as of Jew. At the very beginning a belief may have roots in the intelligence, but when it becomes the actual motor it becomes rather the regulator of the intelligence, the touch-stone of judgment. The mind can receive only what conforms to the new belief. Philosophy, literature and the arts all receive its impress, as in the middle ages, or among the Arabs. All new conceptions and perceptions must be unconsciously shaped by these ancestral conceptions before they can gain entrance to the mind. This is strikingly illustrated in the changing meanings attached to words from age to age, or as used by different races and sexes, a suggestive subject for psychological investigation. On technical subjects there may be intellectual discussion and agreement. But in morals, politics and religion agreement, or even mutual understanding is possible only for those of a common origin. In conference on these themes "it is not the living but the dead who discuss." Ordinary psychology assumes that all men experience identical sentiments under the influence of like stimulation, but nothing is more erroneous. A common well-rooted belief becomes thus the source of common ideas and the greatest factor in the creation of a national soul and will, and so of a characteristic orientation for all ideas.

The psychology of the apostles of the new faith is instructive. Although alienists usually regard the advanced socialists as belonging to the 'criminal-born' type, this is quite a mistake. They are rather actuated, not as the true criminal, by selfishness, but by motives the reverse of selfish, leading to acts quite opposed to their own interests. Like the apostles of past faiths, the men of the Inquisition, the followers of Mahomet, the men of the Convention, their zeal prompts them to destroy first institutions, then all who resist. Their philanthropy is as sincere and as intolerant of opposition as that of former apostles. They may be regarded as hypnotized by two or three formulas constantly brooded over.

Sociology and Philosophy. B. BOSANQUET. *Mind*. January, 1897.

Sociology is coming to be regarded more and more from the point of view of social psychology, the point of view of Plato's *Republic*. This enables us to see its relation to social philosophy. Like individual psychology it is now interested in asserting its claim to be a natural science, and as such to treat all phenomena in its field impartially. The 'laws of association' are the object of investigation, without regard to the logical, ethical or social *value* of the product.

But just as in the concept of apperception we recognize that the mind is not merely a machine, unaffected by its content, but is very different according to the reality which it thinks of, so, in social psychology, when it has ceased to be necessary or worth while to direct our attention solely to the fact that there is a common element in all social groups, we shall inquire into the differences as well. From this the transition to the consideration of the relative social value of the different groups or forms of organization is an easy one, and this is the province of social philosophy. The service of social science to social philosophy may then be similar to that of psychology to logic, ethics and æsthetics, but it would be for the advantage of the sociologist to familiarize himself far more intimately than he has yet done with psychological conceptions and principles, for which he now seems to be vaguely groping.

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NEUROLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY.

The Cell in Development and Inheritance. EDMUND B. WILSON. Columbia University Biological Series, IV. New York and London, The Macmillan Co., 1896. Pp. xvi+371

Within recent years the problems of biology have centered more and more largely in the cell. As long as morphologists were chiefly concerned with the evidences and probable course of organic evolution interest gathered around questions of homologies of organs and affinities of organisms, but now that the paramount problem is the *cause* of evolution the old methods are generally found to be of little service. What light could homology or phylogeny throw upon the nature and causes of assimilation, growth, metabolism, inheritance or development? And yet upon these very questions hangs the causal explanation of vital phenomena in general, including evolution. In almost every case these problems have been found to be at bottom questions as to the structure and function of the cell, and in attacking them morphology has of necessity become physiological. In the life of the cell are centered most of the present philosophical problems of biology.

The appearance, therefore, at this time of a general work on the cell is of more than ordinary interest, not alone to the biologist, but to all persons of liberal ideas. Professor Wilson's work is not the first in the field, though I think it may be said to be easily the best. Hert-