La rôle des sensations internes dans les émotions et dans la perception de la durée. D'ALLONNES. *Revue Philos.*, 1905, LX., 592-623.

M. D'Allonnes discusses the case of a patient who presented herself voluntarily at the hospital of St. Anne, Paris, complaining of a loss of emotions and of the lack of the sentiment of the passing of time. Peculiarly enough, moreover, at the very moment the patient complains of not feeling a certain emotion, she displays all its outward signs: all the apparent conditions of the emotion, intellectual and physical, subsist, and their coördination to actual circumstances is normal. Upon careful examination, she was found to suffer from a complete visceral anæsthesia, existing in a state of comparative purity, with no notable complications of visceral paralysis or of important anæsthesias either of the external senses or of the movements of relation. The skin, though insensitive to pain and thermal stimuli, was very nearly normal in regard to tactile sensations. The internal sensations and those of pain and temperature were lost at the same time as the emotions and the sentiment of time: and since the patient does not show the symptoms of a victim of a fixed idea, the only adequate cause of the disappearance of the affective states is the profound visceral anæsthesia. We thus see the affective sensibilities to lie in the visceral, pain, and temperature senses, as distinguished from the non-affective sensibilities of the specific external senses, and the tactile and muscular senses.

In the case of this patient is seen a clear separation of three sorts of time: First, the intellectual conception of time, which is intact; second, the affective sentiment of the lapse of short periods, from less than a minute to several hours, which is wanting; and third, immediate sensory-motor perception of time, as in rhythm, which is here merely enfeebled. The conclusion is that the feeling we have of actually living out the medium periods of time is conditioned by the internal sensations, in the heart of each one of which our physiological history of the past few hours persists in the state of tenacious affective impressions, whose vibration is not yet extinguished.

An interesting observation by the author is that in the absence of the affective nucleus, without which the emotion ceases to exist, *i. e.*, the internal sensations, there still remains a residue of sensations and ideas which systematize themselves into what are termed inclinations. The inclination is the residue of an emotion despoiled of its affective kernel. It is constituted by the sensations of external movements of relation and expression, by specific sensory data, memories, ideas,

judgments, and reasoning — the whole susceptible of tenacity and systematization and of exteriorization by words, by expressive movements, and by acts, in the absence of all emotion.

HERBERT WOODROW.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

VALUES.

Zur Frage der Wertbestimmung. E. DÜRR. Archiv f. d. ges. Psychol., 1905, VI., 271-288.

Before examining three definitions of value as felt, Herr Dürr shows the validity of a scientific treatment of feeling. The objection that 'the theoretic aspects deal with the knowledge of things, while the practical aspects are concerned, not with the essence of things, but with our attitude towards such things' can scarcely hold. For if we consider that 'feelings are effects of determinate causes like other occurrences, they too can be subject to scientific treatment.' Moreover, 'the knowledge of the causation of feeling, and reflection on the feeling, still remains a function of cognition, and its relation to the essence of things cannot be inferred from the subjectivity of feelings' (p. 272).

Three definitions of felt value are then thoroughly discussed by Herr Dürr. First of all Kreibig's definition of value as 'in general a meaning given by feeling' is taken up. By value we mean, according to Kreibig, 'the signification which a perception- or thought-content has by virtue of its immediate or mediate connection with a feeling, actual or potential'¹ (p. 273). But as Meinong has shown,² many objects which may be considered of value do not excite a feeling of pleasure. The fact that a non-existing thing may have value, that some non-existing cause may excite pleasure, shows the falsity of the identification of pleasure-pain and felt value. If we bring up as an objection the impossibility of a non-existing cause operating to produce feeling, we only emphasize this fact. Even if we consider that in so-called non-existing objects the idea of such objects is the real basis of the value felt, we have in such a case the thought of the object felt as valuable. This will make all psychic processes the direct objects felt as of worth. Not only a non-existing object therefore, but the thought of such an object, may be the cause of a pleasure-pain feeling, and so

¹Kreibig, *Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie*, Wien, 1902, p. 12.

²Meinong, *Psychologische-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, Graz, 1894, p. 16 ff.