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The *Timaeus* of Plato.

J. Cook Wilson

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with the *civitas* after twenty-five years' service (see *Diplomata* in *C. I. L.* iii.), but sometimes during actual service, which explains the otherwise perplexing fact that in inscriptions auxiliary soldiers are sometimes found assigned to one of the tribes. Where they are stated, as is sometimes the case, to belong to a colony, they were either assigned to this after their enfranchisement, or, as Mommsen thinks, the colony is to be regarded as only a Latin colony. It not unfrequently happened that the *civitas* was granted to a whole cohort as a special reward, in which case the words '*civium Romanorum*' were added to its official description (*C. I. L.* III. 1577), but while the title apparently remained, the position of recruits was not affected by it.

Under Augustus in all probability, and during the Julio-Claudian reigns, the auxiliaries were not only recruited from the districts whose names they bear, but were for the most part posted in or near their own provinces. Definite proofs of this are few, as there are no *diplomata* of so early a date, and accounts, like those of Tacitus for the Batavian and Jewish wars, are rare. There was probably no hard and fast rule on the subject, and in many cases it may have been a matter of indifference. But economical and sanitary grounds would favour their employment near their homes, while the inconvenience of posting troops in a country with strange language and habits would be greater for auxiliaries than for the legions with their large camps and greater organisation. On the other hand there were reasons which from the first must have worked in an opposite direction. Small provinces like *Raetia* or *Thrace* would certainly not need all their auxiliaries, while large provinces like *Germany* could hardly supply all they

required. Again legions, when moved to a fresh province, probably took their auxiliaries with them. Thus Batavian cohorts accompanied the XIVth legion to Britain (*Tac. Hist.* iv. 12), and cohorts of *Lusitani* (*Hist.* i. 70), and *Vascones* (iv. 33) accompanied the IVth *Macedonica* from Spain to Germany. So too, cohorts with peculiar arms or equipments were naturally wanted in different parts; as *e.g.* *Syrians* and *Dalmatians*. On the whole Augustus seems to have posted the auxiliaries in their own homes, unless exceptional circumstances prevented it. Thus German auxiliaries certainly served in Germany till 69, but a military diploma of 60 shows that hardly any native auxiliaries served in *Pannonia*, a difference explained by the *Pannonian* revolt of 6 A.D. No doubt from the various causes mentioned, the exceptions to the original plan increased as time went on, but *Vespasian* changed the principle of their employment. Moved, no doubt, by the Batavian rising, he carried out in other provinces the method of Augustus in *Pannonia*, and from his time the auxiliaries were to a great extent denationalised, *i.e.* employed away from home, and also recruited to a great extent locally. A further change, beginning with *Trajan*, was the formation of what were called *numeri* in inscriptions, and *nationes* in *Hyginus*, bodies of barbarians equipped with their own arms, and forming strictly national corps, such as the *Mauri* of *Lusius Quietus*, *Daci*, *Palmyreni*, *Sarmatae*, &c. These, however, differed from the auxiliaries in not necessarily coming from districts possessed of the right of *Latini* or *peregrini*, and were in fact an anticipation of the later employment of *Goths* and *Franks*.

E. G. HARDY.

THE *TIMAEUS* OF PLATO.

The Timaeus of Plato. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by R. D. ARCHER-HIND, M.A. Macmillan. 16s.

To edit the *Timaeus* is a difficult task. The Greek is hard, the text not always certain, the matter requires to elucidate it considerable learning, some knowledge of science and metaphysics, a sound acquaintance with the records of Greek philosophy up to Aristotle and farther; above all, in a work where the mythical element has opened a wide door to extravagance, a sober judgment combined

with training in the criticism of ancient philosophical texts.

Our editor has undertaken all departments. His interest is in the philosophy to which his Introduction is devoted, but the larger part of the notes is taken up by the other matters.

Excellent work has been done in the *Timaeus*: in the text by Stallbaum and C. F. Hermann, on the matter by Böckh, Martin, Zeller, and others nearer home.

The editor in his Introduction implies the place of his own work in some judgments

upon his predecessors. 'Lindau's commentary,' he says, 'does not afford much real help in grappling with the main difficulties of the dialogue.' Praising Stallbaum only for industry, he says 'it would be unfair to disparage the learning which the notes display: none the less it cannot be denied that in dealing with the dialogue the editor seems hardly to have realised the nature of the task he has undertaken.' Martin is praised for modesty and 'unfailing candour.' His edition is declared to be 'far and away' the best. But 'as an exposition of the philosophical import of the dialogue, I,' says the editor, 'should not be disposed to rate it so very highly; but so far as it deals with the physical and other scientific questions discussed and with the numerous difficulties of detail it is invaluable. . . . The debt owed to Martin by any subsequent editor must needs be great.'

The editor's relation to his predecessors will be considered first, then the 'scholarship' of the edition, thirdly the scientific notes, and lastly the philosophical commentary.

Some things are taken with acknowledgement from Stallbaum, but a large use is made of his notes without any acknowledgement whatever. Note after note seems a reproduction or a variation of Stallbaum, especially in the earlier part of the book, afterwards the notes come more and more to be related in a similar way to Martin. Any one may verify this for himself. Some of the notes are little more than a translation. Here it need only be pointed out that the relation exists where it is not obvious at first sight. We noticed a place where the silent reproduction of a point of Stallbaum's was followed by some apparently original matter, comprising quotations from Aristotle, but found it all given in a modern book quoted by Stallbaum, and in the parts to which his references direct. Sometimes portions of a note of Stallbaum's are unskillfully put together and require the complete original to explain them. In return Stallbaum is attacked often with disrespect, often unfairly, and often when he is right. It is not necessary to dwell on a subject so unprofitable, farther than to give one passage out of many in illustration of Stallbaum's great advantage in scholarship, and one to illustrate the editor's want of fairness to him.

37A. λέγει (ἢ ψυχῇ)...ὅτ' ἂν τι ταῦτόν ᾗ καὶ ὅτ' ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὃ τί τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅτ' καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὅποτε ἐμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γινόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πᾶσχειν καὶ

πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα ἀεί. The editor writes, 'Stallbaum, affirming that no one has hitherto understood this passage, takes the antecedent of ὅτ' as the subject of ἐμβαίνει: "she declares of that wherewith anything is the same and wherefrom it is different, in relation to what &c." It may well be doubted whether he has thus improved upon his predecessors.' The innuendo is unfortunate, not so much because Stallbaum is right and the editor has made a grave mistake, as that it draws attention to a conspicuous trait of the editor's own manner. Stallbaum's claim comes nowhere near the self-complacency of the note on 41A, where the editor, after changing the punctuation of the text, says, 'It is impossible not to admire the serenity with which all the editors set a full stop after ἐθέλοντος, and then make a fresh start . . . ; as though γίγνεται stood in the place of γινόμενα &c.'; where too the editor has not the excuse of being right, for he has seriously misrepresented the facts. In the present passage Stallbaum's explanation is grammatical and scholarly; the editor's is not even grammatical. Stallbaum, as said above, rightly makes ὅτ' ἂν τι ταῦτόν ᾗ κ.τ.λ. subject of εἶναι: the editor makes the clause (ὅστις ἂν with subj.) indirect interrogative, coordinate with πρὸς ὃ τί τε κ.τ.λ. (i.e. 'he tells what a thing is identical with or different from'), which is merely impossible. Stallbaum makes ἕκαστα (= 'identical and different') predicate, with εἶναι as copula. The editor makes ἕκαστα subject of εἶναι, and is actually committed to making εἶναι πρὸς ἕκαστον = 'to act upon each thing,' where εἶναι is not helped out by any predicate. Further ὅτ' καὶ ὅπως, 'in what way and manner' (Stallb. 'auf welche Art und Weise'), is rendered 'in what place or manner.' The general objection made to Stallbaum's whole view is a curious bit of logic, and would be equally fatal to the editor's own. All these mistakes come from a determination to see (with Lindau) an anticipation of Aristotle's ten categories. Add to this that the editor, after so speaking of Stallbaum's claims to improvement, reproduces another part of the same note bodily, in silence; and in the next note where Stallbaum makes a similar claim, adopts his view in the translation and reproduces part of his note, in silence.

The instance promised of unfairness is the following—66A, τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν...εἰς...τὰς στενὰς φλέβας ἐνδυσμένων, καὶ τοῖς ἐνοῦσιν αὐτοῖσι μέρεσι γεώδεσι καὶ ὅσα ἀέρος ἐνμετρίαν ἔχοντα κ.τ.λ. The editor says, 'I have little doubt that ἐχόντων should be read for ἔχοντα. Stall-

baum's proposed alterations are the result of his not understanding the construction: *ὅσα ἀέρος* is parallel to *τοῖς γεώδεσι* and equivalent to *τοῖς ὅσα ἀέρος ἔνεστιν*. It may seem incredible, but it is true, that the emendation is Stallbaum's, and the construction he is supposed not to understand is the very one he gives. 'Itaque legendum fortasse videbitur *ἐχόντων* &c.' He takes *ὅσα ἀέρος*, exactly as the editor does, as parallel to *γεώδεσι*, translating the one 'partibus aeriis,' and the other 'partibus terrenis.'

In explanation of this extraordinary circumstance we notice a tendency in the editor to forget benefits and only remember what he thinks mistaken in those on whose notes he is dependent. We hardly doubt that he first learned from Stallbaum the view he here maintains, but only remembered, when he came to write himself, his disagreement (probably) with some other views of Stallbaum's later on in the same lengthy note. To these views the expression 'proposed alterations' (which would however be a misrepresentation) may refer. In common fairness he should have looked at the note again before publishing the criticism. That he should not do so is accounted for by a perversity like that of which he accuses Grote. Grote, he says, insists on something 'in his eagerness to convict Plato of an irrationality.' The eagerness to convict of error Stallbaum (and others, e.g. Aristotle, as we shall see) is nearly a mania with the editor. The instance we have given is not unique; there is an equally astonishing one in the editor's relation to Martin, for which however we have no space. Most of the instances are however not such direct denial, but rather misrepresentation.

From Martin come the bulk of the more scientific notes and many matters of general interpretation; some scientific notes are from Boeckh and some from Stallbaum. Indeed, excepting the philosophy, the commentary in general is made up from those of Martin and Stallbaum. The obligation is not fairly acknowledged, and the material has not been improved. Any one could do better who would make an intelligent redaction of the notes of these two editors (with additions from Boeckh), stating their views clearly with the grounds for them.

In the matter of quotations there is a large unacknowledged debt to the stores accumulated by Martin. In this way have been constructed a number of learned-looking notes, embodying extracts from various works of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Galen, 'Hippocrates,' and others. The

Engelmann edition, Zeller, and Liddell and Scott seem also to have been laid under contribution.

Not unfrequently the editor shows scanty knowledge of the book quoted beyond what is in his authorities: sometimes by repeating their errors; sometimes by omissions of a most tell-tale character; sometimes by inferences or applications which the context of the quotation proves impossible; sometimes by an account of a theory, showing unacquaintance with the principal passages relating to it.

Sometimes he is betrayed by an apparently unimportant remark. For instance in the note on (70 c), the editor tells us a certain doctrine is 'affirmed by the author of the *De Ossium Natura*, a work of uncertain date, vol. I. p. 515, Kühn.' The editor had possibly read a remark in a part of Littré which Martin cites, that certain 'Hippocratean' treatises, including a fragment (not the whole) of the *De Oss. Nat.* were later than Aristotle, and thought it safe to speak of the authorship and date of the 'work' as he does. Now the *De Oss. Nat.* cannot be said to be a 'work,' or to have an author or a date. It is established that it consists of five extracts from different books, some at least by different authors, on the subject of the veins (not the bones) collected by some unknown hand. Two of them are quoted by Aristotle himself who gives their authors.

It is not merely with out-of-the-way books, relating to the *Timaeus*, that such imperfect knowledge is shown, but also with works of Aristotle and Theophrastus which lie in the beaten track, and must be known in any case by one who professes to edit the *Timaeus*.

In one place, Plato's theory of respiration, the editor gives the reader the impression that he has done a piece of original and meritorious research, by using the Greek of a commentary (Galen's) only known in 'a defective Latin translation' when Martin wrote. All that he gets out of the Greek is equally clear in the Latin which is not here defective. All that he rightly gets out of it, and even the illustrative woodcut (a little altered) is already given in the note and translation of the edition used (Daremborg's), to which no acknowledgment is made. We can hardly think the editor has read the Latin: his mistake about it may come from a remark of Daremborg's.

Next will be considered the 'scholarship' of the edition; and first the construction of the text.

As is well known, a new collation of the MS., Paris. A, is much wanted. In default of this, a register of the recorded variants of the MSS. might be required in an edition of such pretensions. The editor has thought otherwise, and we shall only criticise him within his own limits. He proposes to follow Paris. A mainly, and to record only the differences of his text from that MS. and from the editions of Stallbaum, the Zurich editor, and of C. F. Hermann, to whose text he says he has 'rather closely adhered.' There are two main collations of Paris. A, Bekker's and Bast's, which disagree. The minimum which could give the apparatus criticus a scientific value would be a record of these two collations. But if, disregarding scientific value, only one collation were followed, it should be Bast's which appears at least the more accurate. In any case, whatever is given should be given correctly. The editor fulfils none of these conditions, not even the most elementary. He has not collated the Paris. MS.; he does not seem even to have seen Bast's collation, though it is so accessible: he follows Bekker and does not give him correctly; and he does not even give correctly the promised variations of other editions. He does not seem to be aware that there is an edition of the text by Stallbaum later than the one he has used. He has not even studied properly the short *adnotatio critica* which precedes the text of the editor (C. F. Hermann) whom he follows, and thus make some amusing mistakes, especially where he measures himself against Hermann.

In the *apparatus criticus* to the first ten pages of the text, we found, omitting some minor points, thirty mistakes; and felt absolved from further consideration of it. The editor's own emendations generally deserve such a judgment as he pronounces on an emendation of Stallbaum's, 'Stallbaum not understanding this sentence desires to corrupt it.' Little, if any, first-hand use has been made of the ancient testimonia: some of them do not seem to have been used at all. No detail of unscholarly procedure seems wanting.

Next may be considered the editor's 'linguistic exegesis.' The existence of several translations, Latin, German, French, and English, and of editions with good philological notes, ought to limit somewhat the possibility of mistakes: but the editor contrives to make a quantity of them.

Among the mistakes of interpretation are found many which turn on grammatical

points. Sometimes again the editor naïvely defends a well-known usage and defends it inaccurately: or he 'restores' Plato's words from unacquaintance with an idiom: or he objects to a reading, a grammatical peculiarity, which is just in its favour: or in default of understanding a construction he invents a rule of syntax *à priori*:—all this too with confident dogmatism and attacks on scholars of mark. Plato's idioms give him much trouble, more especially hyperbaton about which he is continually wrong. The translation which 'has been given with a view to relieving the notes,' performs this office not unfrequently by contradicting them.

A few specimens only of the mistakes can be given. In 41 c *ὑπαρξάμενος*, which means 'having made beginning,' is translated 'having provided it'—(Is the editor thinking of *ὑπάρχειν* in sense of 'to be provided'?) with the quaint note, 'this transitive use of the verb is not quoted in Liddell and Scott.' The Lexicon will doubtless remain firm: it happens that it quotes the passage with right interpretation. In 22 d the note shows that *ῥυόμενος*, 'delivering' is taken for something like 'flowing' or 'overflowing': a mistake evidently from the German translation used by the editor. In 38 B is a wonderful piece of philosophising, too long to quote, based on a mistake in a tense—the imperfect in idiomatic combination with the aorist. In 53 B ... *παρὰ πάντα ἡμῖν ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦτο λεγόμενον ὑπαρχέτω* is translated 'must above all things be the foundation whereon our account is for ever based'; the meaning is simply, 'this principle must be assumed throughout (*παρὰ*) our whole investigation as always understood.' We have no space to do justice to the mistakes in hyperbaton and other constructions which we have alluded to: but, for an example, may ask the reader to study the translation of 35 A and the note there beginning, 'First a word concerning the Greek,' which is also an illustration of the editor's faculty of making several serious mistakes at once. First he misses the construction, which is a hyperbaton, though made quite clear by a parallel statement in the very next clause. Next a rule is found to explain it, named by the inventor 'loose anticipative apposition,' by help of which some odd Greek sentences might be constructed. Then he makes an inaccurate criticism of Stallbaum seemingly copied from Martin. The culmination is the rendering of *τῆς... γιννομένης μεριστῆς* (sc. οὐσίας) by 'substance which becomes divided': it should be 'divisible substance which belongs to the

world of Becoming'—'substance divisible and phenomenal.'

We will give one instance of the *naïveté* spoken of. In 40 c the editor thinks he is breaking ground in defending the construction of a double indirect interrogative, which he supposes uncommon, and in applying it to the passage. The idiom, recognised in Grammars, is very common in certain combinations. The instance he gives of it is not one at all. It is applied to this very passage in Jowett's translation with which, he tells us, he is acquainted; and in the German translation which he has quoted only three lines above, though an emendation is preferred in the notes to it.

The scientific notes, which we now come to, are pretentious and unsound. As already indicated, they are made almost entirely out of the work of Stallbaum, Martin and Boeckh, and their sole value lies in what is reproduced. The reproduction is not accurate, nor does the editor always understand the materials he is using. Here and there the editor has been unwise enough to interpose confident criticisms of the sources of his inspiration. We can only give a rapid review.

The first is the passage on the proportion of the elements in 31. The editor says he follows Martin with some modifications as against Boeckh. He gives important mathematical points which the reader would certainly suppose his own, but they are from one of Boeckh's essays. He attempts a criticism in one matter both of Martin and Boeckh as having made 'a difficulty which is really no difficulty at all,' and in so doing makes a serious mistake in Greek mathematics, which he might have avoided if he had understood more of the part of Boeckh he read; or if he had read the propositions in Euclid, book vii., which any one who presumes to have an opinion on the passage must read; or even if he had seen the evidence in the passage of Plato before him. And as to Boeckh's view of the whole passage, the editor is hardly entitled to speak as he does of its ability ('Boeckh, who has written two able essays on the subject'): for either he has not read them through, or, we cannot but think, he did not understand them. The essential points of them do not appear in the editor's note at all; and what he professes to quote as Boeckh's 'explanation' is an extract entirely unintelligible by itself.

In the note on the musical scales the handling of the material suggests in one part answers taken without the working; in other

parts the issue is confused, and the objection finally made to Boeckh is a bold one to bring against such a master in the subject. It is merely a misconception of the problem, and among the arguments for it is an obvious *petitio principii*.

In the note on the motions of Mercury and Venus, he maintains against Martin with a great air of originality a view which Proclus mentions in more than one form in more than one passage: one passage being his commentary on this very place. It is true that the editor's first-hand acquaintance with Proclus is not of that intimate character which seems implied in such a judgment as he passes on him in his Introduction; but in a note of Martin's, which he has evidently used, special attention is drawn to this view as one given in Proclus. The editor's attack here on Martin is an instance of the method which vitiates his interpretation everywhere. He assumes Plato couldn't mean anything which would get him into a certain kind of difficulty, and makes rash generalisations about his infallibility in this respect which the *Timaeus* itself confutes. The bit of modern astronomy (illustrated by a woodcut) which the editor quite needlessly adds, illustrates once more the dangers of unfamiliar ground. So also do the notes he adventures, in 31, on the mathematical sense of *δύναμις* and Greek treatment of number.

The note on the earth's rotation which follows the view, perhaps most widely accepted, that of Boeckh ('Boeckh's exhaustive and very masterly examination'), is distinguished by the unbecoming language with which Grote is attacked. The editor's addition *de suo* to what he calls 'Boeckh's crushing refutation' is not new. It is found already in a well known English Essay on the *Timaeus* in a discussion as superior in matter to this note as it is in taste. The editor has his usual reward. Not only is there some strange logic in his argument, but he himself unconsciously adopts in a different form the very characteristic of Grote's theory which causes its well-known difficulty, and is only saved in appearance from the same difficulty by adopting a mistake of Martin's which he calls 'acute.' He takes a mistaken view of the Aristotelian passages on the subject, from which he might have been warned by Zeller's note and ought to have been warned by the Greek of the first of these passages.

In the passage on vision the author is very unfortunate. He calls Martin's view 'hopeless.' Martin construes rightly: the epithet belongs to the editor, who has gone

wrong throughout the passage: though he supposes that 'eschewing the comma, we get the right sense.' In the compass of one page of Greek here he makes five serious mistakes of translation.

We have already spoken of the origin of the note on respiration. The editor makes several mistakes in it on his own account, which with a number of others in the scientific matters we must pass by. Before proceeding to the philosophy in general we may notice the criticism of Aristotle.

With Aristotle, whom he attacks with the acrimony usually reserved for contemporaries, the editor is but imperfectly acquainted. The knowledge he has seems conditioned by the references of his predecessors: he mentions Pseudo-Aristotelian treatises as if genuine, e.g. he treats as Aristotle's what he calls 'the not very luminous (*sic*) treatise *De Coloribus*;' he nearly always misunderstands what he criticises, and makes errors which must rank as palmary.

We choose one passage in a simple matter involving no philosophy. The reader may judge from it the spirit in which the editor undertakes this part of his work and his fitness for it. The passage is in the editor's note on vision, where he has enough mishaps already. Plato makes vision partly due to light emitted from the eye, and, foreseeing the objection that if so we ought to see in the dark, says the light is quenched if it does not meet the kindred light of day. Aristotle raises the objection in question, and truly says that Plato has not met it. 'For how,' he asks in effect, 'can a ray of light be quenched? We understand how an object which emits light, e.g. a hot ember, can be quenched. But neither can darkness quench—that is done by cold or wet—nor can light be quenched, but only a burning object.' The criticism is obviously cogent: for if darkness quenched light, no illumination would be possible.

This is the editor's note: 'Plato explains quite clearly what he means by "extinguished." . . . Aristotle, however, catching at the word *κατασβέννυται*, asks *τίς γὰρ ἀπὸσβεῖς φωτός ἐστιν; κ.τ.λ.* It is impossible to exonerate criticism of this kind from the charge of *ὀνομαζόντων θήρευσιν*.' Once more has the editor pointed out his own characteristics. He does it again when he says in another place of Aristotle's criticism of a theory, 'he simply ignores the whole point of it from beginning to end.' It is the editor's own case in relation to that part of Aristotle.

We must again plead want of space, and only indicate some of the other mistakes.

In a note on 52A, to the dogmatism and exaggeration of which quotation alone could do justice, the editor pits the 'intense vividness of Plato's insight' against the 'mistiness which pervades his (Aristotle's) whole thought,' on a matter where the Peripatetic answer is merely 'crushing' (to borrow a word from the editor). Plato may pray to be delivered from such friends. The editor has obviously been misled by a perverse desire to contradict a certain modern statement on the subject. The answer most commonly given by the editor to Aristotle is that his point of view is 'physical,' while Plato is treating a 'metaphysical' question. We can only infer from the places where this objection occurs that the editor does not understand the distinction of these two terms which he uses very freely; we suspect that he is not even aware that Aristotle's so called 'Physics' is a metaphysical treatise, like some of the others associated with it.

In the note on Space Aristotle is treated with contempt as misunderstanding Plato. Aristotle has understood the text; the editor's interpretation of it is an instance of some of the worst faults of his method. Apart from the remarks on Aristotle the whole system of the notes on Space is as remarkable for confusion as for confidence, whether we consider it in relation to the text or simply in relation to the manipulation of the philosophic conceptions discussed in it.

Of the editor's treatment of the philosophical part of the dialogue it is difficult to speak quite seriously. We have no prejudice against the attempt to understand ancient thought by the help of modern; we venture to believe that Plato and Aristotle are likely to be best understood by those who have an interest in modern metaphysics. But there is a stage in such interpretation which has brought discredit on it: a stage which the individual will still often have to go through, but out of date (we had hoped) in the progress of the race.

When a man with a new enthusiasm for some modern system of metaphysics begins to see, behind differences of formula, affinities between it and the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, it sometimes happens that what to him is a discovery disorders the judgment, so that the reaction against the dull annalistic treatment results in an opposite extreme, almost as much to be deprecated. Ancient thought is crudely treated as if it were modern, and the natural sense of a text is either not seen at all or passed with contempt. To the

student himself something like finality seems achieved: but instead of being the end, it is not much beyond the beginning of critical interpretation: it is merely a stage before the development of a historic sense. It may nevertheless deserve respect, for all must begin, and all must wish charity for their own shortcomings. Yet it is difficult to entertain such a feeling, when this stage of development takes an attitude of authority, and of impatient peremptory dogmatism.

It is evident that for the enterprise of interpreting Plato in the light of modern conceptions there must be at least clear logical thinking, and a sense of what a passage meant for the man who wrote it, in distinction from its modern associations. We should hardly hope for these requisites in the editor: for in matters of ordinary exposition, involving no philosophy, his defects of common logic and consistency are too apparent. In the philosophy these characteristics have not affected minor matters only; we venture to think that the editor has missed his way seriously on the fundamental ones. We have hardly space here to discuss any of them adequately, and must be content to put the more salient points.

In the first place the *Timaeus* is regarded as if a system of thoroughly modern idealism. 'In the *Timaeus* the universe is conceived as the self-evolution of absolute thought. There is no more a distinction between mind and matter, for all is mind, &c.' Plato says nothing of this. The history of the interpretation of sacred and philosophical books proves however that anything may be got out of a text by assuming enough allegory. But Plato speaks at least sometimes without allegory about his philosophy in the *Timaeus*. It is at all events out of the question that he should entrust his supreme result to an allegory so obscure that it does not even suggest itself to the ordinarily careful student. What evidence therefore the editor finds must be matter of curiosity. He finds but few expressions in the text to argue from. We will select the one to which he himself attaches special importance. The argument based on it is enough to indicate the value of his speculations.

In 37 B, Plato says of the operation of right thinking in the spheres of sense (*αἰσθητόν*) and of reason *ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται . . . δόξαι καὶ πίστει γίγνεται βέβαιοι . . . ὅταν δὲ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ᾗ . . . νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελείται*. Of course Plato might have

written *ὅταν περὶ τὸ νοητὸν ᾗ*, 'when thought is concerned with the objects of the reason.' *ὅταν περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν*¹ ᾗ is merely another way of saying the same thing, and only means 'when thought is concerned with the reasoning part of the soul.'

On this passage the editor says (after a mistaken argument from *νοητὸν* in 37 A), 'Still more remarkable is the use of *λογιστικὸν* below in 37 c. There is no other passage in Plato where *λογιστικὸν* is contrasted with *αἰσθητόν*: the regular term is of course *νοητόν*. It is surely impossible that Plato could have substituted *λογιστικὸν* for *νοητόν* until he had reached a period in his metaphysic where he deliberately affirmed the identity of thought and its object. I believe also the present use both of *νοητὸν* and of *λογιστικὸν* is purposely designed to draw attention to this.'

The editor means that because Plato put *τὸ λογιστικόν* where *νοητόν* would be expected, he means to teach the identity of the perceiving subject with the object. (We have given the obvious interpretation of the place.) It is difficult to imagine the state of mind which could attribute to Plato such a frigid and obscure device for conveying his meaning. We are reminded of the exploits of the discoverers of Shakespeare ciphers. The mere quotation however of such notes is the most effective criticism of them. But the climax is not reached till we put another note, that on 61 c. beside this one. It will be noticed that in the first clause of the present passage (37 B) Plato does not substitute *αἰσθητικόν* for *αἰσθητόν*, though according to the editor he identifies these two also. Why does not the editor follow out his own principle illustrated here and in a note on 92 c. (which we shall give presently), and see a profound meaning in the circumstance that while *λογιστικόν* is substituted for its object (*νοητόν*) in one of the two coordinate clauses *αἰσθητικόν* is not substituted for *αἰσθητόν* in the other clause, and give us some such note as this?—(the expressions in double quotation marks are all his own): "The minute correspondence" (between the two clauses) "seems to render the one important deviation all the more strikingly significant" . . . "Now the interpretation of this difference is in my judgment indubitably this." Plato means to tell us that he does not identify the *αἰσθητικόν* and the *αἰσθητόν*, and "I believe his present use of" *λογιστικόν* in one clause and *αἰσθητόν*

¹ One of the inferior MS. reads *αἰσθητικόν*. The editor does not mention this, and, as Stallbaum remarks, it may have been an alteration to suit *λογιστικόν*.

in the other "is purposely designed to draw attention to this." As it is, the editor passes in silence the difficulty which his method involves him in. Now in 61 c he had a remarkable opportunity of helping himself out of it, and it will be interesting to observe what use he makes of it. In 61 c παθήματα αἰσθητικά puzzles him. Through a mistake about an earlier passage he wrongly supposes παθήματα to mean qualities of the perceived object, and these he feels should be αἰσθητά not αἰσθητικά. If the thought had only occurred to him, we can imagine with what conviction he would have pointed out that here again Plato utters a word 'φωνᾶν συνετοῖσι,' and by the substitution of αἰσθητικά for αἰσθητά teaches the identity of perception and its object. Unluckily the thought did not occur to him. He cancels as 'unmeaning' the reading which might have been fraught with such significance, and actually prints αἰσθητά in his text against all the MSS. The inference is irresistible. If there had been a Greek adjective λογιστόν used by Plato, related to λογιστικόν as αἰσθητόν to αἰσθητικόν, then in the former place, 37 c, the editor would have inevitably substituted λογιστόν for λογιστικόν, and never thought of his idealism.

The idealism based on such evidence—for the editor's other arguments are equally nugatory—is applied in the crudest manner to interpret the text. We refer the reader, for instance, to the note on 35 A, pp. 106-7, which should be given in full if space allowed. Moreover the editor actually ascribes to Plato the Kantian theory (though not *eo nomine*) that space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition. There is no trace of any such thing in Plato.

Similar principles are exemplified in the interpretation of the last words of the dialogue, which the editor thinks contain a great mystery.

The universe (κόσμος) is there said to be ζῶν ὁρατόν . . . εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ. Paris A and one inferior MS. read ποιητοῦ for νοητοῦ. The appropriateness of νοητοῦ (τοῦ νοητοῦ ζῶν) as opposed to ὁρατόν is obvious even without referring to the special theories of this dialogue, which elsewhere represents the Creator not as making the universe an εἰκὼν of himself, but of the αὐτὸ ζῶν, i.e. the νοητὸν ζῶν.

The editor thinks it vital to vindicate ποιητοῦ. Of its genuineness he says, 'I can feel no doubt whatever.' He thinks 'it is in the last degree improbable' that the familiar νοητοῦ should have been altered into ποιητοῦ; whereas if ποιητοῦ were the original

reading, 'it was positively certain to be altered in some way': partly because in the other corresponding parts of the dialogue it is the νοητὸν ζῶν which is said to be copied by the κόσμος, partly because 'the word ποιητοῦ must be necessarily unintelligible to any one' who had not arrived at the same view of the dialogue as the editor himself.

It is strange he cannot see how easy it is to reverse all this emphatic reasoning. If νοητοῦ had been the original, the sequel of the editor's own note shows that ποιητοῦ is exactly the alteration which a Neoplatonist would have liked to make, though we will not say it 'was positively certain' to be made. But also the corruption of νοητική into ποιητική is quite easy. Since this is so; since νοητοῦ is the reading of the great majority of MSS.; since it receives the strongest confirmation which it could have from the other parts of the dialogue—the editor unconsciously accentuates this when he says, 'this very minute correspondence seems to render the one important deviation (i.e. ποιητοῦ for νοητοῦ) all the more strikingly significant'—then, according to one of the most undisputed canons of criticism, the probabilities are all in favour of νοητοῦ. Thus we find such scholars as C. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and the Zurich editors all reading νοητοῦ.

We will follow the note further. 'Adopting then ποιητοῦ,' it is said, 'we have of course but one possible inference to draw: the δημιουργὸς and the αὐτὸ ζῶν are one and the same, the δημιουργὸς being simply a mythical duplicate of the αὐτὸ ζῶν.' The reader may well wonder what conceivable motive Plato could have for hiding this identity till the last words of the dialogue. And to confide the revelation of a secret, which need never have been kept, to one single word, which the editor himself tells us would be 'positively certain' to be misunderstood, seems too poor a joke for an author of average sense—to say nothing of Plato.

The editor characteristically inverts this—'Surely,' he says, 'nothing can be more thoroughly characteristic of Plato than that, after talking parables throughout, he should at the very end of the dialogue drop one single word φωνᾶν συνετοῖσι, which was to open our eyes to the fact that he did speak in parables; that if we desire to understand the philosopher, we must be in sympathy with the poet.'

This is the sort of profession of esoteric knowledge of their author's characteristics by which such interpreters try to put common sense out of court. We will quote

another from the Introduction (§ 48). To meet the inevitable objections he says they would 'argue a complete absence of familiarity with Plato's method.' (Doubtless). 'Plato never wrote a handbook of his own philosophy.' (Do philosophers usually do this?) He naively adds that Plato 'will not do our thinking for us: he loves best to make us construct the edifice for ourselves from the materials with which he supplies us.'

Elsewhere the editor has formulated his own condemnation. He asks in reference to an interpretation of Martin's, 'Could Plato possibly expect any one to understand him if he made such use of language?'

Even if *ποιητοῦ* were read, it clearly could not be evidence of the idealism or the monism attributed by the editor to Plato.

Other points we can only touch upon. For instance the notes, confused and inconsistent, on *ἀνάγκη* maintain a monism counter to the clear sense of the reiterated statements of Plato. The editor has not yet felt the magnitude of the problem of evil. He gives the fatal criticism of such notes himself when he says of an interpretation¹ of Martin's, that if Plato had meant it 'surely he must have stated it with a little more definiteness.' Indeed a still more serious form of the objection lies against his general method. Why, if Plato meant these things, did he not only not say them, but choose the language natural to one who meant the opposite?

Again, as to the date of the dialogue—his idea that it belongs to a period much later² than the *Republic*, when *μέθεξις* had been dropped for *μίμνησις*, depends partly on a misconception of the place of these formulæ in Plato, partly on an extraordinary mistake about the *Parmenides*, partly on misinterpretation of passages in the *Timæus*. Nor (what is strange) does he seem to have even heard of a view, which the text itself should have suggested, that the opening of the dialogue strongly favours a date intervening between the two main divisions of the

Republic. He thus speaks with a light heart of an 'advanced ontology' in the *Timæus* which is mere imagination. Chimerical also is the notion that in the supposed 'mature Platonism' of the *Timæus* the ideas were to be limited to ideas of living things. Apart from the absence of evidence for it the editor omits to note that the *Parmenides* the first, according to him, of 'the four great dialogues of the late period,' affirms with emphasis a doctrine which is the opposite of it. (It is the place where the young Socrates is told his difficulties come 'because you are still young; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, if I am not mistaken.') Once more as to the idealism—an application of the very method used by the author to prove that *μέθεξις* is dropped in the *Timæus* would, by a comparison of the *Theætetus* and *Timæus*, commit him to the position that the subjective idealism in respect of the objects of sense supposed to be in the *Theætetus* has been dropped in the *Timæus*.

Lastly as to the opinion, in agreement with Neoplatonism, which the editor affirms so confidently—that the *Timæus* is the 'master-key' to the Platonic system, Plato's highest result and final solution of his metaphysical problems—it seems but an illusion to which the modern student is at first as liable as a Neoplatonist. We at first naturally think that what in a philosopher comes nearest to the problems most important to us was most important to him: but this is often a mistake. The only safe guide is the philosopher himself: and Plato ought to be heard. He does not speak as in the *Republic*: or represent himself as approaching a crowning piece of metaphysics. On the contrary he tells us again and again that the subject of the *Timæus* deals with mere probability at best, and he puts it on a lower level. But such commentators always know better than the author. (Of this, by the way, there is an amusing instance in the note on 29 c, 'The modesty of *Timæus* led him rather unduly to depreciate his physical theories: it would be hard, I think, to find inconsistencies in them.' We need but contrast the editor's own note on 67 E, where, after labouring in vain to reconcile some of these theories, he at last confesses 'the consequence [stated by Plato] seems equally hard to deduce from any interpretation of Plato's corpuscular theory.')³

Plato had much affinity to *Parmenides*, and there is a striking parallel between the lower position which Plato gives the phenomenology of the *Timæus* in his system, and

¹ The objection is fatal to the editor in the particular place where he makes it (56 D.). The one sentence in which he gets near the words to be explained, he has had to withdraw in an erratum. Doubtless he saw it had involved him in an elementary mathematical mistake.

² In this connexion it may be noticed that the consideration by which the editor thinks he can 'dispose of Zeller's theory of particulars immanent in the ideas' only shows a misunderstanding of the problem. Zeller was quite aware of this consideration and many like it, as appears at once from this part of his account of Plato.

the insignificance which Parmenides attaches to his own account of the phenomenal world, as compared with the part of his poem on true Being.

In excuse for such an edition, it may perhaps be pleaded that it is, as the editor says, the first English one. But there is the pity of it. As to the greater part of the commentary, we regret that English work should have begun with an inaccurate compilation from foreign sources. As to the philosophy, which in matter and manner is a sort of modern Neoplatonism, it would be

depressing if foreign critics thought the book at all representative, and supposed that the study of Plato in England had not yet advanced beyond this uncritical stage.

Fortunately, however, valuable help on the *Timaeus* is to be had from English sources. There is also a considerable discussion of the dialogue in the translated part of Zeller's monumental work, the importance of which from an educational point of view and for purposes of independent study is well known. We have learnt it still better by contrast.

J. COOK WILSON.

T. MACCI PLAUTI AULULARIA.

T. Macci Plauti AULULARIA, texte Latin, publié d'après les travaux les plus récents, avec un Commentaire critique et explicatif et une Introduction, par ALEXANDRE BLANCHARD. Paris, Klincksieck, 1888. 3 frcs.

THE title-page of this edition would lead one to expect a text based upon the masterly edition of Goetz (1881), with such improvements as have been suggested during the seven years which have since elapsed (e.g. by Leo in his edition of 1885), and such contributions as the editor has to offer of his own. M. Blanchard however has preferred the more arduous and ambitious course of constructing his text entirely *de novo*. In the preface he states his method as follows: 'Un éditeur de Plaute doit avoir lu les commentateurs, connaître leurs conjectures, les goûter selon leur valeur, mais les négliger le plus souvent pour s'en tenir à la lettre des manuscrits, du moins toutes les fois que cela est possible.' The principle here laid down is unexceptionable; but what is possible and what is impossible in Plautine criticism is a question of evidence, which must be answered according to the lights of the critic. The present volume does not give one the impression that M. Blanchard has himself entered into a minute and laborious examination of the usage of Plautus or that he has a wide experience of MSS. One is rather led to infer that by the time he reaches a second edition he will be inclined to modify his views on a number of passages and will probably find himself more in harmony with doctrines which at present hold the field. At any rate his introduction and notes ought to have stated

more explicitly than they do the grounds of his dissent. One would like to know on what principle he can justify his reading in line 81, *Redi nunc jam intro* in view of line 327, where under precisely similar circumstances he reads *Tace nunc iam tu*: in both passages the MSS. have *nunc iam*, and the line begins with an iambic word. Again, is it not inconsistent to read (with the MSS., but in defiance of the metre) *Meae fidei tuaeque rei* in line 121, while accepting the obvious correction *filiari* for *filiae* in 372 and 797? It is hard to reconcile with M. Blanchard's general principles the change of the MS. reading *sunt* into *sint* (368), a change which seemed unnecessary to Goetz and to Wagner in his second edition (cf. Rud. 304): one wants to know the editor's grounds for suspecting 648 to be corrupt. In regard to the scansion of line 47 can the editor explain his two statements (i.) that *modo* forms two short syllables: (ii.) that the first syllable of *incedit* is short? He scans 655 *Mānē măn- | ē quīs ille | est*, etc., though in the very next line he recognizes that *ille*, even with the ictus on it, may be a pyrrhic; the scansion *mānē măn- | ē quīs ille | est*, etc., is in accordance with a well-known law as to variation of accent in two successive iambic words. In the explanatory notes the editor has hardly used his space to the best advantage. We are informed three times over that *sis* = *si vis*. In 129 *utrique* is most simply regarded as a dative, not a genitive. In 606 *omni* = *ulla* (not *nulla*).

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