps ill applied. In his *Geschichte des Materialismus* Lange has clearly shown how little the views of Büchner and others agree with the strict notion of Materialism. But if among these older representatives of materialistic doctrine there was a confusion of ideas, and Scepticism, Sensualism, Empirism, nay even bits of sheer Idealism were mixed up with genuine materialistic notions, the views of our present evolutionists no longer correspond in the least with Materialism. In them a strictly mechanical and atomistic theory of the universe is connected with the idea that the atoms possess internal states, and that these internal states in combination constitute what we call psychical phenomena. Such a theory is evidently not Materialism, but may be fitly designated 'Monism,' as by Hæckel, to distinguish it from the Dualism in vogue. But it should be understood that in this Monism, represented by many men of science besides Hæckel, the material element predominates, in so far as the necessity is recognised of giving a mechanical explanation of the phenomena of matter from atomistic assumptions; whilst for psychical phenomena resort is had to the general phrase—that they proceed from the internal states of atoms. As soon as greater attention is paid to the psychological side of this parallelism of inner and outer experience, the point of view imperceptibly becomes quite different. A striking example of this has been lately afforded by Fr. Zollner, a writer who likewise began with scientific studies but turned his attention to the problems of knowledge. He too seeks to add a new property to atoms, "by bringing the simplest and most elementary processes of nature into determinate connection with a process of sensation".† Here we see

* Dav. Fr. Strauss, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bde. I., II., Bonn, 1877.

† *Ueber die Natur der Kometen, Beiträge zur Geschichte und Theorie der Erkenntniss* (Leipzig, 1872), s. 322.

the psychical taken as the primary—as involving the deeper reason of material processes. And in fact Zöllner holds that what in our inner experience we call Will proceeds from this sensation in matter. But Will also is with him a universal function of matter: it is Will that is everywhere the cause of motion. Here he attaches himself to the philosophy of Schopenhauer, for whose services in regard to the physiology of the senses he has also sought to win acknowledgment in his attacks on Helmholtz. This blending of scientific Monism with Schopenhauer's philosophical doctrine is not peculiar to Zöllner, but is indeed a feature of the time, other writers having been led independently to similar views. Passing over the like ideas expressed by Rokitsansky,* Ewald Hering,† and others, we may here mention especially Häckel's latest work, in which he employs the hypothesis of a memory inherent in the organic molecules to explain the phenomena of development.‡ We thus come upon the second main current of our present Non-Academic Philosophy, which may be described as idealistic in comparison with the more materialistic current we have hitherto depicted. But as it is specially characteristic of this second movement to be dominated by the influence of Schopenhauer, our last great metaphysician, it may not be quite exact to describe it as idealistic, since Schopenhauer himself comes very near to materialism in many of his views, despite the idealistic foundation of his philosophy.

Schopenhauer is the born leader of Non-Academic Philosophy in Germany. The "professorial philosophy of philosophy-professors" is the constant object of his attacks. He declares it unworthy to live *by* instead of *for* philosophy. He deeply deplores that Kant, whom after Plato and Goethe he venerates most highly, should have been a professor, and he ascribes to his academical position all the defects he finds in him. The followers of Kant he treats with studied coarseness. He calls Fichte a wind-bag, Hegel a charlatan, and Herbart's understanding, he says, was wholly distorted. In his judgments he gives the freest rein to caprice. However clear and acute his thinking, at the critical moment logical consistency gives way to brilliant sallies and gusts of temper. His native gifts and his education are of the most varied sort; his artistic sense, in particular, is extremely fine, as in fact his æsthetic doctrines are among the best things he has produced. From such a man

* Rokitsansky, *Der selbstständige Werth des Wissens*, Vienna, 1869.

† E. Hering, *Das Gedächtniss, eine Function der organisierten Materie*, Vienna, 1870.

‡ Häckel, *Die Phylogenesis der Plautidule*, Berlin, 1876.

we must not expect a consistent system. But where he fails as a philosopher, he succeeds as a writer, who keeps hold of his readers the more his personality comes to the front. Schopenhauer is perhaps the most brilliant, certainly the clearest and most entertaining of our philosophical writers, and he has made it easy for the reader to master his whole system. No other of our foremost writers has laid so wise a restraint upon himself. Although he spent his whole time in philosophical reflection, free from all professional cares and enjoying the most vigorous health till the age of 72, yet all his works together, in the second collected edition now just published, come to no more than six volumes of moderate size.* It would however be a great mistake to ascribe to his manner of writing the reputation that Schopenhauer has acquired after a long period of neglect. The deeper and true reason of his influence must rather be sought in the peculiar nature of his philosophy, which gave expression to the thoughts and feelings of the time. His ethical more than his theoretic views have gained him the sympathies of great numbers of cultivated people. In fact the chief attraction of Schopenhauer's philosophy has not been any of his characteristic doctrines—not his doctrine of the Will as cosmical principle, still less that of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as the ground of our knowledge, but simply his Pessimism, which stands in no necessary relation with his other views. How completely he has here fallen in with the current of his time appears in the affinity of sentiment between him and certain contemporary systems otherwise as far as possible alien from his philosophy, such as Schelling's later doctrines (set forth in his posthumous lectures) and Franz Baader's theosophy. It is remarkable enough that Schopenhauer too betrays a great sympathy with mediæval asceticism. The philosophy of Romanticism, which Schelling and Baader represented in the form of religious enthusiasm, appears in Schopenhauer in a secular guise. His metaphysic is not on that account the less mystical, but it is one of the many contradictions of his intellect that in him mysticism and clear understanding are mixed in an odd fashion, and that he manages to combine such a metaphysic with a comparatively lucid theory of cognition. This combination, too, goes far to explain the success he has achieved. Pure and unadulterated Mysticism is not to the taste of the present age; it must be, as far as possible, reconciled at least in appearance, with scientific knowledge. Now Schopenhauer, in spite of many wayward outbreaks (as against Newton's colour-theory), was yet on the whole not ill-acquainted with the natural

* Arthur Schopenhauer's *Sämmtliche Werke*, herausgegeben von Julius Frauenstädt, 1te Aufl., Leipzig, 1873; 2te Aufl., 1876.

sciences, especially physiology, and he took very good care to avoid the arbitrary constructions of a Schelling or a Hegel in this field.

For twenty years Schopenhauer's philosophy was almost totally neglected. Two disciples of Hegel, the philosopher against whom he launched his most envenomed darts, have the merit of first directing attention to him, namely, J. E. Erdmann in his *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (1853) and Julius Frauenstädt, who passed over to him and became his most faithful apostle. From the year 1844, when the second edition of his *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* appeared, Schopenhauer began to find adherents among journalists and novel writers, than whom none could more effectually help in the diffusion of a philosophy. His varied culture, his refined æsthetic views, his elegant style, soon made him the favourite philosopher of a class which is naturally more attracted by such qualities than by depth of thought, and in which moreover Romanticism had not yet lost all its power. It certainly was men of this class who did most for the rapid extension of the Non-Academic Philosophy. The writers whom Eduard von Hartmann, its most distinguished representative at the present time, gratefully enumerates in the preface to the seventh edition of his *Philosophie des Unbewussten* as the chief promoters of his philosophy—Rudolf Gottschalk, David Asher, Hieronymus Lorm and others—are all influential journalists. Theirs is undoubtedly the credit of having made the philosophy of Schopenhauer and his successors more popular than was ever philosophy in Germany before. For since the invention of printing no philosophical work of the size has ever had such a success in Germany as the *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, which ran through edition after edition from the year 1868 till finally the seventh was stereotyped in 1876. Something indeed (as Hartmann himself allows in his last edition) may be due to the advertising arts of the publisher, who, I doubt not, if the sentence I have just written should come under his eye, will not fail to set it forth in leaded type in the advertisement-sheet of his next edition, though everything else I may have to say about the work should be as unfavourable as possible. It is, however, a great mistake to ascribe, as some do, the success of the whole philosophical movement to such external circumstances. The patronage of the men of the press is itself a sign that the pessimistic philosophy accorded with a state of feeling widely diffused.

Eduard von Hartmann is the first who sought to introduce serious changes into Schopenhauer's system; and that the time was come for most of these changes is shown not only by his external success but by the fact of his quickly finding followers

who arrived at like conclusions in somewhat altered form. The Metaphysic of the Unconscious had predecessors also. Hartmann himself has given an account of these in his work, and although he lays hold of many occasional observations the authors of which would by no means agree with him in the main, yet it is not to be denied that especially in the physiology of the senses there has been a considerable tendency to explain certain processes by unconscious mental activities. Perhaps, indeed, the impulses that Hartmann received from physiologists have not been less powerful than those that came to him from the doctrine of Schopenhauer. He certainly had as his aim at starting to reconcile Schopenhauer's metaphysic with the results of natural science. This appeared in the motto of his first edition—"Speculative results according to the inductive method of natural science," and we may safely ascribe to this peculiar conjunction no small part of the applause with which his philosophy has been received. The Schopenhauerian doctrine was a powerful attraction to many, but at the present day the exact sciences play so great a part that everybody desires to be on a good footing with them. Even our spiritualistic performers claim the support of 'scientific authorities' for their manifestations. What then could be more opportune than a philosophy that professed to reconcile speculation and natural science?

Hartmann's metaphysical system is an attempt to overcome the dualism of Will and Knowledge in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Schopenhauer regards unconscious Will as the transcendent cosmical principle that first of all objectifies itself for our subjective cognition in the human body, and then, through the brain-processes there arising, produces the world that we know. On the other hand, according to Hartmann, Will and Knowledge form an inseparable unity in the Unconscious. Hartmann passes under review the most diverse functions of body and mind in order to show that there always remains an unknowable something, which cannot be deduced from the conditions supplied by conscious experience, and which therefore must be referred to an unconscious mental principle. This principle on one side is to be conceived as Will because it passes forth into definite activities, and on the other side as Knowledge, since it may be credited with some apprehension of the results that are to follow. In support of his thesis, Hartmann brings forward in the first part of his work nerve-functions, instinct, *vis medicatrix*, organic development, æsthetic feeling, sexual love, speech, mysticism, history—showing no doubt great width of reading but unfortunately without the least critical scrutiny of the sources whence he drew his facts. He places side by side, without the least hesitation, the careful experiments of scientific

inquirers and the reports of spiritualistic enthusiasts or mesmerising charlatans. This utter want of critical sense is very apparent even in the introduction to his work where he sets forth its scope. Here he seeks to justify the assumption of final causes in nature by maintaining that, where known causes do not suffice for the explanation of a phenomenon, unknown conditions may be supposed; and, as in his opinion there is a number of natural phenomena that cannot be accounted for by material causes, there is no help but in assuming spiritual causes, that is to say, *ends*. The argument is set out in the mathematical guise of a theory of probability, which is enough to make Laplace turn in his grave; but there is no doubt that here as elsewhere when he refers to his scientific "sponsors" for facts, he succeeds in imposing on weak minds by this show of exactness.

Consciousness, according to Hartmann, is a higher stage of development of the Unconscious. It is not, as in Schopenhauer, produced by the Will, but it arises through Knowledge breaking loose from Will and then falling into wonder over its independence. With this deduction of consciousness is connected Hartmann's doctrine of Pessimism. The Unconscious stands above all negation, it suffers not, is never weary, doubts not, nor errs. With consciousness there first arises want, and thus a state of discontent and unhappiness, increasing in proportion as illusion vanishes with growing intelligence. Schopenhauer tried to give his pessimism a metaphysical foundation: the creative power of Will, he said, was ever being repressed, and thus it spent itself in restless unsatisfied struggling. Hartmann is determined here also to follow the method of inductive science. He tries to show that, when statistics of pleasure and pain are carefully set off against each other, the sum of pain in human existence is far the greater. That his figures are not very trustworthy need hardly be said. A single glance at his authorities suffices to show how utterly subjective such statistics must necessarily be, and that not the least objective support is thereby got for his preconceived opinion.

Hartmann is one of the most prolific philosophical writers of the time. He is a contributor to various journals, and besides his chief work has published many smaller writings; amongst these his *Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums** and his book against Darwinism† have excited most attention. Although Hartmann in the first of these took ground against our reforming theo-

* *Die Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft*, 2te Aufl., Berlin, 1875.

† *Wahrheit und Irrthum in Darwinismus*, 1875.

logians, yet he has not failed of encouragement from these, any philosophical movement that has something of an anti-materialistic character being sure to be welcomed with a certain sympathy. Hartmann can also with reason point to the affinity which many of the philosophic views that have lately proceeded from this circle (especially A. E. Biedermann's *Christliche Dogmatik*) show with his own. With men of science the Philosophy of the Unconscious has not fared so well. If they paid little heed to Hartmann's main work, their attention was all the more excited by his attack on Darwinism. In particular, Oscar Schmidt, the distinguished Strasburg zoologist, has subjected the scientific foundations of the Philosophy of the Unconscious to a merciless and yet, it must be confessed, a thoroughly fair criticism.* It must not be supposed, however, that Hartmann himself is not very well aware of many of his own weaknesses. A number of years ago there appeared a critical examination of the Philosophy of the Unconscious from the point of view of the mechanical philosophy, the best perhaps of all the writings directed against it before Schmidt's.† A rumour has long been current that this criticism was the work of the philosopher himself, and in his latest book he has in fact confessed himself the author of it.‡ Hartmann thus is not one of the infallible philosophers who cannot bear to be contradicted; and, otherwise, the perfectly civil and even polite tone which he assumes towards his opponents contrasts very favourably with the unsurpassable coarseness of his pessimistic predecessor.

From the philosophical side, Hartmann's doctrine has been subjected to formal criticism chiefly by R. Haym§ and J. H. von Kirchmann,|| but a work that has drawn so much attention, while itself so vulnerable, could not fail to call forth a multitude of polemical writings, not always conceived in the style of grave scientific discussion. On the whole however the literature evoked by Hartmann's work has been friendly, especially when account is taken of those productions that have not been merely critical but have sought to bring forward independent metaphysical views. It is impossible here to give even a list of those

* *Die naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Leipzig, 1876.

† *Das Unbewusste vom Standpunkte der Physiologie und Descendenztheorie*, Berlin, 1872.

‡ *Neukantianismus, Schopenhauerianismus und Hegelianismus*, 2te erweit. Aufl. der *Erläuterungen zur Metaphysik des Unbewussten*, Berlin, 1877. Cf. the publisher's advertisement of this work.

§ *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Bd. 31; the critique is also published separately, Berlin, 1873.

|| *Ueber das Princip des Realismus*, Berlin, 1875.

that have found a considerable circle of readers. I must be content to indicate the chief streams of thought in relation with the Philosophy of the Unconscious. They are, I think, three: the first accepting Hartmann's main ideas without modification; the second seeking to combine the Philosophy of the Unconscious with other speculative elements, especially with Hegel; and a third which gratefully recognises Hartmann's affinity with Schopenhauer, but labours to bring back the philosophy of the disciple to that of the master. Among the champions wholly devoted to Hartmann, A. Taubert* and C. du Prel† are the most prominent. Moritz Venetianer‡ has endeavoured to carry farther the panlogism in Hartmann's philosophy, besides engaging in a sharp polemic against Kant and Schopenhauer; and still more decidedly the attempt has been made by Johannes Volkelt§ to reconcile Hartmann's principle with Hegel's Philosophy. With these also may be ranked Ludwig Noiré|| who aims at combining Schopenhauer's philosophy with scientific monism and the doctrine of evolution. On the other hand Julius Bahnsen,¶ who has recently been reviewed at length by Hartmann himself, harks back to the position of Schopenhauer. The philosophy of Schopenhauer has still indeed numerous adherents, who give expression to their views in writings not always of a strictly philosophical character, while they accept as much as suits them from Hartmann or other pessimists. A prominent representative of this pessimistic strain in our literature is Prof. Friedrich Nietzsche of Basel, the successive parts of whose *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*** have drawn much notice. In the writings of Nietzsche and others of the same stamp, the pessimistic mood is combined in a very peculiar way with an enthusiastic devotion to certain ideas closely related to religious mysticism. Richard Wagner and his music are ardently worshipped by this sect of pessimists. The great composer himself was won over to Schopenhauer by the philosopher's profound views of the nature of music, and his enthusiastic admirers declare that the Will has been revealed as

* *Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner*, Berlin, 1873.

† *Der gesunde Menschenverstand vor den Problemen der Wissenschaft*, Berlin, 1872.

‡ *Der Allgeist: Grundzüge des Panpsychismus im Anschluss an die Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Berlin, 1877.

§ *Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus*, Berlin, 1873.

|| *Der monistische Gedanke*. Eine Concordanz der Philosophie Schopenhauers, Darwins, B. Meyers und L. Geigers, Leipzig, 1873.

¶ *Beiträge zur Characterologie*, 2 Bde., Leipzig, 1867. *Zur Philosophie der Geschichte*, Berlin, 1872.

** *Zweites bis viertes Stück*, Leipzig, 1874-76—*Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie, Schopenhauer als Erzieher, Wagner in Bayreuth*.

cosmical principle in the *Nibelungen*. The most remarkable product of this revival of Schopenhauer's philosophy is the *Philosophie der Erlösung* by P. H. Mainländer (probably a pseudonym), published at Berlin in 1876. A gloomy melancholy pervades this work, which shows clearly how short a step it is from Schopenhauer's Will-manifestations to a system of mystical emanation. God, it is here set forth, was the original Unity of the world, but he is so no longer, since the world broke up into a multiplicity of particular things. God willed that *nothing* should be, but his essence prevented the immediate coming to pass of nothingness; the world meanwhile behaved to fall asunder into a multiplicity, whose separate entities are all clashing with one another as they struggle to arrive at the state of nothingness. It is not therefore the Will-to-live, as Schopenhauer said, that maintains the change of phenomena, but the Will-to-die, and this is coming ever nearer to its fulfilment, since in the mutual struggle of all things the sum total of force grows ever less. In the view of this author, the highest moral duty is that negation of existence which would cut short the unlimited continuance of individual life in the future by the cessation of all sexual connection.

With the mention of this book, which is only a somewhat exaggerated specimen of the sort of phantastic speculation, guided more by feeling and temperament than by scientific method, that is rife in our Non-Academic Philosophy, we may now turn to cast a glance on our Academic Philosophy.

II.

In the Academic Philosophy also, we have to distinguish a variety of movements, proceeding mostly from the schools formed by the philosophers of an earlier generation. Kant, Hegel, and Herbart are again the thinkers of greatest influence, but Schleiermacher, Krause, and Beneke have also their adherents. Schleiermacher's philosophy, especially since his death, has drawn no small amount of attention outside of as well as within the circle of theologians. As men grew dissatisfied with the speculative method of Hegel, there were some who readily turned to a philosophy that mediated between Idealism and Realism by ascribing a properly objective reality to the subjective forms of intuition and thought. Schleiermacher's philosophical works were indeed too aphoristic in character to form the basis of a regular school, but his point of view has been adopted by H. Ritter, the historian of philosophy, and by Fr. Harms, as it has also found expression in the well-known logical treatise of Ueberweg. Krause, by reason of his works on the philosophy of law, is most in repute with jurists; Beneke's

following is mostly of practical educationists, attracted by his psychological and paedagogical writings. But besides the various sets of philosophical disciples, there has been for a considerable time a class of independent thinkers busily engaged in the task of working out a philosophy in harmony with the present state of scientific knowledge. Our best course will be to notice, first, the main currents of the School-philosophy departing from Hegel, Herbart, and Kant, and then some of these other philosophers with eclectic or independent systems.

Curiously enough, among all past systems the one that has the most rigid and compacted form, namely Hegel's, has at the present day the fewest thoroughgoing adherents. Wide as is the circle of thinkers who have come under the influence of Hegel, the venerable C. L. Michelet (who has just published the two first volumes of a system of philosophy*) is perhaps the one man in Germany who can still be called an orthodox Hegelian. The foremost representatives of the Hegelian school, when they have not, like Ludwig Feuerbach and David Strauss, taken up new positions, have turned by preference to the History of Philosophy. The chief historians of philosophy at the present day have proceeded from the school of Hegel. The comprehensive historic sense that distinguished Hegel himself remains the birthright of his school. Nevertheless it may be said that our historians of philosophy have done their work better according as they have cut themselves free from the formalism of the system. J. E. Erdmann has gradually emancipated himself in the course of his exposition of the History of Modern Philosophy. Kuno Fischer and Eduard Zeller took up from the first a more independent position. Fischer's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, now brought down to Schelling, with his complementary work, *Bacon und die Erfahrungsphilosophie*, and Zeller's *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, as well as his shorter *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz*, are models of historical exposition. The two historians however have a very different notion of their task. Kuno Fischer tries to think himself wholly into the spirit of his author, and then give a free reproduction of his doctrines. Zeller, on the other hand, endeavours to get to the bottom of his subject with a philologist's exactness, and to give his reader the truest possible picture of it.

It is hardly possible to conceive a greater intellectual difference than between Hegel and Herbart. Both indeed accept the fundamental position of ontological metaphysic—that experience must be constructed from speculative conceptions instead of these being wrought out with the aid of experience, but while in

* *Logik und Naturphilosophie*, Berlin, 1876-7.

Hegel we see the daring speculator transgressing all the bounds of knowledge, Herbart, burying himself in a laborious scrutiny of notions and exposing their inherent contradictions, seems as if he would hinder rather than further the solution of philosophical problems. The difference is again manifested in their schools. While the Hegelians have shown a power of comprehending the whole development of philosophical thought, the Herbartians have shown a total want of historical sense: not a single historian of philosophy of any importance has appeared in their ranks. On the other hand their strength has lain in Psychology, where the Hegelians have been weakest; for here again it can be said that the Herbartians have been better psychologists the more they have thrown off the trammels of Herbart's metaphysic. Thus Drobisch's *Empirische Psychologie*, just because it comes to the investigation of internal experience without metaphysical assumptions yet in the spirit of Herbart's rigid criticism, is still an excellent manual, though of course, as it appeared as far back as 1842, it does not represent the present state of the science. Two of the most important psychologists of our time also base, but with greater independence, upon Herbart: Hermann Lotze, whose *Medicinische Psychologie* was the forerunner of our present physiological psychology, while his *Mikrokosmos* has stimulated a wider circle of philosophical readers; and Theodor Waitz who, still more than by his *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, achieved distinction by his *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*.^{*} The lately deceased W. Volkmann adhered more closely to Herbart's point of view, and his *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, in the second edition, which includes very full historical references, has become a most useful book. From Herbart also came the original impulse to those investigations, first designated as *Völkerpsychologie* by M. Lazarus, which are concerned about the psychological phenomena of human society, such as language, manners and customs, myths, &c. Lazarus himself, in his *Leben der Seele* (2d Ed., Vol. I., 1876), has published a series of brilliant essays dealing for the most part with this class of subjects. He has besides, in conjunction with H. Steinthal, founded an organ for such inquiries, the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, which is already in its ninth volume and includes a great quantity of valuable matter. Steinthal, who takes the greater share in the management of the journal, is at the same its most active contributor, publishing in its pages most important researches in the psychology of language and in mythology. These contributions and his formal works, *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache*, *Ueber die Typen des Sprachbaus*, *Ueber die Manden-Negersprache*, with

* A second edition supervised by George Gerland, has just appeared.

his *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, mark Steinthal out as one of the foremost psychologists of the present time. In addition to Psychology, the Theory of Education has been much cultivated by the Herbartian school, and it numbers among its adherents many practical instructors. On the other hand, R. Zimmermann has made the solitary attempt to treat Æsthetics from the Herbartian point of view, and the importance of his work lies more in its historical information than in its doctrine.* Lotze, who followed Herbart (however independently) in psychology and metaphysic, severed himself wholly from the school in regard to the foundations of Æsthetics.† Yet even on this field it is not to be denied that the ideas of Herbart have had a stimulative influence, though outside the circle of his immediate adherents. If Fechner, in his *Vorschule der Ästhetik* (1876), makes it his chief object to determine by observation and experiment the simplest relations that are æsthetically pleasing or displeasing, his idea is one that may be traced back to Herbart's doctrine of elemental æsthetic relations, though it may have been excited in him more immediately by Adolf Zeising, who, in a series of works,‡ sought to prove the Golden Section to be the fundamental law of Æsthetics. Zeising himself cannot be said to have borrowed from Herbart, being one of those minds, not rare in our midst, who work out philosophical views of their own under the influence mainly of poetic or religious feeling and with little regard to logical system.

In the course of its development Philosophy has not seldom appeared to move backwards, and thus it happened, on the decline of Hegel's system and Herbart's metaphysic, that a return was made to the views of earlier philosophers. First of all there was an Aristotelian revival. The leader of this eclectic movement was Adolf Trendelenburg of Berlin, who both in the way of academic instruction and by his *Logische Untersuchungen* exercised a remarkable influence. As was to be expected at a time when original thinking had come to a standstill, Trendelenburg and his followers occupied themselves chiefly with philological criticism of philosophical works. The movement became of greater account for the development of scientific philosophy when more modern thinkers became the subject of study, and no subject could be equal to Kant, from whom had proceeded Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, as well as

* *Ästhetik*, 2 Bde., Wien, 1865. *Studien und Kritiken zur Philosophie und Ästhetik*, Wien, 1870.

† *Geschichte der Ästhetik*, München, 1868.

‡ *Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Körpers*, Leipzig, 1854. *Ästhetische Forschungen*, Frankfurt, 1855.

Herbart and Schopenhauer, and in whom therefore all the different directions of later philosophy are implied. The Aristotelian philology thus passed into a "Kant-philology". The object first sought was to arrive again at a true understanding of the great thinker of Königsberg; but in this way there also gradually arose a "Kant-philosophy"—a Neo-Kantian school which adhered more or less closely to the Critical Philosophy and sought to develop it. "Back to Kant" was the war-cry in which many especially of the younger philosophers loudly joined. Otto Liebmann in his work *Kant und die Epigonen* (1865) was one of those who led the way; but the scholar who has done most for the interpretation of Kant is Professor Hermann Cohen of Marburg.* Cohen indeed is not free from the tendency, pervading the whole movement of Neo-Kantianism, to force the later developments of science by hook or by crook into the language of Kantian formulas; still it must be allowed that he often understands Kant's thoughts and can develop them more lucidly than Kant himself, whose expressions were not seldom so careless and obscure. It has been Cohen's great concern to overcome the apparent or real contradictions that are found in Kant, and his expositions will seem very cogent to those who are without firm convictions of their own, as unquestionably the skilfulness of his interpretations has much helped forward the spread of Neo-Kantianism. Nevertheless I cannot but think the whole movement, so long as its cry is "Back to Kant" not "Beyond Kant," an unhistoric one and destined to have no future, because not seeing the necessity of a continuous development. Orthodox Neo-Kantianism must inevitably lead to reactionary courses, as in the case of Jürgen Bona Meyer, who in his work on *Kant's Psychologie*, however meritorious it is from the historico-critical point of view, would fain rehabilitate the theory of mental faculties so happily expelled by Herbart, for no other reason than because Kant was entangled in it. Some of these Neo-Kantians have coined the word "Criticistic" to designate their aims in philosophy, and the distinction is most significant. Whoever would make a Criticistic Philosophy out of the Critical shows clearly that for him the Critical Philosophy has become dogma, and in becoming criticistic he ceases to be critical. No doubt, even within the orthodox Neo-Kantian school, there has been some attempt to carry farther the Kantian system by applying it to different regions of experience. Thus, quite lately, A. Krause has undertaken a development of the doctrine of the Categories, in trying to bring within them the most varied forms of perception and

* *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*, Berlin, 1871. *Die systematischen Begriffe in Kant's vorkritischen Schriften*, Berlin, 1873.

feeling;* and A. Classen has followed with an attempt to bring even the whole body of physiological optics within their frame.† The diligence and acuteness shown in these works are worthy of acknowledgment, but it is impossible not to feel that they are sadly wasted. For what at the best could come from such efforts except an artificial classification, instead of the explanation that is wanted?

Already however a counter-current has begun to set in against this Kantianism which has been running so strong. Even within the school the attempt to reconcile Kant's theory of cognition with the results of the later psychology and natural science has led to broad-minded interpretations and far-reaching concessions. For example, A. Stadler, who previously had tried to accommodate Kant's teleology to the present position of biological science,‡ has now in his latest work§ surrendered one of the main supports of the Kantian theory of knowledge—the deduction of the Categories from the forms of judgment, though he would still uphold their metaphysical validity. The disposition to freer criticism of the Critical Philosophy appears also in the publication of a number of works which, expressly leaving aside the question of the truth of the Kantian doctrines, are directed solely to the task of historically explaining their origin, as is done by Dr. Fr. Paulsen|| in regard to the theory of cognition, and by Fritz Schultze¶ and Konrad Dieterich** in regard to Kant's scientific writings. At the same time a number of our "Kant-philologists" have made a special study of various predecessors and contemporaries of the philosopher. Thus J. B. Meyer made the discovery that Tetens was the particular Wolffian from whom Kant borrowed his classification of the mental faculties.†† More recently B. Erdmann has given us a monograph on Kant's teacher, Martin Knutzen,‡‡ and J. H. Witte a sketch of the life and philosophical development of one

* *Die Gesetze des menschlichen Herzens wissenschaftlich dargestellt als die Formale Logik des reinen Gefühls*, Lahr, 1876.

† *Physiologie des Gesichtssinns*, Braunschweig, 1876.

‡ *Kant's Teleologie und ihre erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung*, Berlin, 1874.

§ *Die Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntnistheorie in der Kantischen Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1876.

|| *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie*, Leipzig, 1875.

¶ *Kant und Darwin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Entwicklungslehre*, Jena, 1875.

** *Kant und Newton*, Tübingen, 1877.

†† *Kant's Psychologie*, Berlin, 1870.

‡‡ *Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1876.

of the earliest of Kant's critics, the remarkable Jew, Salomon Maimon.* Some years earlier, E. Pfleiderer made an elaborate exposition of Hume's philosophy, which had so great an influence on Kant's critical undertaking;† and here we reach the stage in our Kantian literature at which the cry "Beyond Kant" begins to rise above the other. In the last years a series of important books have appeared which, partly working upon Kant and partly amending his doctrines, aim at laying anew the foundations of the theory of cognition. Of these *Der philosophische Kriticismus* by A. Riehl‡ stands nearest to Kant, but the author takes the greatest pains to do justice also to later philosophers. C. Göring comes nearer to the point of view of Hume and Stuart Mill in his *System der kritischen Philosophie* (Bd. I. 1874, II. 1876) which might better perhaps be entitled *Kritik der philosophischen Systeme*, the second volume being devoted to Kant. The most trenchant critic of the Kantian philosophy is, however, Ernest Laas, who has very happily selected for special consideration that part of the *Kritik d. r. V.* which is of greatest importance both for the theory of knowledge in general and the various sciences in particular, namely, the section on "The Analogies of Experience".§

We are thus brought in the course of our review to the consideration of the various attempts to found a new philosophy, more or less independently of the past. Two directions can again be distinguished, an idealistic and a realistic. The *idealistic* is related chiefly to Kant and the Kantian movement we have now sketched. Albert Lange, one of the ablest representatives of this idealistic philosophy, acknowledges, in the second edition of his *Geschichte des Materialismus*, the influence that Cohen's interpretations of Kant had upon him. Lange does not think of standing by all the doctrines of Kant: he allows that the Transcendental *Æsthetic* needs to have a foundation laid in psychology, and the *Analytic* to be thoroughly overhauled in the light of the later results of the sciences. Still he is essentially at Kant's point of view, and holds that it is absolutely exclusive both of materialism and dogmatic metaphysic. At the same time he refuses for ethical reasons to be content with this negative result. We must erect an ideal world behind the world of phenomena, and regard it as the true reality of things. The metaphysic that does this is a

* Salomon Maimon, Berlin, 1876.

† *Empirismus und Skepsis in David Hume's Philosophie*, Berlin, 1874.

‡ *Der philosophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft*, Bd. I., Leipzig, 1876.

§ *Kant's Analogien der Erfahrung*, Berlin, 1876.

dream ; its constructions are a deception ; but the deception is a necessity. Straining after the ideal, man has always felt the need of metaphysical invention, and for ever must feel it.* Metaphysic and poetry are thus to Lange closely allied, and amongst all past thinkers he feels himself drawn most to Schiller, who was at once Kantian and poet. Kant himself indeed would little relish such a view, having declared that poetry has as little to do with philosophy as with book-keeping. But, so far as Lange is concerned, we can understand how his view is connected with the predominant interest now taken in History of Philosophy. When Metaphysic is recognised only in the historic succession of past metaphysical systems, the metaphysic of the future inevitably becomes some such idealism as Lange's. The same thought in a somewhat different shape has been urged not less forcibly as the historic justification of Metaphysic by Dr. R. Avenarius in a small but weighty treatise,† where he maintains that every philosophical system tries to meet the requirement of comprehending the universe in the simplest possible manner.

The *realistic* movement in our academic philosophy connects itself much less closely than the idealistic movement with Kant, joining on rather to Locke and Hume or Auguste Comte (who has become known in Germany later than in England) in as far as it is not independent. J. H. von Kirchmann has set forth a realistic theory of knowledge‡ which reminds one of Czolbe's in ascribing objective existence to sensations, yet is otherwise far removed from sensualism, since it assumes original forms of thought co-operating with perception in the production of knowledge. Much nearer to sensualism and materialism stands Eugen Dühring's "Philosophy of Reality,"§ intended thus in its very name to be a counterblast to the Kantian doctrine of subjective forms. According to Dühring, space and time are forms of our sense-perception only because they are at the same time objectively real, and in like manner all such universal relations as causality have not only a conceptual but also a real existence. His criticism of certain ontological aberrations of thought in his *Natürliche Dialektik* (1865) is most excellent ; he shows in his

* An elaborate criticism of Lange's philosophical point of view, by M. Heinze, is to be found in No. II. of the *Vierteljahrsschrift für wiss. Philosophie* ; and a sympathetic comparison of his philosophy with that of Dühring and of Hartmann in Dr. Hans Vaihinger's *Hartmann, Dühring und Lange* (1876).

† *Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäß dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmaasses*, Leipzig, 1876.

‡ *Die Philosophie des Wissens*, Berlin, 1864.

§ *Cursus der Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1876.

works rare familiarity with the exact sciences ; and besides his philosophical writings he has published a very superior *Geschichte der Principien der Mechanik* (1873, 2nd ed., 1876), as also several sociological works, especially his *Cursus der National- und Socialökonomie* (1873). But whatever the extent of Dühning's performance, the majority of realistic thinkers hold that the time has by no means yet come for the construction of a definite philosophy ; and indeed this opinion is shared also by those idealists who look upon a development of Kant's doctrine as the immediate work of the future.

Thus from different sides it is coming to be more and more seen that for the present there can be no question of setting up comprehensive metaphysical systems which, like those that have just gone down, must seem to the next generation phantastic illusions rather than works of science. The recent foundation of a journal (edited by Dr. R. Avenarius) with the advancement of "Scientific Philosophy" for its aim, shows plainly that the time is past when philosophy can hope to live apart from the other sciences. We see accordingly, at the present time, all interest turned on those two departments of philosophy that are of most account for the building up of a universal science, namely, Psychology and the Theory of Cognition. As regards the former, we have already taken note of the works of the Herbartian school in anthropology and comparative psychology ; and now the new science of "Physiological Psychology" is busily concerned with the mental life of the individual. The Theory of Knowledge, besides being separately treated, is included in all the newest expositions of Logic, dominated as these no longer are by the old formalistic conception. The most remarkable of recent logical works are those of Lotze* and Sigwart,† to which should be added various memoirs by C. Prantl,‡ the able historian of the science, and Albert Lange's posthumous *Logische Studien* (1877). The philosophical movement in Germany presents everywhere the spectacle of preparation for a step to be taken forward. New weapons are being sought in the arsenal of experience and of the human mind wherewith to carry on the old struggle round the eternal problems of thought and existence.

W. WUNDT.

* *Logik : Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen*, Leipzig, 1874.

† *Logik*, Bd. I., Tübingen, 1873.

‡ In *Verhandlungen der kgl. bairischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*.