admit them as the feeling, the sense-awareness of a struggle of adjustment in which the actual self of the moment, self-divided, is seeking expression in a complete action, and who is there that cannot subscribe to the theory?

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Über willkürliche Vorstellungsverbindung. STEPHAN WITASEK.
Zeitschrift für Psychol. u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane, XII., 3 und 4, Oct., 1893.

A difficult and interesting topic is handled by Witasek after a somewhat inadequate and an unduly diffuse fashion. His subject is the nature of *willkürliche Vorstellungsverbindungen*, that is, of volitions which have as their 'objects' psychic facts, not bodily motions. How, for instance, can one be said to 'will' to imagine a three-fourth rhythm, or the 'color designated by the Fraunhofer line B?' Anticipatory image of color and of rhythm there must be, or there is no volition, yet the anticipatory image can not be precisely like the intended one, else the supposed volition will coincide with its object. Witasek answers by distinguishing the anticipatory image as un-perceptual (*unanschaulich*), from the concrete image which is the result of volition, while he observes that they are alike in referring to the 'same thing'; since, however, such a sequence of un-concrete upon concrete may be an affair of purely involuntary association, he emphasizes the additional consciousness of the relation between the two. He proceeds to analyze the solution into four psychic factors: (1) the act of will (*Willensakt*), (2) the unperceptual anticipatory image of the object, (3) the relation between the anticipatory image and (4) the concrete image which is the object of the act of will.

Witasek's exposition of this analysis discloses its weak features. There is in the first place, no justification whatever of its first moment, the 'act of will' which proves to be a perfect fifth wheel to the coach (see p. 211). The 'relation' between (2) and (3) is another contraband article in modern psychological writing; it might better be treated after Dr. James' fashion as a 'transitive element' of the anticipatory image itself. In fact, the greatest value of the discussion is its recognition of the problem of inner volition, its emphasis upon the difficulty of the distinction between volition and object of the volition, when the latter is itself a fact of consciousness. The real nature of the distinction, however, is only suggested by the description *unanschaulich*, which, if one may judge from the illustrations offered,

virtually means 'verbal.' On the other hand, the different emphasis of attention in the case of anticipatory and of resultant image is not adequately considered, for (in the opinion of the writer of this notice) attention is the x in terms of which the problem must be solved.

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EMOTION.

The Sense of Beauty, being the Outlines of Æsthetic Theory

GEORGE SANTAYANA. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.

1896. Pp. ix + 275.

Perhaps the first thing to be mentioned about this book is its perfection—if the word be not too cruelly pressed—its flawlessness. It is an unpadded little masterpiece—it fills its covers as an athlete fills his skin, it 'pays' its way sentence by sentence down the page. It makes 'no pretensions to originality beyond that of putting together the scattered commonplaces of criticism, under the inspiration of a naturalistic psychology'; but the inspiration has been sincere, and the commonplaces have been not only reset, but recut, and the 'cutting' is often, in its unobtrusive way, exquisite. Granted its point of view, it is all thought out with an extraordinary quietness and completeness and uninsistent finish; and the artistic imagination has everywhere been discreetly busy with its phrase.

It 'contains the chief ideas gathered together for a course of lectures on the theory and history of æsthetics given at Harvard College from 1892 to 1895.' It consists of a brief 'Preface,' from which the foregoing sentence is quoted; of an 'Introduction,' on the 'Methods of Æsthetics'; of four 'Parts,' on the 'Nature of Beauty,' the 'Materials of Beauty,' 'Form,' and 'Expression' respectively; and of a concluding chapter. There is also an analytical table of contents and an index. The 'Method' recommended (it has been indicated already), is the psychological, as distinguished from the historical and from the didactic. Æsthetics is the theory of a certain kind of 'values,' and values are subjective. "We desire nothing because it is good, but it is good only because we desire it." "Things are interesting because we care about them, and important because we need them. Had our perceptions no connections with our pleasures, we should soon close our eyes on this world; if our intelligence were of no service to our passions, we should come to doubt in the lazy freedom of reverie, whether two and two make four."