entirely unconscious of any such law. Among the preferred forms the one consisting of a cretic and a trochee is by far the most common. It is found in 4,184 of the 17,902 cases. The same form but with the first long syllable dissolved is found 436 times; *i. e.*, in about 10 per cent. of the number of the form from which it is derived. The other four forms, similarly derived from the other four preferred forms by dissolution of the first syllable, appear also in about 10 per cent. of the numbers of the forms from which they are derived. These and other regularities prove that the period endings of Cicero's orations are governed by a definite rhythmic law.

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DISCUSSION.

THE EGO AND EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY.¹

In his President's Address, last March, before the Western Philosophical Association, Professor Pillsbury considered what is, in my view, the most fundamentally important of the modern issues of psychology. I wish, therefore, that I more clearly understood the conclusion which he reaches. In the second paragraph, as well as later on in his address, he refers with evident disapproval to upholders of that which he calls the 'self-construction' who, as he thinks, 'abandon logic for emotion.' But in the final paragraph, in which he sums up his own doctrine, we find the following statements: "The self is merely all that we are and know, organized, self-unified, and self-identical, a growing vital unity that as a whole is effective in every experience. . . . It is unity with multiplicity, identity amid difference. . . . It is a principle of explanation, but is immanent, not transcendent, effective, not shadowy. It is . . . something empirically known, nothing mystical or mysterious in its nature or actions." All this is in such perfect accord with the conception of the self as basal fact of psychology that without the testimony of other sections and clauses of the paper one would be tempted to welcome Saul to the band of the prophets—in other words, to count Mr. Pillsbury among those whom he calls 'paper architects of the self.'

The address falls naturally into two parts: a defence of structural psychology in the form of a criticism of self-psychology; and, following on this, a constructive supplementation of structural psychology.

¹ 'The Ego and Empirical Psychology.' Read as the president's address before the Western Philosophical Association at Chicago University, March 29, 1907. Printed in the *Philosophical Review*, 1907, Vol. XVI., pp. 387-407.

The objections to self-psychology reduce to the following: It does not, in the first place, concern itself with 'the experience immediately given,' but rather 'with what must be assumed as the foundation of the experience' (p. 387). Again, 'sometimes the self-construction is welcomed as a means of avoiding conclusions admitted to be adequate from other premises' (p. 388). And, finally, the conception of a self is irreconcilable with the conception of the 'mental stream' (pp. 388-391).

Two of these criticisms are, I think, founded on misapprehensions. For, first, the self regarded as basal fact of psychology is conceived not as a philosophical or epistemological explanation of experience, but as a concretely and directly experienced fact — a 'what is' and not a mere 'what must be.'¹ And, second, Mr. Pillsbury has certainly missed the meaning of my teaching about will, to which he refers as his only example of the self-psychologist's tendency to cut loose from thought and 'to give way to emotion.' He represents me (p. 388) as 'satisfied of the correctness of the modern conclusion that will is no peculiar aspect of consciousness,' but as holding 'that a self is in some way conscious of a difference that we cannot find.' Mr. Pillsbury does not cite the passage which he takes as foundation for this intended paraphrase of my views, but I think that he refers to one of the closing paragraphs of my address on 'A Reconciliation between Structural and Functional Psychology.'² Here I say that "the modern school of structural psychology rightly, as it seems to me, teaches the impossibility of discovering in experience a peculiar volitional element." I add that this denial 'does violence to the plain outcome of introspection which sharply contrasts will with other sorts of consciousness'; and I conclude that in order adequately to describe will one must supplement the analysis into structural elements by an analysis of will conceived as personal relation. I am sorry that the statement of my partial agreement with the merely structural psychologist has lent itself to misconstruction. I do agree with him that there is no volition-element, in the sense in which there is a sensational element. But, so far from agreeing with

¹ Cf. Ward, 'On the Definition of Psychology,' *British Journal of Psychology*, 1904, I., 23, 25; and Judd, *Psychology. General Introduction*, p. 316: "Our considerations have led us along strictly empirical paths to the recognition of the self." For my own assertions of the immediacy of the consciousness of self, cf. *An Introduction to Psychology*, p. 151 et al.; *Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie*, p. 34 et al.; and especially 'A Reconciliation between Structural and Functional Psychology,' *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW*, 1906, XIII., 67-68 (with note).

² *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW*, *loc. cit.*, p. 79.

him in the teaching that 'we cannot find' a difference between will and other experiences, I firmly believe that we do find, that is, immediately experience, such a difference. Thus, the contrast between the structuralist's account of will (correct from his point of view) and the actual experience of will is the sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of the structuralist's conception. The argument seems to me to be precisely parallel with that which leads Mr. Pillsbury to undertake his constructive addition to structural psychology.

There remains the objection that the conception of the self is ultimately irreconcilable with that of a mental stream — in other words, with the conception of consciousness as consisting in a series of mental states. This will cheerfully be admitted; but it will be urged, by every self-psychologist, that the conception of a series of mental states is a scientific (if not, indeed, a metaphysical) abstraction — a hypothesis sometimes useful for purposes of description but in no sense a fact of experience. Thus the self-psychologist, assured from introspection that every alleged experience of a mental state is really an experience of oneself being conscious, sees no need of squaring his immediate experience with this abstract conception of the mental stream.

I shall speak more briefly of Professor Pillsbury's positive contribution to the discussion, because I realize that he may have some meaning which I utterly miss. He begins (p. 392, end) by admitting that "the structures ordinarily analyzed out by structural psychology will not explain the functions that we find mind capable of when viewed in the large." He is therefore led to attempt a 'construction on the basis of fact' which shall satisfy 'the real need . . . for unity and identity of mental states' (p. 393). The facts which he adduces are, first (p. 393), that "associations years old, of which there was no trace in the ordinary sense of spontaneous reinstatement, could nevertheless be brought back to consciousness with surprisingly few repetitions"; and, second (p. 394) that these associations "are active in some degree in the control of later mental operations of widely different character. . . . Much emphasis" Mr. Pillsbury adds, in explanation, "has been laid by Külpe and his pupils upon the purpose in mind . . . or upon the task that has been set . . . , in deciding which one of the many possible associates shall be actually effective in the control of consciousness." His conclusion (p. 395) is that "reasoning, judgment, meaning, and belief go back for their explanation, not to bare physiological association, but to the dynamic controlling force of the entirety of experience." It is thus evident that self,

or mind, is for Mr. Pillsbury synonymous with 'experience as a whole' or with 'the entirety of experience'; and that he conceives this 'whole' as possessed of 'controlling force,' as 'dynamic not static' (p. 397).

At this point the self-psychologist is bound to turn upon Mr. Pillsbury with the retort of the little ducky to his accuser: "All of dem t'ings you say I is, you am." If the direct consciousness of self is to be set down as a vague imagining and a paper fabrication, what, pray, is to be said of the conception of consciousness as force? For either this is a mere restatement of the laws of association or else it illicitly implies that force is a sort of mythical entity. In any case, the conception of mind as force demands as its basis an exposition of the meaning of force; and this Mr. Pillsbury nowhere attempts. Besides being vague, this doctrine seems to me inconsistent with Mr. Pillsbury's criticism and ineffective for his purpose. For the conception of mental states as a force (or as forces) is surely inconsistent with the mental-stream hypothesis, which Mr. Pillsbury assumes as established when he is criticising the doctrine of the self. And, in the second place, though a totality is a kind of unity it is not an identity, whereas identity of experience is that which Mr. Pillsbury started out to find.

I venture to point out, by way of conclusion, that Mr. Pillsbury, like many psychologists of his school, enjoys to the full one of the advantages offered him by the conventionality of language. I refer to his recurring use of personal pronouns. For example he says, that "we perceive an object as an object when we attach a meaning to it, and that consists in identifying it with . . . an earlier crystallization from experience. In the same way when we attempt to know our mental states as mental states we . . . refer them to other earlier developed crystallizations of experiences." Would these sentences still retain a meaning if for 'we' one read 'the dynamic entirety of experience'? The truth is, I think, that Professor Pillsbury, like all the rest of us (though without realizing it) 'finds' a self as the reality of which 'mental state,' 'mental structure,' and even 'dynamic force of the entirety of experience' are mere abstractions.

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