PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY, 1908-1909.

I.—MENTAL ACTIVITY IN WILLING AND IN IDEAS.

By S. ALEXANDER.

LOCKE, as it will be remembered, divides the objects of thought or ideas, so far as concerns their origin, into ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection, as well as a third class of ideas which are common both to sensation and reflection. The ideas of sensation come to us ultimately from sensible experience. The ideas of reflection are those which we have from reflecting upon the operations of our own minds. Now, I take it that we may conveniently say that while ideas of sensation are the subject matter of the physical sciences, the ideas of reflection are the subject matter of psychology. Locke's simple enumeration, though so well known, is well worth recalling, because it makes a clear theoretical distinction between objects open to external inspection and objects open to internal inspection. It requires, of course, qualification to make it correspond with psychology as at present understood. In the first place, though these processes are described as being such as are open to reflection, it does not follow that simple inspection will teach us everything that there is in them or that can be known about them—we may have to have recourse to indirect methods as well. I do not mean merely that we may need to use experiment, which by itself offers no theoretical difficulties, but that we may need in order to discover the nature of our mental processes to direct our attention, in the first instance, to the contents or subject

matter, the ideas of sensation, upon which those processes are employed. We may need to get at our mental processes from a study, as Mr. Stout says, of the presented objects. In other words, the operations of our mind may call for all manner of other helps than simple introspection in order to reveal them to introspection, and much may be learned about their conditions which is not open to introspection at all. But it remains true that the study of mind is, in Locke's language, a study of the processes which the mind performs as distinct from the ideas of sensation which evoke these mental processes.

There is a second and far more important qualification of Locke's conception which must be insisted on. Locke distinguished his ideas from the real things of which they were copies. His ideas of sensation and of reflection are mental objects only, dependent in some obscure way on the mind. This was part of his philosophy and Locke wrote as a philosopher and not as a psychologist. But it need be no burden to our psychology. Let us substitute for Locke's ideas of reflection and of sensation mental processes and physical objects and we have the result that psychology is the study of mind as consisting of mental processes, and physical science is the study of physical objects. We may, if we choose, call physical objects ideas in order to indicate that they are related to mind so far as we know them. But let us not substitute fictions for facts by supposing that a physical object, because it is related to a mental process, gives rise to an idea of itself which is not physical but mental.

This simple, perhaps over-simple, statement that the world which we know consists of two kinds of things, one, our minds or mental processes, and the other, physical objects, is only what is yielded by an unbiassed description of facts and therefore to question it would be left for philosophy and is not a pre-supposition of psychology. Take an act of will. I will to catch a train. The train is a physical object and so is catching the train. But there is a process of willing to catch it and that is mental. Take an act of thought. I think about the movements

of the planets in ellipses. Those movements are physical. Thinking about them is mental. Take an attentive act of perception, say, of a house. I can distinguish here two separate things, the house, which is physical, the attentive perceiving of it, which is mental. There is no doubt in these cases that there are two things present, one mental and the other physical, which are related to each other. But then, on the other hand, there is imagination which may turn out to be mere imagination, and there is error which is not real. And straightway we say that in these cases, consequently, besides the mental process of imaging, there is not a physical imagined object but only a mental idea of it, and therewith we have the doctrine that besides mental processes such as we are familiar with in attention and willing and inference and desiring, there are also presentations which are essentially mental and different from physical things. And in accordance with this, our simple sensations, green, hot and the like, are described as psychical states and sometimes even those who say that psychology describes mental processes declare sensations to be a particular kind of mental process, that there is a mental process green, and another mental process blue, and the like.

Now there is a theory familiarly connected with the name of Avenarius of how this so-called introjection comes into existence. Whether that theory is correct or not I do not inquire. For I believe it to be the case that many who admit to the full the fallacious character of introjection, continue to speak of presentations as if they were elements of the mind's fabric, instead of being merely particular ways under which non-mental objects exist in relation to the apprehending mind. And therefore it does not seem superfluous to disregard the theory of the origin of introjection and to urge that the whole method of supposing that besides mental processes of conation and affection there are also presentations, depends on what I respectfully plead is a hasty interpretation of facts. Locke himself is a sinner. For under the head of ideas of reflection he includes

our memories or our imaginations. Now a remembered event or a remembered person or an imagined event or person is as much physical as the perceived event or person. The object apprehended is presented in a different form, but in itself, so far as we can tell from immediate experience, the imaged tree is as much a physical object as the perceived tree. True, the object may be vitiated by elements introduced into it by the mind. But why not take the facts at their face value, and, difficult as it may be, explain afterwards how they come to be vitiated? The stick bent in water is a physical object as much as the straight stick out of water. It is only subsequently that we learn why it appears bent, being itself straight. That does not make the bent stick mental. With one eye slightly displaced by pressing on it, I see two candles. The two candles are two physical objects. Afterwards I can see why they are only two appearances of the one real candle. That does not show that the two candles are mental, but only that the apprehending organ has distorted the real object. When what is thought to be pure water turns out to be full of bacteria, we do not say that the pure water was mental, but only that the water was not really pure. Sensation offers more difficulty, artificial as it in some degree is. But it, too, submits to the same natural method of description. Blue and green and sweet are not in any sense mental processes. No mental process is blue or sweet. But when we experience blue or sweet we can distinguish the physical object blue or sweet from the act of mind which we describe as having those particular sensations. We cannot even say that there is a special qualitative modification of consciousness through which, as through a veil, the blue or sweet is apprehended. The consciousness is one thing, the blue is another, and it is physical. Try to think of your consciousness as being affected blue, in the same way as you think of how you pass from step to step of a difficult demonstration; or as you think of carrying out an impulsive process. You cannot do it. And you cannot do it because there is no

such affection there. The blue is outside your mind. Let me not be told that I am confusing the sensation blue with the physical property of blueness. Of course, the object of the sensation blue is not the same as, or, to say the least, less complex than, the permanent quality of blueness apprehended by perception. And let me not be told that the facts of adaptation, or contrast, or colour-blindness all show that sensations, the objects sensed, are purely mental affections. This is to break the recognised canon of those who copy manuscripts, that in case of doubt the more difficult reading is to be preferred. The reading I defend is, perhaps, the more difficult, but yours, though perhaps easier in these special cases, is contrary to the obvious reading of the vast mass of psychological facts. The variations of sensible appearances, such as those mentioned, merely mean that objects reveal themselves differently to organs which are variously constructed or variously disposed. But in describing our direct experiences, we are not inquiring into what the object really is, or in what sense we attribute reality to the object. When a colour-blind person confuses green and red they are the same to him, but they are different to the normal eye and really different. Nor let me be told finally, that to call a sensation like blue physical is to exclude the study of it from psychology and to disturb the traditional boundaries of our science. I do not think so. Psychology is still the most convenient place for the study of these sensations, unless that place be disputed by physiology. What is true is, that physical science confines itself to the study of the primary qualities of matter and treats of the secondary qualities only so far as they are conditioned by the primary qualities. Does this amount to a denial that the secondary qualities in their secondary form are physical? You might as well say that life is not a physical property because it cannot be completely identified with mechanical and chemical changes expressible in terms of extension, motion, and number. And if you insist in denying blue, as such, to be physical, I reply that

it was shown ages ago, for equally good reasons, that the primary qualities must be denied to be physical. But this belongs to metaphysics, and in defining the subject matter of psychology we do not start with metaphysics, but with the simplest statement of the facts we are to study. Metaphysics has its say afterwards, and I do not doubt that it does not disturb what is contained in the simple statement of facts, though it may put those facts into clearer relation with one another.

The conception which results from these considerations is that instead of the triple analysis of mind into cognitions, affections, and conations, we are left with the proposition that consciousness consists of conations with feeling. If we take the more perfect analysis of mind into presentations, attention, and feeling, the element of presentation drops out of the account. It is no part of the psychosis itself. It is only included in so far as conations contain a reference to objects which are not mental. The stuff of which mind is made consists of conations and feeling. In a previous communication made to the Society, I stated roundly that mind consisted of conations, affection being treated as a modality of conation. I still prefer this form of statement, according to which pleasure and pain are features of conation and indicate the furtherance or hindrance of it. But I believe it is true that next to nothing is known about feeling. Only quite recently the doctrine has been revived that pleasure and pain (but not emotions) are mere sensations. If that doctrine were to be established there would be nothing left for mind to contain, except conations. But if not, and I am not convinced that it is so, and if it is still true that affections are a special form of mental experience not expressible as conations, I am still content. Consciousness would then consist of conations and affections. But I do not feel assurance that this is the case, and I prefer to abide, for the present, by the view which I have indicated; which, vague as it is, is a well accredited view and has the merit of insisting that feeling is at

any rate closely dependent upon conation. Conation I take to be not merely a fact which is true about consciousness, but something which is experienced as consciousness. If we use the word activity as equivalent to mental process without distinguishing between passive and active process, consciousness is, in its main tissue, mental activity. The idea of reflection which we discover by simple inspection is this activity which is what we call consciousness. Attention, impulsive action, volition, active thought, passive association, are some of the familiar forms of this activity. Examining further the peculiar fact called consciousness, we discover that it occupies time and occurs in time, and moreover that it has direction, its direction varying with the physical object to which the activity is related, so that the activity works in a different direction in desire and in aversion, in willing to lift the arm or to lift the head, in perceiving a tree and in perceiving a table, in seeing green and in tasting sweet, and in seeing green and in seeing blue. The word direction may appear to be used metaphorically, but a little further examination shows that mental process occurs in space however vaguely located in it. By saying that it is in space I mean that simple inspection, partly of myself, that is introspection, and partly of nature, that is extrospection, shows that my mind when it works, works in a direction of space ; in the same sense as a railway runs along lines, or as a tree is planted on the edge of a garden. The consciousness exists in space just as greenness is spread over a leaf. What the precise spatial direction is, is something as to which we only become clear when later knowledge shows that the locality of the mind is the brain itself. Anyone who carefully analyses a complex mental activity will verify for himself this experience, which whether he takes it literally, as I plead that we should, or only metaphorically, can best be described as a complex and highly differentiated system of directions, here beginning, there inhibited, here pressing on and changing to a different topic, there taking on thoughts that

have emerged from another direction. The mind is thus a continuum of such awareness. According to the direction of the awareness the object or presentation changes, or to say the same thing, as the object changes the awareness alters its direction. But the object is never mental; it is never even the contents of the awareness. It is something else on which the awareness is directed. There is another thing also from which the awareness itself must be distinguished, namely, the motor reactions in which consciousness perpetually finds expression: movements, gestures, words, and the like. These motor presentations are new physical objects, and the kinæsthetic or verbal consciousness is but the awareness of these objects. But very often the outward expression is the best or the only guide to the discovery of the inward process, for example, the fixating processes of perception enable us to become aware of the actual perceptive process so far as we can be aware of it.

This leads me on to say in the next place that in like manner we can often most easily, or sometimes only, detect the mental process by investigating the object upon which it is directed. We can study the process of presentation by studying the actual object presented. And this is why it is often pedantic to speak in terms of the activity when it is most natural for us with our outwardly directed gaze to speak of the object. But it remains true that it is only for the sake of the activity that the presentations are interesting. Accordingly the phrase presentation-continuum, so valuable and fertile in the second portion of the phrase, covers two different things. There is a continuum of processes of presentation awarenesses, or consciousnesses as I call them, and there is a continuum of the physical world of objects presented. Psychology is concerned with the continuum of the acts of presentation.

Consciousness or awareness is a new fact in the world which makes it the topic of a new study. But unique as it is

in its character it admits of scientific description, for it varies in complexity. Psychology has to trace these varying grades of complexity. I propose in the remainder of this address to test the value of the description I have given of mind by two inquiries, one into the process of willing, the other into the meaning of ideas in the sense which Mr. Bradley has made familiar.

The characteristic features of willing are best observed in its contrast to impulsive action. In the familiar language of psychology, the impulse is awakened by a perception and tends to an end, but it is not excited by the idea of the end, is purposive without being purposed, and yet is not merely reflex action. Volition is directed towards an end, entertained as an idea. There is another feature in volition which may be deferred, its connection with the self as contrasted with the relative isolation of impulse. In the previous description free use was made of the idea of the end, which was declared to be merely implicit in impulse and explicit in volition. It is not denied that in an impulsive action we may have an image as such of the end, but it is maintained that the impulse is not discharged by the image. The end, if present in idea, is merely a qualification of the provoking object. The breast is qualified as a thing to be sucked, but there is no explicit idea of sucking it which is afterwards realised. But it is just this which characterises volition as a conative action. Now if we are to understand impulse we must put aside the reference to the idea and look to the impulsive activities themselves. It is this which Mr. Stout has done with such conspicuous success in his chapter in the *Manual*, and his account of perceptual process as founded upon the analysis of impulse has, if I may be allowed to say so, seemed to me one of the finest and most enlightening chapters in psychology that I have read, and has, indeed, been the source of such thinking as I have been able to give to the subject. It is so enlightening because he uses the analysis of impulse to explain the two

distinguishing features of perception, its unitary character or wholeness as distinct from a mere train of ideas, and, secondly, the presence of ideas in the form not of images but of "tied" or "complicated" ideas. Turn to what we can easily observe, the activity of impulse, and we see at once what is the activity of this part sensory, part ideal, and all the while unitary, process which perception is. In an impulse we have the felt series of activities running down their prearranged course to a single result, and at the same time, corresponding to the tied idea in perception, in each step in the process there is the preparation for the next. The activity of a tied idea is thus the preparation of the mind, while presently occupied in one activity, to proceed in some connected direction. Now volition is a stage in advance of this. What is it that mentally corresponds to entertaining the end in idea? Self-observation showed and experiments confirmed that the idea of the willed object need not be present in the form of an actual image.* Still no one would call it a volition where in some form the object willed was not distinguished from the present condition of the agent. Take the will to lift the arm. It is safe to say that in nine cases out of ten there is no image of the arm being lifted. But as I understand it, the activity to which corresponds the idea of lifting the arm is present, felt as a direction, but inchoate and disconnected with the system of mental movements which is the consciousness of present reality. Now the will to lift the arm takes place when this disconnected mental movement coalesces with and forms part of that dominant system. I take the consciousness of willing an end to be this felt coalescence or continuity of a hitherto disconnected mental activity, and the consciousness of this effective coalescence is the sense of decision or of consenting to the act. The *fiat* of the will, which some writers love to regard as mysterious, is nothing but the snapping together of the

* See, in particular, the recent study of R. S. Woodworth in the volume of studies dedicated to Charles Garman.

temporarily imperfect and disconnected system with the general trend of the mind's activity. By calling the idea of the end an inchoate activity or a direction not completely realised, I mean to indicate the ideal character which volition shares with perception or impulse as contrasted with reflex action. By calling it disconnected I mean to indicate the special features of volition in contrast with impulse itself. Now it is plain that the process thus described may manifest itself in different ways. I may look at an object in a shop window, and the inchoate mental activity of possessing it may be set going and so work itself out as to coalesce with my perception and make me will to buy it and go into the shop. Or the inchoate activity may be suggested in my mind by anticipation in the form of an expectation. I may think of how happy it would be to have money, heigh-ho! and then an offer of employment being given me I accept it as the realisation of my expectation. Or I may have a third case. The ideal activity may remain ideal. It may take the form of an image and yet the will take place as in the case of resolve where the future action is willed, and though necessarily only an image it is realised so far as the future can be realised.

I am happy to refer for support of this analysis to an important experimental investigation by Dr. Ach.* Dr. Ach's work belongs to a class of experimental studies whose distinctive feature is the elaborate and systematic self-observation which is made by the patient. Of this group of writings, besides Dr. Ach's work, the others with which I am acquainted are Dr. H. J. Watt's "Experimental Contributions to a Theory of Thinking,"† and Dr. Buehler's recent work, to be mentioned later. Here I refer more particularly to Dr. Ach's experiments. They are experiments in reaction time, some of them of the usual type and others of a different sort. In each case the patient was asked to say what happened in his mind. Three

* *Ueber die Willensthätigkeit und das Denken*, Göttingen, 1905.

† *Experimentelle Beiträge zu einer Theorie der Denkens*, Leipzig, 1904.

periods are distinguished in each experiment, the preparatory period between the usual signal and the stimulus, the main period that of the experiment proper, in which the patient reacts to the stimulus, and the subsequent period in which he describes what his state of mind was in the two previous periods. The experiment was preceded by instructions as to what the patient had to do. Now it appeared from the patient's testimony that in the preparatory period the patient took up a certain mental attitude and entertained in his mind a certain intention corresponding with the instruction given. This attitude produces in his mind "a certain determining tendency" which in fact anticipates the solution of the problem offered by the experiment. Probably many who have thought about the difference between sensorial and muscular reaction time have represented the case to themselves in this same way. The difference in the attitude produced by setting the different problems determines the character of the response. With regard to the details of the patient's state of mind in the preparatory period, these are very various: he may entertain a picture of the end to be aimed at or more often the end is present merely as some imageless object, an "awareness," Dr. Ach calls it. But the sensible accompaniments may be very different. I had best quote the passage in full. (Page 211) "Normally in the condition of expectation (in these experiments) where the effect of practice is not too marked the following complex content is present simultaneously as awareness: (1) the coming stimulus (a white card) which has a definite place in so far as the patient knows that where he is looking the definite change, that is, the appearance of the white card, will take place. (2) The patient is aware that thereupon a specific known change is to take place on his side, that is, the movement of reaction has to follow. (3) Besides this there is a relation between these two specific changes (the appearance of the stimulus and the movement of reaction) in the consciousness that as soon as the stimulus appears the reaction has to follow. (4) There is a time component of the

awareness consisting in the knowledge that the stimulus will appear in a certain time, *e.g.*, between a second and a minute. Besides the immediate content of expectation there are also the concomitants of sensuous attention, such as strain sensations in the upper part of the body and in the organ of vision, over and above the visual perception of the apparatus. Occasionally special components of the awareness complex may appear in the form of images, especially at the beginning of the preparatory period or in the first experiments on any particular day" (*e.g.*, images of the movements to be performed or what Dr. Ach calls "intentional sensations" in the limb, or words in which the object of the experiment is repeated). "But there is an extraordinary number of experiments in which, apart from the concomitants aforementioned, the whole content of the expectation is present only unimaginatively as a knowledge, and this presence of the content of knowledge is what I call awareness."

The details of the main period itself need not be stated at such great length. They show how the determining tendencies work, settling the character of the reaction, the effect being most evident in the more complicated cases where, for instance, a patient is asked to add or subtract two numbers shown to him, or, of two syllables read in a series before, to name the preceding or the succeeding. Sometimes, but exceptionally, we have the instruction persisting and reinstated as an idea. Sometimes the intention declares itself by blending apperceptively with the stimulus, as when a plus sign corresponding to addition was represented and the two numbers shown placed on the sides of it. Or the two numbers might be seen closer together for addition, or separated for subtraction. Or the determining tendency may strengthen certain reproductions suggested by the stimulus, namely, those which are appropriate to the intention. Or it might be that there was no awareness of the end at all and the determined object appears in consciousness immediately in connection with the stimulus without any intermediary.

Now I have quoted these reaction experiences for this reason. The patient's mind being directed to the problem, he has the experience of willing in so far as the reaction which he performs is felt to be continuous with the attitude with which he approached the performance of it. Though I have not described at length the details of the main period, they show sufficiently that in consequence of the instruction the solution is half made beforehand, and when the stimulus comes the response is often of quite an immediate character. This was true even in simple reaction times (*e.g.*, p. 46, one of the patients always thought the action was willed). And it is still truer in cases of so-called "choice reaction" where a different movement is assigned to each of a certain number of stimuli, and in the more complicated problems to which I referred above. Dr. Ach sums up in these words: "The individual knows whether a psychical event takes place in the direction of a previous determination or not. If so, the process is characterised for the individual by its content as being willed. Such course of mental processes thus referred to the efficiency of determining tendencies we described as a willed action, or as one which takes place with the consent of the individual. The conscious experience of such an event is specific in quality, and the individual can in a special case say at once whether the action were willed or not (p. 230)."

One can see at once what likeness there is between this and Mr. Bradley's account of willing as the self realisation of an idea. But it appears to me preferable because it explains the operation in terms of the process itself and not in terms of its contents or object. The account which I have given of willing is substantially one with Dr. Ach's, but it differs in certain respects. I have all along spoken of the consciousness in willing as belonging to the processes or mental tendencies themselves, not properly to the object which we are conscious of, whether imaged or imageless. Now Dr. Ach, speaking of

certain extreme cases mentioned at the end of the last paragraph but one, describes the determining tendencies which make the determined idea, that is, the solution of the problem, appear spontaneously, as working in the unconscious, meaning by the unconscious merely that of which we are not conscious. The awareness is of the mental content, and this awareness he speaks of as a function of the determining tendencies. Now I find a considerable difficulty in this attempt to separate awareness from determining tendency. To say that awareness is a function of the tendency looks to me very like the notion that awareness belongs to a sort of mental content (an imageless one), whereas I have been trying to indicate that the contents we are aware of are not mental. Consequently I suggest that the determining tendencies in themselves, so far as they operate mentally at all (for of course there may be physical determinants which are not in the strict sense mental), are always in consciousness. When I have an intention the determining tendency is the consciousness of what we intend, though what we intend may be purely imageless. They represent the conscious side of the experience, the other side of it is not mental at all. When, in the extreme cases mentioned, the result follows immediately, the determining tendency is still felt in the felt transition from the stimulus to the result. The intention does not appear separately. But it works in consequence of the previous mental attitude whereby the problem is already half solved before it is put. It is present in the transition to the particular result, so far as the result is felt to be an answer to the instructions. In other words, the very awareness of the intention is the direction in which the mind is working. In desire, and the like, this direction is very definitely present in consciousness. It appears to me that the stinging consciousness of direction which we have in desire is only an extreme form of the general case, not merely the case in which you happen to be aware of the tendency as such. In fact, if you want to realise that the

so-called content of a mental process is not itself mental, go to desire and watch that.

There is one other point on which I do not feel satisfied. The feeling of consent, the fiat of the will, is not I think exhausted by describing it as a sense of identity with a previous determination. It involves that, of course, but you may have that sense of continuity in the stages of an impulse. You need, in addition, that the tendency shall consciously be present as a tendency, *i.e.*, as different from the present general character of your mental direction, and then when that tendency coalesces with your general mental direction, that is yourself as a whole, it is felt to be the act of consent, the stress is laid upon the snapping to of this determining tendency, *i.e.*, the intention, or awareness of what is to be done, with the pervading self. And in speaking of the self I do not think we need to think of the self as being present in the form of the impression or image of the self as part mind and part body, the so-called self which is object, but only as the consistent and systematised complex of directions of consciousness. In many cases, doubtless, we are apt to call up these special contents of the self. In fact, in all difficult and critical cases of willing we may compare the proposed action with all our normal objects of desire, the expectations made and the like, but the really mental side in the self-experience is never our body or the various objects upon which our actions are directed, but only the conscious direction of ourselves upon them. And consequently it is more or less a matter of varying circumstances whether in contemplating a future course of action these contents are present to our consciousness or not. What is present is the more or less consistent and systematised system of directions.

I pass on now to the topic of ideas, in the sense of universals, or of the ideal content so familiar to us from Mr. Bradley's writings. There is urgent need, I think, for an accurate statement of what goes on in the mind when it has an

idea of this sort. I dare say that many persons besides myself have felt puzzled in their study of Mr. Bradley in dealing with these ideas, because at times they seem to be mere qualifications of reality, and yet are spoken of as working, or even as realising themselves, that is to say, as being psychical existences. Mr. Bradley himself has taken all precautions against misunderstanding. He has explicitly denied that ideas can ever be floating ideas cut off from reality. "Every idea has its own existence as a fact."* And again, in speaking of the will,† "In the course of the act itself [*e.g.*, of acting on the idea of avoidance or injury] the idea's content will in its process further particularise itself [the idea, that is, will become an image or a perception], but before the act the genuine content of the idea may be general." What difficulty I feel after these statements turns, I suspect, upon the implication that a universal idea must necessarily have a psychical existence, that it cannot exist except as being also an act of mind, whereas I should distinguish the act of mind directed towards a universal idea from the universal idea itself. This difficulty is not so much psychological as metaphysical, it seems to depend on the doctrine that all reality is necessarily psychical, which I do not accept. But at any rate, for psychology, it seems to me, it would clear up our minds to insist that when we speak of ideas there is some definite mental process corresponding to them which ought to be described, and that it is not enough to speak of the idea as working without explaining its mechanism. It is not enough to insist that an idea is different from an image which is particularised. The idea as universal is just as particular a system of mental directions as the image with which it is contrasted. The what always is a that, but it is a that of a different sort. The same difficulty seems to me to arise in regard to the very helpful distinction drawn by Mr. Stout

* *Mind*, N.S., No. 60, p. 445.

† *Mind*, N.S., xi, p. 4261.

between the content of an assertion and its intent. The intent is after all only another sort of content. It is the content not of what I presently have in my mind, but of what I am tending towards or willing. And obviously the same thing is true of Locke's contrast between idea and reality. When he speaks of an idea as conforming or not to reality, the reality is itself an idea, and the question is not of the difference between an idea and something disparate, but of one idea and a different and fuller one.

Thus the idea as a universal, as a meaning, is not an image, but it is apprehended in a particular mental process. What then, in the language of mental process, is the universal? Here, again, it is easier to describe the process by referring to its object than to describe it itself. Any such description must be hypothetical. But I do not think the answer in this case is very remote. Contrast a conceptual process with an imaginative process. In the imaging as compared with the perception the activity is dim, it is indistinct, fragmentary, and unstable. But as contrasted with the conceiving act it is relatively full and complete. But conception, though partial and unrealised, may be definite and distinct, and it has the property of working itself out into examples which supply it with fulness. Moreover, the processes in conception are common to many perceptions or images. It consists, then, of the directions, or to use Dr. Ach's word, tendencies, which represent the prevailing determinant structure of an indefinite number of individuals. I thus take it to be a conscious disposition, so far as that conscious disposition can exist by itself, that is, be apprehended as such, as a body of general mental directions, or since disposition is a word which suggests other meanings, it would be better to speak of the idea as a scheme of mental directions. With this account we can understand how conceptions keep passing over with their examples; the mind not only works in the scheme, but the scheme is amplified or modified by special elements of mental direction, which, combined with

the scheme, make up the fulness of mental action corresponding to a concrete individual perception or image. We can see also how one such mental scheme may be so connected with another as to complete one another and make a more definite and precise system, though one which is still an object of thought and not of perception. Finally, we can understand what goes on psychologically in the act of judgment: how in the complex activity present in perception, the scheme or form corresponding to the predicate is, by an act of attention prompted by the interest of the moment, made to stand out separately in consciousness while retaining its connection with the whole.

I take the rediscovery of ideas, in the sense of universals, to be one of the most important results of recent philosophical and psychological work. One can only wish, parenthetically, that the word idea could be used with some more definite uniformity. It began with Locke as the name of any object we can occupy our minds about, and a psychological process is as much an idea as a tree or a triangle. It became with Hume an image. And now in the revolt against the tyranny of images idea has come to mean, through Mr. Bradley's influence, a notion or meaning. But I turn from this complaint to refer to another set of valuable experimental inquiries by Dr. Karl Buehler,* who has by a set of ingenious questions got his patients to go through real operations of thinking and to record their own observation of the processes they went through. These experiments have been subjected to some severe criticism. But it can hardly be denied that they are of great value as a systematic beginning of inquiry into the higher mental processes. Dr. Buehler does, indeed, seem to me to overlook the extent to which others before him, like, for instance, Mr. Stout or Mr. Bradley, have recognised the existence of imageless thinking. But here we have, in the

* "*Thatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge*" (*Archiv für die ges. Psych.*, ix and xii, 1907-8).

first place, a great deal of careful self observation, and we have in the second place not only the demonstration on a large scale that thoughts are a specific kind of mental objects, and thinking a specific sort of mental process, but the results show the extraordinary variation which may exist in the thought according to circumstances. Thoughts may, in the first place, exist without corresponding images, though it is not shown that they may exist except in conjunction with other individual mental contents, for example, the words of the answer, or at least the words of the question. But the thought may be of the vaguest description: a mere awareness of something or other, or reference in a certain undefined direction, or again, it is shown that in remembering we may, without calling up an image, have a thought of an object once experienced or the thought of having once experienced it; there may be thoughts of relations between objects or the thought of my own relation to some object, and the like. For all this I must refer to the work itself. But in all forms they vividly confirm what has been suggested above, that a thought is a kind of schema or rule upon which an individual presentation can be constructed. And, indeed, Dr. Buehler refers aptly enough to Kant's account of a schema in contrast with an image as being a rule of construction. One result appears to me of particular interest. In certain experiments of memory the patients had the thought of an object experienced before; in others they had the thought merely of having experienced before something or other bearing on the question. And in some of these cases the object reference appeared so slight that the remembrance of the process of experiencing it was all that was present and active. Now it may be said that, as a general rule, whenever the mind is active it is active upon some object, and that in general while we are always conscious of ourselves as a mental process the practical interest makes the object the more important of the pair of terms self and object. In some cases we forget ourselves in the object, but these

experiments seem to indicate that we may also have what amounts to a complete absorption in the self in the mental process itself, while the correlative object seems almost to vanish or to be replaced by a shadow.

If the above description is correct, an idea, or notion, or concept, or thought, is a very definite form of mental process, a kind of scheme of mental direction. The physical object upon which it is directed is the universal. I do not see that there need be any difficulty in describing the universal as physical. Dr. Buehler, indeed, uses the language of presentation and protests that the universal can be nothing but a mental object. But unless Plato has lived and written in vain, why should not ideas be realities? And even more important though not more real realities than sensible things? The very fluidity of our mental conceptual directions, their perpetual extension and amplification so as to take on the clothing of circumstance, what is it in the mind but the response of our minds to that real existence of the universal in the real particulars which it connects, and connects them much as the diverse mental conations are unified in the one continuum which is the mind.

I have been trying to exemplify in two important cases the truth of the proposition which seems to me a bare statement of fact, that what is mental in the world is conation (feeling being for the present barred), and that our conations are the operation of one and the same thing, consciousness, in different directions; and that such conations are relative to certain non-mental or physical things *of* which they are said to be consciousness, to which they refer but which are incorrectly described as their contents. A few words may be added, though they must be incomplete, as to the position of sensations, and also all other mental processes, *e.g.*, images, so far as they involve sensory elements. The safe rule is to interpret the obscure by what is patent, and I have urged that the so-called and miscalled contents of sensation are really physical. But the

mental process of sensation is like all other mental process, conation, recipient and passive, but a passive form of activity. Of course, the mental activity of sensation is different in direction according to the character of the sensation, and the difference betrays itself, like all psychical difference, in difference of outward or internal physical movement or in words. It shows itself according as the conation is pleasant or painful in mental continuance along the direction of the sensation or in flying from it. I ventured on a previous occasion to suggest that we might describe them as signs of direction, meaning that as the mind moved in one direction rather than in another, the direction-consciousness varied. This would not be making consciousness green or sweet, but would only be doing justice to the fact that the movement was not a mere physical movement in time and space, but had a mental character as well. It is best, however, to describe sensations as merely the simplest mental movements, and not run the risk of suggesting, as the phrase signs of direction is apt to do, that there are differences of quality in the consciousness according to the character of the sensation. It is, indeed, unthinkable that consciousness itself is green or sweet, and when it is urged that green and sweet not only are mental, but are actually localised in the body, the answer is that the so-called localisation of sensations actually furnishes the disproof that the sensational object is mental. For when green is felt in the eye it is the seeing of green that is localised there, but the green itself (except, of course, in entoptic phenomena) is in the green leaf. The sensations which are localised in the body are mainly the organic sensations where the object sensed is a physical object; or sensations like heat which can belong to both body and external things, or like touch, where the two objects, body and external things, are in contact.

I set out with a proposition that the proper object of psychology is the various conations or mental movements which,

in their continuity, constitute the mind. To every such movement there corresponds an object, and while, in many cases, it is easier to describe the mental operation by its object, and, in some cases, it is difficult to do otherwise, it is always the operation at which we aim. That object which is commonly called a presentation I have insisted upon regarding as physical. Now it may be said that this is a presumption and is introducing epistemology into psychology. It may be said that, in psychology, we know nothing of the real physical object, but only of presentations, that in the perception of a tree it is not the real tree with which we are concerned, but only the presented tree. Now, I should be quite content if the psychologist never spoke of anything but presentations, but he is constantly and inevitably speaking of physical objects in distinction from them. He distinguishes the blue thing from the blue sensation, the things in nature from our thoughts about them, and the like. If he goes on to deny that the sensation or image or thought is a physical object, he introduces into the foundation of the science a distinction between a mental content or object and a physical object, and it is really he, so far as any given psychologist is open to the imputation, who makes an epistemological assumption, and then, having made it, hands over to epistemology the solution of the difficulty which he has himself arbitrarily created. Every science, indeed, makes a certain postulate for convenience, but these postulates must not be mistaken, or be likely to be mistaken, from the start, but only such as can be modified by suitable qualification. Now, for psychology, it is sufficient to take what is obvious *primâ facie* fact, that the experience called the perception of a tree contains two elements, one mental and the other physical, and that psychology studies the mental element, and the physical only so far as it presents features with which an operation stands in relation, so far that is, as it is sensed, or perceived, or imaged, or conceived. Making this pre-supposition, which is a bare unembarrassed statement of facts without any theory, he leaves

over for metaphysics or theory of knowledge to inquire into the relation of these separate aspects of physical reality to reality itself. Suppose that philosophy discovers that these objects you talk of, percepts, sensations, images, concepts, are not the same physical reality which physical science investigates with another purpose, well and good. Metaphysics will then have afterwards to make a separation between psychological objects and physical objects. I do not myself suppose that any such result would happen, but we have no right to start by pre-judging a case. Except for metaphysics, no one would ever think of saying that the objects psychology is concerned with are only mental and not real objects.

There is a difficulty which I admit remains. If your mental object is physical, how can you know yourself? In psychology at any rate you make your own mind an object and your own mind, you will say to me, is confessedly mental and not physical. I must ask to defer the answer to this question. Self knowledge is a very real thing, but you may know other things than physical objects.

I know that in suggesting a certain difference of psychological view, so far as I am really doing so, for I do not feel at all sure that I am, I incur a certain danger. Sweeping assertions produce upon the expert in any science the impression that the speaker is just beginning to think about the subject. And in my case this is probably true. In reality, I am only trying to clear up my own mind and suggesting a solution of my own difficulties. I should feel very uneasy if what I had said implied that any single part of psychology, as now understood, had not all the value which it has at present. Nothing upon my view is lost, only in certain cases a difference of interpretation, or perhaps only of emphasis, is suggested. At any rate, the best way in which I can repay the Society for the honour which they have done me in electing me as President is to say what I am myself thinking about. If what I say is mistaken or superfluous, someone will, I hope, be found to correct me.

Appendix on Self-Knowledge.

IN the foregoing paper I have spoken of mental activities as directed upon objects which are not mental, or, to use other words, are external or physical. The question at once arises if this is knowledge how can there be self-knowledge? For the object before me when I know myself is not external but is mental. It would follow then that either there is no such thing as self-knowledge, or else that in knowing myself I so far turn myself into an object, into something which occupies the same relation to me as physical objects do.

Both positions seem impossible. I certainly do know myself. But, secondly, it is clear that if I treat myself as an object this is altogether inconsistent with the account which I have given of the process of knowing an external object. For there the essence of the process is that knowing is a particular kind of reaction upon the external object. The object evokes in me those conations which I call sensational processes, perceiving, thinking, and the like. But there can be no such reaction of the self upon itself. The mind does not stimulate itself to reaction.

The answer to these difficulties is complex. In the first place we must distinguish between the self or mind and the self as we ordinarily speak of it, as a compound of mind and body. I have knowledge of my body in the same way as I have knowledge of external bodies, and the same thing applies to the knowledge which is supplied to me by the organic sensations: for example, hunger and thirst belong to the bodily self and are located in it. But we commonly think of ourselves as including not merely our bodies, but our thoughts about certain objects, especially objects of interest to us, and our desires and volitions as directed towards these objects. Our moral selves, to take the most obvious instance, include as elements the objects to which we devote ourselves, for example, politics or mathematics, which are as much

external to us as the tree. Thus the self as an ordinary object of experience is a number of objects which are habitually and intimately connected with our minds and form with them a single whole. So far the knowledge of the self presents no difficulty and a very real addition was made to psychology when this particular object of experience was singled out and the growth of our knowledge of it was described.

But in the self so described it is the element of mind, of consistent and organised conation, which constitutes the more important element in the complex, and it is this mental element which is in question when we are considering how and whether self-knowledge is possible. In other words, it is not my capacity for friendship in so far as the direction of my interests towards friends is concerned that offers any difficulty of description, or that constitutes the real core of myself. It is the directions of these interests themselves. Human beings excite my capacities for friendship. I can largely describe these capacities by reference to their objects; precisely as is the case with my ordinary knowledge or volitions directed upon external objects. But it is not my immediate environment of my own body and the things and human beings which lie next to me, which constitute the selfhood of myself, it is the purely mental element which the self involves.

In order to remove the difficulty of the original question, we have in the next place to recognise that knowledge is a very ambiguous term. It is used loosely to cover all kinds of apprehension and sometimes it is used to denote that kind of knowledge in which we have the objects set over against ourselves. Now the mind has knowledge of itself, but not in the same sense as it has knowledge of external things. When the mind knows an external thing it is itself knowledge, itself consists in that moment in the act of knowing. We have to distinguish two senses in the phrase knowledge of something. The "of" may be the "of" of reference. Knowledge of a tree is an act of mind of a certain sort directed upon the

tree. Or the "of" may be (I have the phrase from Mr. Stout) the "of" of apposition. The knowledge may consist of what it is said to be knowledge of. The difference may be illustrated by Locke's phrases, idea of sensation or of reflection, meaning an idea coming from sensation, or consisting in a sensation, or a reflection, as the case may be, as contrasted with his phrase the idea of heat, in which heat is the object referred to. Now my self-knowledge is knowledge consisting in myself. Myself is only those acts which are otherwise described as self-knowledge.

This is evident from considering that in any case of knowledge of the external object we can distinguish the external object or cognitum, from the act of knowing which is conational, the cognitio, and which is a special form of conation that does not aim at alteration of an object. In every such act the self is present in the form of a certain more or less complicated direction or system of directions of consciousness. I cannot know something not-myself without that object's moving myself into activity. In thus having knowledge of an object I also have the knowledge which consists in my action and is therefore self-knowledge. To me, therefore, I myself cannot be a *cognitum*. I can only be a *cognitum* to a being who stood outside both me and physical things, in the same way as I myself stand outside physical things and life. Life is an individual thing to the liver. But I can contemplate another being's life though I cannot live it. Now it is as impossible for me to contemplate my own mind as for an animal to live another animal's life. There is no reason, however, in the nature of things why a race of beings should not arise or be now in existence who can contemplate minds. Such beings would be of a higher order of mind and for them minds would be objects of knowledge.

It might be supposed that if I never am an object to myself, but only am myself, there can therefore be no science of the mind. In fact, consideration of the difference between self and external objects has led to remarkable views as to the

nature of psychology. One party has declared in the face of all the acquisitions of psychology, of its constant and uninterrupted development, that there is no such science. Another answer is the following. Reality, it is urged, is experience, something in which you cannot separate mind and things. You have physical science in so far as you attend only to the physical aspect of experience and consider it by itself. You have psychology in so far as you attend only to the psychical aspect of experience by itself. Both the physical and the psychological sciences deal with abstractions and they are in the strict sense untrue. The only real truth is given in metaphysics, which considers the two elements unified. There is a third modification of this way of thinking. It is maintained that psychology never describes the mind as it actually exists, but creates an artificial object which it pretends to find given in the same way as it finds physical phenomena given, and such descriptive psychology is little more than a substitute for the physiological description of the bodily processes which underlie mental action. Psychology studies not mind itself, but an artificial symbol of it.

A thorough treatment of these propositions would require a theory of knowledge and of metaphysics. They all arise from the unexamined postulate that reality is experience. They imply that physical science and psychology are only true till they are connected and then they are seen to be untrue; instead of maintaining as might reasonably be done that they are both true and that their connection is a further truth. But we need not go into the whole question. For the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge drawn above is enough to convince us that psychology does describe the mind itself and is a science. The objection arises from an apparent prejudice, that in order to be the subject of scientific treatment an object must be like an external object, capable of standing outside the mind which observes it. This is plainly an assumption.

In fact, science is only the orderly description and classification and explanation of things. Amongst things there are two classes, physical things and ourselves. In so far as we describe physical things we are making physical science. In so far as we describe ourselves we are making psychology. Self-knowledge is that knowledge which constitutes the science of psychology. Knowledge of external things is that knowledge which constitutes physical science. In this way instead of raising questions as to the legitimacy of science because of difficulties about the nature of knowledge, we may with convenience describe the different kinds of knowledge as the respective subject-matter of the different sciences. Or perhaps the gist of the matter may be stated thus. Let the subject matter of knowledge mean that which exists in reality and can be described. Then knowledge includes two things, the first is physical objects, the second is knowing, knowing being used as a general term for all mental life.

When, therefore, in pursuit of psychology we describe ourselves, we do not erect ourselves into presentations. We only formulate our condition in words, *with a psychological interest*. Psychology is in fact the extension of one of the commonest incidents. When I say I feel cold, or I do not want to fight, I am describing my mind. Does anyone maintain that in these expressions I am making my mind into a presentation? The description takes the place of an interjection. Instead of shivering, or crying out with the pain of cold, I may say cold. And afterwards when I have an apparatus of language which corresponds to the analysis or dissection of things into their components I say I feel cold. Nor would anyone say that in saying I feel cold, or I do not want to fight, I am describing not my mind itself but a mere appearance of it. I am describing it as it really is in a particular phase of its existence. Now psychology is nothing but an extension and systematisation of such statements as this. Just as physics is nothing but an extension of such propositions as the stone

is heavy, so psychology is an extension of such propositions as I feel cold, or I do not want to fight. The difference between the science of psychology and the mere exclamation which expresses my mental state consists in two things : first, in the organisation and analysis of these descriptions, with the consequent attempts at explanation ; secondly, in the difference of interest. In general in describing our mental reactions upon things we are concerned with the things rather than with our reactions ; our interest is practical not introspective, but the material of introspection is always present. It is not so markedly present in the experience I see a tree, it is present more markedly in I am cold, it is present very markedly in I do not *want* to fight. But whereas we are content in daily life to describe these introspective experiences merely in such a way as to affect other people's actions, in psychology pure and simple our interest in them is theoretical.

Psychology, then, describes mental process with a psychological interest. What this means is that the problem is now different from the mere description of how we feel. The influence of the problems set before the mind in determining the character of the mental response has been illustrated already from reaction time, and is abundantly illustrated in Mr. Watt's paper. Now the scientific interest is an interest in careful minute description, in classification, analysis, and explanation. When we describe our mental states with that interest their details stand out, their likenesses, their connections, their antecedents, their causes. The psychological habit has its germ in any mere description of self, but it is powerfully aided by the experience of scientific description of physical things. When we have learned to treat external things scientifically we go on to treat minds scientifically, and we not only apply to our mind the methods learned in respect of things, but we use of them the words and concepts we have been accustomed to use of things. This is but saying once more how knowledge of minds and things are reciprocally

affected by one another. It is a familiar truth that while the most important categories we employ in respect of the external world, such as causality, substance, and the like, are experienced by us most easily in our own mental life, we repay the debt by describing our mental life in terms of the external world, apprehension, comprehension, mental process, direction, and we raise with regard to mind the same problems as meet us in physics, what is mental causality, what is continuity, and the like.

Thus, when in psychology I pretend to describe my feelings and conations, I am not substituting for the reality an artificial abstraction, I am describing the actual mental reality. I am, of course, leaving out the physical realities with which those mental activities are related, but it is a pure assumption to suppose that I have no right to do so. Psychology is a faithful description of certain real events in the world.

But this statement is met by certain obstinate objections. One is the ancient one connected with the method of psychology, the objection based on the difficulties of introspection. The other is the difficulty, a far less ancient and far more serious one, arising from the fact that we can remember and think of the self.

In both cases the same objection appears, but in different forms, that in studying the mind you make it an object. Hence, it is said in the first place, that introspection, in the strict sense, is never possible; for if we introspected our actual condition we should be dividing ourselves into two, making one part of the self an object to the other part. To avoid this difficulty we have recourse to retrospection, in which it is urged, not indeed by cautious psychologists, we palpably do take the immediately past moment and make it an object to ourselves at the present. In the next place it is said, and said rightly, that not only do we enjoy a present experience, and not only do we actually remember something we met before, but we remember that we did have this experience. Is not such remembered self an object to us like a physical event?

Now, as to the difficulty of introspection, this is real enough. But I cannot think that the reason for this difficulty is rightly given. Our introspection is indeed apt to be distorted by the presence of the psychological interest. We are practically interested in feeling cold, or disliking to fight, and not generally interested in the nuances of the process. But there is no further difficulty. It is because the event when just remembered is freer from these distortions that it is advisable to turn to retrospection; and also because when the heat of practical interest is over details may appear in our calmer mind which escaped us before. But our reason for retrospection is not that it enables us to make the mental state an object. A moment's consideration, indeed, shows us that our mental state in retrospection is no more an object to us than it was in actual experience. It is only a part of a larger whole. The remembered state is a present state, just as much as the actually enjoyed state. You do not turn your remembered state into a presentation merely by combining with it the attentive attitude. It is still a present state of your own mind. The alleged reason, then, for the use of retrospection cannot be the right one. In fact, the term introspection has raised around itself so many prejudices that it would seem to be high time to state explicitly that it is but a name for mental inspection. You may inspect external things or you may inspect mind. In order to inspect external things you have to let them play upon you, and you have to adopt the attitude of attention best adapted to receive the revelation of their characters. This is extrospection. In order to inspect your mind carefully you throw yourself into a certain state of mind by stimulating yourself by an appropriate object, and then record in words the immediately apprehended details of the mental process. This is introspection. We introspect ourselves when we say I feel cold. For psychological purposes we only do it more carefully and under special conditions. And to complete the parallel with the observation of external things, just as

in self-inspection, or introspection, we use retrospection, so also in the inspection of external things, or extrospection, we use also the memory of the extrospected object.

I come now to the more important question of memory, ideas, imaginations, thoughts of myself. These things exist. I project myself into the past or the future. I can perceive myself as a whole, I can think of myself as a personality. I can distinguish my real self from my transitory or unreal self. Now, when we speak of knowledge we think naturally of external things. But we get to know of these by perception, memory, thought, and the like. And so when perception, thought, imagination of anything occur we say we have knowledge of the thing remembered, that it is an object to us. Therefore, because we can remember, and imagine, and think ourselves, it is said we also have knowledge *of* ourselves, we can be objects to ourselves. In other words, we take these varying processes, perception, memory, imagination, and so forth, that is to say, the possibility that we may be in these varying conditions in respect of anything, as the criteria of knowledge of objects, as indicating that what is present in these forms is an object. But they are not such criteria. It is true that about both external things and ourselves we may be in these varying conditions. But that does not make me and the tree alike objects of knowledge. On the contrary, as I have already said, the difference between the object of knowledge and the object which consists in knowing is not that you have memory or imagination of the one and not of the other, but simply that the one is physical and the other is mental.

What, then, we must inquire, is the nature of our ideas of ourselves; whether that idea be one of memory or expectation? That is the real question, whether we have an image of ourselves which is comparable to the image of a tree, and not the question whether we have one at all; and I suspect

that the inquiry into the question, what our images of ourselves are, may throw a considerable light on what goes on when we have an image of things not ourselves. I may remember, then, that upon a certain occasion I felt pain, or that I made up my mind; or I may look forward to feeling pain, or I may contemplate the possibility of making up my mind on some future date. Now, there are certain ways of remembering myself, or rather certain elements in the memory of myself that I may exclude from consideration. I may be simply recalling a form of words stating that I felt so and so. Or, again, what I may be recalling may be the objects remembered, the circumstances in which I was, the condition of my body at the time. All this is but the memory of external objects. But over and above this I have also the personal element in the form of memory. From common experience and from the experiments recorded by Dr. Buehler it would appear that in certain cases my memory may be of nothing but the fact that I did on a past occasion have an experience, without even any more indication of what the experience was about. Thus one of the subjects says, "I knew at once that I had understood the answer to the question before, and that it struck me as comic, but still I could not find it" (*Archiv*, Bd. xii, p. 64). Or, "I knew first that I said 'yes' before when I should have said 'no,' and then I arrived at the thought itself" (p. 65). Or, "I had at once the consciousness that I had heard something about it. Then came the thought itself" (p. 63). This is what Dr. Buehler calls knowledge of the experience, but not of the subject-matter of the experience. It might be taken, and erroneously taken, to mean that we have ourselves before us in the form of an object.

It has been said that we may have an idea of pleasure, or an idea of an emotion. M. Ribot has gone so far as to say that just as there are visual and auditory types of memory, so there is an affective type. It cannot be said that his proofs are

convincing. Some of the instances recorded by him, apparently by way of support, seem to point in the opposite direction; like the case of M. Sully Prudhomme, who describes his emotional memory as tending to the hallucinatory, that is, as being a new emotion, evoked and vividly evoked at the suggestion of a past memory. Before it can be established that we have emotional or feeling memory we must show that we are not merely remembering the bodily accompaniments, or the attendant circumstances, or the provoking object, of a past emotion, and so reviving that emotion. Thus I can recall slightly the feeling of shame I felt at a foolish mistake which I made in my early school days. I can just say that it is not a present shame that I am feeling again, but all that I can say is not present in it is, so far as I can judge, the remembrance of the flushed face and uneasiness and other organic accompaniments. And even here I do not feel quite sure.*

Now in the case of the alleged ideas of emotions, or ideas of pleasures, the common account appears to me to be true, that we have a revived emotional excitement, or a revived pleasure or pain, called up by memory of all the physical circumstances. It seems to me that this ideal pleasure is what we mean by the idea of a pleasure. We feel our present self extending backwards to the remembered event, and the pleasurable tinge in this experience is the ideal pleasure. It is quite distinguishable from the pleasure that we feel in the same object when actually present. Ourself has a past colouring. It extends backwards to an experienced past, and that is why we call the pleasure the

* The following extract from *The Life of Helen Faucit*, by Sir Theodore Martin, Chapter I, describes her memory of a terrifying interview she had as a girl with Edmund Kean, the actor, in his old age: "How vividly some things remain with us. I can shut my eyes and recall the whole scene, see and hear all that passed, and thrill again with my own fright and pleasure."

memory of a past pleasure. It is a pleasure ideally present, referred to the past of myself, which past is called up by the memory of the external conditions under which it occurred. There is no particular difficulty in this, for any experience of ourself at any moment contains the past and the future of the self felt as one continuous consciousness with the signs of past and future. I should say, therefore, that pleasures may be present in memory, but not as objects of memory. They attach to objects of memory and are themselves qualified by a past reference.*

When we turn from this more obscure case to the case of remembered acts of knowledge, we come upon a confirmatory topic of great importance. In the first place, let me observe that Dr. Buehler's case of remembering that we experience, without remembering what, represents an extreme case. We may, of course, remember what we learned in the past without recalling the act of learning it at all. That is not, strictly speaking, memory, but mere reproduction; the self element has disappeared from the remembrance. But if we put aside this case then in general in remembering a past event in our lives, our interest may be mainly in the external event itself, as it generally is; or it may be in our own reaction upon it. Now just as in perception we may be, and generally are, absorbed in the object, but at times we may be absorbed in ourselves, the perceiving subject; so in remembering a past event we recall mainly that it happened without special reference to ourselves, or we may, in a few rare cases, remember only that we underwent the experience. This does not prove that we can remember our past condition utterly without reference to its content. It only means that the content is so vague and indefinite as not to be recallable. The same thing occurs in our

* I need hardly say that this bears upon the hedonistic controversy in Ethics. It is said against the hedonists that we must distinguish a prospective pleasure from the present pleasure of an imagined object. The distinction is, I think, unreal in this form.

apprehension of a present object—for example, a sentence where the object may sometimes be present as sensuous images, or only in the form of a thought, that is, in the form of a mere scheme.

But what is this memory of oneself? Contrast it with the memory of the past event. Here I have before my mind a certain object as past. The act of mind by which I apprehend it is present and is not felt as past; difficult though it may be to describe what the difference is between the act of mind in apprehending an image of a past object and in apprehending the same object present. In other words, what is past in this experience is not the act of mind, but the object. Suppose, now, I am remembering an event as happening to myself. The event is past, as I have said, and it is quite distinguishable from the objects which are actually present. The past object is before my mind, but it is *not* present. But my past self *is* present. It is an extension backwards of myself, so far as myself is occupied with present objects. And that extension has got the note which enables us to say that it is an extension backwards in time and not forwards. In other words, we find just what we should expect to find if we understand mental events to be mere directions of consciousness. A past direction is a present consciousness. My past consciousness is ideal as compared with the real moment of present consciousness. But it is not an idea of that past consciousness. On the other hand, to repeat what was said above, the past external object of which we have an idea is not present, but is past.

What are we to understand by the actual present existence of the self's past, by the fact that its memory of itself is present in itself, whereas the past external object is not present to the self, but past to the self? The best way to answer the question is to refer to actual experience. The fact so described is actually given in any broad tract of momentary consciousness. But if we are to understand the phenomenon by exhibiting the relation of this fact to cognate facts, the fact to which we must

appeal is, I think, that of inheritance. As the skin becomes horny through toil, or as the germinal qualities of the father are inherited by the son (I speak in broad terms, for I do not raise biological issues which do not concern me), so the past of the self is actually present in the present self, and at the call of the object may rise up into distinct consciousness. I find myself here at one with M. Bergson, who thinks of its whole past as gathered up into the present moment of the soul's life.

This is, however, a difficult and debatable matter on which I do not pretend to feel assurance, but whatever account we are to give of the fact, the fact itself remains. And the result at which we arrive is that the remembered or imagined self is not a memory or imagination *of* the self, and yet the self is truly described as remembered or imagined. Can we go on to say that we have also thought about the self? If this means that special features may be distinguished in the self and thrown up analytically into prominence, undoubtedly we have thought about ourself. I have not, however, a conception of myself in the same sense as I have a conception of dog. I do not compare myself with other selves, unless it be indirectly by taking into account along with myself my body and the objects upon which I am directed. But I do have a direct experience of a continuous self, in which I can distinguish phases, all of them given as a continuous whole. I have thus a perception of myself. If I choose to call this an individual concept I may do so, but I do so not in order to imply that it is more than a percept, but only to indicate that it is a percept in which features have been isolated out of the combination in which they are given. This is, in fact, only to say that the self is individual and not universal. At the same time, I may observe in passing that this individual concept of the self enables us to understand what possibly the universal Platonic idea may be.

I have tried to show, then, that the notion that the self can be an object *of* knowledge breaks down, so far as the difficulties

of introspection are concerned, and so far as it is supposed that everything which can be given in memory or thought must be an object of knowledge. There remains for consideration the supposed fission in the self, according to which one part becomes foreign to another and is regarded as a not-self. Mr. Bradley has said that any part of the self may become an object to the rest, and be discarded from the self. I have here to join issue on the fact. It is true that I may say that such and such an act of mind is not myself. But my attitude to it is quite different from my attitude to an external object. For, separated though it is from my true self, it is still felt to be continuous with it. In fact, it must be felt to be a part of oneself with the true self in order to be degraded to the rank of an unreal self. But this is precisely what we do not mean when in respect of any external thing we call it the object and ourselves the subject. There is no continuity between myself and an external thing in the sense in which there is continuity between my different mental actions. We are getting back again to the elementary facts where psychology joins metaphysics. It is because subject and object are supposed to constitute an experience, to make that unity within duality which alone is real, that we are disposed to accept the proposition that a part of the self may become a not-self and be turned into an object to the self from which it is cut off. As a matter of fact, there is always an external element present in such a state of affairs which may properly be described as the object, namely, the bodily condition. But directly we recognise that the relation of subject to object, or of consciousness to object is a relation of reaction, we recognise that they are independent of each other and related to one another because continuous within one universe. But they are not continuous with one another in the sense that we cannot justly conceive the external object existing without a self to apprehend it at all. These considerations are, however, metaphysical and I am content to rely upon the fact that however

much one part of the self is cast off from the main body of the self it is still retained within the self. When there does happen an absolute fission, as in disease, then the second self may be an object to the self, but the reason is that it has then become a different and discontinuous consciousness with a partly different body.