MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.—LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT
AND THINGS. I.

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IT is easier to quote Lotze than to criticise him. His philosophy is composed of so many heterogeneous ingredients and has so many side issues at stake, that it presents the appearance of administering to every recognised cult in turn, from teleological Idealism to scientific Materialism, about equal shares of favour and abuse. Were a collection made of isolated passages which one theory or another might adduce in its support, it would appear that Lotze's writings were a hopeless sea of contradictions. But it would be obviously unfair to form an estimate of Lotze's worth in this piecemeal fashion. His admirers have naturally preferred to dwell on the consistency of his general line of thought and to exhibit the attractiveness of the ultimate aims and aspirations which undoubtedly exercise a dominating influence over all the details of his speculations. There is yet a third method of treatment, to which Lotze has been subjected by those of his enemies who regard themselves as staunch Idealists of the "absolute" type; they have simply ignored him. With feelings of impatience and irritation they have dismissed him from their minds as a terrible example of the ways in which philosophy can be misunder-

stood. Even Lotze's lifelong efforts to officiate as the peacemaker between philosophies they regard with contempt, under the impression that his achievements in this vocation are rather of the literary and forensic kind, which blows hot and cold with the same breath, than possessed of any healing virtue to permanently close the ruptures between opposing schools. In fact they do not want peace but war, and hope to find in their own Hegelian theory a signal example of the survival of the fittest.

But neither by picking holes in a man nor by praising him can we form an unbiased judgment of his worth. And Lotze is too important to be ignored. It may be fairly claimed that, in pure philosophy, he is the last in the field; he has pronounced his verdict upon all the most important problems of speculation; and so wide is the respect he commands that, as long as his words are allowed to remain the last, they will continue to gain acceptance as final. His attitude towards other German thinkers is most precisely described by von Hartmann in his *Lotze's Philosophie*. In that book he shows that it was Lotze's object, by a reconstruction of Herbart, to arrive at a higher point of view from which the elements of truth in Hegel and in Herbart might be blended into one harmonious whole, always provided that this point of view should be consistent with the spirit of Weisse. If students of Lotze would take up this hint of von Hartmann's and bear well in mind the influence of Weisse, they would possibly understand better what Idealism, with Lotze, really means. But in England, at any rate, the niceties of Lotze's position relative to the immediate philosophical atmosphere with which he was surrounded do not excite much concern; attention is confined to the broad and permanent outlines of his thought, which mark the culminating point of the reaction, led by Idealists with a partiality for "common-sense" and science, against extreme Hegelianism. Most of our recent metaphysicians bear strong marks of his influence, and he is also gaining in favour and importance among that class of religious speculators who view with apprehension the latest and boldest interpretations of Hegel. For ultra-Hegelianism is bound, in the first instance, to assume a negative attitude towards many of the cherished convictions of religious minds; and, until it convinces people that it can provide a positive philosophy of religion which shall be adequate to religious needs—a task in which it has not succeeded as yet—there are strong temptations for sober-minded men to throw in their lot with Lotze, the able champion of Christianity who can

do battle with Hegel and Herbart on their own grounds, and yet contrive at the end of the day to bring in victorious the more characteristic tenets of orthodoxy. If, therefore, Hegelians wish to check these desertions from their camp, they ought to take action; if they do not wish their silence to be misunderstood, they ought to clear away those misunderstandings of philosophy to which they think Lotze gives rise.

The final goal to which Lotze's thoughts are always directed is well known and much admired, and the many grounds on which its attainment is desirable are set forth with great persuasiveness and plausibility in the *Microcosmus*. But I think it is the first duty of criticism to examine the methods by which this consummation is to be reached and demonstrated as true; and for this purpose his later works on Logic and Metaphysic are the most important. One of the dominating notions, or at least the pervading perplexity, which is especially prominent herein is the belief in a relation or antithesis (or both) between thought and things. It is to be noted however that the importance, and at the same time the difficulty, of this antithesis lies in the fact that it is impossible to lay our finger on any particular chapter of Lotze's (as could be done, e.g., with regard to his views on space) and say "here is his theory on the subject"; he does not make it a special problem; it is rather a vein of thought, permeating the entire body of his metaphysical theories, and, to a large extent, supplying the principle on which their vitality depends. Accordingly, although his Theory of Knowledge in *Logic*, bk. iii., is the *locus classicus* on the matter, in order to appreciate its import and seek its full justification we must often go further afield.

If we would fix upon the starting-point from which the antithesis developed in Lotze's mind, I think we must find it in his steady conviction that philosophy is, in the last resort, tentative, and is debarred by the frailty of human knowledge from the possibility of arriving at absolute certainty.

I readily admit that I take philosophy to be throughout merely an inner movement of the human spirit. In the history of that spirit alone has philosophy its history. It is an effort, within the presupposed limits, even to ourselves absolutely unknown, which our earthly existence imposes on us, to gain a consistent view of the world. . . . An absolute truth, such as the archangels in heaven would have to accept, is not its object.

This passage (*Met.*, bk. i. ch. vii.), which is typical of many, throws a strong light on the characteristic bent of

Lotze's mind. It betrays at once his recognition of the finite and human aspect of knowledge and also his firm conviction that this is not the whole of the matter, that there is a sense in which knowledge and reality must be held to be infinite and divine. I shall try to show later on that Lotze has made a fatal mistake and caused endless confusion by not clearing away the ambiguity, involved in the above view, at the outset, by giving a frank theory of the relation of the finite to the Infinite mind. At present we must simply note that his logical and metaphysical speculations suffer from the absence of some such theory; they are pervaded with an unanalysed feeling of uncertainty and of submission to a higher power, due to a reluctance to close with this ultimate but fundamental problem, while yet recognising its presence. He is firmly convinced of the existence of a true Reality, but seriously doubts whether our human minds are capable of cognising it.

We can now understand his attitude when first entering into the problems of speculation in *Logic*, bk. iii. He there disclaims all pretensions to the omniscience which alone could accomplish the consummation of philosophy as a "perfected system of connected truths at once ultimate and concrete". His less ambitious object, at the outset, is "not to inquire into the content of the principles in question, but into the grounds on which in a subjective sense their certainty for us reposes" (p. 412). He realises that the facts of human cognition, such as it is, are all the immediate data we have to work upon; he therefore resolves to make the best of them, and consequently opens his inquiry with an examination of "ideas," in which all the contents of our knowledge must take shape. He does not however think it necessary to preface his investigations with an examination into the extent and manner in which an object depends for its reality on its relation to a mind; he only recognises the very obvious, not to say trivial, fact that the reality of an object is not constituted by its relation to any particular mind, and thereupon makes bold to treat the reality of ideas as though it had nothing to do with the reality of objects. He asks us to concede his very plausible postulate that, whatever reality there may be behind our ideas, it is always in the first instance with "mere ideas" that we have to deal.

Of course if "idea" simply = "that which we know," every one will concede Lotze's postulate, but a moment's consideration will show that, on this interpretation, the postulate is quite barren and tautologous. We are thus naturally led to ask: Does not Lotze import some additional meaning

into the term "idea"? I think every one who reads him must perceive that he does. He constantly adopts that "common-sense" usage of "idea," by which the term is taken to mean a representation, true or false, of an object; a "mere idea" being a representation to which no object corresponds, or a representation considered apart from its object. Instances of this popular language occur on almost every page of his. We hear of objects "corresponding" or "not corresponding" with conceptions, of things being "more than" thoughts, of "the possible," *i.e.*, the world of conceptions, being "wider than" the real, of "things" with no "counterpart" in thought, and thoughts with no "counterpart" in things. Such modes of expression are full of metaphysical assumptions, the prevailing one being that thought is a subjective and formal activity directed against an alien world of objects. It is not necessary now to examine these assumptions in detail or inquire how far they implicate Lotze in the errors of the Formal Logicians. The point is that they *are* assumptions which Lotze does not attempt to prove. Unconscious apparently of any prejudices which they may involve, he imports them bodily, now under one guise and now under another, into that originally empty and tautologous statement "we know only ideas". Indeed, this last step is absolutely necessary for him; otherwise, his proposal to "begin with ideas" would not have told him where to begin at all; now, indeed, he has obtained a very definite starting-point, but it is at the cost of converting his primary postulate into an assumption which many metaphysicians would be far from conceding to him. I think it is not unfair to say that this assumption amounts to a demand that the mind's ideas shall be grouped into a sort of picture-gallery, round which it is necessary to make a tour of inspection and comparison before it is possible to ask whether the pictures correspond to the objects of real nature from which they are taken.

It would be highly unjust to charge Lotze with deliberately attempting to conceal the need for a metaphysical justification of his postulate. On the contrary, he informs us with inimitable coolness and good faith that his assumption is the necessary basis for every possible metaphysic. It is the one stable fact of the theory of cognition on which Idealists and Realists must find common ground. Thus he says, on p. 421:—

All we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are within us; it is so far entirely indifferent whether with Idealism we deny the existence of that world, and regard our ideas of it as alone

reality, or whether we maintain with Realism the existence of things outside us which act upon our minds. On the latter hypothesis as little as the former do the things themselves pass into our knowledge; they only awaken in us Ideas, which are not things.

Lotze regards the impartiality of the above doctrine as a sure guarantee for its fairness. It is intended to be a sign-post erected, on common ground, at the parting of the ways towards Idealism and Realism. And what exactly is the "common ground"? It is the belief, to quote Lotze's words, that "knowledge under whatever form can never be things in themselves, but only represent them". Far from regarding this proposition as at all ambiguous or dangerous, he holds it to be the statement of a primary fact on which "thought is perfectly clear, and at one with itself". The reason of Lotze's confidence is easy to explain. In his anxiety to find a common point of agreement between Idealism and Realism, he asks us to choose one of two alternative propositions, *viz.*: (1) Knowledge *is* things-in-themselves: (2) Knowledge *only represents* things-in-themselves. Naturally every one, be he inclined to Idealism or Realism, will decide to adopt proposition (2), *always provided that we are compelled to choose either the one or the other*. Now Lotze makes another step which should be taken in close connexion with the above. He makes another assumption which he holds must be equally acceptable to all, *viz.*, that knowledge must *at least represent* things. Here, again, in order that this second assumption may be conceded, he thinks it is only necessary to ask us to make our choice between the alternatives—(1) thought does not represent things in any way; (2) thought *at least represents* things. Here, too, it is easy to persuade every one that they must accept proposition (2), *always provided that we are compelled to choose either the one or the other*. I wish to lay particular stress on the fact that the conditions I have italicised are ignored by Lotze, and tacitly assumed to be accepted; I hope to show in the sequel that the supposition that they are binding is one of Lotze's most fatal mistakes.

The significance for him of the above view as to the representative character of knowledge cannot be over-estimated. It at once provides the justification for his Metaphysic, and furnishes ready to hand its immediate problem. For if thought does bring us reports from an external world of real things, a science of Metaphysic is possible, and it is the first business of that science to collect all the data which thought can furnish in answer to the question—"What is a thing?"

The actual steps by which Lotze's theory develops itself are as follows: Knowledge must in some way be representative, but we do not yet know in what way. We must, therefore, disclaim complicity with two prejudices which are equally liable to obtrude themselves in the phrase, "we know only phenomena". We must, in the first place, steer clear of the unwarranted presupposition that thought is, by its limitation to phenomena, thwarted in its purpose, or fails to penetrate to a real essence of things which exists in the grandeur of inaccessible solitude behind phenomena. To keep our minds free from bias, we must, in the second place, take note that there is another supposition equally possible and equally unproven. "We may at once pronounce an opposite point of view to be conceivable, which should regard things as mere means to produce in us in all its details the spectacle of the ideal world" (*Logic*, p. 431). It must be carefully noted here that in the passage from which this last quotation has been made, Lotze in no way modifies his view, as we have previously sketched it, of the representative character of knowledge. He does not deny that knowledge is representative; he does not even deny that it is representative of the unknowable; he only admits the difficulty of knowing the unknowable.

This last difficulty is made by Lotze the occasion for a new departure. He is not at all disconcerted by the discovery that he has made his "ideas" representative of something which he does not know. On the contrary, he seizes on the fact with avidity, and labelling it with the name "circle of ideas," makes immense capital out of it. For, if knowledge is only directly concerned with ideas within this circle, we have every right to neglect for the time being ugly questions about the relation of thought to an external reality, and not only can, but must, confine ourselves to the data which this circle of mere ideas provides. "Let us leave entirely out of the question the opposition between our world of ideas and a world of things; let us look upon the former alone as the material we have to deal with" (pp. 431-2). And so, after rehabilitating the Platonic world of ideas, Lotze proposes to take up the problem where Plato left it, and discover "what are those first principles of our knowledge under which the manifold world of Ideas has itself to be arranged" (p. 449). Thereupon the candour of Lotze prominently asserts itself. Fully convinced that the contents of knowledge are limited to a "circle of ideas," he wishes every one to take note of the fact; he calls upon us deliberately to watch him as he

“perpetrates” his surrender to the circle “with his eyes open”.

The circle is inevitable, so we had better perpetrate it with our eyes open ; the first thing we have to do is to endeavour to establish what meaning it is possible for us to attach to knowledge in its widest sense, and what sort of relation we can conceive to subsist between the subject which knows, and the object of its knowledge, consistently with those yet more general notions which determine the mode in which we have to conceive the operation of anything whatever upon anything else. What we have to do is to obtain the last-mentioned conception, which amounts to a metaphysical doctrine, and to treat the relation of subject and object as subordinate to it (p. 451).

This passage is highly important as indicating the direction in which Lotze is driven by his doctrine with regard to the limitation of knowledge to ideas. He becomes aware of the deficiency of that doctrine, and strives to supplement it by supplying to the essentially subjective aspect of “ideas” a more stable objectivity. Still, since knowledge is limited to “ideas,” this “something more” ought, strictly, to be unknowable. It is an unknown, however, which plays such an important part that we cannot get along without taking it into account ; so Lotze ingeniously proposes that, as we cannot *know* it, we must make an *assumption* or *postulate* as to what it would be like if we could know it. In this way “real things” cease to stand in an external relation to the circle of ideas ; it is rather the reference of things to ideas and ideas to things which itself constitutes that circle. The assumption made, he invests it with the title “metaphysical,” and erects it into the guiding principle which shall show us, as though by a miraculous intervention, how to “perpetrate” the circle of ideas. To this principle all logical inquiry must conform.

This leads us to ask, how far, and with what justification, does Lotze subordinate logic to metaphysic ? Let us recollect the meaning of his terms. With him logic = the science of ideas, as opposed to metaphysic, which = the science of “things”. He is not, be it remembered, attempting a regress to the grounds upon which the antithesis “thought v. things” is based ; such a task would be equally logical and metaphysical. On what, then, does the priority of his “metaphysical assumptions” rest ? In the first place, it cannot rest on their supposed reference to a Real beyond thought. For, although they be assumptions *about* that Real, they are yet out and out assumptions *of* thought ; it is as thoughts alone, *i.e.*, solely in virtue of their place as members of the ideal world, that they must establish their

truth. He has told us at the beginning of bk. iii. of the *Logic* that "Truth and the knowledge of truth consist only in the laws of interconnexion which are found to obtain universally within a given set of ideas". Accordingly the supreme authority of his "metaphysical" assumptions over the circle of ideas cannot be delegated to them by an unknown power beyond that circle; it must consist of their recognised *ideal* supremacy, within the circle, over all other members of the circle. But can the "metaphysical" doctrine which is to regulate the circle of ideas stand this test? If its mysterious title "metaphysical" be ruled out of order, what special claim to sovereignty does the "law of the operation of anything whatever upon anything else" possess? Well, let us first try to understand Lotze's attitude on the subject.

Eager as Lotze is in his theory of knowledge to begin with "mere ideas" taken apart from their objects, he soon reminds us that he has a still more deeply rooted affection for "things". While professedly confining his attention to ideas, at least, we might have expected him to admit that the dominating laws of his subject-matter are those imposed by that mind to which the ideas owe their genesis; but, despite inconsistencies, he is found asserting at all hazards the pre-eminence of "things" even here. Why he should do so it is difficult to say, for he vouchsafes no explanation. I can only suggest that he has lapsed into a very plausible prejudice of "common-sense". It is a step which, however it be accounted for, is sadly mischievous in its results. His most confusing utterances on the theory of ideas are prompted by this latent assumption that "things" (whatever they may be), in virtue of their properties, produce modifications, *i.e.*, thoughts, in the cognising subject. He thinks we can treat the relation of thought to its object as a particular case to be dealt with by an application of the general laws of cause and effect. He, of course, avoids those coarser applications of these laws which figure in the pages of "scientific" philosophers; the way he utilises them is much more refined. (I shall mention some of these refinements when I come to deal with his use of the term "super-sensuous".) Still the qualifications and safeguards with which he supplements it do not affect the fundamental import of his metaphysical belief in the causative action of "things". Some such belief obtrudes itself, in a variety of guises, on almost every page. It is a notion almost as characteristic of Lotze as "thought-relations" are characteristic of Green. Indeed, we might say that the root-conception from which Lotze's system of philosophical

argumentation has sprung is the assumption that some external objective reality distinct from human thought exercises a causative action on our minds.

It is characteristic of Lotze always to face his difficulties boldly, until he has explained them away; they never induce him to turn back and reconsider his starting-point. It is now our business to note some of the complications in which he is involved by the assumption of an active causality on the part of things in themselves, and to trace the devices by which he endeavours to extricate himself from his embarrassments. He has laid himself open to the charge—to put it in the grossest form—of making consciousness, which can never be anything but the subject for which objects are, into an object; for it is only objects which can stand in the relation of cause and effect. I am quite ready to acknowledge that in many passages he rises superior to this debased view of consciousness, allowing that it is something altogether unique, and admitting, implicitly, its superiority over the categories of cause and effect. (I do not allude to Lotze's ascription to consciousness of a supposed indeterministic "freedom".) But the fact remains that, instead of discarding utterly the notion that consciousness is a passive thing, he tries to patch it up, as though any amount of patching up would make what is radically wrong right.

His first concession with a view to rectifying his mistake is that thought is, in part, constitutive of knowledge; the reason being that *each* of two objects which act on one another contributes from its own nature to the resultant effect. His meaning is made apparent at the point where (p. 456), after puzzling over the "innate ideas" of Descartes, he finds the solution of that problem must be prefaced by a deliberate "assumption as to the mode in which the object of knowledge may be conceived as operating upon the subject which apprehends it". By his own chosen assumption, which amounts to a rough doctrine of causality amongst natural phenomena, thought comes under the rule that "every object is receptive of various kinds of stimuli to its spontaneity". He then goes on to show that in the resultant effect, *i.e.*, the thought-content, the particular nature of the spontaneity of thought must be taken into account.

But subsequently Lotze makes a second and still greater concession to the importance of the work of thought. Thought always puts its own colour on objects given to it; but, in some cases, it does more; it makes its own objects entirely out of its own nature. The experience of the mind is

thus of two kinds according as it is (1) made out of material which thought does not make, or (2) made out of material which thought does make entirely out of itself. Which, with Lotze, amounts to saying that thought is not only a reality *per se*, but can *per se* produce real results. "In an act of knowledge the direct contribution from the side of the object may be absent, but never that which is furnished by the subject's own nature" (p. 457). After the original "stimulus from without" thoughts may "have their source in the constitution of the mind alone".

Proceeding on these lines, Lotze half unconsciously permits himself to widen and widen the gap between thought and "things," until he gets on the one hand an hypostasised world of ideas and on the other an unknown world of "things". Once set in motion a "stimulus from without," he imagines that thought may call into being a whole world of "possible" ideas, the private property of the mind itself and distinctly independent of the world of material objects. I particularly wish to call the attention of Idealists to this last point, because I think it will enable them to see what sort of an Idealist Lotze really is. I would have them observe that his justification for his "ideal world" is based on a plausible endeavour to do justice to thought as one amongst other partially independent and partially causally interconnected objects. Is such a philosopher, I would ask them, a safe or a dangerous friend?

The importance of seriously considering this question is emphasised by the growing habit of accepting Lotze's conclusions without taking the trouble to carefully examine their source. That is what makes his influence on the philosophy of to-day such a serious matter. And he states his convictions with such a persuasive air. He coaxes men to agree with him, who never would agree with him if he tried to compel them. Indeed, if attractiveness were the only test of philosophic truth, he would stand easily first. And nowhere has he done more to popularise his views, among those who judge Idealism by its results rather than by its justifications, than in his brilliant chapter on the Platonic ideas. I allude especially to his division of Reality into three unique kinds, *viz.*, Events, which *occur*; Things, which *exist*; Thoughts, which are *valid*. There can be no doubt "validity" is a capital name to conjure with. Whether it really succeeds in conjuring away all the difficulties of Platonism I cannot stop to inquire. It is more important to notice that in Lotze's own work it renders the important service of reducing to a minimum the friction between factors

of his thought which would be otherwise incompatible with one another. And thus he eludes the rude dialectical force of mere partisan warfare, which, if left to itself, would have heightened the antagonism between thoughts and things until they destroyed each other, thereby proving the necessity for their reunion in a higher unity which transcends their differences. To the outside world "validity" comes as a message of peace, which looks so temptingly plausible that they are only too willing to accept it, without bothering their heads particularly as to what the dispute has been about. For there is no royal road to Idealism; and, after their first laborious efforts in the direction of that goal, people begin to feel dissatisfied; unused to the rarefied atmosphere, they imagine they have left solid ground behind them. Then comes the arch-tempter and whispers in their ear that Idealism is a very estimable thing in its way, only it has a little over-rated itself; let them but endorse this quite innocent division of Reality into three, for which they have the authority of Lotze—the most scrupulous and conscientious of philosophers—and all the dark riddles of philosophy shall be revealed to them. And those who swallow the bait remind us thenceforth unceasingly that "thoughts are not things," and under the spell of that pass-word all the difficulties of philosophy make way before them; and those of their former friends who still ascend to Idealism by the hard and narrow way they never cease to reproach with the taunt that they "have hypostasised an abstraction".

I have tried to indicate the groundwork of Lotze's theory of thought, in the belief that people would do well to pause before growing enthusiastic over his "world" of "really valid" thought-concepts, and soberly ask what is the basis upon which this attractive superstructure rests. But so far we have been taking a one-sided view of Lotze. That is the worst of philosophies in two pieces; they have to be inspected twice over. Lotze indeed seems anxious to save us the trouble by trying to weld the two pieces into one in his philosophy of religion. But perhaps it would be advisable to follow him more closely, without anticipating the general statements with which he concludes; let us see how far he avails himself of the advantages of Dualism before he rejects it.

He constantly sets thought in opposition, latent or explicit, to "things". It would be impossible, without unfairly suppressing his meaning, to take his doctrine of thought in isolation, because the *quasi*-independence of the other member of the antithesis is for ever asserting itself. That is why

Lotze is such a formidable opponent to attack. "Thought" is no sooner demolished than "things" gain the ascendancy in this mental see-saw, and shower upon us a host of additional reasons why neither term in the antithesis can be disturbed. Popular English writers have taken a leaf out of Lotze's book. They forbid the Idealist to hypostasise thought, because they have shown thought to be impotent by investing it with the inane independence of universal validity; then, when experience testifies to the presence of something other than the bare universal in the content of thought, they triumphantly exclaim: "Behold those Real things, quite other than thoughts, which your stupid hypostasised thought has left out of the account".

It is therefore now our business to examine those claims to be independent of thought which "things" put forth. Incidentally, I call attention to a preliminary embarrassment which is apt to throw Lotze's readers off their guard. He not unfrequently changes his antithesis between ideas and reality into an antithesis between our ideas and God. He says at the outset that he will not decide whether "things" or God lie at the back of our ideas; he takes the benefit of the doubt, together with the credit for impartiality in doing so. The immensity of the difference between God and "things" as a substratum to thought is obvious enough; but, as I hope to show that his application of the notion of the Deity in this connexion is one which cannot philosophically be allowed, I think the ambiguity about the substratum need not here disconcert us.

And now, to resume, we can boldly ask *why* are "things" more than thoughts? without being overawed by fear of the insinuation that we are asking Why is God more than man? Lotze's first answer is—because they account for a *posteriori* knowledge. "The *a priori* character, however, which we thus claim in so broad a sense for our knowledge, is only one side of the matter. If we regard all forms of sensible perception . . . as modes of manifestation innate in the mind, then and for that reason the ground for this or that particular application of them, one necessarily excluding the other, cannot possibly be found in the mind" (*Logic*, p. 460). At this point Lotze's procedure needs to be carefully observed, for he is preparing the way for the transition from logic to metaphysic. Let us recollect that Lotze never saw the necessity for beginning with an analysis of the conditions of knowledge and existence. We have already observed how he takes thought for granted without asking how thought is possible; we must now trace the growth of his complemen-

tary assumption that "things" exist, and observe how strongly and irrevocably that assumption has influenced his theories, long before he brings himself to deal with the question—What are the conditions of the existence of a "thing"?

The first step towards the transition is made when he observes, and rightly enough, that knowledge must have an *a posteriori* element. But, as such an element is excluded from his narrow and formal view of thought, it must be referred to an unknown outside thought. This is the germinal conception from which his elaborated doctrine of "things" takes its rise. For the justification of his procedure we must look to his chapter on the "Real and Formal Value of Logical Acts". The argument there turns on his view of the relation between the process and the result of reasoning; or, as he puts it, the question is—When have our thought-contents a Real significance and when are they the mere "scaffolding of thought"? The main conclusion of a long and intricate discussion is that, regarded as intermediary links in a chain of reasoning, thoughts are only formal, whereas the thoughts in which chains of reasoning terminate have, or ought to have, real objects corresponding to them. In support of this he shows that judgments and syllogisms cannot have a "Real" significance, because no real object could possibly correspond, *e.g.*, to a hypothetical judgment. To adopt the simile which Lotze works out at the end of the chapter, thought is a spectator travelling by "subjective" and "formal" routes to an "objective" and "real" hill-top. Different spectators may ascend by different paths, but the view from the summit is the same for all. Now Lotze expects us to read a good deal of meaning in this simile of his. Amongst other things, he expects us to concede that, although thought in virtue of its "formality" (p. 493) is always, as it were, in touch with objective reality; yet thought as the universal result or terminus (the summit) is to be distinguished from and not limited to thought as the particular or the subjective process (the arbitrarily chosen path). "Surely," I may be told, "that is a highly plausible request. What harm can there be in emphasising the very modest truth that the universal and the particular are not the same?" Wait a moment; turning to the next page we find the illustration of the difference between universals and particulars is not as innocent as it appears to be. Lotze there tells us that in his illustrations the difference between the "arbitrary path" and the "summit" is meant to serve as a "preliminary elucidation" of the diffe-

rence between logical and metaphysical reality. I am aware that he promptly observes: "It will be better to reserve for the *Metaphysic* the fuller discussion of this important point". Very good; let us not forget the "fuller discussion"; but above all let us not be hurried away before digesting the full importance of the step he has just taken.

I think that if chapter iv. of *Logic*, bk iii., be carefully read, especially the last three pages, it will be seen that in the explanation of this last step from logic to metaphysic is to be found the key which enables Lotze and his followers to open out their metaphysical assumptions into a working theory. We saw a little while ago that the "*a posteriori* element" pointed in this direction, by demanding that logical ideas must be supplemented from some other source. But the "*a posteriori* element" is not enough for them, because they can only extort out of it a "datum" alien to thought; for anything they can show, this datum might be a flux of particulars; in which case "things," being void of permanent qualities, could not be the subject-matter of a theory. *It is therefore necessary to universalise "things,"* so that metaphysical attributes may be predicated of them; this is done in a most subtle manner in the chapter before us. Thought had previously been stripped of its concrete particularity, in order that "things" might be clothed with reality; now its universality is borrowed from it, in order that "things" may be invested with the only property which can make them cognisable.

It is on account of this conversion of "things" into concrete universals that Lotze is able to make his divorce between thought and "things" complete and yet not suicidal. He raises the two into independent entities, and reduces their connexion from an intrinsic unity to a parallelism. There are thus (1) thoughts to which no "things" correspond: (2) thoughts and "things" which correspond to or are parallel with one another: (3) "things" to which no thoughts correspond. (1) are the outcome of the theory of "mere ideas"; (2) owe their existence to the transference to "things" of those attributes of particularity and universality which, I take it, should belong to thoughts alone. We have now to deal with (3) i.e., with "things" which presume to be "more than" thoughts, with the belief, as English writers express it, that "existence is one thing, knowledge is another".

Now is the time to turn to that "fuller discussion" in the *Metaphysic* to which Lotze referred us for an elucidation of his views. It is to be found on pp. 142-4. He is dealing

with the difference between relations between the contents of ideas and relations between "real objects" or "things". He finds that "if a and b " be "simply contents of possible ideas like red and yellow, straight and curved, then a relation between them exists only so far as we think it and by the act of our thinking it". It has existence and permanence "only in the sense of being an occurrence which will always repeat itself in our thinking in the same way under the same conditions". But let a and b indicate expressly Realities, Entities or "Things". Then, although thought can institute comparisons and relations between a and b as before, "it is not these relations that we have in view, if, in order to render intelligible a connexion of the things a and b which experience forces on our notice, we appeal to a relation C , which sometimes does, sometimes does not, obtain between a and b "; such an "objective relation C ," he goes on to say, "cannot be anything that takes place *between* a and b , because it is only thought which constitutes a 'between'". What, then, is it? Well, the upshot is: "That which we sought under this name of an objective relation between things can only subsist if it is more than mere relation, and if it subsists not between things but immediately in them as the mutual action which they exercise on each other and the mutual effects which they sustain from each other".

Possibly Lotze might have made the above remarks a little more lucid, but they contain two unmistakable and vitally important statements. They tell us that we know thoughts are more than "things," because we are presented with "*variable* relations C ," *i.e.*, because the facts of our experience *change*. They tell us that, as, on the one hand, thoughts owe their reality to their presence to a mind, so "things," on the other hand, owe *their* reality to their participation in a mutual interaction between each other. The elucidation of these two points ought, if we wish seriously to regard Lotze's philosophy as a *system*, to be placed at the forefront of his *Metaphysic*. For his philosophy cannot possibly be regarded as a systematic whole unless his *Metaphysic* can be seen to be connected with and necessarily to flow from his theory of knowledge. We must carefully keep in view the reasons *why* he is justified in saying, in the Introduction to his *Metaphysic*, that the problems of that volume centre about the fact of change, taking place amongst real things.

After having seen how the mind is compelled to seek a solution of these metaphysical problems, the next step

obviously is to ask : What then is meant by "things which change"? It must here be observed that Lotze is not very obliging towards his readers. For it is a long time before any explanation is forthcoming. He refers us, it is true, to our "common-sense," which never finds the slightest difficulty in deciding what is a "change" and what is a "thing". But we are now supposed to be dealing with philosophy, and I think I am well within the mark in saying that the philosophical meaning of "change" and "thing" is very far from being a matter of common consent. It is therefore Lotze's fault, and not ours, that we are compelled to turn towards the conclusion of his speculative theories for the explanation of those terms which he uses from the beginning. He tells us on p. 1 of the *Metaphysic* that "while predicable only by metaphor of anything that is merely object of thought, change completely dominates the whole range of reality". But that is to assume, without explaining, that we know what "change" and "reality" are, and, in particular, that we know in what respects they are more than "mere objects of thought". Nor again do we get any more light on the matter from his special chapter on "Becoming and Change". He there professes to tell us the precise difference between metaphysical "things" and thoughts (p. 78). In the world of ideas "the content of a truth *a* is indeed founded on that of another *b*, but, far from arising out of the annihilation of *b*, holds good along with it in eternal validity"; whereas, in the world of changeable things, "the reality of the new is not contained in the reality of the old. It presupposes the removal of that reality as the beginning of its own." Of course there is an obvious difference between a valid truth (*e.g.*, a proposition in Euclid) and an actual fact; but that does not help us in the slightest to understand the difference between a thought and a "thing," because a thought, too, is always an actual fact as the object of the mind which thinks it, and to that mind the *actuality* of a new thought always presupposes the removal of the actuality of the old. Surely it would be preposterous first to abstract a certain (and essential) characteristic (*viz.*, their actuality) from ideas, and then to say that their difference from "things" consists in their not possessing that very characteristic.

Although I cannot find in the Ontology any explanation why a "thing" should be more than or other than a thought, I think I can find the reason why no such explanation is there forthcoming. Throughout the first book of his *Metaphysic* Lotze seems happily oblivious of the fact that Change implies Time. But our views on the import, logical and

metaphysical, of Change must depend entirely on our theory of Time. The reasons why Lotze holds that Change draws the border-line between logic and metaphysic must be found, if anywhere, in his doctrine as to the relation of Time to the cognising mind, or, as it is generally, though somewhat misleadingly, put, as to the question of the subjectivity or objectivity of Time. His verdict is pronounced on pp. 264-5. "Time as a whole is without doubt merely a creation of our presentative intellect. It neither is permanent nor does it elapse. . . . But the lapse of events in time we do not eliminate from reality, and we regard it as a perfectly hopeless undertaking to regard even the idea of this lapse as an *a priori* merely subjective form of apprehension, which develops itself within a timeless reality in the consciousness of spiritual beings." In short he finds Time or succession to be transcendently real. I must point out that this discovery was practically a foregone conclusion, because he has, throughout the *Metaphysic* and in the theory of knowledge—in so far as that treatise borders on metaphysic—been already treating *change* as transcendently real. Are we then to charge Lotze with a huge *petitio principii*? Without answering that question, I must insist that, whether consciously or unconsciously, his justification for treating "things" as "more than" thoughts is not to be found until we reach his theory of Time. Here for the first time come to light the full reasons for his conviction that the Idealist, or, as he often calls it, the "subjective," view of "real things" is inadequate. Even in his doctrine of space, the existence of noumenal "things" is taken for granted rather than proved; it is only out of the dictum "succession is inseparable from reality" that he is able to form the bridge whereby the mind may pass from its own world of ideas to an outer world of things in themselves.

This view of Time, if it be tenable, constitutes the stronghold of Lotze's system. For if Time is to be our passport to things in themselves, we shall carry with us a host of advantages. Let us recollect that cause and effect differ from reason and consequence in that the former are in time, the latter are not. Now if the time-relationship is in any way applicable to "supersensuous" or "intelligible" "things," it at once becomes possible to invest those "things" with a causal activity. And that is why Lotze holds himself at liberty to disregard the warning of Kant that the categories of cause and effect are applicable only to phenomena.

No sooner has Lotze completed his vindication of the

"reality" of Time than he is seized with an uneasy foreboding that he has been committing himself to a doctrine incompatible with the ultimate goal of his philosophy. He keenly sympathises with "the efforts which are ever being renewed to include the real process of becoming within the compass of an abiding reality" (p. 269). Then he goes on to give a highly significant and characteristic hint of the direction which he considers those efforts ought to take. "They will not, however, attain their object, unless the reality, which is greater than our thought, vouchsafes us a Perception, which, by showing us the mode of solution, at the same time persuades us of the solubility of this riddle." It is to the philosophy of religion, he concludes, that we must look for help.

It would lead me too far afield to describe the way in which, in bk. ix. of the *Microcosmus* and in the *Dictated Portions of the Philosophy of Religion*, he strives, by his theory of the Deity, to render his Realism compatible with his Idealism. My special reason for making the last quotation is that it affords an excellent illustration of the way in which Lotze habitually falls back on "immediate perception" as a guarantee of the superiority of "real things" over human thoughts. I briefly note three leading types of these appeals. Often he appeals to perception (1) as giving assurance of actual fact. Thought is supposed to be a spider, spinning an unsubstantial web of ideas; only when the spider catches its fly, when the mind immediately perceives something, is it certain that the meshes of thought are attached to a concrete reality. In other passages he seems to make perception do duty for (2) a miraculous revelation of things in themselves. He defends his belief by an argument from analogy. As, for example, the union of Being and not-Being presented in Becoming would be held to be impossible or miraculous, were it not a matter of everyday perception, so, he holds, the unverified inexplicabilities of his own theories might, by a divine revelation or a deeper insight, be immediately perceived to be established truths. I have already quoted an example of the sort of revelation he desires (*Metaphysic*, p. 269). The fact that the desiderated perceptions are not forthcoming does not disturb his belief in their possibility or shake his confidence in immediacy; it only induces him to appeal to immediacy under a new aspect, *viz.*, (3) "faith". The best references are *Microcosmus*, bk. ix. pp. 660-3, and ch. i. of the *Dictated Portions of the Philosophy of Religion*. The ultimate questions of philosophy, he says, "only the new and

special faculty of Faith is competent to answer". He particularly relies on religious faith, as distinct from "scientific," to give assurances of "realities" and "facts". Thus, apart from knowledge originating in external experience and mediated by the senses, "there are also inner states which are available as data for the acquisition of truth".

I began this sketch by saying that the key to Lotze's attitude when entering on the problems of speculation is to be found in his confession of a "feeling of uncertainty," arising from religious grounds. I end it with the observation that for the ultimate justification for his views Lotze again resorts to religion—this time, however, as the guarantee for a "feeling of immediate certainty".

Having first endeavoured to understand the meaning and justification of Lotze's antithesis, I propose in my next article to discuss its value.

(To be continued.)