SPECIAL REVIEWS

Body and Mind, a History and a Defense of Animism. WILLIAM McDUGALL. London: Methuen, 1911. Pp. xix+384.

The first six chapters of this book are given to the rise and subsequent history of animism; the following three chapters to a sketch of the adverse doctrine as developed by the practical successes of the mechanical sciences; and the remaining seventeen chapters to a systematic presentation of the philosophical and other arguments against animism and to the author's own admirable exposition and defense of this doctrine. While the volume is frankly written as a defense and vindication of animism, its discussions and presentations are everywhere marked by the most faultless candor and impartiality of judgment. And this feature alone, apart from the further fact that the text is undeviatingly interesting, well-arranged and clear, makes this volume one of the most excellent that has ever been written on this well-nigh cardinal philosophical topic.

The author expressly disclaims having any new material to present in the historical chapters, yet he has assembled the facts so well that they yield an enhanced measure of instructiveness. Here one sees again that history is intelligible when, and only when, it is the warp and not the woof of the web of time that is studied. Forces operate continuously down the temporal series, and the consecutive history of a single line of thought reveals the force and the necessity of nature's workings as they can never be revealed in a series of cross-sections, in detailed pictures of the multifarious forces interacting at an epoch. Thus the slow attenuation of primitive anthropomorphism, with its gross conceptions of the "ghost-soul," nature-gods and demons, to the less substantial animism of the Greeks and Romans, on to the spiritualism of the early Fathers, and then on to the soul-doctrine of later and present-day theology, philosophy and psychology—makes an interesting study. And on the way one is led to speculate, indeed to prognosticate, how far such attenuation is destined to proceed.

The counter-movement against animism is presented with perfect fairness: indeed Professor McDougall has run the risk that his readers will be irretrievably convinced that mechanism holds full sway in this universe, before they reach his own systematic

vindication of animism. This shows only, however, that the author knows exactly what he is writing about, and surveys it broadly. Of especial interest is Chapter VIII., *The Rise of the Mechanistic Physiology and of the Psychology Without a Soul*. Here one sees how slowly the soul has been squeezed out, so to say, from any last foothold in the nervous system. From the voluminous accommodations, the bowels, stomach and brain, assigned to the soul by the earliest psychologists, it was forced into the single compartment of the brain, then into the very cramping pineal gland: then it was dismembered or indeed pulverized and distributed atom-wise to the "cell-bodies"; now it is by some forced to remove to the cortical synapses, by others swept out altogether. The excellent point is made that Kant's philosophy has not touched nor in any wise relieved us from the psychophysical problem. And as much might be said of the other idealists.

Professor McDougall's discussion of the outstanding "solutions" of the psycho-physical problem is extended, clear, scholarly, and, when one reflects what a hoary old topic it is, astonishingly original. It will seem strange to some readers that epiphenomenalism, psycho-physical parallelism, phenomenistic parallelism and psychical monism (the last two being "identity"-hypotheses) are designated as "anti-animistic" solutions of the problem: strange inasmuch as the first two at least are ordinarily called dualistic. For the author any sort of parallelism is monistic (p. 355) and is opposed to Animism; and against all varieties of the former he adduces good (and in your reviewer's opinion, conclusive) arguments. By "animism" Professor McDougall means a rigorously dualistic interactionism, with the emphasis, perhaps, on the dualism. The author finds many reasons for reasserting the dignity of the soul and its distinctness from mechanical nature; notable among these reasons are the empirical phenomena of memory, unity of consciousness, and the "meaning" of things; and, as a last, perhaps great, reason he finds (p. 194) "that Animism, or the dualistic doctrine of soul and body reciprocally influencing one another, is the only psycho-physical theory logically compatible with Theism, with a belief in a personal God, a Divine Creator, Designer and Ruler of the World." The phenomena of "meaning," memory, and unity of consciousness have "no immediate physical correlate in the brain." Indeed the active and efficient Anima is found to be essential to the operation of practically all, even the simplest, of the animal functions. For (p. 266) "no adequate mechanical explanation of the

scratch-reflex has been suggested; and it may be argued with at least equal plausibility that the analogy between the processes shows that the scratch-reflex, like the instinctive expression of distress, involves some factor incapable of description in mechanical terms"; *i. e.*, an animistic factor. The arguments adduced in these connections, it should be noted, are far from being the time-worn phrases that one finds in every text-book of philosophy and psychology.

As nearly everyone is aware, the "Soul," whatever the arguments that urge one to believe in such a thing, is not, or at least has not been, a fruitful *explanatory* concept in psychology. And so the pertinent question arises in the reader's mind—"Now that you have got your Soul, what are you going to do with it?" Some suggestions of an answer to this question are given; but to the reviewer's mind these constitute the least satisfactory aspect of the volume. But of course it could be contended that the answer to this question lies beyond the scope of a "*defense*" of animism.

All in all the book is a noteworthy achievement. At every point the author writes from a direct examination of the relevant facts, transcribing his immediate vision of them and not mouthing the stale formulæ of the innumerable previous disputants on this topic. He has produced a very worthy monument to Animism.

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