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THE SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE.

BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

VI.—THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

BY LORD THRING, K.C.B.

(*With a Map.*)

A UNITED British Empire, going forth—not conquering or to conquer, but to regulate commerce and spread peace and civilisation throughout its limits,—would be a dominion of a grandeur and beneficence as yet unknown among the kingdoms of the World.

The possibility of the establishment of such a reign of peace and goodwill has been widely canvassed. On the one side it has been said that the component parts of the Empire are so divergent in their interests that they will not admit of being welded into a compact mass. On the other side, it is replied that, granted that territories such as India and the spheres of influence in Africa cannot enter into complete union with Canada and Australia, there still remain a number of Colonies capable of being moulded into an efficient working Empire. In short, the solution of the problem of *Britannic Confederation* must depend largely on what is meant by *confederation*—what is the degree of union indicated, and what territories are intended to be tied together by a bond of greater or less stringency. The object of the present article is to deal with the whole question impartially. The facts, on which the conclusions in it are based, will in the main be found in the able papers already published in this Magazine. The task set before me is to collect and compare the results of those papers, and to present in a succinct form the existing conditions of the British Empire, and the means to be adopted to draw closer the bonds of union, or at all events to counteract the forces tending to greater disintegration.

The extent and general characteristics of the British Empire will be best understood by a careful examination of the excellent map, specially prepared to illustrate this series of papers, and appended to this number. It may be added, that the map has been designed by Mr. Silva White and compiled by Mr. J. G. Bartholomew. The Empire comprehends about one-fifth of the land-surface of the globe, and contains a population in the gross of 348,000,000. The countries of the British Empire occupied by settlers of European, and principally British, origin are distinguished on the map from those countries of the Empire in which the native element is in numerical preponderance. In the following pages the term Colonies is restricted to the former, whilst the latter are classed under the generic name of Dependencies. This classification has been adopted, inasmuch as the main object of this paper is to deal with certain typical Colonies rather than to discriminate accurately between the great variety of governments prevailing in the British Empire. The other original features of the map explain themselves. It may, however, be well to draw attention to the fact that an attempt has been made to show at a glance, by distinguishing the places where there are British Ambassadors or other accredited Diplomatic or Consular agents of the British Government, the vast organisation maintained by Great Britain for the protection and assistance of all the subjects of the Empire.

The United Kingdom, the centre and head of this vast aggregate of nations, has an area of 121,481 square miles, and a population of 38,000,000. The Indian Empire is far the most important of the dark-coloured Dependencies, and has an area of 1,533,611 square miles, containing a population of 286,000,000. The spheres of influence in Africa comprehend an area of about 2,462,000 square miles, with a large population, the amount of which is quite unknown.

The Colonies to be chiefly noted are the Dominion of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Cape. The area and population of each of these Colonies is given below. The remainder of the Empire consists of numerous smaller Colonies; but, for the purpose of this paper, no detailed description is required of their extent or population.

	Area. Square Miles.	Population.
Canada,	3,456,383	4,830,897
Australia,	2,944,628	3,038,763
Cape Colony,	221,311	1,527,224
New Zealand,	104,235	668,353
Remainder (excluding India),	649,000	9,000,000
	<u>7,375,557</u>	<u>19,065,237</u>

The greater part of this vast Empire has been acquired during the course of 150 years by settlement, by conquest, and by that most dubious form of acquisition which passes under the name of annexation.

Having now stated the relations between Great Britain and her Colonies in respect to area and population, let us proceed to the consideration of their commercial relations. By the old school of political economists these would have been deemed the only ties worth considering :

we now know that sentiment and passion are as powerful, or more powerful, factors in the friendship of nations than even money and trade. Still, as the argument of the purse is a strong one, let us see how that stands between the mother-country and her children. In round numbers,

THE TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

With Canada . . .	is $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. of her whole trade.
Australia . . .	$5\frac{1}{4}$
Cape Colony . . .	$1\frac{1}{8}$
New Zealand . . .	$1\frac{3}{4}$
	— $11\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. or not quite $\frac{1}{8}$ of the whole
Remainder . . .	$4\frac{3}{4}$
India . . .	9
Foreign Countries . .	$74\frac{1}{2}$

From this table it will be seen that, viewed solely from a pecuniary point of view, the trade of the United Kingdom with the Colonies, though of great importance, is far inferior in magnitude to her trade with foreign countries, being less than 12 per cent. of her whole trade.¹

The next step in the progress of our investigations in respect to the relations of the mother-country to the Colonies is to ascertain under what laws the Colonies have grown up and what privileges they now enjoy. At common law a broad distinction is made between a conquered country and a country settled by British subjects. In the case of a conquered country, the existing law prevails till it is altered by the conqueror. The case of a Colony formed by English settlers is very different. An Englishman, according to Lord Mansfield, on settling in an uncivilised country, carries with him as much of the law of England as is adapted to his situation. Liberty is his birthright, of which he does not divest himself by going to other lands, provided those other lands are not within the jurisdiction of any recognised civilised power. All he requires to complete his status as a Colonist is that the tract of land on which he is settled should be declared by the Home Government to be adopted by them and placed under the protection of the British flag.

In the earlier Colonies the system most in vogue was to grant to any adventurous spirits desirous of settling—for example, in America—a charter, reserving to the Queen the power of appointing a Governor and creating two Houses of Legislature and committing to the Governor and the two Houses full power to make all laws necessary for the well-being of the new community. In more modern times the usual course has been to appoint during the infancy of a Colony a Governor with a Legislative Assembly, nominated by the Crown, to assist him in the Government; then, as the Colony advanced in years, to substitute two Legislative Houses; and, as a last stage, to give responsible government—that is to say, to make the advisers of the Governor responsible to the two Houses in the same manner as the Ministers of the Crown in the United Kingdom are responsible to the two Houses of Parliament.

¹ These statistics have been kindly supplied to me by Mr. J. FitzGerald of the Imperial Institute. They have been compiled from the latest returns.

In granting these institutions to the Colonies, the mother-country has shown no niggard hand, no selfish spirit. She has handed over to them vast tracts of territory—witness her most recent gift of one hundred million of acres to nine hundred thousand settlers in Western Australia. She has allowed, contrary to her most cherished policy, her Colonies to raise up against one another the barrier of Protection, and, stranger still, to impose protective duties against goods imported from the mother-country. No advantage, then, has been reserved to the mother-country. She cannot without the consent of the Colony settle her surplus population on lands defended by her navy. She cannot carry into a Colonial port the products of Lancashire or Yorkshire, the results of the industry of their British fellow-subjects, without paying a heavy duty.

What, then, is the position of the Colonist as compared with that of an Englishman, Scotsman, or Irishman—say, of a citizen of New South Wales as compared with that of a citizen of Manchester? How do they stand as regards the mother-country? Both are subjects of Her Majesty—as fully as if both had been born in England; they can alike be elected to Parliament, enter the army or navy, or be admitted to the bar, or to any other profession or calling for which British citizenship is a necessary qualification. Both, wherever they go, can claim the protection of the British Ambassador and the British Consul. Then as to their powers of government. First as to local affairs, the New South Wales man has the advantage over the Manchester man: the latter can by his representatives take part in the local government of England, but he has no reserve stock of land with which he can deal sufficient to give many cows and many acres to any of his neighbours who may require them. While in addition to his acres the New South Wales man has, to say the least, as large a power over the local government of his Colony as the Manchester man has over English local government. Then as to taxes—the Manchester man belongs to a community which contributes, according to Sir John Colomb, 19s. 5½d. out of every pound spent on the navy, and 20s. in the pound to the maintenance of the Foreign Office, or, in other words, to the maintenance of the relations of the Empire with foreign countries. In the benefit of this expenditure the New South Wales citizen has as large a share as the Manchester man, yet what does he contribute?—6¼d. of every pound spent on the navy, nothing to the army, nothing to the Foreign Office expenditure.

Such are the general conditions of the British Empire. It has cost hundreds of millions to build it up—an expense wholly borne by the mother-country. It costs over 14 millions a year to defend it at sea—the whole of which is defrayed by the British tax-payer, except to the extent of £381,000, of which India pays £254,000, chiefly for troopships and harbours, and Australia the remainder to maintain a local squadron. It has cost us a blood-tax which can only be estimated by the reflection that, according to some historians, our wars for the last two hundred years have really been sustained for the maintenance, expansion, and consolidation of our Colonial Empire—“*Gare à qui la touche.*”

What, then, are the inducements for the members of this great family to stand by and assist each other and the mother-country, and for

the mother-country to keep under her wing these great and growing communities? In considering this question India, is, of course, excluded: it has been won by the sword—it will, if the necessity arises, of which there appears to be little probability, be kept by the sword; and the considerations applicable to such a possession are totally distinct from those which bear on the question of the situation of our Colonies, properly so called. The spheres of influence in Africa and the mere Dependencies are also obviously excluded.

Some forty years ago a Colonial Society was formed in London for the purpose of determining the true relations between the mother-country and the Colonies. All the various political parties were represented amongst its members. These included Mr. Walpole, Mr. Adderley (now Lord Norton), Sir William Molesworth, Mr. Cobden, Mr. Godley, one of the founders of the Canterbury Settlement in New Zealand, Mr. Bright, and others. The object of the Society was to obtain self-government for the greater Colonies, then writhing and uneasy under the eccentric rule of the Colonial Office of the day. With this view, the opportunity was taken by Sir William Molesworth, on the occasion of a Bill being brought into Parliament in 1850 for the government of the Australian Colonies, to propose a scheme for conferring on them a complete system of self-government. This proposal, as might be expected, was not carried. The Government plan prevailed, and these Colonies did not obtain responsible government till three or four years later. The principles, however, on which the Society acted are at this distance of time of more importance than the mode in which it sought to carry these principles into effect. It was assumed that Colonies were outlets for the surplus population of Great Britain, that it was the duty of the mother-country to fill up the waste places of the World, and that she was bound to protect her Colonies so long as they were young and unable to protect themselves, but that national children, like the children of a well-ordered family, should be brought up with a desire to maintain themselves, and that they would, when adult, separate from their parent and set up for themselves. It was taught by the political economists of the time that Free Trade was about to make the World a universal brotherhood, and that the fact of a country being a Colony or not mattered nothing as respected the extent of its commercial intercourse with the mother-country, and that the burden of protecting it as a Colony far outweighed in a financial point of view any possible advantages to be derived by the mother-country from maintaining the connection.

Since 1850 far other counsels have prevailed. "The millennium" of Free-Trade has not been established; and, in the event of a war, grave inconveniences would arise to Great Britain, if Australia, for instance, were an independent State. In such an event Australia, however friendly, would be bound by the obligations of a neutral Power. As a belligerent, Great Britain could not fit or refit her ships at any Australian port. She could not obtain supplies, and would have to acknowledge the territorial waters of Australia as a place of refuge within which she could not attack any ship of the enemy.

Again, when the Colonist asserts his desire for independence, has he

ever considered that, though not wholly independent, he is in no sense dependent on the mother-country? The British Parliament has long since renounced the power of taxing the Colonies, and all that the mother-country asks of her children, even in case of war, is sympathy and voluntary support. Apart, then, from the higher considerations of feeling and patriotism which, as will be shown hereafter, condemn absolutely the education by the mother-country of her children with a view to separation, it may be admitted that, taking a lower ground, and looking to the protection of our commerce in time of war, every inhabitant of the United Kingdom should desire to retain the affections of his Colonial fellow-subjects by any reasonable concession. In discussing in those bygone years the advantages conferred by a Colony on the mother-country, it never occurred to the philanthropists of the Colonial Society that there existed a possibility of the Colony aiding the mother-country by troops or ships. The possibility of the presence of an Australian Contingent under the British commander in Egypt would have seemed to them a mere dream unworthy of the consideration of any one but a visionary sentimentalist.

If, however, we proceed to weigh in the balance the benefit to the colony as compared with that to the mother-country, which is secured by their mutual connection, it will be seen that the advantages in favour of the colony greatly preponderate. Take Australia as an example, and assume her to be independent. Where would she stand in the commonwealth of nations? Three millions of people would be charged with the protection of 8800 miles of seaboard. How long would Australia be for the Australians? What is there to prevent Germans, French, Italians from creating their "spheres of influence" in Australia? England protects them with an expenditure of 14 millions a year with a fleet that can follow an enemy into every sea, and blockade an enemy in its own ports. What possible force could Australia raise which could shut up the fleet of any European Power in port, or be prepared to meet such a force in the open sea? Again, in case of separation, at the very moment when money was imperatively required for defence, what would be the value of Australian securities? At the present moment the Australian Colonies raise money in the English market at the rate of three and a half per cent. Let them become independent, and great would be the downfall in Australian credit.

If we add to the cost of naval defence the expense of keeping up an army, and last—not least—the cost of a Foreign Office, with Ministers and Consuls and all the attendant paraphernalia of intercourse with Foreign States, it must be admitted that the Australian Republic would scarcely start on its course of independence in these days of annexation and filibustering without casting "a longing, lingering look" at the Old Country and its ever-present, ever-protecting flag. Then, as is well put by Sir John Colomb, and also by Mr. Hervey in his very interesting article, what influence would the Ministers and Consuls of an Australian Republic have? Instead of their Consul being the one to whom foreigners are often glad to apply for assistance, they would be liable in times of danger to find themselves in the position of those foreigners, and to have to appeal to the charity of the British Consul, whose protection they could no longer invoke as a right.

Having, I hope, proved that the views of 1850 were a mistake, and that no English politician of these days would desire to separate the sticks which are unbreakable while bound together, but which would snap so readily were they attacked singly, let us turn to the problem presented for solution—namely, the formation *within* the Empire of a Britannic Confederation. The phrase “*within* the Empire” is deliberately used; for it seems sometimes to be forgotten that, assuming the existence of such a Confederation, no inconsiderable portion of the Empire—notably India with its population of 286 millions, and the African spheres of influence—must inevitably be left out. Moreover, in considering the question in the only form in which it can arise in the immediate future, we may further narrow its scope by confining our argument to the larger Colonies—Canada, Australia, the Cape, and New Zealand; for any scheme applicable to them can readily be adapted to the smaller British Possessions when occasion arises.

What, then, is the nature of the proposed Britannic Confederation which is intended to draw closer the bonds of union between the mother-country and the Anglo-Saxon Colonies? What examples can be found in contemporary history of forms of government binding together political communities having local self-governing powers?—for to such forms of government the expressions “Federation” and “Confederation” are alone applicable.

An example which may be taken to illustrate all the characteristics of Federal Union will be found in the United States Republic. The thirteen American Colonies, which revolted against British rule, found themselves at the conclusion of the war in the position of thirteen independent States, having no connection with each other. The common tie of British supremacy had been dissolved; and each State possessed the prerogatives of making peace and war, of maintaining armies and navies, of regulating commerce and making treaties with foreign nations, which had previously been vested in the Sovereign of Great Britain. Such a state of things was intolerable. A cluster of thirteen small independent States lay at the mercy of any foreign Power; and, to obviate this danger, they agreed to form a Confederacy. This they attempted to do by the establishment of a central body called Congress, consisting of delegates from the component States, and invested with all the prerogatives of the British Crown. The expenses incurred by the Confederacy were to be defrayed out of a common fund, to be supplied by requisitions made on the several States. The defects of this Confederacy soon became apparent. Congress was utterly devoid of all coercive authority to carry its laws into effect. “Every breach of the laws involved a state of war, and military execution became the only instrument of civil obedience.”¹ “A still more striking defect was the total want of power to lay and levy taxes or to raise revenue to defray the ordinary expenses of government. Requisitions were to be made on thirteen independent States. The consequence was that, though in theory the resolutions of the Federal Government were constitutionally

¹ *Federalist*, p. 74.

binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they were mere recommendations which the States regarded or disregarded at their option." Story sums up the whole question as follows:—"It has been justly observed that 'a government authorised to declare war, but relying on independent States for the means of prosecuting it, capable of contracting debts and of pledging the public faith for their payment, but depending on thirteen distinct sovereignties for the preservation of that faith, could only be rescued from ignominy and contempt by finding those sovereignties administered by men exempt from the passions incident to human nature'—that is, supposing a case in which all human government would become unnecessary and all difference of opinion would become impossible."¹ In this state of things the Americans perceived that it was quite possible to maintain complete unity as a nation if, in addition to investing the supreme government with the prerogative powers, they added full power to impose Federal taxes on the component States and established an executive furnished with ample means to carry all Federal powers into effect through the medium of Federal officers. A complete system of Federal taxation enforced by Federal courts supplied the central government with the necessary funds to perform effectually all the functions of a supreme national government.

To understand this system it is only necessary to reflect that every inhabitant of the United States has a double political status. He belongs to one great nation called the United States. He is also a citizen of a local self-governing body called a State.

The Empire of Germany is a Federal Union differing from the United States of America in having an Emperor at its head. The King of Prussia, under the title of German Emperor, represents the Empire in all its relations with foreign nations, and has the prerogative of making peace and war; but, if the war be more than a defensive war, he must have the assent of the Upper House.

In considering the position of the Empire and the prospects of Britannic Confederation, the first reflection that occurs is that a Britannic Confederation can extend only to the Colonies and not to the Imperial Dependencies—meaning by the Colonies, as has been already explained, the settlements of British, or at all events of British and other European, settlers, while the expression Imperial Dependencies is used to designate India, Ceylon, and the countries inhabited in the main by dark-skinned races. To draw an accurate line of demarcation between these two classes of Colonies and Imperial Dependencies is not possible or necessary. Again, to enumerate the Settlements included within the category of Colonies would conduce little to the solution of the problem before us, as it is with the typical representatives of each class, and not with details, that we have to deal. The only fact which it may be well to remember is that the Imperial Dependencies have a population of some 300 millions and a volume of trade of £196,000,000, while the Colonies have a population of some 20 millions and a trade of £162,000,000.

¹ Story, chap. ii. p. 96.

It is not, of course, intended by this comparison to put the Imperial Dependencies on a par with the Colonies in the estimation of Englishmen, but to show the vast numbers whose happiness is involved in the government of the Empire, and the great national interests affected by that government. Now, the common link between the United Kingdom, its Colonies, and its Imperial Dependencies—in other words, the force which makes the Empire—is the sovereignty of the United Kingdom: the prerogative of Her Majesty to make peace and war, to maintain fleets and armies, and to govern by that prerogative alone the Imperial Dependencies.

Let us now consider what privileges the Colonists desire of which they are not already possessed. They do not, of course, claim to interfere in the local government of the United Kingdom, inasmuch as the British Government does not interfere in their local affairs; and a Canadian or Victorian has, to say the least, as large a power of governing Canada or Victoria as a Yorkshireman has of governing England. Again, the Colonist has little to desire with respect to the regulation of commerce. A citizen of New York or Florida cannot, as such, impose any customs-duties or interfere with trade. A citizen of Canada or New South Wales can deal with the import and export of goods into his own Colony as he wills, even to the extent of imposing burdensome duties on the manufactures of the mother-country. It is true, a Colonist cannot make treaties with a foreign country; but to grant this privilege would enable Canada with four millions of inhabitants, or New South Wales with one million, to legislate for the Colonies and Dependencies alike—in other words, to make treaties binding on 303 millions of peoples. Such a concession is obviously out of the question. Again, with respect to the power of making peace or war. The Australians complained some little time ago that we were unwilling to allow the annexation of certain islands in the Pacific. Those islands were of no consequence viewed in relation to the Empire, and their annexation might have involved us in a European war. Would it be right that, for an indirect benefit to a particular Colony or Colonies, a war should be set on foot which would have disturbed the whole Empire and cost thousands of lives and millions of money? And how would a Colony in such a case be benefited by independence? Would all Australia, having a population of only three millions, if she made a demand on any of the great European Powers, have a chance of sustaining that demand? It is sometimes suggested that a Colony may be drawn into war by the mother-country, and would be safer if independent. Here, if ever, the *tu quoque* argument applies. As has been stated above, the Empire is a structure which has cost hundreds of millions of money and millions of lives to erect and maintain. "Where is the woman?" is the question of the wise man, in searching for the origin of any quarrel between individuals: "Where is the Colony?" would be an equally apposite question in respect of any difference arising between Great Britain and any civilised nation. Were Great Britain assisted in the protection of her Colonial possessions by a Colonial fleet, and of her Indian countries by a native fleet, would she not be a Power capable of defying the nations of the World?

Something may also be said of the vast influence she would possess if her children, following her example, would abolish their hostile tariffs, and adopt Free Trade throughout the Empire. Would not such an Empire be far preferable to any *Zollverein* formed on the impossible lines of a protective tariff imposed by the mother-country on all Colonial products to the detriment of herself and foreign countries? Is it to be expected that the British citizen who pays so much to maintain the army and navy under the shadow of which the commerce of the Colonies, including their protective tariffs, is carried on, would consent to be further taxed for the benefit of his richer brother in Canada or Australia?

Is it conceivable that Britain, having led the vanguard in Free Trade, should waver in her advance, give up her commercial treaties with foreign countries, and reverse her policy of the last thirty years? Surely it is more reasonable that the Colonies should substitute Free Trade for Protection, than to expect that the mother-country should return to a policy which she abandoned for the benefit of the working-man, for the advantage of the very class who, having emigrated, have, contrary to the opinion of the old Roman poet, changed their opinions with their change of climate. In short, it is easier for countries whose united commerce amounts to 160 millions to alter their commercial regulations, than for Great Britain to risk its 750 millions of trade by again subjecting it to trammels from which it has been so lately emancipated.

No argument is required to show that, as the British Empire exceeds in extent every other union of States which the World has ever seen, so it presents a complexity of interests which has no parallel in history.

Confederation and Imperial taxation must go hand in hand. If the Colonies desire representation in an Imperial Parliament they must be prepared to take their share in all Imperial burdens, including the National Debt. Further, taxes for Imperial purposes would have to be collected by Imperial officers and enforced by Imperial courts, as taxes for Federal purposes are levied in the United States by Federal officers. Such a scheme of union cannot be looked upon as feasible within the near future, but must be developed gradually, and progress with the advance of the Colonies in respect of population and wealth.

But admitting this to be a barrier to the formulation to-day or to-morrow of a detailed scheme of Confederation, may we not initiate a system calculated to lead up to such a union? The problem is a new one: new conditions require new political relations: and, without attempting to prophesy what the British Empire may become before the close of another half century, let us consider what may be done immediately in the way of Britannic Confederation.

Let, as Sir John Colomb suggests, an Imperial army and an Imperial navy, as contradistinguished from a British army and navy, be established by the mother-country, and a fixed status in that army and navy be offered on certain conditions to every Colony. Take first the army, and let me illustrate my meaning by supposing Canada to respond to the invitation of Great Britain. Canada would raise a body of troops and maintain them. They would not be *compelled* to serve in the Imperial army unless Canada were attacked by an enemy of Great Britain: in such an event

they would be as completely under the command of Her Majesty's officers as the British troops. In time of peace they would be regulated by the law of the Colony. If the Canadian troops were required for service out of their own country, it would be necessary to obtain their own consent. Form a navy on similar conditions. The ships would be commissioned by Her Majesty, but they would not be required to serve out of a certain restricted area except with their own consent. What has been said of Canada applies to every other Colony desirous of becoming a member of a Britannic Confederation. Let the Colonies contribute in proportion to their size and wealth to the Imperial army and navy, and there can be little doubt that their influence in making peace and war will be in proportion to the strength of their battalions and the number of their ships. Nor need the intervention of the Colonies in British politics be only indirect. The direct intervention of a Colony may be secured by elevating the position of an Agent-General to one more akin to that of a Minister of a foreign State, and giving him a facility of access to the British Government and a social position commensurate with the important duties with which he would be intrusted.

Social links, as they may be called, between the mother-country and the Colonies might also be multiplied by adopting, as Sir John Colomb proposes, freer postage, telegraphic and other communications. There seems also no reason why a scheme should not be adopted whereby an interchange should take place between the Civil Service of a Colony and the English Civil Service. The Colonial Office might thus obtain a practical knowledge of genuine Colonial wants and ideas, and the staff of the greater Colonies might be strengthened by the assistance of men versed in the business of the higher departments in the English Civil Service. No stronger argument for the introduction of such a plan can be found than in the career of Sir Robert Herbert, who has just retired from the Colonial Office, to the regret alike of the Colonies and the mother-country. The personal knowledge and experience of Colonial affairs which he gained during his tenure of office as Premier of Queensland from 1860 to 1865 have, by universal consent, given him a unique position as adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A material step in advance has already been taken in the blending of English and Colonial ideas by the establishment of the Imperial Institute, whereby Colonists, on their arrival in this country, will find an institution in which they can conveniently meet for business or pleasure and obtain information. Last, but not least, the Imperial Federation League, through its able lecturer Mr. Parkin, has diffused throughout the United Kingdom and the Colonies a greater knowledge of the advantages to be derived from closer acquaintance and mutual confidence.

What, then, is the outcome of the whole question? The Colonies have all the powers of government, which communities can possess, except the Sovereign's prerogative of making peace and war and regulating commerce with foreign nations. These powers are, both in monarchical and republican States, vested in the head of the supreme government, and are practically controlled in constitutional States by the necessity of appealing to the people for money to carry on a war or for laws to

enforce treaties. If the Colonists are desirous of making their influence felt on these questions, the means are in their own hands. Let them ask the mother-country to form an Imperial army and navy, and let them contribute their quota to the land forces and reinforce the navy with their ships. As they grow in strength they will grow in influence, and when the five millions of Canadians have become a hundred millions, when the Australians can reckon fifty instead of three million inhabitants, and their local naval and military forces have grown in equal proportion, it may be that their numbers may be so great as to virtually shift the supremacy from the old country to the new; but that time has not yet arrived. The immediate Britannic Confederation should consist of a political organisation in which the Queen should maintain the existing prerogatives, but in which the Colonies, who are able and willing to give substantial assistance in the defence of the Empire, should be represented in London by Ministers, as suggested above.

Let me not be misunderstood. We may attempt "to dip into the future as far as human eye can see," and imagine an ideal State with its millions of British subjects commanding such an ascendancy in the World as to be able to insist that—

"The war-drum throb no longer and the battle-flag be furled
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the World";

but the hour is not yet, and for the present we must rest the stability of the Empire on the mutual affection of the mother-country and her vast Colonial family. What is there wanting in such a tie? There is a common origin, a common flag, a community of glorious recollections. The Canadian, the Australian, the New Zealander, each has his share in Agincourt, in Blenheim, in Waterloo, in the Crimea; his fathers were Englishmen—he, too, is an Englishman. "*Civis Romanus sum.*" "I am a British subject," he may proclaim everywhere, and he will find his claim allowed and respected. It may be said that such ties are merely sentimental, silken ties, broken by the slightest strain. If this be so, then love of country is a mere sentiment, nationality is a mere sentiment—the purest, liveliest, strongest affections of the human heart are mere sentiments. History tells us in every page that a common nationality is the firmest bond which unites men in political communities. Look abroad at Poland, still restless and uneasy because her nationality has been crushed and trampled upon. Consider the Slav aspiration for unity, seething and disturbing Europe with its misplaced energy and ambitious cravings. Ask the Hungarian why he revolted from Austria and is content because his nationality is recognised. Search the World throughout its length and breadth, and it will be found that combinations of States are strong and compact in proportion as their component members possess a common nationality and are bound together by a community of sentiment. Great Britain and her Colonies are the greatest combination of States of a similar origin which the World has yet known. They are held together by the firmest tie—that of "kindred blood, similar privileges, and equal protection."