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Notes on Greek Grammar

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Ἀέναον τόδε σῆμα ἀνὴρ εἶδρυνε γυναῖκί
 Ἑλπίζων Κυρίλλῃ, κὲ πέντε τέκνοισιν ἁώροις,
 ἐξ ἐτέρου γάμου Κυρίλλης δύο θρεπτοῖς
 καὶ τρισὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις, Ζωίλῳ ἥδὲ [θυ]γατρὶ
 5 Τατιαῇ κ(αὶ) νύμφῃ Κυρίλλῃ ταχυ[μ]οίροις
 κὲ ζῶν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ.

A man named Elpizon (Bunyan's 'Hopeful') erects this tomb to his wife Kyrilla, and five children (two of them his step-children, and the other three his own), and to himself, while yet alive. ['It is noteworthy that the two step-children are here called *θρεπτοί*, which is usually applied to foundlings (*Cities and Bishopr. of Phr.* pp. 147, 350, 546), and they are mentioned before his own.' W. M. R.].

1. εἶδρυνε = ἰδρυνε, cf. Meisterhans, *gramm. der att. Inschriften*, p. 24 (ed. 1). 2. Ἑλπίζων διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν ἀποκειμένην. ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς Ep. Col. i. 5' shows the inscription to be Christian. Κυρίλλῃ must be scanned Κῦρίλλῃ, as probably in v. 3, though there two long syllables are wanting, but in v. 5 we must take the word as Κῦρίλλῃ. 4. Ζωίλῳ must have the ι scanned as long. 5. Τάτιανῇ, cf. Τάτιανός cited in notes to iii. 1, and the numerous exx. of cognate names Τάτα, Ταῖς, etc. in P. Kretschmer's *Einführung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache* (Gött. 1896), pp. 348-9. τὸν θεὸν σὺ μὴ ἀδικήσεις is a Christian formula,

as is proved by W. M. R. in *Expositor*, 1888 (Oct.), p. 258 (where he has published a translation of this inscription).

['The bad metre in this (and many similar epitaphs) is due, at least in part, to the fact that they were composed of standing formulae which were rudely adapted to suit the names of the persons buried in the grave. Elpizon purchased a tombstone (perhaps in Kotiaion, the nearest large city). It did not exactly suit him, for it was adorned with a relief representing only two children and one grown up person; but it was probably the most suitable that was ready in the stock of the mason's (or artist's) yard. He took a stock epitaph in metre and turned it to his own purposes. It enabled him to give the names only of two of his five children or step-children, Zoilos and Tatiane, and he added the names of the other three (who were all daughters) on the margin of the stone. It would appear that the name Tatiane was given both to one of his own daughters and to one of his step-daughters. His only son Zoilos married Kyrilla (who bears the same name as Elpizon's wife). Both Kyrilla and Kyrillos were adopted as common names in Christian use, though occasionally employed by pagans.' W. M. R.]

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(To be continued.)

NOTES ON GREEK GRAMMAR.

I. A use of ἐγώ.

In this *Review*, vol. x., no. 8, p. 381, Prof. Arthur Platt asks whether in Greek the pronoun must be expressed when the representative first person singular, 'I' = 'anybody you like,' is employed, as in Dem. *Phil.* iii. 17; [*Xen.*] *Resp. Ath.* i. 11; ii. 11, 12. This usage runs the risk of seeming egotistic, and there is in it a familiar, or at least a free and easy tone that naturally tends to restrict it to conversation; but it does not appear that the usage is, as Prof. Platt says, 'excessively rare' in Greek. The Greeks seem to have used it with considerable freedom in dialogue, and occasionally in other compositions of a didactic nature. To judge from Jowett's translation of Plato, we use it more

frequently than the Greeks did; but this may well be due to the greater need for it in a less inflected language; for, as will appear, this 'I' is often used for the sake of perspicuity.

Though the answer about to be made to the special question propounded is not absolutely conclusive, it is hoped that the facts contributed will not be without interest on their own account.

It seems best to restrict the question to the nominative case. The oblique cases have to be expressed if they are needed at the first occurrence of this use of the first singular in a given passage; otherwise the first singular would not appear at all. The only question with regard to them would be whether the strong forms are necessarily used; and this is answered in the negative

by the first example from the *Resp. Ath.* cited above. This fact, however, does not show that the nom. may be omitted; for ἐγώ sometimes has less emphasis than ἐμοί, ἐμοί, ἐμέ ever have except with prepositions. Moreover, as intimated by Prof. Platt, we must not be misled by emphasis that exists on other accounts. It will be found that when 'I' is thus used, there is generally a contrast with some other person or persons. From such examples, of course, no inference can be drawn. When there is no other cause for emphasis, the suggestion of Dr. Jackson, reported by Prof. Platt, that 'I' means 'I, for instance' and so might lead to the use of ἐγώ, seems sound. The nature of the stress on ἐγώ is made clear by [Plat.] *Just.* 374 E, ὁφθαλμὸν ἐγὼ ἔχω δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερον ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι. Now we give the pronoun three modes of utterance: the *emphatic*, marked by various cadences; the *distinct*, but without special cadence; the *obscure*, the diphthongal character almost vanishing. The Greeks used ἐγώ regularly for the English emphatic 'I,' often for the distinct, sometimes even for the obscure. In no example that I can invent, would the representative 'I' bear the obscure utterance. Hence it would not be surprising if the Greeks settled into the fixed habit of expressing the pronoun. But the question certainly cannot be answered affirmatively on *a priori* principles. The apostle Paul (*Gal.* ii. 18) at once confronts us with εἰ γὰρ ἂν κατέλυσα ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ, παραβάτην ἔμεινόν συνιστάνω. Also (1 *Cor.* xiii. 1 ff.), εἰ ἐν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ κτέ.,—thirteen verbs without ἐγώ once. A scholiast (Westphal's *Aristoxenus*, vol. ii., p. 23, § 55, c) says concerning musical intervals: ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰβ' ἂν διέλθω τὸν ἰβ' εἰς γ.δ καὶ πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἰβ' εἰς γ.δ, ἐν μὲν τῇ εἰς γ.δ διαίρεσει γίνονται τέτταρες τριάδες. Of course these examples are not conclusive for the classical usage; but where Paul omits ἐγώ we cannot say *a priori* that Plato must have used it.

The examples I have collected are not intended to be exhaustive, but are only such as I could recall or find by a brief search. The subject is hardly of sufficient general importance to justify an irksome mechanical perusal of all the Greek authors. The only *certain* example I can now add from the orators is *Dem.* xxiii. 55, where, after remarking that the law exculpates one who has by mistake slain a friend in battle, the speaker adds καλῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἐγώ τινα τῶν ἐναντίων οἰήθεις εἶναι διέφθειρα, οὐ δίκην ὑπέχουν

ἀλλὰ συγγνώμης τυχεῖν δίκαιός εἰμι. Here we have the slayer and the slain, two pronouns side by side, hence a rhetorical contrast, and no inference can be drawn. The omission of ἐγώ in the apodosis we should in any case expect. This contrast, actual or formal, is nearly always present. The very object of this use of 'I' is often to avoid the obscurity resulting from the use of two or more indefinite pronouns. Accordingly we sometimes find ἐγώ and σύ instead of τις and ἑτερός τις, where Aristotle would use A and B, as we sometimes do; for instance, *Plat. Crat.* 385 D (after τις has threatened to cause obscurity) οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὀνόματος ἄλλην ὀρθότητα ἢ ταύτην, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἕτερον εἶναι καλεῖν ἐκάστω ὄνομα ὃ ἐγὼ ἐθέμην, σοὶ δὲ ἕτερον ὃ ἂν σύ. Similarly 386 A, οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοὶ τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί, and nearly the same words *Theaet.* 152 A. Again, *Crat.* 434 E, ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ὃ ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκείνο, σὺ δὲ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι ἐκείνο διανοοῦμαι; See also *Gorg.* 469 D, *Hipp. Maj.* 300 D, 303 B, *Legg.* iv. 719 D, xi. 913 A. In *Crat.* 385 A the contrast is between ἐγώ and everybody else: εἰ ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἵππον προσαγορεύω ὃ νῦν καλοῦμεν ἄνθρωπον κτέ. In *Phileb.* 14 D a man as one is contrasted with himself as many: ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ, Πρώταρχον, ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ κτέ. (where there is also formal contrast between 'some one' and 'me'). Sometimes the contrast is between more than two persons, as *Theaet.* 191 B (which may not be a real example); 192 D, ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον...καὶ Θεαίτητον κτέ. If any one will read rapidly the page preceding the last example, he will feel the need of a concrete case and will probably find it natural to read ἐγώ with some emphasis, although, since the other two men are introduced as objects of perception and knowledge rather than as persons, the contrast is not very marked.

Between the last example and the end of 193 are numerous instances of the omission of ἐγώ. So just after *Crat.* 434 E (quoted above), ἐγώ is omitted. Also *Theaet.* 159 C we find Ὅταν δὲ οἶνον πίνω ἡγαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς; Ναί. But further on (160 A, C) the emphatic forms are again required to express contrast. These facts appear at first sight to prove that ἐγώ was expressed or omitted just as under ordinary circumstances; but there is a flaw in the evidence. It is a principle of Greek, as of other languages, when a situation has

been assumed as a basis of discussion, it may be treated as if it were actual. Now in *Theaet.* 192 B ff., the representative ἐγώ has been introduced, and this prepares the way for the omission of ἐγώ just as it does for the use of obscure 'I' in English. Likewise in 159 C, not only has ἐγώ been used, but Socrates has, in B, explicitly made himself and Theaetetus representative persons. There is omission of ἐγώ also in *Phaed.* 99 A, εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι ἀνὲρ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, καὶ ὅσῳ καὶ νῦνα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἶην κτέ.; but the example is weakened by the fact that Socrates is making his *actual situation* a representative case. In *Theaet.* 155 B, ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ σοῦ μείζω εἶναι, then in C εἰ μὴ γὰρ δὴ ὁ πρότερον οὐκ ᾔ, the acc. ἐμέ (necessarily emphatic because of contrast with σοῦ) has introduced the illustration. Other analogous examples might be cited. The following, if it is an example at all, as I am inclined to think it is, furnishes a clear instance of the omission of ἐγώ: *Parmen.* 143 C, Ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; Ἔστιν. Καὶ αὖθις εἰπεῖν ἐν; Καὶ τοῦτο. Ἄρ' οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν εἴρηται; Ναί. Τί δ' ὅτ' αὖ ἐῖπω οὐσία καὶ ἐν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω; Πάνν γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἑκάστον ἀμφω λέγω; The use of εἴρηται renders it possible that Socrates has glided into the *actual situation* when he says ὅταν εἰπω. In *Aeschin Ctes.* § 21, an objector is supposed to say ὅτι ἡρᾶ μὴ ἀποδημήσω; 'Because I obtained an office am I not to go abroad?' Here ἐγώ is omitted; but it is possible that the orator conceives of an *office-holder* making the objection.

Although no perfectly convincing proof has been produced for classical Greek, still the facts cited taken all together leave little doubt in my mind that it was, under favourable circumstances, allowable to omit the pronoun. I am convinced that the sentence of the scholiast quoted above might have been written by Plato, and it is possible that he did write such a sentence when he made Socrates say ὅταν εἰπω οὐσία καὶ ἐν.

II. A use of καί.

Prof. Platt also calls attention to the use of καί...δὲ καί in *Xen. Oec.* vii. 21, and μὲν καί...δὲ καί in *Thuc.* i. 126 *ad fin.*, remarking that he does not remember to have seen it noticed anywhere. The usage is not entirely neglected by grammarians. Krüger, for instance, *Sprachlehre* § 69, 32, 15, mentions ὁ μὲν καί...ὁ δὲ καί and refers

to his commentary on *Thuc.* vii. 12, 1; 85, 4; viii. 47, 2; but the most he does at any of these places is to refer back to his grammar. Once when collecting evidence that πολλοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι always means 'also many others' (see *Class. Rev.* vol. v., no. 9, p. 431), I had occasion to examine this phenomenon, but did not publish the results. Perhaps it will not be useless to do so now.

It is always best to dispense, if we can, with English renderings and try to view questions of this sort from the Greek standpoint. No matter how we should render the particles nor whether we can render them at all, it may safely be assumed that the Greeks never connected a pair of words or clauses simultaneously by means of *two* conjunctions felt as such. The general statement, then, of the phenomenon under discussion would be: When one clause is connected with another, two καί's referring to each other may occur, one in each clause, even when the second clause contains δέ; or, if we assume (as we safely may for the classical period) that the δέ of the second clause is connective, we can make a more comprehensive statement including cases where δέ does not occur: Two mutual καί's may occur in two clauses already connected with each other. In the passage quoted by Prof. Platt from *Xenophon*, the first καί may be retrospective rather than prospective, so that this may not be a real example; but the phenomenon is not very rare, and it is strange that, on its account, anyone should have condemned the opening lines of Theocritus.

When one of the clauses is subordinate to the other, we can feel the force of 'also' in each clause, though we do not so use it, as *Dem.* lii. 2, δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο πῶποτε πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐδιδάσατε...οὕτω καὶ νῦν διαγινῶναι. 'I beseech you, if you ever judged also another matter on its own merits, so to render your decision also on this occasion.' *Xen. Conviv.* ii. 6, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν. 'If also any other thing, this also is learnable.' This use of καί...καί is familiar to beginners; but it does not seem certain that the Greeks felt any difference between it and the one under consideration, though the nearer we come to co-ordination the more unnatural appears our 'also...also,' as is seen in such familiar examples as *Andoc. Myst.* 140, συμφοραὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἐγένοντο οὐκ ἐλάττωες ἢ καὶ ἡμῶν (in which a relative is felt after ἦ). *Aeschin. F.L.* 41, 25, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς κατηγορίας ἡκούσατε...οὕτω

καὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας εὐτάκτως ἀκούσατε. [Plat.] *Alcib.* i. 110 D, ἔμαθον καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. *Xen. Cyrop.* viii. 2. 5, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐξειργασμένοι εἰσὶ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ παρὰ βασιλεῖ σῖτα ἐκπεποιήται. i. 6. 3, εἰκότως ἂν καὶ παρὰ θεῶν πρακτικώτερος εἴη ὥσπερ καὶ ἀνθρώπων. Entering the field of complete co-ordination, where 'also...also' is hardly bearable, we find, as in the examples cited by Prof. Platt and by Krüger, *Plat. Phaed.* 61 E, ἥδη γὰρ ἐγωγε καὶ Φιλολόων ἤκουσα...ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν. [Plat.] 'Ἀλκυών iii., συχρὰ μὲν καὶ δι' ἀπορίαν, συχρὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ νηπιότητα φρενῶν. Analogous is καί...καί—δέ, as *Dem.* vii. 5, τῶν καὶ πρὶν ὑπεσχημένων καὶ νῦν δὲ πραττόντων. For τε...δὲ καὶ and τε...καί—δέ, see below. (These combinations appear to have led some to believe that in such expressions as καὶ στρατηγὸν δέ, it is δέ that means 'also.') The second καί, just as when one of the clauses is subordinate, may be omitted, as *Plat. Theaet.* 142 B, χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸν αἰρεῖ τὸ νόσημα. Or the second καὶ may immediately precede some other word closely connected with the emphatic one, as *Plat. Menon* 94 E, ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει βᾶδιόν ἐστι κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εἰ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνν. Examples containing πολλοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι (where καί is certainly not like that in πολλοὶ καὶ καλοί) exhibit, of course, the same varieties, as *Aeschin. Tim.* 15, 25, κατὰ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, οὐχ ἤκιστα δὲ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα. *Xen. Consciv.* ii. 9, ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον, καὶ ἐν οἷς δὲ ἡ παῖς ποιεῖ. *Anab.* vi. 4. 4, ξύλα δὲ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, πάνν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ναυπηγήσιμα (second καὶ omitted). So *Plat. Parmen.* 133 B, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε (where μέγιστον renders καὶ needless). *Aeschin. Tim.* 6, 38, πολλὰ πὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα καταγέλαστα πέπρακται...ἐν δὲ ὃ καὶ διηγέσθαι ὑμῖν βούλομαι (second καὶ shifted). Here καταγέλαστα, like ναυπηγήσιμα a few lines above, has no καὶ connecting it with πολλὰ.

It is also a significant fact that the negative of καί...καί—δέ is not οὔτε...οὔτε—δέ, but οὐδὲ...οὐδὲ—δέ, as *Xen. Anab.* i. 8. 20, καὶ οὐδὲν μέντοι οὐδὲ τοῦτον παθεῖν ἔφασαν, οὐδ' ἄλλος δὲ ἔπαθεν οὐδεὶς οὐδέν, showing that the negative of the first καὶ is felt rather as our 'also not' than as our

'neither.' So *Isaeus* iii. 50, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ' ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνον οὐδ' ἄλλον δὲ κτέ. (where some write δὲ, others γε, against the MSS.). In like manner the first καὶ may become οὐδέ when the second is omitted, as *Xen. Cyrop.* vii. 2. 20, τοῦτον μὲν οὐδ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι περιγενέσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰμὶ ἀπληστος καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. Here καί before ἐγὼ is the affirmative of οὐδέ before αὐτός, and the ὥσπερ clause has no καί as it might have.

Taking into consideration all the facts adduced, we are justified in believing that to the Greek mind καί...καί in co-ordinate clauses connected by δέ was not essentially different from καί...καί where one clause is subordinate to the other.

There is a usage which at first glance might seem to militate against this view, though in fact it rather lends additional support. I refer to the fact that we sometimes find, not καί but τε in the first clause, followed by δὲ καὶ and καί—δέ, as *Plat. Euthyphro* 3 E, σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν. *Xen. Cyrop.* v. 3. 40, οἱ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ πάντες δὲ οἱ σωφρονούντες. The combination τε...καί, it is true, cannot be used when one clause is subordinated to the other; but this is for the simple reason that prospective τε is of the nature of prospective μὲν to a sufficient degree to require a corresponding retrospective conjunction or conscious asyndeton, so that when the clauses are co-ordinate we not rarely find τε...δέ where there is no καί and no question of καί, and consequently there can be no obstacle to the insertion of 'also' or 'even'; so that in τε...δέ καί it is δέ and not καί that is paired with τε.

Prof. Platt elsewhere in his article points out the fact that τε or καί, meaning 'both,' may be followed by asyndeton. This is the view I have always taken of the passages he cites. In my edition of the *Antigone* τε is omitted in v. 673, but the note on v. 296 is: 'καί, both. The asyndeton of the next two clauses, with the subject (τόδε after τοῦτο as in 673) repeated, keeps up the force of the series which καί introduces.' To the same effect Prof. D'Ooge on v. 673: 'π ό λ ε ι ς τ ε: as though καί or τε were to follow. So καί in 296.'

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