which all the virtues of womanhood were not sufficient to procure a career of respectability."

Southern "sentiment could wink at miscegenation but would not legalize it." The black woman was at the mercy of the white rapist; and even today, according to creditable southern white witnesses, for every case of the rape of a white woman by a black man there are many cases of the rape of black women by white men. In short, the degradation of the Negro's family life through slavery debased the domestic life of the white.

The volume closes with a chapter on the "White Family in the Old South" and another in which the "Effects of the Civil War" on household institutions are considered. These may not here be summarized. Dr. Calhoun is producing a monumental work. The *Social History of the American Family* will take its place, I venture to say, as one of the chief contributions which several decades of active sociological research have yielded.

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A League of Nations. By HENRY NOEL BRAILSFORD. Revised edition. London: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. vii+349. \$1.55.

This is a book that no one can afford to miss who cares to understand the tremendous issue of our time. The author has had unusual opportunities for knowing the facts of the European situation and has used his opportunities with great diligence and understanding, and, above all, in a judicial spirit. Many will disagree with the book at certain points for the simple reason that the judicial spirit has been driven out by the spirit of warlike hostility. In fact anything like a judicial attitude toward the contending parties in this war to many now seems a vice rather than a virtue. But whatever the effect of unmitigated hostility and blind partisanship upon fighting men, it is clear that at the end of the war there will be need for counselors who are capable of judicial discrimination.

Mr. Brailsford is far too judicial to extenuate the evils that have been perpetrated in this war by the Germans—evils of the very sort which a league of nations aims to prevent. Germany, he says "can be acquitted of crime only if it is convicted of madness," "in denouncing Prussian militarism no words are too harsh," the work of the school of

Treitschke "is written in blood and fire across a continent, and its memory will be execrated with ever-increasing vehemence."

If this is to prove in fact "a war against war," if the purposes for which America forsook her traditional policy of aloofness from European contentions, and of which her President has been the most eloquent and consistent exponent, are not to be abandoned, the fierce passions of this troubled hour must not prevent us from farseeing and judicial exercise of intelligence. The conflict between passionate action and calm and judicial intelligence was never sharper. The period of action that creates the opportunity for the constructive exercise of intelligence must not pervert the intelligence without which that opportunity will have been so dearly bought in vain.

The second edition of this work was required by the large and swift events that had intervened since the first appeared: Russia has overthrown the Romanoffs and entered upon the turbulent struggle for the establishment of thoroughly democratic institutions, the German Reichstag is striving with some promise of success to win supremacy for the representatives of the people, a series of revelations is shattering the old secret processes of diplomacy, and America has thrown herself into the war, declaring that she seeks nothing for herself alone but seeks for the world the final discrediting of the madness of war by which ambitious rulers and greedy trusts and cartels seek at such appalling cost to their fellow-men to gain glory and wealth, and to substitute therefor the rule of reason among nations.

The present war is the culmination of rivalry between Pan-German and the Pan-Slavic programs. These were predominantly programs of economic development, though also designed to realize national and dynastic ambitions. It is utterly erroneous to imagine that this war is due to inborn racial peculiarities of any of the peoples engaged. It is due to a type of ambition that is characteristic of exploiters in all lands, seconded by peculiar geographic and historical conditions, belated social customs that have survived from the dark ages, and political organization that enables a ruling class so to educate the youth of a nation and to prostitute its art, its literature, and its science that they become tools of war.

The *Pan-Slavic* plan involved the withdrawal of the southern Slavs, under the leadership of Servia, from their vassalage to Austria-Hungary and their attachment to the Slavic league. This would have effectually barred the southeastward development of the economic and political dominance of the Central Powers and would have substituted for it a

Slavic supremacy. The *Pan-German* in its most promising form involved the cementing of the southern Slavs into a third group within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which in that way would become a triad instead of a dual monarchy. This would have given the Central Powers a solid dominance stretching away to the only great fields of economic development that are open to European powers unhindered by contact with the baffling maritime power of Britain.

Archduke Ferdinand, popular with the Slavs, was the trump card of the Pan-Germans in playing for the solidification of the south Slavs in a triad Hapsburg monarchy and the permanent subordination of Serbia to the Central Powers. Hence his murder.

This was the "appeal" of the Pan-Slavic movement to "force." Some answering pressure from Austria was inevitable, and by the standards of historic conventionality was justifiable. The only question was whether the action of Austria and the reaction of Russia and the Pan-Slavs would be moderate enough to avoid the precipitation of a general European war. It was at this point that Earl Gray sought to establish mediation and that the German Chancellor sent to Vienna the telegram which contained the following words: "Should the Austro-Hungarian government refuse all mediation we are confronted with a conflagration in which England would go against us. . . . The political prestige of Austria-Hungary, the honor of her arms, and her justified claims against Serbia can be sufficiently safeguarded by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. We must therefore urgently and emphatically ask the Vienna Cabinet to consider the acceptance of mediation on the proposed conditions. Responsibility for the consequences which may otherwise arise must be extraordinarily severe for Austria-Hungary and ourselves." Some hours later the German Chancellor sent a further message which concluded thus: "As an ally we must refuse to be drawn into a world-conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice."

After the severe action of Austria had been taken, war was almost inevitable, but there seems still to have been hope that it might be at worst a small war, confined to Austria on one side and Serbia and Russia on the other. This issue for a time appeared to hang upon the question whether Russia would mobilize against Austria without at the same time mobilizing on the German frontier. The war parties in both Germany and Russia were eager to come to grips. But the Tsar, and the liberals in Germany, and the German government itself appear to have retained some hope of avoiding the general conflagration. The

German government could hardly say to Russia: You may mobilize against Austria, my ally, provided you do not mobilize on the German frontier. But the German Chancellor did give to the British and French governments assurances that Germany would not mobilize if Russia confined her mobilization to the Austrian frontier, thus enabling Britain and France to bring pressure upon their Russian ally to avoid mobilization in the north. This they did. And the instruction of the German Chancellor to his Ambassador at Petrograd, which has been represented as a brutal threat, ran as follows: "Please point out again to M. Sazanoff, that any fresh development of the Russian measures of mobilization would oblige us to mobilize. It would then be almost impossible to avoid a European War." The German Chancellor, according to Mr. Brailsford "was fighting a battle with his own party, and he knew very clearly at what point it would pass beyond his control. It would become unmanageable if Russia mobilized on the East Prussian front."

And Russia did so mobilize. The Russian war party, disobeying the Tsar and lying to its British and French allies, crossed the Rubicon.

If the words of the German government have any doubt as to its real intentions, these, says Mr. Brailsford, are "removed by a simple reference to what it did. It knew officially on the 29th that Russia was mobilizing against Austria. It refrained from countermeasures. It waited till the 31st when it learned officially that Russian mobilization was general (i.e., included the German frontier). It then sent its ultimatum, and after waiting for a reply (which meant nearly a day's delay), itself mobilized on August 1. The facts make it clear that Russia might with impunity have mobilized against Austria alone. Had the Tsar been obeyed when on the evening of the 29th he ordered the general mobilization to be stopped, there would have been no (general European) war." The Russian military aristocracy has in part answered for its sins.

Mr. Brailsford adds: "Our own popular view, that one evil will, the will of the Rulers of Germany, deliberately planned the world-war, must be discarded with all its consequences. Two war parties, both of them unscrupulous, acted and reacted on each other, within a European system which fostered antagonisms and thwarted good-will. Our problem is to change that system."

But the historical question as to the origin of the war is wholly secondary to the practical problem: How is it to end? England, says Mr. Brailsford, entered the war saying "never again," and "this is a war to end war," but owing to the mental change induced by years of fighting she is now disposed to look forward to a reorganization of international

politics adjusted to the fact that the world is governed by force. "Nations cannot set out to injure each other without organizing and perpetuating hate." We have come to desire not only security for the future but also revenge for the past. And we lean toward a limited alliance against the Central Powers rather than an all-inclusive league of nations, and especially to an economic "war after the war." Such a policy promises no end of militarism but a perpetration of its burdens and horrors for all the nations, and for Germany and Austria, if it succeeds, an impoverishment that will fall more heavily upon the working people than on the packers and financiers. "A more repugnant use of force could hardly be conceived. Is there no alternative? Are we prepared on conference and conciliation to found a league of nations, and to admit (since that is their wish) the central empires to its society?"

"The proposal of a trade war after peace does not surprise our critics and detractors in Germany: it merely confirms their worst and most malicious interpretation of our policy and motives. The man who causes it to be said of us that our aim in this war was something lower than a concern for the public law and the liberties of Europe inflicts on us an injury more lasting than any defeat." The Paris resolutions threatening the boycott of the Central Powers and their exclusion from sources of raw material may be as justifiable as our participation in the present military struggle, provided it is used as a means of compelling Germany to right the wrongs she has done and take her place as an orderly member of the society of nations. Beyond that it would be as unjustifiable as continuance of the war of shot and shell.

Mr. Brailsford ascribes to America's participation in the solution of the world-problem decisive importance. "A policy of trust, with America to back it, ceases to be an idealistic folly." "Her conversion to the doctrine of international duty brings the League of Peace among workaday realities." No power could guarantee, and that of America would not, "a peace which is based on exclusions and boycotts. Her offer is to insure the idea of international right." May she not be so debauched as to disappoint the faith of her English friends. We in this country shall be exposed to a steam roller of emotional propaganda and suppression of free discussion, designed to wean us from the high aims with which we entered "the war against war" and to fasten upon us militarism and the brutal commercialism which is the chief animating spirit of militarism and the most sordid shame of nations.

It is useless to think that we can provide for permanent peace by settling the specific problems that may be pressing at the close of the present war. We must create a system that will provide for the settle-

ment of questions that will arise in the future, questions of the kind that hitherto have caused wars. The social evolution of Europe must involve many changes. We have seen how forgotten races rise to national consciousness, how backward races leap, by industrial and educational development, into the position to claim their rights, and how sundered races discover their affinity. Future emigration may make new problems, the decay of an ancient empire, the bankruptcy of a semicivilized state, the discovery of a new source of some raw material in great demand, the invention of a new industrial process; any of these is likely to call for readjustment of the kind that has often led to war. We must not force upon the "have nots" among the nations and parvenu powers the will of the "haves" to stereotype things as they are. Provision for adjudication of future problems "involves some diminution of the arrogance and self-sufficiency of the sovereign state."

While we cannot settle, once for all, every question that could ever cause international strife, the obvious moment to begin the institution of the system for substituting conference for force "is when all the nations are assembled in council for the settlement of this war. If this moment is neglected, each side will see in this neglect a fresh reason for resuming, with the old suspicions, the old precautions."

Mr. Brailsford proceeds to discuss a long list of specific problems that will call for consideration at the close of the war, problems of the minor nationalities, alienated provinces, and coveted trade routes. With reference to each he makes intelligent and fair-minded suggestions that merit deliberate consideration.

The two overshadowing questions are: First, shall the naval supremacy of Great Britain be continued and established? Second, shall Germany be allowed a sphere of commercial and colonial activity commensurate with her population and ability?

Mr. Brailsford states that the people of Britain are by no means ready to consent to yielding their naval position. Later a generation reared under the influence of an established league of peace may bring itself to this sacrifice. Till it has been made the world-order will resemble the order of a pioneer community that rejoices that it has courts but in which individuals still think it prudent to carry a six-shooter. Meantime it will be easier for Englishmen than for Germans to be confident that the power of England will always be used to uphold the authority of the court. And Britain must accept the doctrine that the infringement of the rights and privileges of neutrals on the high seas which is involved in drastic use of sea power is intolerable in a war undertaken by the single will and for the single interest of any one nation. "It is,

on the other hand, expedient for civilization to preserve the right to make this drastic use of sea power, provided that civilized peoples as a whole have the means of determining whether any given war is really waged in the common interest."

The sea power of England, which her geographic position renders indispensable to her "until the world has changed not merely its laws but its habits of thinking," enables her not only to continue to expand her empire, but also to veto the expansion of any continental rival. There is experience to indicate that Germany will consent to the continuance of British naval supremacy if it is not employed in a selfish and illiberal frustration of the legitimate activities of other nations. But, says Mr. Brailsford, "it is precisely this opposition to German expansion which in our generation has perpetuated Prussian militarism," for it left to Germany no satisfactory opening for expansion except the *Mittel-Europa* plan, which demanded force. Britain will use her overseas gains during the present war as pawns with which to purchase the restoration of Poland and Lorraine, or Servia; then her sea power will in fact have triumphed over Prussian militarism. But if she says our colonials have purchased these colonies with their blood and we will not restore them, then far greater quantities of British blood must flow on European fields and the responsibility of perpetuating the burdens and perils of the old order will rest heavily on the shoulders of the island kingdom that entered the war in order to end that ancient and evil order. Even the extension over *Mittel-Europa* of the German commercial system, its enterprising banks, its national system of production and exchange, followed as it would be by the German socialistic trade-union, "the speeding up of these Eastern lands to the rhythm of German work," is a more constructive ideal than any schemes of "war after the war." The *Mittel-Europa* project indeed is a scheme "full of menace to the world" and one "that cannot be fitted into any framework of a league of nations." The like is not true of German colonial expansion. "The commercial policy of Germany in her colonies is, moreover, as enlightened as our own and far more liberal than that of certain other colonizing powers." Not only is there no tariff preference for German over foreign goods, but the administration invariably welcomes the foreign merchant. Her government of the natives may not equal that of England today, with all her colonial experience. Neither is it the worst, not so bad as pictured, and was improving.

The extension of German control in the French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonies in Africa has received disinterested and intelligent advo-

cacy in England, before the war, as a means of improving the condition of the natives. Shall we refuse to the most prolific and most energetic of West European peoples any share in the vast undertaking to organize modern economic life in the backward regions of the world, doing so at the cost of the lives of half a million English youth in merciless prolongation of the war and at the peril of all those high hopes for which we have bidden men to fight, or will England accept instead well-grounded hope of "an advance from the era of force to the era of international organization, the gratitude of liberated nationalities, the respect of her Allies and even of her enemies?"

One of the strongest parts of this book is that in which Mr. Brailsford argues that the league of nations must have a constructive economic policy. "Peace must mean something more positive than the existence side by side of nations which just contrive to avoid bloodshed. It must come to mean for us some conception of a worldwide society, within which a sense of solidarity may grow up." Of the two great causes of war it must remove not only the first, the failure to recognize nationality, but also the second, the failure to recognize commercial freedom. "A basis of force is indispensable as the world exists today, and a league which was not prepared to use concerted force to repress anarchic force would hardly be worth creating." But "unless the nations who compose it can look upon the league with a sense of gratitude, they will never come to feel loyalty toward it. It must be their benefactor before it can hope to command their obedience. If it is ever regarded merely as an overwhelming association of forces too strong for resistance it will, even at the height of its power, bear the seeds of dissolution within itself. Nations must think of it as the once sundered fragments of nations, think of the United Kingdom, of United Italy, of the German Empire. It would be futile to propose at this stage anything resembling the immense advantage of economic unity and complete internal freedom of trade which the United States, the United Kingdom, the German Zollverein, and United Italy were able to offer to their component states. But something of the kind we must offer. Certain interests imagine that they can derive immense gains from a policy of commercial egoism. To some groups of financiers it would be profitable. Against them we must appeal, not only to the need of escape from the waste of armaments and the woe of wars, but also to the need of a more general prosperity based on commercial freedom." The surest way of keeping the league together will be to attach to membership in it economic advantages so evident and so large that no sane nation will venture to forfeit them. An economic

boycott of a self-willed power might, if the world were united, avail as effectively as war to reduce it to reason. That is true only on one condition: "Before committing its offence it must be enjoying profitable economic intimacy with its neighbors, instead of moving toward the conception of national economic independence." This implies at least "most favored nation treatment" toward all members of the league. "No league of peace can be formed until the idea of 'the war after the war' is definitely negated."

Mr. Brailsford ends his book with a detailed discussion of the requirements of a working constitution for the league. Of all its interesting provisions the one most interesting is that for "the representation of peoples." If it is only a league of governments the nations will not be brought into touch. Probably the only way out is to adopt a system of representation in the great council of the league which will give play not merely to national interests but to opinions that cut across the lines of nationality. The council would come to represent, not a mere compromise between states, but the real opinion of the population of Europe, provided its members were elected as liberals, conservatives, and socialists. Let each five millions of population represented in a national parliament send a delegate to the international parliament—or twice that ratio as might be determined. Let England's nine be chosen, not to represent a single majority party in England, but by a system of proportional representation so as to reflect the balance of English parties and opinions. In time votes of the council would come to be looked upon, not as victories for this or that nation, but for the ideas that are to organize the united and co-operating world.

If we fail to organize for enduring peace "we have failed in the only aim that could compensate the world for these years of heroism and misery, of endurance and slaughter. The settlement of the war and the creation of the league are not two separate problems. They are a single organic problem. The league cannot be based on a settlement that merely registers the claims of successful force." The settlement of the war must be the preparation for the league.

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A Soldier's Confidences with God. By GIOSIU BORSI. New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1918. Pp. xxii+362. \$1.00.

This volume consists of meditations by a lieutenant in the Italian army. He was killed in action on November 10, 1915. The volume