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Further Note on Plato, *Rep.* X. 597 E

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The Classical Review / Volume 10 / Issue 07 / October 1896, pp 325 - 326

DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00204514, Published online: 27 October 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X00204514

How to cite this article:

B. Bosanquet (1896). Further Note on Plato, *Rep.* X. 597 E. The Classical Review, 10, pp 325-326 doi:10.1017/S0009840X00204514

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days of their youth; and they had been severed from the leaden weights, as I may call them, *with which they are born into the world,* etc.; and in the last edition of his translation he made only slight changes in this passage, reading, '*which like leaden weights were attached to them at their birth.*' Davies and Vaughan (1879) translate: 'But, I proceeded, if from earliest childhood these characters had been shorn and stripped of these leaden, *earth-born weights*'; and similarly Mr. Purves (1883): 'Had their nature been docked at first, and shorn of its *congenital infirmities,*' and 'circumcised of these leaden scales of its *nativity.*'

To criticise at length the rendering of a single clause of Plato might seem trifling, but here the authority of Stallbaum seems to have carried later interpreters away from the truth in an unusual and instructive fashion. The clause has long caused trouble. Ficinus translated (edition of 1518): *si ab hoc ingenio statim a pueritia amputentur quae sunt generationis affinia seu plumbea pondera*, etc.; but Serranus, in the edition of Stephanus (1542): *si ab huiusmodi natura, inquam, statim ab ineunte aetate amputentur ea quae ab ortu ipso illis cognata sunt, veluti plumbea pondera*, etc. But I do not think that any

doubt of the meaning can remain after the examination of the passage in connexion with half a dozen others; Plato is simply continuing the contrast between τὸ γινόμενον or γένεσις and τὸ ὄν or οὐσία. Cf. 485 B δ' ἀν...δηλοῖ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰὲς οὐσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, and 508 D ὅταν μὲν, οὐ καταλάμπει ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ τὸ ὄν..., ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενον τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, 518 C τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος...ἐκ τοῦ γιγνόμενου περιεκτέον εἶναι, ἔως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν κ.τ.λ., 521 D τί ἂν ὄν εἴη—μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνόμενου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; 525 B σοφῶ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτεόν εἶναι, γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, 526 E Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι, προσήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, οὐ προσήκει, and 534 A δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν. Thus in the passage before us τὰς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς must mean *what is akin to BECOMING*, in contrast with *being*. Whether we say that the attraction to the feminine *μολυβδίδας* was in Plato's mind or due to a copyist, is immaterial. For the genitive with συγγενεῖς, any one may compare 403 A, 487 A, 554 D, 560 A, etc.

T. D. SEYMOUR.

FURTHER NOTE ON PLATO, *REP.* X. 597 E.

PERHAPS I may be permitted to illustrate my suggested interpretation a little further, by pointing out in what way a really important question is involved in the difference of opinion between Mr. Mayor and myself. It is my conviction that the formal theory of separate ideas ought not to be presupposed in the interpretation of Plato where it is not quite explicitly insisted on in the text. To Mr. Mayor it seems quite natural to refer a substantive βασιλέως, occurring without any sign of differentiation, to one peculiar grade of reality as normally distinguished by Plato into idea, thing, or imitation. To me, holding no doubt a different conception of the place of the so-called 'ideas' in Plato's mind, this reference appears inconceivably harsh and uncalled for, and I am quite unable to read the passage as Platonic Greek if I force that meaning upon it.

To my argument that βασιλέως occurs without any distinguishing mark (such as ὁ ἔστι κλῆν, κλῆνς ὄντως οὐσης, ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσα) Mr. Mayor answers by insisting on

the words καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας in this sentence, and parallel expressions elsewhere. I may most plainly state my point, which he does not appear to me to see, by asking whether Plato could possibly have written in the present sentence τρίτος τις ἀπὸ κλῆνς κ. τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, supposing that he had been speaking of the carpenter and not of the poet. Is it not clear that the whole emphasis of the sentence would thus be destroyed? The words καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας only set the standard, and when an ordinary substantive is used along with them it is bound to justify its position. This it can only do, if its reference involves a distinction between three objects bearing the same name, by some indication to which of the three it is to be referred. But on the view which still seems to me the simple and natural one, if we read the dialogue attentively and continuously, the differences of reality here implied are not between objects of the same name, but between the king as such, on the one hand, and the oligarch, democrat, or tyrant, repre-

senting the successive removes of moral degradation, on the other. When thus read, the sentence under discussion has at once its full rhetorical and logical weight in every term. We have not to ask 'what kind of a king.' The word king fills the part assigned to it at once with appropriate emphasis.

It is a strange suggestion that in denying the king in this passage to be 'ideal' in the sense required by the contrast with the other kinds of king, I admit of his being an actual Xerxes or Pausanias. I take him to be the βασιλεύς of books iv., viii., and ix., in the account of whom there is no allusion to the theory of separate ideas. All the characters there described are regarded as forming a causally connected series, and it is impossible that the king should be there regarded as an abstract idea any more than the tyrant. But he is treated as nearer to reality in a different and much profounder sense, viz. that his character, that of the good man in general (587 E, where just and unjust men are substituted for king and tyrant as a matter of course), has the note of harmony and constancy which is the criterion of reality (585 C).

From the first and second books, in which the tyrant was accepted as the type of the unjust man (344 A), and the unjust man was alleged to be pursuing a πᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον (362 A), there follows the necessity of showing that the king, who is to the good man as the tyrant to the bad man, has the

real kinship with ἀλήθεια. This is finally shown in 587 E, and from that point the connection of ἀλήθεια with the king as opposed to the tyrant is taken as obvious and necessary. As is hinted even in 336 A and explained at length in 568 A ff., the poet tends to go with the tyrant, or deteriorated moral personality. And so, I suggest, in 597 E the same connection is reiterated as generally corroborating that disparaging view of imitation which the paradoxical statement of the doctrine of separate ideas has made probable. It is to be remembered that the special ground for recurring to the question of imitation in book x. is not the doctrine of ideas, but the psychology of the soul (595 B ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διήρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδη). It is thus quite natural that the language drawn from the theory of ideas should be corroborated by an appeal to the previous psychological investigation, in which a very similar terminology, that of 'removes,' had already become familiar.

I regard the statement of the doctrine of ideas in *Republic*, x. as paradoxical and exceptional, intended to bring out certain points in the criticism of imitation. I do not believe that any such doctrine formed a permanent background of Plato's thought, and consequently I feel unable to draw it into the interpretation of special passages except where Plato himself takes pains to make it clear that some such paradox is for the moment in his mind.

B. BOSANQUET.

CORRECTIONS IN THE TEXT OF THUCYDIDES VI.

C. 35, 1 ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ ἐρίδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν ὡς... οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ἔστιν ἃ λέγει, τοῖς δ' ἐ, εἰ καὶ ἔλθοιεν, τί ἂν δράσειαν.

For ΛΕΓΕΙΤΟΙC read ΛΕΓΟΙΤΟΟΙ = λέγοιτο, οἱ. For the sequence οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ἔστιν ἃ λέγοιτο see Goodwin, *M.T.* § 690.

C. 37, 2 μόλις ἂν μοι δοκοῦσιν, εἰ πόλιν ἐτέραν τοσαύτην ὅσαι Συράκουσαι εἰσιν ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες καὶ ὁμοροὶ οἰκήσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖντο.

For οἰκήσαντες read οἰκίσαντες; the sense required is not 'settle in' a place previously existing, but 'found' a new settlement. With this slight change, there is no need to bracket either ἔλθοιεν or ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες.

C. 64, 1 βουλόμενοι... στρατόπεδον καταλαμβάνειν ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ καθ' ἡσυχίαν, εἰδότες οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες, [καὶ *del.* Reiske] εἰ... ἐκβιάζοιεν.

Cf. c. 66, 1 καθ' ἡσυχίαν καθίσαν τὸ στράτευμα ἐς χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον. For δυνηθέντες[καὶ] i.e. δυνηθεντεCICAI read δυνηθεντεCICA<ΘICA>ι, i.e. δυνηθέντες καθίσαν, εἰ... ἐκβιάζοιεν, sc. τὸ στράτευμα. The blunder (*lipography*) is an old one, as the scholiast tries to explain the text with καὶ in it.

C. 83, 4 τὴν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦκειν... καταστήσομενοι.

Stahl reads ἦκομεν, since the latter part of the sentence does not correspond to anything that Euphemus, the Athenian envoy to Camarina, has previously said.

Read τὴν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνΘΑΔΕ<ΦΑΜΕΝ>ΔΙΑ κ.τ.λ., i.e. ...εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε <φάμεν> διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦκειν... καταστήσομενοι. Thus τὴν ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν)(τὰ ἐνθάδε;