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Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Royal United Services Institution. Journal

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19>

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Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: T. Miller Maguire M.A., LL.D. (1904) The “new Pacific” from a Strategic Point of View, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 48:316, 631-651, DOI: [10.1080/03071840409418330](https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840409418330)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840409418330>

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THE "NEW PACIFIC" FROM A STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW.¹

By T. MILLER MAGUIRE, M.A., LL.D. (*Barrister-at-Law*).

Friday, 18th March, 1904.

Field-Marshal the Right Hon. F. S., Earl ROBERTS, V.C., K.G., K.P.,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., C.C.I.E., etc., in the Chair.

THIS lecture was originally intended to have been delivered on Monday, the 8th of February. For several reasons I am very glad indeed that I was not called upon to address you on that occasion. One reason you will all appreciate at once, and that is, that on the 8th of February we could not possibly have had the presence, as Chairman, of one of the most distinguished of living soldiers, the noble lord whom I have the honour of addressing; one who is not only a theoretical soldier and a writer of history, but who is also a maker of history. He has conducted the operations of the most famous of all armies that ever manœuvred in any part of the world, the Army of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The services he has rendered to his country in India proper, in Afghanistan, and in South Africa, are celebrated.

It is a curious coincidence that ever since the very dawn of history it has been a material object with all great leaders of the human race to acquire influence, if possible, over the territory in the great central Asiatic peninsula, so remarkable for its ancient art and for its various populations and religions, and where was probably the origin of all European culture. It has been their object always to get possession of Hindustan. Since the Middle Ages it has been the object of every European race also to get control whether by the Mediterranean and Red Sea, or overland by the Euphrates Valley, or by the South African route, of its wealth and its unique strategical command. It is a curious historical coincidence that for a lecture on the New Pacific, or as it may be called after the events of the last few days, the "Newest Pacific," we have in our Chair a military chief who has reversed the normal course of invasion of India from the north-west, by marching on Kabul and Kandahar from the Indus, and has also secured for us the possession of the South African key to the East. The fact that we have Lord Roberts in the Chair justified the postponement of the lecture.

¹ This lecture was delivered extempore and illustrated by large wall maps, but it can be followed in any good atlas.

Another reason is, that a considerable amount of history has been made since the 8th of February. Strange to say, on that very day we had a most striking modern illustration of sea power, the first sea fight in the war with Japan and Russia. The war between the great island Power of the Far East, and the greatest land Power of the West has now been going on some six weeks, and it must be interesting and satisfactory to members of this Institution to know that so far they have no reason to alter their opinions or to apologise for the warnings which again and again in this room they have given to their fellow countrymen. I say that the war in the Pacific between the island Power Japan and the continental Power Russia has verified the most ancient oracles of time in the most striking manner conceivable within these six weeks.

What are the lessons of history and of strategy most invariably set forth here and everywhere, set forth in the words of the ablest historians, set forth by Alexander the Great, set forth by Julius Cæsar, by the Spaniards at the beginning of their power, and by the great American Mahan, in his explanation of embodiment of sea power in our Nelson. What are the lessons? The first is: Let no nation expect to be great that is not always prepared and ready on a just occasion of arming. Supposing Japan had not been prepared and ready on the 8th of February last, what would the position of Japan have been compared with its present position? In this hall always the first idea of the Council of this Institution and of the speakers has been to pray all persons, political and military, who are responsible for the four-hundred millions of the human race under the British Crown, to make it their first business—leaving aside all party, political, and other considerations—to ask this question, and to get a proper answer:—Are we ready to talk with our enemies in the gate *now*; not waiting on Providence, but now? If Japan had not been ready on the 8th of February, the position would have been very different now. That is one strategic lesson which has been illustrated more fully by the war since this lecture was postponed. It was explained by Lord Bacon in his essay on "The True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," in the year 1612. I wonder whether there are any gentlemen in this room who have not read that essay. If so, I would strongly advise every gentleman, and lady too, to read it forthwith, and most attentively. It applies now exactly as it applied in the days of Queen Elizabeth and James I., when their ancestors were commencing that destruction of the Spanish Empire in our narrow seas, which Admiral Dewey consummated at Manila in the Pacific in 1898. That lesson is, that the command of both Indies—America at that time was known as one of the Indies—the command of both Indies, the Far East and the Far West, is but incidental to the command of the sea, and that the principal dowry of Great Britain was the command of the sea. Both of those verities were announced in the year 1612 by the greatest of Englishmen in the realms of science and philosophy, and we repeat them to-day before one of the most famous British soldiers. "To be master of the sea is an abridgement of a monarchy." Why? Because as Bacon explains, very few Powers are entirely inland. Now, Russia is not entirely inland, for you will see on the large map of Asia, all these ports and bays from Kamchatka to the Yalu. Had Russia been wholly inland, the fight between Russia and Japan would have been a fight between the whale and the elephant. But as Lord

Bacon says, most Powers somewhere touch the sea, and thence can be harassed by sea power; and a bone of contention between the great land Power and the new sea Power was a peninsula, as has been the case in many a former war. Lord Bacon goes on to say that inso-much as all Powers are not wholly inland, but in some places touch the sea, he, who is a master of the sea, can take as much or as little of the war as he pleases. He can assault his enemy's lines of communications; he can threaten his enemy's forces in the peninsula; he can make raids; he can embarrass the enemy's commerce; he can excite ill-will among the people subject to his enemy's rule, especially if they are a great distance from the centre of his own State; and he can take as much or as little of the war as he pleases. The insular sea Power as long as it can feed its people and retains naval command, is, on the other hand, invulnerable. Therefore, not only is an insular sea Power in a position to defy invasion, but it can also harass, distress, worry, and exhaust a great land Power, however great, till it makes peace. These two lessons of strategy, whether in the East or in the West, have been continually preached in this Institution. In fact, they can be learned in any school, except an English fashionable public school. They are taught in the United States' schools by the shores of both Atlantic and Pacific, how, for example, whereas Spain could not injure England in 1588, the English singled the fringe of the King of Spain's beard from Cadiz to Portobello.

Now another strategic lesson, that there is not the slightest use of an insular Power, or any other form of sea Power, being content with sea power alone. Even if it be not an almost universal empire like the British, with subjects in every part of the world, it must have means to be able to supplement its command of the sea by efficient forces ready to land at once, complete in everything needful for a soldier; not expeditions to land and then to play the fool, wondering what kind of weapons they will get next or to retreat, but to land in a business-like effective manner, armed *cap-à-pie*, fit for such enterprises as they have in hand, and able to stick to the business until the enemy be worried into peace, or at any rate seriously embarrassed. This doctrine was preached here for twenty years by many lecturers, and I say that the lesson of this war so far is not only that you must be prepared to crush an enemy mercilessly and continually at sea, but must also be prepared to follow up that success by an effective land expedition. An empire like ours — or any empire in any age — could not carry out its purpose, and no one knows that better than the noble lord in the Chair, by mere command of the sea. In the 17th and 18th centuries, we followed up our exploits at sea by constant expeditions to every part of the trans-oceanic territories of our enemies. In the time of our wars with Spain and Holland, we followed up our sea power by expeditions to India, America, Africa, and so forth. The same thing occurred in the Roman Empire. Mere passive defence would never have exhausted the Carthaginians, even if the Romans had the command of the Mediterranean. This had to be followed up by an attack on Africa itself and Hannibal was beaten at Zama. Hence, so far, we have had three strategic lessons in the war in the Far East. One, that no nation can expect to be great that is not ready on a just occasion of arms. Secondly, that the command of the sea is the epitome of greatness. Thirdly, that command of the sea must be supplemented at once by having ready a sufficient number of forces for

expeditionary offensive purposes. These wars, however, whether in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, or the Pacific, may be protracted. You must not imagine that you are suddenly going to catch by the throat and throttle a great Power. Napoleon was in Moscow fighting against Russia in 1812. The Russians were in Paris in 1814. It is not our business here to take sides with either Japan or Russia; we have not the least prejudice one way or another. We merely discuss strategy of the Far East as illustrating other strategy, and as important in itself from a purely scientific point of view, without taking any side whatever, and in order to gather certain lessons for ourselves with regard to the future, just as lawyers search for precedents.

Before Japan adopted this new combination of the traditions of the old Eastern times, and the most accomplished use of science of the most modern times, her people put their whole house in order. They did not proceed in a spasmodic, fitful, capricious, partisan way. They had had quite enough of being fooled by European Powers and America. They were a proud, high-spirited nation. They had adopted for ages an unassuming, retiring, philosophic repose, domestic ease and fantastic art; but the instant they found this course did not pay she changed it. Why did Japan change? She had not the smallest intention of adopting the policy of going forth on the sea as the British have done for so many ages, her people had not the records of the predecessors of the Saxons or the Vikings of Scandinavia or the Dutch. The Japanese had no idea of sea power, and no idea even adopting a wide commercial policy as did the isles of Greece, "where grew the arts of war and peace." They wished to live quietly within their own isles. Some gentlemen here, especially belonging to the Navy, are well aware that their very ships were constructed purposely to prevent them from becoming anything like a sea Power, or taking action outside their own islands. The architecture of these ships prevented excursions out of their narrow seas. But other folk would not let them alone, they could not rest in peace. They were bombarded in 1862 and 1864. Then they mewed their mighty youth, they revolutionised their whole system. Their ruler was a man of tremendous energy and character, and under him they adopted the finest system of education that could be possibly devised. They were not afraid of exhausting the intellects of their younger sons, and were not disposed to let them spend time upon football or cricket, which they should have spent in their studies. You have the fact that the Japanese thought that every man's immortal mental part was at least as worthy of care and attention as his mortal physical part, although the physical man was not to be neglected. They devoted themselves to profound study and scientific investigation, and they adopted a system of universal military service of education, so that there might be a reserve of strength in case of war. Again I must say I am not advocating their policy or any policy to-day; I am simply stating that so it was; but I think I ought to add to that that a hundred years before, when these isles were, in the opinion of Europe, about to be forthwith overwhelmed by the greatest military genius of any age—Napoleon—or one of the greatest geniuses, at any rate, the British people determined to win command of the sea and won it. They then determined to get a good striking force. They got one. They were able to send expeditions against the Mahrattas in 1804-5 in India, and even greater expeditions still, and they adopted a system

of military service which provided that every able-bodied man was a Regular of the Navy or the Army or a Militiaman or a Volunteer. As Mr. Pitt said, speaking in the House of Commons in March, 1804, this was done, so that in the unfortunate event of losing command of the sea, or in the event of even a temporary invasion, no Englishman of either high rank or low rank, rich man or poor man, the man of learned occupation or the horny-handed son of toil, would have to go about wondering what he was to do to help his country in its distress. They would teach him beforehand, said Mr. Pitt. So did the Japanese.

Do the Japanese deserve success? You will find that they do in a book by Vladimir, called "The Chino-Japanese War." The quotation I am about to read refers to the question of whether they deserved success as against China in 1894 and 1895. He proves that they did. I will add that in the intervening nine years they have deserved success still more by devoting themselves heart and soul to preparation for another probable disturbance. The quotation is as follows: "If the future of Japan promises to be great, it must be confessed that Japan deserves it. For the last thirty years the best part of the nation has been quietly but steadfastly working to rise to the level of the foremost nations of the world." That is a noble enterprise for this people far away in the East to accomplish. "The youth of Japan have been exploring the whole of the world in search of everything that might contribute to the welfare and growth of their country. Every steamer to Europe and America had Japanese passengers of every class, all bent upon study and self-improvement. No branch of human activity had been neglected, and each nation has had to yield its best knowledge to the inquisitive curiosity of the Japanese. Even Ceylon had been visited by people wishing to improve their knowledge of religion." I do not know that I would have gone to Ceylon myself for that purpose; but the report was, that they had seen no religion anywhere one whit better for mankind than their own. "During the last generation, Japan has been like a vast beehive, whose inmates were busy everywhere gathering the essence of the best they saw, and it is just that they should begin to enjoy the fruits of their industry." That was said as to the war of 1894. It is too soon to prophesy what the results of the present war will be, but clearly up to the present we will be justified in saying that the Japanese have been enjoying the fruits of their industry. That for the yellow race in the Far East, which is now at war in the Pacific.

Their Knowledge is their Greatness.

And now we come to the advance of various nations to the Pacific. It is strange how news and tradition travel in the most extraordinary way throughout the East, with which the Chairman has such a profound acquaintance. I have been studying these points all my life, and I have never been able to make out the system that prevails and how the news of important incidents spread by some occult methods from the Crimea to Lucknow. I heard of a very curious instance in which the news of a battle in Africa (the Athara) was carried in a few days right across the continent to the West Coast, before even our officers could get it by telegram from home. All Eastern races had had a tradition that wealth untold was accumulated beyond the passes leading from Tartary to India, and that further

East was a mighty ocean which annually deposited treasures on its shores. This idea was reflected in the fabled expedition of Bacchus into the Valley of the Ganges. The expedition of the great Assyrian Queen Semiramis found the passes, and there have been twenty-two recorded invasions of India seeking after wealth and plunder, from the days of Darius and Alexander and his successors. Alexander himself, when he got into the Punjab, made a speech to his soldiers, in which he said, "I am going to bring you to the great ocean, and we shall come back to Macedonia, covered with riches which it casts upon the shores." But the troops said they had gone quite far enough; they were standing on earth's utmost verge, and they obliged him to return to the Euphrates. I shall be able to illustrate the desire which the people of Europe and of Asia, and recently of America, have had to get to the Pacific. It was the Cossacks who first brought the Russians to the Pacific in the 16th century; towards the Pacific, not to it. In the 16th century, in the days of Queen Elizabeth, the Cossacks, under Yermak, had got as far as the Irtysh River. They were fighting the Chinese in the year 1678. They retired, and they did not come back until the days of Queen Victoria.

Various events retarded the progress of the Russians. They were stopped for a while by the Crimean War. A few years after Lord Roberts went to India, they began their movements again. They defeated Schamyl, finally in 1861 passed the Caucasus, and in 1864, or soon after, you will find them going ahead eastwards. In 1858 the Russians took the left bank of the Amur, at a time when the Western European Allies were at one of their periodical bombardments of Peking, a mode of amusement which has been carried on with some regularity since the 13th century. When any military "world conquerors" were hard up for a change, they went to Peking — when the allies of Western Europe were bombarding Peking as usual in 1860, the Russians came down south of the Amur to the north of Korea, and now we have the Russians on the Pacific.

Having started to drive the Mongols across the Ural Mountains at the end of the Middle Ages, they reached Vladivostok in the time of Queen Victoria. But they were making another march simultaneously—a march which some of you gentlemen began to oppose with a counter-march. They got from Moscow across the Caucasus, around the south of the Caspian to Bokhara, through Samarkand, and as far as the Pamir, and there they are now touching the British. They made a very satisfactory advance between the close of the Crimean war and the time when you gentlemen went to Chitral in 1895. That was not a very long time, only about forty years, and that sufficed to make them master of the realm of Tamerlane and his successors.

At the present moment, I hear on good authority that they are making another railway by the aid of the Chinese, the best railway makers in the world, who constructed the railway across the United States to the Pacific. They are now constructing a line through Mongolia for Russia, which will take Peking in flank. I have brought Russia to the Pamir, to Afghanistan, to the old capital of Tamerlane, and then to Port Arthur and Vladivostok; but in the meantime the course of empire was taking another turn in another direction. After

the Turks took Constantinople in 1453, all central Europe was engaged for about two hundred years in stopping their progress towards Vienna. As the Crusaders had been driven out of the Levant, and the Turks had taken Egypt and Syria, and the Mahomedan religion prevailed there, Christian Europe was rather embarrassed for an outlet to the wealth of Asia. Accordingly we have Columbus sailing to discover another route, and in doing so he happened upon the West Indian Isles, and his followers of various races explored and annexed the continent of America. In the year 1513 the Pacific was discovered, and thus we have reached the Pacific from another side of the world, and we shall see great things presently. A distinguished warrior, Vasco Nunez Balboa, came along from the isles of the West Indies, and he crossed the Isthmus of Panama, and he saw the Pacific from the peak of a mountain, Quarequa, in September, 1513. That is alluded to by Keats, in his celebrated sonnet. The poet was describing the extraordinary impression made upon his mind by reading Chapman's Translation of Homer, the poet who gives the first account of a European expedition against Asia. He says, when he opened Homer :

"Then felt I like some watcher in the skies,
When a new planet swims into his ken,
Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
He stared at the Pacific—and all his men
Looked at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon the peak in Darien."

That was the discovery of the Pacific. Now the daring Spanish had realised all their wildest dreams. But it was not Cortez who led them, it was Balboa. He precipitated himself into the ocean, and waving his sword in every direction claimed for God, the Holy Church, and the King of Spain all the riches of the new ocean and all the people dwelling by its shores. Magellan soon came through the straits which bear his name into the same ocean, which he called Mar Pacifico, and after three months' voyage reached the Philippines; and we have here the Far East touched again from the Far West, before the arrival of the Cossacks, on the other side of the Far East.

There is something very curious, very weird almost, in all this. Here we have the Portuguese, Spanish, British, Dutch, precipitating all their best men eastward and westward, in search of gold. They found it on this occasion. Precious metals beyond all previous estimate abounded in Potosi and Mexico, far surpassing the wealth of the gorgeous East even, where she showers on her "Kings barbaric pearl and gold," as Milton says. Cortez destroyed Mexico, Pizarro destroyed Peru; but they sent galleons full of gold to their king and homes. The whole of the Pacific is absolutely lined with gold; there is wealth indescribable everywhere, but unfortunately volcanoes and earthquakes accompany it. Here are gold and silver and precious gems unlimited, herds, corn, spices, wool, nitrates—everything that man desires—along the whole Pacific. The valley of the Orinoco could support forty millions of people as easily as Belgium could support four millions.

North of Mexico the English founded thirteen States on the west of the North-American continent. These thirteen States separated from England in the year 1783. They saw perfectly

clearly that they could have possession, if they were wise, and prudent and daring of almost the future of humanity, when they separated from Britain in 1783. They knew that England would soon be involved with their own French allies, and England was involved in a tremendous example of sea power ten years later, which lasted for twenty-two years, against the French Revolution, and Napoleon from 1793 to 1815, wars which cost a thousand millions of money.

Well, they separated, and to the Pacific they would go as soon as it was possible. There was some little difficulty in settling down, and forming new States, and so on, which might have tried or exhausted other young communities, but which was nothing to people of their enterprising genius. They "bluffed" the British Cabinet in 1783, in the North-West, from Ohio to Illinois, out of the whole territories from New York State to Michigan, and made further progress towards their goal.

A very strange event occurred in 1803. The French had got Louisiana, and the whole basin of the Mississippi from the Spanish, but they were afraid the English would take it, and so they sold the whole realm for fifteen million dollars to the United States of America, and for that amount these became the possessors of the whole valley of the Mississippi as far as Wyoming and Colorado. When Napoleon lost Egypt two years before, he said: "I am losing Egypt, and I am losing the Empire of the East." The British have got it now, and they may hope, according to Napoleon, to retain the Empire of, at least, part of the East. But when, owing to the pressure of English sea power, he sold the Mississippi Basin to the United States for a few millions of our money, he said: "I am now parting with the future empire of mankind; he who holds the valley of the Mississippi, will ultimately rule the world." Several American authors entirely agree with that view, and some recently assert that they are quite able to manage the entire civilised world, and that Western Europe will be at their mercy when they please to become the first sea Power. They are making efforts in that direction as I speak. They went on smoothly, until they got Oregon, 1846, and that brought them to the Pacific. Canada, by that time, had not got so far; it had not expanded between the great lakes and the Rocky Mountains. Then the Americans annexed Texas. The value of Texas rangers, Texas mules, and Texas liars you know, as did General Stonewall Jackson in the Civil War. Then America fought and defeated Mexico, and, to cover the humiliation of the Mexicans, they gave them fifteen million dollars. For what? For Arizona, Nevada and California. Accordingly they were able to say a few years later, "We have got to the Pacific, and this will enable us to control the world's trade in due time." Quite independent of these fine prophetic ideas, you will admit that California was very good value. They received Nevada, where the "silver kings" fructify; they got Utah, where the Mormons have Salt Lake City; and California and the Harbour of San Francisco, the only good or tolerable harbour on the Pacific, south of the Canadian frontier, and all for fifteen million dollars. It was a good bargain, as they extracted £200,000,000 sterling, out of California, alone within a very short period. They gained territory by arbitration from England. Whenever England goes to arbitration it loses; it would appear that England goes to arbitration in the interests of humanity, to show a

good example of moderation and self-control to other races, hence it surrendered the island of San Juan, in 1872. The United States bought, from Russia, Alaska. They just missed acquiring British Columbia, in addition, but Canada managed to get hold of it. In the interests of humanity, in 1898, they went to war with Spain, and that put them right across the Pacific to the Philippines, and, as an American writer said, "the centre of the United States was changed from Kansas to California." They took Cuba. They made the Northern-Pacific Railway, and the Central Pacific, and the Southern Pacific to San Francisco. I would advise you to read Mahan's books, which are the very best books for any English student to spend some of his time on, and especially this book, "The History of America in Sea Power," by Captain Mahan. I have marked a lot of passages, but I have not time to read them. The Editor tells me that I may put a lot of matter in the Appendix, and it is a good thing I can do so, because otherwise I should go on for hours. Mahan told them that if they proceeded in an inefficient fashion, other Powers would have the entrances and exits to the Panama Canal, and consequently they must take Cuba or Jamaica. They took Cuba, and I am rather pleased at their choice. They took it in 1898, by sea power, and expeditionary forces—the same old story. They got command of the sea, south of Orleans and Key West and when they had command of the sea they invaded the island, and hopelessly beat the poor Spaniards. The Spanish soldier or sailor was out-classed, not in bravery, but in *matériel*. He was neglected by his Government, that is all; sent to die, "to commit suicide," which was nothing serious to the people who stayed at home. By an expeditionary force the Americans took Cuba, destroyed the Spanish Fleet, and Admiral Dewey defeated Montogo and took Manilla. It is interesting in the history of sea power to note that in the 18th century, 1761-2, the English Navy took both Manilla and Cuba, which were restored to Spain by foolish politicians, in 1763. The other branch of the Saxon race now have them again. To use the words of an American writer, "The capture of Cuba and the capture of the Philippines caused a New Pacific and a New Atlantic," and thus I got the title for my lecture.

I would strongly advise gentlemen to read the American Bancroft's "New Pacific," one of the most interesting books I have ever read. It is full of details with regard to commerce, strategic position, and races.

There was not much gain in having the Philippines unless the United States had links joining San Francisco to Asia. Americans looked forward to that, and say so in these books. There is "The American Advance," by Carpenter, which is a most valuable book. They deliberately lay it down that as they have control of a great part of the brains of the world, as they have endless potentialities of wealth-making in the valley of the Mississippi and other places—minerals, corn, cattle, and oil—that there are, on the other side of the Pacific, 4,750 miles away, 600,000,000 people between Cochin China, Burmah, Indo-China—people panting for wealth, and with every desirable commodity for exchange. Mr. Bancroft gives details of the schemes of commerce from the point of view of the United States. Captain Mahan gave them another piece of good advice—to take the

Sandwich Islands, to take Hawaii. Look at the strategic position of Hawaii, he says, half-way between our ports; nothing between it and Asia and Australia but Fiji; consequently Hawaii is a place of the utmost importance. They got it without even paying their usual annexation fee of fifteen million dollars. There was some domestic confusion in Hawaii. The name of the Queen, whom you saw at the Jubilee, was beautiful, and her end was quick. Her name was Liliuokalani. She was abolished soon after the Jubilee, for the United States annexed her island. The next thing they did was to get a naval station and a port between Hawaii and the Philippines, in the Ladrões, at Guam. I see some naval gentlemen here, and I would much prefer that they should continue the discussion in this connection, and state the exact potentialities of the United States as between those large territories and the Monroe doctrine, which is an elastic doctrine preventing Europeans getting power in South America, or controlling the vast wealth of Brazil, Peru, etc. Consider the potentialities of linking San Francisco by Hawaii, and the Philippines on to Japan. One of the books to which I have referred says that the United States must immediately champion the Chinese, because the Chinese are the reservoir of the mechanical and labour power of humanity. I have testimonies here in abundance to the strategic future of China. If you take the lecture delivered at Aldershot lately by Colonel Browne, the Military Attaché during the late war, and take the book by Captain Barnes describing the Wei-Hai-Wei Chinese Regiment, and read the writings of Gordon, you will see that from every conceivable point of view there is much more in the Chinaman than is generally supposed, and the Americans hope to control them.

Now we come to another progress towards the Pacific, which is a British progress, and on British territory. The French did not succeed in getting eastward anything like as successfully as the Dutch or the Spanish or the British. They had some small possessions. They had tried to get control of India, but they were ousted by Clive. Simultaneously with the endeavours under Dupleix and others in India, they went along up the St. Lawrence and got to Quebec, and founded the fortress. You know all about Wolff and its capture, and the remarkable display of British sea power in 1757-1761. Things marked time until about the close of the Crimean War, when progress began to expand westward from Montreal. Mr. Pitt in 1789 had recognised the future of the Pacific. Anson had explored the Pacific in the time of George II. Mr. Pitt so recognised the importance of Vancouver Island on the Pacific coast of Canada that he absolutely threatened to go to war with Spain unless he was allowed to keep the island in 1789. That was a very provident measure on the part of Mr. Pitt. But Canada was long ignored, and, indeed, during the reaction after the splendid energy of the British race against Napoleon, there was a kind of dead calm, not the spirit of God brooding over the face of our waters, but the spirit of low and base commercialism and the spirit of luxury. But the Canadians were true to their future in spite of their stupid rulers. They soon got beyond the great lakes, and they made the finest system of internal water communication in the world.

They saw that they must link the Atlantic with the Pacific. Nova Scotia projects out into the Atlantic, so much so as to be a distinct advantage to traffic from Liverpool to Quebec, 2,620 miles, as com-

pared with the Liverpool and New York, 3,020. Moreover, in Nova Scotia there is coal, and at the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria coal became to sea power what victuals are to armies. Lord Roberts was telling me about the small ship he went to India in, a ship of about 600 tons. Some of you gentlemen can contrast that boat with the ships in which you went to South Africa in which you could put a couple of battalions. Transit across the sea by big steamers opened up the coal question to a tremendous extent, and the coal question enters every detail of navigation nowadays. The question is always being asked: Where is coal? There is coal in China, and that is another potentiality of the East; there is coal enough there to last at the present consumption of England 2,000 years. There is coal at Halifax, at one end of the Canadian-Pacific Railway. Unfortunately the arbitration in the State of Maine put Maine astride the line from Montreal to Halifax. This piece of Canadian territory was alienated from Canada by the Ashburton Treaty. The Canadians made another railway around Maine, an inter-Colonial railway. There is plenty of coal and enormous resources of food on that side of the line, and it is all secure, provided you have command of the sea. Now when you get to the great lakes you go into the rolling prairie to the Rocky Mountains, and then you come out at Vancouver, where there is coal again, the Nanaimo coalfield.

I believe the best coal for shipping is the Welsh coal, and therefore England has a tremendous monopoly from that point of view. But there is excellent coal at Vancouver. Another curious thing that I did not know till lately is, that there is smokeless coal in the Rocky Mountains, at Canmore and its vicinity. This fact may affect the future enormously. Consequently, you have a railway which enables you to take your troops right across to the Pacific coast to the Far East, a thousand miles nearer than by any other route, which gives our nation while it has command of the sea a greater power than it had at the time of Napoleon. But you will scarcely believe that the British Government did everything they possibly could—I am not speaking politics, only plain history as to several British Governments, administrators of both parties—to prevent the development of Canada and to give Columbia to the United States. I would not blame the United States for taking it, but certainly I am surprised at our recent statesmen. Mr. Pitt, the best Minister we had, the Minister who, when all the Powers were cringing before Napoleon, stood up to him, having saved his own nation by his courage, and saved Europe by his example, saw the value of Columbia. Providence was impersonated in this case by Sir John MacDonald, who saved our strategic position. In 1870 he saw that Canada must make a tremendous effort if she meant to secure the outlet to the Pacific. "It is quite evident to me," he wrote, "from the advice received from Washington that the United States Government are resolved to do all they can short of war to get possession of the Western territory, and we must take immediate steps to counteract it. One of the first things to be done is to resolve to build a Pacific Railway." Inspired by this great pioneer of Imperial unity Canada was able to do this the following year, 1871, and British Columbia was saved. It is curious, to say the least of it, that this colossal undertaking, whose strategic importance—my main argument is strategic, but you cannot have strategy without food, and railways mean brains

—whose strategic importance was noted in a burst of envious admiration by Li Hung Chang, received little or no encouragement from the mother country. So much the more is Canada's glory the greater. The Trans-Continental Railway, with British Columbia at the end of it, is a monument to the genius of Sir John MacDonald, as it is to the political ability of the people, the Canadians, who put their trust in it. That it is of immense value to the Empire as well as to Canada every year demonstrates more clearly. There is absolutely untold wealth on each side of it. There are 500,000 square miles more arable land on each side of that railway than there are in the United States altogether, and everything else is in proportion to that colossal state of things. Columbia is of immense value. Save for its many fine ports the Union Jack of England waves nowhere along the Pacific Coast from the Horn to the Behring Sea. That is a strategic flaw with regard to our Empire, especially from the side of Panama and Nicaragua. Americans are going to have a canal at the cost of twenty-eight millions of money in eight years by continuing the French scheme probably. If you look at the map you will observe that all the coast of the Pacific has very few indents. The United States are singularly unfortunate in their Pacific Coast—San Diego, San Francisco, Portland, and a few other places are all they possess, whereas the coast of Columbia is absolutely impregnated with harbours. If Columbia had been given to the United States there would have been no port of any kind British between the Falkland Islands and the North Pole. Columbia reaches out towards Asia as Nova Scotia reaches out towards Europe, 430 miles nearer Asia than is San Francisco. In addition, on the return voyage, the current shortens the journey considerably. I believe the journey from Yokohama to Liverpool was performed in twenty-five days once, if not less. Reaching out towards Asia, as Nova Scotia reaches out towards Europe, the distance between Liverpool and the Far East by way of the chief town, Vancouver, is a thousand miles shorter than the route by New York and San Francisco, and, moreover, as I have said, the ocean current which leaves the coast of Asia eastwards to the northern part of the American Continent gives the ships bound for the north-western port a gain of twenty miles every twenty-four hours. But these advantages, great as they are, would be of little value without the supply of good coal, of which British Columbia produces an inexhaustible quantity; elsewhere on the whole of that coast there is very little. I believe, in fact, that San Francisco depends in great part on British coal. Esquimaft, fortified by Canada and England, is a naval base of the utmost importance; in fact is the key to the Imperial supremacy in the North Pacific. Eastwards there is no other coal station nearer than Hong Kong; southward, none nearer than Fiji. In time of war it will serve the British Government to as good purpose as the want of it would paralyse the fleet of an enemy. Opposite stands Vancouver, the terminus of the Canadian-Pacific Railway, by means of which the British can land in Japan in half the time it would take by Suez or the Cape. My principal object is to show the strategical importance of these places, Fiji, Hong Kong, Singapore, and so on. Had Sir John MacDonald and the people of the Dominions been converts of the Manchester School, to which the people of the United Kingdom were devoted in the sixties, Russia would now have a distinct advantage with regard to the Pacific. By what? By the Trans-

Siberian Railway, which, however, is not a more important railway than the Canadian-Pacific. The British Empire would have had no trade route to rival the Trans-Siberian Railway, and would have had no naval base from which to dominate the North Pacific. It would have had no Vladivostok or Port Arthur. These are Canada's contributions to the magnificent sum of our Imperial might.

Now let us see what Britain's Imperial might was able to do one hundred years ago in regard to sea power *versus* land power. You will observe a very striking resemblance indeed between the position of Napoleon after Trafalgar and the position of England then and the position of Russia and Japan at the beginning of the present war. It is perfectly clear that there is a marvelous resemblance topographically and strategically between the Japanese isles now, and their resources and future prospects, and the British Isles from 1804 to 1815. In other words, we stand at the beginning of the 20th century with our allies, the Japanese, bearing the same relation to Eastern Asia as our little islands of the United Kingdom bore to the French power at the beginning of the last century. If you take that point home and study it with the aid of maps you will admit its accuracy. Of the two Powers John Bull is, I think, the stouter, Japan being more elongated; but there is not much difference with regard to the square mileage, ours being 121,000 and Japan's about 160,000. The population now bears the same relative proportion to Russia as the population of Great Britain bore to the population of the French Empire at its height. Here we were on the west of Europe against a great land Power. It was impossible for Napoleon to get to England unless he obtained command of the sea. Owing to the English being armed to the teeth, even if he had got into England, he could not have fared very well. A celebrated strategist says that he is going to make peace in Tokio, and Napoleon, in 1804, said he was going to make peace in London. Well, he rested in peace in St. Helena before it was all over. It was hard indeed for Napoleon to do anything against England, especially at that time, when it could feed its people with the produce of its own island.

The British were wise and resolute. They were determined to hold out *à outrance*. The wars of the French Revolution and Empire lasted from 1793 till 1815, with only a year interval. What were the methods? To break down the sea power of the French and their allies and then to harass the French by expeditions, and to incite European Powers to worry the Emperor by contributing to the support of their armies.

Trafalgar was the consummation of the Empire of the Seas, but two days before October the 21st Napoleon made the Austrian general, Mack, a prisoner at Ulm. He entered Vienna in 1805, Berlin in 1806, and made the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, thus becoming master of the Continent west of the Niemen.

But in 1808 he went to Madrid, and this was the commencement of the end. "The Spanish ulcer," and the British Navy and Army, ruined him. We became allies of the Portuguese and Spanish. We aided, abetted, and utilised their guerilla warfare. Our sea power enabled us to send expeditions from Sicily to the east coast road between Valencia and Barcelona, to Figueras Bay, under Sir A. Wellesley, from Cork, and, between 1808 and 1813, to Cadiz, Lisbon, and Oporto.

When Sir John Moore was cut off by Napoleon from Portugal in 1808 he was able to secure the retreat of his army by the aid of the fleet at Corunna. When Wellington wished to drive Joseph across the Ebro and to cross the Pyrenees into France, he was able to change his base from Lisbon to Santander, on the Biscayan shore, and the Navy flanked his march from Vittoria to Bayonne. Just compare Spain and Italy with Korea, and see how the Shan-Alin Mountains and the Ché-Piang-Shan Mountains and the Yalu resemble, from a strategic point of view, the Alps and the Po, the Pyrenees and the Ebro. See the resemblance of Port Arthur and Gensan to San Sebastian and Taragona. The further Napoleon or any other invader advanced south of the Pyrenees the more dangerous became his line of communications, and the greater the advantages of sea power. When the Russians crossed the Danube and took Plevna, and got within touch of Constantinople in 1878, their whole invasion collapsed, by reason of the Fleets of Turkey and Great Britain. Manifestly, on the other hand, the British in 1814 would not have had a chance of invading France successfully with 70,000 men unless the main body of the French was occupied on the Seine and Marne against the Allies, and unless Napoleon had wasted his Grand Army in Russia in 1812. So the Japanese may be obliged to be content with a campaign in Korea and Manchuria for as long a period as that waged by the British in the Iberian Peninsula 1808-1813. If Russia be as obstinate as on previous occasions the war may last for twenty-nine years. The British would have fought for thirty years if necessary 100 years ago. The Japanese can make raids—so did the British, but they cannot break the land might of Russia in a hurry, unless it be far inferior to what it was in 1812 or in 1854, if the Russian leaders be equal to Scult or Marimont, not to speak of Napoleon. Korea and Manchuria may illustrate guerilla warfare, and the careers of the Spaniards Empecinado and the Minas may be repeated in the Far East. If Port Arthur be taken, Southern Manchuria may be the theatre of Japanese operations, even as when San Sebastian fell Southern France was the theatre of British operations in 1814; but it is as hard for the Japanese to get to Harbin as it was for Wellington to get to Toulouse. But I must ask you to pursue these and many other interesting problems at home with the aid of any good atlas. My time has been more than exhausted.

I must conclude by thanking the illustrious Chairman and all my audience for such patient attention to such a long, dry, and involved discourse. My excuse for thus detaining you is that it is only by careful study of these and similar Imperial strategic questions that a self-governing community like the British, whose party leaders by no means represent the wisdom or foresight which such an Empire as ours requires, can sow greatness for posterity, or even hold their own in this new century.

APPENDIX A.

THE NEW PACIFIC: LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

A dozen line of steamships, or thereabout, now (in 1900) cross the Pacific between America and Asia, where, for two and a half centuries, a single galleon made its clumsy way forth and back from

Acapulco to Manila once a year. Ships comprising scores of lines ply along shore, unite the islands and mainland, or sail direct for foreign ports. Thus Hawaii and California are linked, Australia with Asia and America and all the larger islands; North America with South America, Africa, and Europe; Japan and China with Southern Asia, the Philippines, Australia, India, and Europe; Alaska and Pacific ports, Mexico and Pacific ports, Central and South America, while the shores, islands, and rivers of Asia swarm with foreign vessels where, half a century ago, a timid commerce found for the most part sealed ports. Sixty years ago vessels trading into the Pacific rounded Cape Horn or Good Hope, and, creeping along the coasts of America or Asia, called at the various points for traffic and made their exchanges, returning after an absence of one or two years. Now all the important ports have their fast-running steam-ships, sailing on stated days, direct to, or connected with, the chief cities of the world. At such places as Vladivostok, Yokohama, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Hong Kong twenty-five or fifty steamers of the Pacific mail, the Canada Pacific, the Northern Pacific, the Oriental and California, the Oriental and Peninsula, the Trans-Siberian, and the Nipon Yusen Kaisha, or Japan Mail Steamship Company, may any day be seen at anchor, or arriving and departing, the last-named company alone, the largest but one in the world, operating hundreds of vessels, including eighty-three steamers, and entering every commercial port of Japan, China, Korea, and Siberia, with lines to Calcutta, the Philippines, Australia, the Hawaiian Islands, and America. Then, besides the swarms of native junks and river steamboats and fleets of sail, are thousands of foreign sailing vessels which likewise cross and recross from every point to every point, or pass along the shore, carrying the surplus products of one land to another to benefit all first appearing within the last half century. Back of this was the time when small craft of forty and sixty tons—seldom larger than three or four hundred tons—sailed this sea on voyages of circumnavigation and discovery, sometimes of piracy or of pure adventure, sometimes of all together, now stealing stealthily along the shore with bloody-handed cut-throat crew, rifling towns and burning ships, or striking out boldly into the unknown with a recklessness unsurpassed by the mariners of any age or nation.

To-day, the iron-bound battle-ship ploughs her majestic course with ponderous implements of destruction so nicely poised as to make the leviathan arbiter of human destinies alike on sea and land; one or more of these modern monsters being served on their way and at their destination by coal ships, supply ships, refrigerator ships, and distilling and repair vessels, so that every comfort and every advantage may be at hand for those who go forth to death or domination. With the application to navigation of electrical, or some yet-to-be-discovered power, the voyage across the Pacific will occupy no more time than is now required in crossing the Atlantic. Thirty years ago Japan's foreign trade was next to nothing; it is now £40,000,000 a year, more than half of which has sprung up within the last decade. An increase of China's trade at that rate would bring the amount to 2,000,000,000 dollars in fifteen years. Aroused from the dead past to life and self-consciousness, Japan is just now filled with a further sense of her capabilities from her success in the late war with her neighbour. Since her emergence from barbaric isolation, she has come

to the front as a maritime Power, meeting America more than half way in trans-Pacific intercourse.

In their steamship service the Japanese have an advantage over their competitors in the small wages paid to seamen and the large subsidies received from their Government. As long as this state of things continues, and until *our* (*i.e.*, United States) Government sees fit to place our commerce on an equality with that of other nations, or until *our* (*i.e.*, United States) merchants or shipowners can devise some means to obviate the difficulty, we must expect to see our products transported across the Pacific to a great extent in foreign bottoms. Should the Chinese ever come forward as a maritime nation, which they are as able to do as were the Japanese, then, indeed, will Asiatic craft swarm upon the sea like bees in a field of flowers.

The Canadian-Pacific Railway has its own steamship service from Vancouver to Asia and Australia. The Northern Pacific Railway and the Oregon Railway and Navigation companies both have connections with Asiatic lines from Seattle and Portland. From San Francisco the Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company carry freight and passengers to Honolulu, Yokohama, Hong Kong, Kobe, Nagasaki, and Shanghai, while the California and Oriental Steamship Company from San Diego to Hawaii, China, and Japan facilitates the commerce of the Southern United States with Asia. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company offers service between San Francisco and Manila, and the Polynesian Steamship Company has been organised by New York and Philadelphia capitalists for the establishing of a line to Manila, stopping at Honolulu, the Ladrões, and the Carolines. The spots of ground on which now stand Vancouver, western terminus of the Canadian-Pacific Railway, and port for the Canadian Trans-Pacific steamers, and Vladivostok, Russia's Pacific metropolis, and Trans-Siberian railway terminus, at once the Petersburg, Gibraltar, and Odessa of the Far East, were, forty years ago, little better than primæval wilderness. From Tacoma the Northern Pacific Steamship Company has good service to Japan and China, one steamer sailing every fortnight. The Oceanic Steamship Company has lines from San Francisco to Honolulu, Somoa, Fiji, Tahiti, New Zealand, and Australia. The Seattle-Honolulu Steamship Company and the British-American line from Seattle to Honolulu and Hilo were organised and put in operation soon after annexation. South America, the South Sea, Australia, and the Far South-East all have ample steam and sail navigation facilities. Further than this, new Trans-Pacific lines are constantly springing up, and new vessels being added to the old lines. (See "New Pacific," Chapter I., by Bancroft.)

APPENDIX B.

BRITISH COLUMBIAN COAL.

When we cross the Continent to the Pacific Coast, we find, in connection with the coal of British Columbia, a group of facts scarcely less striking than those to which reference has already been made. Along the whole Pacific Coast of South America no coal is found suited

for steaming purposes. There is none along the coast of North America until we come to Puget Sound. At different points on the Sound mines are being worked on American territory, but the coal is all of a distinctly inferior quality. It is only when we cross the boundary line into Canadian territory that in Vancouver Island, the site of Britain's only naval station on the western coast of America, we meet with large deposits of good steaming coal. The superiority of this coal is proved beyond question by the published tables of the War Department of the United States, in which are given the comparative values for steam-raising purposes of the various fuels found on the Pacific Coast. In this statement—certainly not a partial one—the Nanaimo coal is rated far above any found in Washington, Oregon, or California. The annual output of the mines at Nanaimo and Wellington has now risen beyond a million tons.

We may now consider how the coal supplies of the coast are supplemented by those of the interior.

An important coal area has lately been opened up in the Rocky Mountain district. A few miles from Banff, and scarcely a hundred yards from the line of the Canadian-Pacific Railway, a mine of anthracite coal is being worked. Many outcrops of the same deposit are found northward and southward along the line of the Rockies in British Columbia. It represents, I believe, the only true anthracite coal which has yet been found, or, at any rate, worked in America westward of Pennsylvania. It contains a larger amount of fixed carbon than the Pennsylvanian coal, burns rather more rapidly, and gives out greater heat. On account of the peculiar excellence of the coal, the development of this mine has been watched with much interest. The chief difficulty has arisen from the lack of a sufficient market within a reasonable distance. The coal is used exclusively by the Canadian-Pacific Railway in heating its cars as far eastward as Lake Superior. For domestic purposes it is sold as far westward as Winnipeg, taking the place of Pennsylvanian coal brought up the lakes, and westward as far as Vancouver. It would be much more extensively used but for the fact that stoves and furnaces generally throughout the country are adapted to the use of soft, bituminous coal, and the class of people willing to change their appliances and pay a higher price for a superior coal is limited. There has hitherto been little sale for the refuse coal, or slack, which, in the neighbourhood of large manufacturing centres in England or Pennsylvania, adds so much to the profits of the mine-owner. Use is now being found for it in working electrical machinery, and this field is enlarging in the West. At Canmore, only ten miles distant from the anthracite mine, the Rocky Mountain deposits furnish a coal of a different quality. The mines have not long been opened, and their extent has not yet been fully determined, but the coal has been found to be almost smokeless, and has the further quality of coking well. Both these facts are of the utmost interest, as the one suggests the possibility of our ships of war in the Pacific being supplied near at hand with the smokeless coal at present obtained from Wales, while the silver mines now opened up in the Kootenay districts, as well as those on the other side of the national boundary, create a large demand for coke to be used in smelting.

(See "The Great Dominion Studies of Canada," by G. R. Parkin.)

Pages 78 and 79.

APPENDIX C.

The following table of distances will be useful for reference:—

	Miles.
Vancouver to Montreal	2,906
Vancouver to New York, <i>via</i> Brockville	3,163
Vancouver to Boston, <i>via</i> Montreal	3,248
Vancouver to Liverpool, <i>via</i> Montreal	5,713
San Francisco to New York	3,266
San Francisco to Boston	3,370
Yokohama, Japan to Liverpool, <i>via</i> San Francisco	11,281
Yokohama, Japan to Liverpool, <i>via</i> Vancouver ...	10,047
Sydney to Liverpool, <i>via</i> Vancouver	12,657
Sydney to Liverpool, <i>via</i> San Francisco	13,032
Liverpool to Hong Kong, <i>via</i> Vancouver	11,649
Liverpool to Hong Kong, <i>via</i> San Francisco...	12,883
Vancouver to Yokohama	4,283
Vancouver to Hong Kong	5,936
Vancouver to Calcutta	8,987
Vancouver to London, <i>via</i> Suez Canal	15,735
Vancouver to Suva, Fiji	5,215
Vancouver to Honolulu, H.I.	2,410
Vancouver to Sydney, N.S.W.	6,960

In these and similar matters I got much help and most liberal supplies of matter from the agents of the Canadian-Pacific Railway.

APPENDIX D.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION SINCE THE CRIMEAN WAR.

- 1858. The Amur, all the left bank of, secured by the Muravieff Treaty with China.
- Saghalien Islands, from Japan.
- 1864. Submission of all the tribes of the Caucasus.
- 1865. Province of Turkestan in Central Asia established.
- 1866. Bokhara subdued.
- 1868. Samarkand taken.
- 1872. Vladivostok naval station in place of Nicolaiefsk.
- 1873. Khiva subdued.
- 1876. Khokand (Ferghana) annexed.
- 1878. Balkh occupied.
- 1879. Tekke Turkomans defeated.
- 1884. Merv annexed.
- 1885. Aktapa Penjdeh Komaroff's attack on Afghans.
- 1898. Port Arthur "leased" from China.

APPENDIX E.

MURAVIEFF AND THE PACIFIC.

Muravieff, in over a year's residence at Irkutsk, had acquired clearer views of the growing importance of the Pacific Ocean due to the naval activity of England,

Though at such a distance inland, by the decline of the overland trade through Kiakhda, he was able to measure the effects of the opening of China to maritime commerce.

He therefore hastened to fulfil his promise to the Tsar to visit Kamchatka and its port Petropavlovsk, the only possible Russian naval base on the Eastern Ocean. No Governor-General had ever visited the distant peninsula, as the voyage was long, difficult, and supposed to lead to no useful results.

Muravieff thought otherwise; the frequent visits of whalers on the coast had given the place a certain commercial importance, and he foresaw that in the event of war Russia must have a safe port on the Pacific.

Muravieff left Irkutsk on 15th May, 1849, and reached Okhotsk on 25th June, whence he sailed on 4th July, arriving at Petropavlovsk on 25th July, after two months and ten days. He was charmed at the sight of the Bay of Avacha, where Petropavlovsk is situated. This beautiful bay, which is said to surpass in beauty and grandeur the celebrated harbours of Rio Janeiro and Sydney, with its numerous inlets protected on the north, west, and south by high volcanic mountains, with depth of water sufficient to allow vessels to unload on the quays, offered such advantages that Muravieff decided to transfer from Okhotsk the seat of the Russian naval forces on the Pacific. His enthusiasm is shown in his letters, where he declares that among the many ports he had seen in Europe and Russia none were comparable to the Bay of Avacha.—*Vladimir*.

APPENDIX F.

HAWAII AND PACIFIC STRATEGY.

To have a central position such as this, to wit, Honolulu, and to be alone, having no rival and admitting no alternative throughout an extensive tract, are conditions that at once fix the attention of the strategist. It may be added of the statesmen of commerce likewise. But to this striking combination are to be added the remarkable relations borne by these singularly placed islands to the greater commercial routes traversing this vast expanse known to us as the Pacific, not only, however, to those actually now in use, important as they are, but also to those that must be called into being necessarily by that future to which the Hawaiian incident compels our too unwilling attention. Circumstances, as already remarked, create centres, between which communication necessarily follows; and in the vista of the future all discern, however dimly, a new and great centre that must largely modify existing sea routes, as well as bring new ones into existence. Whether the canal of the Central American Isthmus be eventually Panama or at Nicaragua matters little to the question now in hand, although, in common with most Americans who have thought upon the subject, I believe it will surely be at the latter point. Whichever it might be, the convergence there of so many ships from the Atlantic and the Pacific will constitute a centre of commerce, inter-oceanic, and inferior to few, if to any, in the world; one whose approach to the other centres will be watched jealously

and whose relations to the other centres of the Pacific by the lines joining it to them must be examined carefully. Such study of the commercial routes and of the relations to the Hawaiian Islands, taken together with the other strategic considerations previously set forth, completes the synopsis of facts which determine the value of the group for conferring either commercial or naval power.

("The Interest of America in Sea Power."—Captain A. H. Mahan. Page 43. Written in January, 1893.)

APPENDIX G.

Some of the principal books which I used for this lecture were:—

Reclus.—"Géographie Universelle." A magnificent work, with countless fine illustrations.

Bancroft.—"New Pacific." One of the most interesting and instructive books of recent years, edit. 1900.

Vladimir.—"Russia on the Pacific and the Pacific Railway," and his "Treatise on the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5."

Colquhoun.—"The Mastery of the Pacific."

Carpenter.—"The American Advance."

Mahan.—"Interest of America in Sea Power."

"*Augescat*" in "United Service Magazine,"

and many other works, but I mention the above as, with the exception of *Reclus*, which is very large and costly, and can be consulted in public libraries, all these should be in every Military Library.

T. M. M.

The CHAIRMAN (Field-Marshal the Right Hon. F. S., Earl Roberts, H.C., K.G., K.P., &c.):—I have listened, as I am sure all present here have listened, with the greatest interest to the lecture which has just been delivered—a most interesting and most instructive lecture. Dr. Miller Maguire has taken us over a vast extent of country, and given us most valuable lessons throughout his lecture. Time will not permit of me alluding to some of the many interesting points he brought forward; but there is one point to which I would especially invite your attention, namely, that it is to the Pacific that the centre of International gravity has now shifted, and that it is mainly in that direction that the dominating factors will be found when any serious future complications arise. In his lecture, Dr. Miller Maguire has very graphically explained to us how some of the causes of this change have been quite phenomenal. If we look first to the Western shores of the Pacific, where our attention is now more immediately directed, we find in Japan perhaps the most wonderful instance of a new national birth which history has ever recorded. Less than forty years—I think it was in 1868—this comparatively small group of islands was scarcely in touch with the outer world, and, strategically speaking, was a negligible quantity. To-day Japan is a nation whose alliance we are proud to possess, and estimates itself powerful enough to enter single-handed into a contest with a European Power which has the strongest Army in the whole of the world, and the bravery of whose soldiers is only equalled by their hardiness. If we take Japan's great adversary, Russia, we find that about the same time (forty years ago) Russia's possessions in the Far East were absolutely undeveloped. Within

the last few years those possessions have been brought into direct communication with St. Petersburg by a railway close upon 6,000 miles in length, and vast sums have been spent in garrisoning and fortifying the harbours which that railway feeds, in order to make use of them as bases for the very considerable fleet which Russia thought proper to place in the Western seas of the Pacific. Other nations have not kept aloof from that region. France has possessed herself of territory known as Indo-China; Great Britain has acquired Hong Kong and Wei-hai-Wei; and Germany Kiau-Chau. Farther south we come to Australia. Less than 100 years ago Australia was considered almost a waterless waste, and used as a convict settlement. Now it has developed into a powerful continent, the colonies of which four years ago nobly came to the aid of the Mother Country in her hour of need. Crossing to the Eastern waters of the Pacific, we meet again precisely the same extraordinary and material progress, which has considerably modified the old strategic conditions, whether as regards Columbia with its potentialities of great wealth, or the mines of Alaska, or in the great United States port of San Francisco. To show to what extreme importance the Pacific has become, I may mention that it is now, as I daresay you all probably know, connected to the Atlantic by no less than nine lines of direct railway communication. I believe that a tenth is under consideration. Valuable and important from strategic points of view as these railways are, they will be surpassed when the canal is made through the Isthmus of Panama. That will be indeed a change in strategic views. If any further proof is required of the great importance of the Pacific, I would call your attention to the fact that in the last two years two submarine cables have been laid from one shore to the other: the all-British one from Vancouver to Australia, and the United States cable from San Francisco to Manila. These two cables, owing to their connection with land telegraphs and other submarine cables, have given the final link to the telegraphic girdle round the whole of the world. That is an important strategical condition of affairs which I think Dr. Miller Maguire has enabled us to appreciate by his very valuable lecture.