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EXAMPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MADAGASCAR BY FOREIGN POWERS AND NATIVE CAMPAIGNS, 1642 —1881.¹

By Captain S. PASFIELD OLIVER, F.R.G.S., &c., late Royal Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, a somewhat small attendance to-day does not prevent the lecture being one on one of the most interesting topics that could be brought before an English audience at this moment. If there is one country in the whole world more than another in which England is interested, it is Madagascar. In the first place it is a very wonderful strategical position in the Eastern seas, and although we have not chosen to take possession of it or to make any use of it, it is absolutely necessary that no enemy of ours should ever get it. The first effect of such a hostile occupation would be our disappearance from the Mauritius and from all our sugar plantations, and everything that comes from that Colony. The people could not sustain themselves without Madagascar, they get all their food and the necessaries of life from there; for that reason alone it is absolutely necessary to England. And not only the Mauritius, but the whole of the islands of that Archipelago are dependent upon Madagascar. Then comes the great strategical position in case of war. Our friends the French have an eye to strategical positions. There is a great bay at the northern part of the island called Bembatoka Bay, where all the fleets in the world might anchor, and that is, I believe, the position they chiefly want. Thence they could interrupt the whole of our Eastern commerce. The other day, before the French business occurred, I was thinking of joining a company myself to work the trade of Madagascar, and I have just a few notes here that would be worth reading. The island has a population of about 3,000,000; it is 818 miles long by 300 miles broad, and, situated between 12° 2' and 23° 40' south latitude, is almost entirely within the tropics. It rises from both sides to an altitude of about 4,500 feet above the sea level by a series of plains and plateaus, some of which are from 30 to 40 miles wide. The geographical position and topographical configuration render its soil capable of yielding the most valuable tropical and sub-tropical products, such as coffee, cotton, indigo, sugar, rice; and it is not improbable but the tea-plant may find its home there also. They grow those products in a manner far superior to the Mauritius, for the Mauritius is getting somewhat worn out. The silk produced in Madagascar is of the finest quality, of which beautiful specimens were presented to the Queen on the occasion of the Envoy's visit. A band of forest owned by the

¹ The Institution is indebted to Messrs. Macmillan for the use of the accompanying map prepared for their forthcoming work on Madagascar by Captain Oliver.—Er.

Government, and from 10 to 40 miles wide, encircles the island. Besides other timber, it comprises ebony, rose, sandal, and other fancy woods. While the plains of Imerina and some other portions of the island are thoroughly cultivated, large tracts of valuable land remain untilled and uninhabited, as for example the region known as "no man's land." Extensive pasture lands also occur, over which roam herds of cattle, in which there is an extensive trade, large numbers being exported to Mauritius, Réunion, and even to Natal. There is in fact no country in the world where cattle are so cheap as in Madagascar. Fat bullocks can be put on board ship at 40s. to 44s. per head, or at about 1d. per pound. Cattle are cheap in the island because there are no droughts, and because the grazing grounds are well watered and inexhaustible. Now these grazing grounds are but one month's sail distant, and surely they may be rendered available for the supply of meat to the United Kingdom. The geographical position of the island from a commercial standpoint is most important. It is about midway between the Cape of Good Hope and Aden, and about seven days' sail from the Red Sea. Mauritius is 500 miles distant. Its southern end lies about 700 miles E.N.E. of Natal, and, its whole length, Madagascar lies off that part of the coast of East Africa in which most interest is felt. In fact it bears the same relation to that great continent that Great Britain does to Europe, and when brought, through Christianity and commerce, into a higher state of civilization, will exercise upon the African negro an important influence. The French call Madagascar, on account of its position, the future storehouse of the Indian Ocean. That position certainly will give it an important and commanding influence over the African coast-trade from Zanzibar and Natal. With respect to sugar, a large trade is now carried on from Mauritius, as well as from that island to Bombay, the exports being in 1880-81 as follows:—Bombay, 38,470l.; Australia and New Zealand, 45,640l.; Cape ports, 6,298l. against 15,613l.; to the United Kingdom. Sugar can be as profitably produced in Madagascar as in Mauritius, and the growth of our Australian Colonies must naturally always secure an enlarging demand for the great staple, in the supply of which Madagascar may reasonably hope largely to share. The truth of the matter is, it is new soil, and the Mauritius is not, and its capabilities are very great. Now I have not come here to give a lecture myself, so I will come to a conclusion, and I have great pleasure in introducing the lecturer of the day, Captain Oliver, who knows a great deal about the country, and I have no doubt will give us an interesting description of everything that he proposes to bring before you.

Captain OLIVER: I must ask the indulgence of the audience this afternoon, if they will allow me to refer to the absence, through death, alas! of my much-valued friend Admiral John Crawford Wilson, R.N., whose sudden death has taken all his friends by surprise. He would have been here this afternoon had his duties permitted him, and in fact, possibly would have taken the chair. His interest in the Malagasy¹ was great, and his position as a well-known member of this Institution, apart from his well-known career in the Royal Navy, is sufficient to draw from us all a tribute of sincere heartfelt grief at the loss which this Institution has sustained by his death at the very period when his country looked upon him to fulfil the expectation formed from his former strict and stainless life of honour. Doubtless the shock sustained by his voluntary entrance into the engine-room of H.M.S. "Thunderer" when the explosion took place gave an additional strain on his constitution which has probably contributed towards his untimely death. I must also lament the loss of another friend of Madagascar, Lieutenant H. Horace Hayes, First Lieutenant of the "Bacchante," who gave me a great deal of information about Madagascar, and whose voyage down the east coast of Madagascar has eventuated in his death. He died on the 13th June.²

¹ Admiral Wilson commanded H.M.S. "Gorgon" in 1862-63, and conveyed the British Mission (of which Captain Oliver was a member) to and from Tamatave. He also visited the west coast, and contributed a paper on the Sakalava tribes to the Royal Geographical Society's Proceedings. (See "Notes on the West Coast of Madagascar," R.G.S. Journal, vol. xxxvi, p. 244.)

² Lieutenant Henry Horace Hayes, R.N., died on board the P. and O. steamer

I.—EARLIEST FRENCH OPERATIONS DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

THE subject on which I treat this afternoon does not carry us back further than the seventeenth century, when the attention of European nations was turned generally to colonial expansion and the acquisition of unoccupied territories.

La Société de l'Orient.—Armand Duplessis, Cardinal Richelieu, during the latter days of Louis XIII, established the *Société de l'Orient*, five months before his own death in December, 1642, for the express purpose of founding a permanent Colony in Madagascar, or Saint Laurent, as the island was then named. The letters patent granting a concession of the island of Madagascar and adjacent islets to the company were signed in the following year, 1643, by Louis XIV.

First French Settlements.—Pronis, a Huguenot, and Fouquembourg first established the small French Colony at St. Lucia; but the unhealthiness of the locality caused the speedy removal of the settlement to a peninsula at the south-east corner of the island where they built Fort Dauphin.

From the very outset misfortune attended the French efforts at colonization in the island. Not only was the mortality excessive, but religious differences caused the Catholic troops and colonists to revolt against the Huguenot chief.¹ Pronis was deposed and confined by the mutineers until rescued by a reinforcement from Europe. On the occurrence of a second outbreak of insubordination, Pronis managed to subdue the rising, and deported the ringleaders to the Grande Mascareigne (now Réunion), but he was superseded by the Sieur de Flacourt, who was sent from La Rochelle to take command of the Colony in 1643.

De Flacourt's Expedition.—De Flacourt aimed at reducing the whole of Madagascar to a state of subjection, and soon after his arrival took advantage of some slight provocation to send an expedition of eighty men under Sieur Angeleau to destroy the town of Fanshere. On this occasion the Chief Dian Ramach was slain, and the villages and property throughout the district pillaged and burnt. The Roandrians, or petty kings of the tribes as far as St. Augustine's Bay, were all subdued or overawed, and submitted to pay tribute to the French at Fort Dauphin. Nevertheless the settlement was neglected by the home authorities; during the seven years of De Flacourt's administration no supplies were sent from France; and in 1653, the charter of the Society having expired, De Flacourt returned to Europe, leaving Pronis again in charge of the establishment at Fort Dauphin.

"Venetia," off Suez, on 13th June, 1885, invalided from H.M.S. "Bacchante." When belonging to H.M.S. "Tourmaline" he was especially mentioned by Captain R. Boyle, R.N. (now of H.M.S. "Iron Duke"), for his boat voyages on the east coast of Madagascar during the French blockade in 1884.

¹ Pronis is accused of selling publicly to Van der Mester, Governor of Mauritius, a number of natives engaged in the service of the French Colony, including sixteen women, relations of Malagasy chiefs. These unfortunate slaves, on arriving at Mauritius, fled to the woods and mountains, where they became Maroons.

In 1655, Fort Dauphin was burnt, and the next Governor sent out by the reconstituted Society was M. Chamargou, who arrived at the settlement in 1660. The fort was rebuilt and the houses reconstructed by 1663.

Victorious Enterprise of La Case.—La Case, the lieutenant of Chamargou, was despatched by the Governor to reconnoitre the district of Matitana, a mission which he carried out with intelligence. The real name of the young Officer was Le Vacher, a native of Rochelle; he had taken the name of La Case as a *nom de guerre* on joining the expeditionary forces of the *Société de l'Orient* as a soldier of fortune. On his arrival at Fort Dauphin he found that the relations between the French and the natives of the island were of the most unfriendly description, and he recognized the necessity of re-establishing the reputation of the French Colonists among the neighbouring tribes. After several victorious engagements La Case gained by his tact and valour such an influence over the southern tribes that the Malagasy named him Dian Pousse, the title of a great chief reputed to have conquered the whole island, and whose memory and posthumous name were held in veneration by the warlike people. The sovereign of the fertile province, Ambolo, Dian Rassitate, offered his daughter, Andrian Nong, in marriage to La Case, who with five of his companions had left the French Colony disgusted by the conduct of Chamargou. On the death of Dian Rassitate, La Case was elected chief of his wife's tribe, and speedily became master of a large portion of the island.

Meantime the establishment of Fort Dauphin was reduced to the greatest straits through sickness and famine, until their necessities were relieved by supplies of rice and beef which were furnished by La Case.

Chamargou, having received reinforcements from France, waged another cruel war against the tribes of Carcanosy, and the murder of a French missionary by Dian Manangue, Chief of Mandrerrey, led to sanguinary reprisals. A detachment of forty Frenchmen was cut off and massacred by a chief, La Vatangue, and Chamargou himself led all the available men he had against Dian Manangue. Dian Manangue assembled a force of, it is said, 6,000 men to dispute the passage of the river Mandrerrey against Chamargou, and the French would doubtless have been destroyed, had not La Case, accompanied by 3,000 Malagasy of Ambolo, attacked the tribesmen of Dian Manangue, and covered the French retreat to Fort Dauphin. Even then the garrison would have been starved had not La Case conveyed 5,000 bullocks into the fort which was blockaded by Dian Manangue.

La Compagnie Orientale.—Under the auspices of Colbert a new company was formed, on the model of the English East India Company, in 1664, to which all the rights of the *Société de l'Orient* over the island of Saint Laurent, were transferred. This company was named *La Compagnie Orientale*, and the island of Madagascar received the name of *Ile Dauphine*. This last name, however, was not preserved, for we find that in the following year, 1665, this island was re-named *La France Orientale*, and M. de Rennefort

assumed the reins of its government. The first act of the new company was to send a sword of honour to La Case, together with his commission as Major; in return for which that Officer pledged himself that if a force of 200 Frenchmen were placed under him he would conquer the whole island, and establish the permanent authority of the King of France throughout Madagascar.

In 1667, the Comte de Mondevergue arrived with a fleet at Fort Dauphin, and, by the assistance of La Case, an arrangement was arrived at with the powerful chief, Dian Manangue, who swore fealty to the French Governor-General, and undertook to keep the garrison supplied with provisions. The grand *Compagnie Orientale*, however, failed through the maladministration of the funds, and Madagascar became a Crown Colony under the Viceroy, Admiral de la Haye.

Admiral de la Haye.—Admiral de la Haye impeached the former Governor de Mondevergue (who died of chagrin, a prisoner at Saumur), and instituted at once an aggressive policy. Determined to overawe the neighbouring chiefs who would not acknowledge his authority, he ordered Chamargou and Major La Case to summon Andrian Ramousay to surrender all the arms in his possession. The summons not being complied with, Chamargou and La Case attacked the chief's town with 700 French and 600 native allies. Andrian Ramousay, however, made a stout resistance, and repulsed the French attack. It was believed that Chamargou behaved treacherously on this occasion, and contrived the failure of the assault.

Admiral de la Haye finding that his force was insufficient to cope with the natives, left his command and sailed for Surat. His departure was shortly followed by the death of La Case, whose name and reputation for valour alone kept the islanders in subjection to the French. Their conduct had become intolerable to the Malagasy tribes, who only awaited a suitable opportunity to rid themselves of the foreigners. On the death of Chamargou, his son-in-law, Le Bretesche, succeeded as Governor; but finding his authority disregarded by those beneath him, he also took advantage of a ship putting in to Fort Dauphin to embark himself, family, and a few followers. The ship had no sooner set sail than a signal of distress was observed on shore. The Captain sent off his boats, which succeeded in rescuing a few individuals remaining after a dreadful massacre effected by Dian Ramousay and the other chiefs. This tragic event took place, it is said, at midnight on Christmas Eve, when the French were attending service in the chapel without the gates of the fort, December 25, 1672. No French establishment was again posted on the shores of Madagascar for upwards of a century.

Remarks on the French Operations during the Seventeenth Century.—From the "History of Madagascar," written by M. de Flacourt, we are enabled to form an accurate estimate of the state of the natives in the southern portion of the island, with whom the Frenchmen of the seventeenth century had to deal. We find that the tribes of Anosy, and the Ambolo Valley, the Machicora and the Mahafali, the Tsienim-

balala, and Antaisaka, preserve to this day all the characteristics of their ancestors, and are not in the least changed in their manners and customs from what they were when they were first intruded upon by foreigners. The tribes of the south end of the island of Madagascar, outside the tropic of Capricorn, belong to that branch of the Malagasy which includes the people now known as the Sàkalàva (or *long tongues*).

M. de Flacourt describes these people, their social condition, and surroundings minutely, and they perfectly agree with the modern accounts of the southern and western Sàkalàva given by the Jesuit missionaries who have resided at St. Augustine's Bay and Baly Bay; as well as with the descriptions accurately recorded by the Norwegian Protestant missionaries at Tolcar.

From these sources it is evident that the Sàkalàva and all the west tribes are incapable of sustained military combination or civil organization. They have remained unimproved for the last two centuries; if, indeed, they are not more degraded from their ancient simplicity by the introduction of gunpowder and muskets, rum and arrak, and the means of purchasing these commodities by the betrayal into slavery of their comrades and relations. Nevertheless the successful operations of men like La Case show that under good leadership and organization their tribesmen are not incapable of doing good service at least against their own equals, and doubtless if properly disciplined could be drilled and made as efficient as the Madras Sepoys. Unfortunately whatever was undertaken by the French during the seventeenth century was carried out on too small a scale and by the wrong class of men. Their leaders were not supported from home, and the knowledge of overcoming the local malarious fever was wanting. Coercion instead of conciliation was the policy of all European expeditions in those days, and the result was an undying hatred of the foreigner by the inhabitants, by nature more timid and docile than ferocious and untameable.

The West Coast Tribes.—The various Sàkalàva tribes are perfectly independent and jealous of one another, seldom remaining long on a friendly footing with their neighbours. They are frequently at war, and many are the *cause belli*, such as cattle-lifting, robbery, quarrels about hereditary fiefs, insulting personal remarks between the chiefs, disagreements with regard to boundaries and pretensions to supremacy, &c. But although the tribes make war against each other so often their battles are not very serious, nor the casualties numerous. If any are killed it is immediately known on both sides, and all become sorrow-stricken. The weeping women stand up to negotiate peace, and the war ceases until a new quarrel again offers an opportunity for recommencing hostilities, and they have not very long to wait. Although they are so violent in war, the number of killed, under the circumstances, is very small. They fight in very extended order, and every warrior is particularly careful to remain under cover, so they blaze away, expending plenty of ammunition with the *minimum* of effect. When danger is near they take good care to escape in time, and the sight of a comrade shot or captured will cause a

general panic. Every one fights on his own hook, and has not the slightest confidence in his own side assisting him. Should a man fall, he is left to his fate, and no Sakalava would dream of an attempt to rescue or defend his comrade. One chief reason for this lack of courage and confidence is that they are often compelled to fight against their own relations should they be among the enemies of their king. When war is proclaimed all the people are obliged to follow their king whether they like it or not; and if any one dared to make an excuse on the ground of not wishing to fight against friends and relations, he would expose himself to cruel treatment. If a warrior thinks it more advantageous to him to join with the chief's enemies, he will frequently become a deserter. The Vezo (coast tribes near St. Augustine's Bay) are especially given to this sort of desertion.

The most secure retreat for deserters is the Fiherenga kingdom, which is the largest and most powerful of all the independent kingdoms, and offers the most secure protection for runaways.

The many petty princes in this kingdom, sons or relations of the present King Lahimorisa, gather together as many men as possible for their own individual ends (for they are always fighting with each other); and in consequence, that old weak chief has no power to carry out his laws. All deserters from other kingdoms are accepted and welcomed in this Alsatia by these petty chiefs, who like to have a large number of followers ready to fight, rob, or plunder, and do every kind of evil deed. On this account the Fiherenga province is the most insecure as to life and property throughout Madagascar.

The Sakalava consider it possible to keep on good terms with all except the Hova (or Ambaniandro), against whom they have sworn an eternal enmity. Even when fighting with other tribes they do not regard them as their enemies. The only tribe they regard with real hatred is the Hova, as they believe that the Hova is the only tribe which intends to subdue the Sakalava and seize their country. Rather than become subject to the Hova, and give up their independence, they would exterminate themselves by warring against each other.¹

Sakalava Warfare.—The *Ampisikely*, or soothsayers, prophesy when war may be expected to be declared by any neighbouring king. The *Ampisikely*, on being asked whether there shall be war or not, takes his divining apparatus, generally a small board divided into squares, on which some small stones are placed—the wisdom stones. His divinations are oracular; then he says, perhaps, the enemy may begin to make war upon the kingdom in the beginning of the next month; if not then it may be about the time of the next new moon; and so on, till even half-a-year has passed away, but the enemy makes no appearance at all.

When war, however, is actually declared, whether a war of aggression or defence, the chieftain appeals to his followers, and the men gather at the appointed *rendezvous*, generally the king's residence.

¹ A. Walen, Norwegian Mission, "Antananarivo Annual," 1881

When assembled the first thing thought of is to secure a proper charm or talisman. The sorcerer, *Onsitra*, obtains a black bull calf and a cock. These animals are buried alive, and when covered with earth a mark is put on the spot. When the advancing enemy sees the potent sign he is supposed to retire and war is averted. But sometimes the enemy will make a flank march to avoid the hidden danger; and again the *Onsitra* is summoned to provide medicine to instil valour into the tribesmen. This is generally provided in the shape of an ox-horn full of grease, with which the warriors anoint their bodies, thereby rendering them presumably invulnerable. The warriors then start shouting and singing their war song, until the hostile forces are near enough to shout defiance at one another, when a halt is called. After an interchange of compliments, the firing begins, and should any one fall his fellows take to flight. The enemy run up to the fallen man, spear him, and plunder him, and the battle is over for the day. The *Sâkalâva* only approach each other near enough to use their spears when very excited, and this game is repeated for weeks and even months. The vanquished receive no mercy from the victors, who carry away the women and children, cattle, and any other property they can lay hold of. Wars of this kind are constant, and are much enjoyed by the *Sâkalâva*, for there is little real bloodshed.

The *Sâkalâva* tribes are now in much the same condition as they were in the days of Flacourt. From their frequent intercourse with Europeans in the Mozambique they obtained a knowledge of the use of firearms, and cheap muskets, gunpowder, and rum have always been the chief articles of commerce on the west coast. The possession of firearms enabled them to exercise military supremacy throughout the western and warmer portions of the island from north to south, and the highland tribes of the interior were subjected to blackmail. The province of Imano, indeed, paid tribute to the *Sâkalâva* of Menabé until the *Hovas*, obtaining arms and ammunition, were able to turn the tables on their more swarthy neighbours.

1774. After the abandonment of Fort Dauphin and the destruction of the garrison, the intercourse between Madagascar and Europeans was for a long time most casual, and the southern provinces of the island were left to themselves. But at about this period the pirates who infested the Indian Ocean made settlements at St. Mary and Antongil Bay, from whence they sent out marauding expeditions, until 1722, when the piratical haunts were destroyed by the Portuguese. French adventurers, of similar calibre to La Case, successfully established themselves in the neighbourhood of Antongil Bay, notably one Bigorne, who was recognized as Commissioner of Trade by the Government of Mauritius until the arrival of Benyowsky. Benyowsky was a Polish adventurer who escaped from Siberia, and was entrusted by the French Government with the establishment of a military colony at the head of Antongil Bay, where he arrived in 1744. The natives were at first ready to be friendly, as they had been with Bigorne, but Benyowsky, whose followers were as unprincipled as himself, soon involved the whole

country in war; and instead of instituting a self-supporting establishment, capable of exporting provisions to Mauritius and Réunion, his expedition required provisions from without, and consumed the depôt of supplies intended for the French island colonies, which are entirely dependent on Madagascar for sustenance.*

Benyowsky, with 800 Europeans and 3,500 native allies, made an expedition against the northern Sàkalàva. As he advanced he was joined by numerous tribes, so that when he approached the Sàkalàva camp his forces amounted to 16,313—a swarm of locusts attracted by the prospects of plunder. An engagement took place, in which eighty Sàkalàva were killed and fifty wounded, after which the enemy sued for peace. His conduct not being approved by the French, he resigned his command and went to Europe, where he in vain sought employment in Madagascar by the French, English, and other European Governments. At length, obtaining money and goods in America, he returned, and attempted to found an independent government of his own, and, having appropriated the stores of the French Government, a frigate was despatched from the Isle of France, from which a detachment was landed at Angoney, under Captain Larcher, to capture him. The Pole offered resistance, and was killed by the first volley from the French marines, who took possession of the fortified post the adventurer had occupied.

1810. *Origin and Development of the Hova Military Supremacy.*—Hitherto the coast tribes only had been known to Europeans, and from the above notice of the Sàkalàva, who represent them, it is evident that they have been ever looked upon by civilized nations as incapable of forming a strong government of their own.

Whilst Bigorne and Benyowsky were causing internal dissensions and fruitless attempts at civilization on the coast, in the interior highlands of Madagascar a tribe of superior intelligence was beginning to comprehend and make use of combination as a means of advancement and power. The origin and previous history of the Hovas is too obscure and remote to enter upon here. It is sufficient to say, that when Mr. Farquhar came to Mauritius, he found amongst the records accounts of the growing supremacy of the Hovas in the elevated plateaux of Imerina.

Andrianimpoinimerina had successfully combined the scattered clans of a certain district, sometimes called Ankova, and established a small kingdom, which he was gradually enlarging by the successful annexation of the adjoining provinces. Having established communication with the Arab slave-traders of the north-west coast at Mojangà, along the line of the Ikiopa River, the Hova chief had obtained muskets and ammunition. His people also possessed a plentiful supply of natural iron, and the knowledge of smelting and manufacturing tools and weapons. They were large raisers of cattle, possessed extensive rice-fields and pasturages, and were perfectly independent of exterior assistance. They were hardy, intelligent, and brave, and although small, agile and wiry. Each village was a fortification, and when Mr. Farquhar first discovered their capacity and aptitude for improvement, the founder of the combined nation had lately died and been

succeeded by a young ambitious monarch, with a French deserter from Réunion as a companion, who had imbuéd him with Napoleonic ideas. Radama, born in 1792, was only eighteen years of age when he became king, in 1810, just after his father had consolidated his kingdom and subjugated the Vakinankaratra, the most formidable tribe of spearmen and warriors throughout the island.

1820. *The Campaigns of Radama I.*—Radama I followed in the footsteps of his father, and devoted his attention to the subjugation of the entire island of Madagascar. Of his early campaigns we have no record; but in 1816 Captain La Sage, aide-de-camp to Governor Farquhar of Mauritius, took up some British soldiers to Antananarivo, and left Sergeant Brady and another non-commissioned officer to drill Radama's troops in European fashion. By the treaty made in 1817, England agreed to pay Radama a yearly subsidy, including 100 English Tower muskets with accoutrements, 100 barrels of powder, 10,000 flints, 400 suits of uniform, &c.; so that by 1820 he felt himself powerful enough to commence a war on the Sàkalàva of Menabé, to whose chieftain the Hova district of Imamo had long been tributary.

A considerable force was therefore sent to the west under M. Robin, a French deserter; but the Sàkalàva succeeded in repelling the invasion of their territory, and the French leader and the Hova troops returned to Antananarivo in disgrace. Meantime Sergeant Brady continued his unwearied exertions with the troops, and by dint of hard drill and severe discipline at last organized a body of picked soldiers, which formed the nucleus of a larger army, the British words of command being used.

1821-22. *Subjugation of the Sàkalàva.*—In the autumn of 1821 Radama was so far encouraged by the improved discipline of his troops, as to turn his thoughts to the further prosecution of the war with the Sàkalàva. For this purpose a *kabary* was held at Andohalo, when from 40,000 to 50,000 persons were present. It was then resolved to renew hostilities, and that every man capable of bearing arms should go to war, or pay a forfeit of 10 dollars. Preparations for war were accordingly made during the rainy season, and early in the ensuing spring the people were ready to commence the expedition. Including a thousand disciplined troops, with slaves, bearers, and attendants, the whole aggregate amounted to 70,000 or 80,000 men.

On the 23rd June, 1822, about 500 *Maroserana*, heads of districts, assembled in the court-yard of the palace, bearing their shields and spears, assuring their monarch of their fidelity in the approaching war, and betting wagers from 5 dollars to 1,000—the coward to pay the brave. The king stood at the door of his palace, holding his spear and shield, exciting the ardour of his people by his actions and addresses, prompting them to bet high, promising to confer his greatest honours on the brave and to reward them with 9 dollars for every head of the enemy; at the same time representing the Sàkalàva country as abounding in cattle, where abundance of booty might be obtained.

At daybreak on the 24th June, cannon were fired as the signal of

departure. The king, acting as priest as well as Commander-in-Chief, sacrificed a cock and a heifer, and offered a prayer at the tomb of Andriambelomasina, his renowned grandfather. Mounted on a *filanjan*, carried on men's shoulders and accompanied by Mr. Hastie, the British Agent, surrounded by his body guard, the king then took his departure from the capital. The national idols were taken with the headquarters of the army, whilst each clan or tribal division took its own idol, and every soldier possessed a private charm or *ody*. The astrologers, *mpanandro*,¹ and diviners, also formed a species of intelligence department, directing the days of marching, the direction, the watering places and sites for encampments, indicating the fords, strategy, and tactics of the campaign. The birds crossing the path or flying over the heads of the troops were also carefully observed, as auguring well or ill to the expedition.

Of this vast multitude, the men kept their own respective clans, and each territorial regiment had its own leader, each individual soldier furnishing himself with his own weapons, whether gun or spear and shield. Imerina was almost deserted by the departure of the troops; few able-bodied men being left, but only the women and children, the aged and infirm. Raholatra, brother to Ramitraba, chief of the Sâkalava, acted as guide: having quarrelled with his brother he thus turned traitor. But Radama placed no trust whatever in him, and had him watched closely by 100 men.

The army advanced in short stages to the west and various routes assigned to the different divisions, which were ordered to assemble at a given rendezvous on a certain date. On the 8th July, the day when the army was expected to cross the Sâkalava frontier and encounter the enemy, all the females at the capital arose at daylight and assembled in bands facing the west, sang war songs, and brandished sticks like spears in the direction of the enemy. This expedition lasted until October. Its principal object was ostensibly to search for Ramitraba and his followers, in reality to seize whatever booty could be secured. In these pursuits the conduct of the Hovas is said to have resembled rather the ravening of wolves than the deliberate attack of warriors. If they could seize cattle or surprise a few defenceless people, they rushed upon them with fury; but in any moment of danger no one cared for his neighbour, only caring for himself.

Fever and want of provisions proved dreadfully destructive to the troops in this expedition. It was calculated that not fewer than 25,000 or 30,000 perished in the campaign, and most of these from hunger. The stock of provisions carried from Imerina was consumed, and no supplies could be obtained. Even Radama himself and the British Agent had a mere handful of rice and a few birds,

¹ "— quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset, ut matres familie eorum sortibus et vaticinationibus declararent, utrum prælium committi ex usu esset, nec ne: eas ita dicere, 'Non esse fas Germanos superare si anti novam lunam prælio contendissent.'"—(Caesar, "*De Bellô Gallico*," Lib. I, Cap. L.)

"Coëunt . . . cum aut incobatur luna, aut impletur; nam agendis rebus hoc auspiciatissimum initium credunt."—(Tacitus, *Germ.* 11.)

which the latter shot, during the space of eight days. The people died on the road, unable to sustain the complicated evils of malaria and want of regular supplies. For months afterwards not a day passed without the firing of musketry in some part of the capital, indicating the arrival of the corpses of those fallen in the war. The bones only were thus brought, the flesh being scraped off on the spot where the deceased fell. The Sàkalàva were hunted through the woods, and took refuge in caves and inaccessible retreats.

Rasalima, the daughter of the Sàkalàva Chief Ramitraha, who subsequently married Radama, remarked to some Officers who had accompanied the latter in his expedition, "We saw you, during your whole march, and observed all your movements in search of us. We were near you in the woods, and concealing ourselves in caverns; and on one occasion you actually walked over our heads, without ever imagining we were so near." Yet there were several thousand men with Radama and as many with Ramitraha.

The Hova took vast numbers of slaves and cattle, and captured Mananarivo, the capital of Ramitraha, only some 15 miles from the Mozambique Channel, where the household gods of the Sàkalàva Chief were taken possession of, as well as two pieces of ordnance, which were buried in the bed of the River Mania, and afterwards brought up to Antananarivo by Ramanetaka. But the Sàkalàva remained unconquered.

The king made a halt on his return a few miles west of Antananarivo, where he and his followers, after performing a religious ablution, made a triumphant entry, proceeding in pomp to the holy stone at Andohalo. A general *kabary* was held, at which honours were conferred on the Officers who had distinguished themselves during the campaign.

1823. *A Regular Army constituted.*—The losses sustained by the Hova army during the campaign against the Sàkalàva were keenly felt by the inhabitants of Ankova, who showed a decided disinclination to again proceed on such another expedition. In consequence, at a great *kabary*, Radama announced that he wished no more to take the people in a body to the war, that the last expedition had been a lesson on that subject, and that henceforth soldiers only should go out to subdue the enemy, to quell disturbances, to subject the island to his government, to protect the innocent, and to secure peace and tranquillity to the kingdom. "And for these reasons," said the king, "it is necessary that the regular army should be augmented. As to the numbers requisite, and the quota of men each district should furnish, that I leave you to deliberate upon; at the same time, those who are not selected for soldiers, but who remain at home, must pay a tax towards the support of those who go to war." This address was cordially received, and on the king requesting those who wished to volunteer for service to stand up, a great number instantly arose.

The Officers of the Voromahery Regiment (the one disciplined body of the capital) ascertained the number of volunteers to be 13,000, and these were at once placed in training and reviewed at Ambohimanga in March 1823. This small army was harangued by Radama, who

left it to them to consider and determine what punishment should be inflicted on cowards and deserters. The troops unanimously fixed upon burning as the military punishment for desertion and cowardice; this punishment, however, it was expressly agreed should not affect the family or property of the criminal.

It was not then imagined to what extent the power, which was created by a disciplined and organized standing army, would desolate the country and destroy the inhabitants of the other provinces of the island.

Establishment of the Hova Power on the East Coast.—One of the first uses Radama made of his possession of a regular army was to establish a post on the east coast and connect it by a line of communication with the capital. The eligible situation fixed upon was Foule Point, with communication through the Antsihanaka country.

The Second Sâkalâva War.—In 1823 the war with the Sâkalâva chief, Ramitraha, was renewed, and Radama took the field with his 13,000 disciplined troops, accompanied by 7,000 bearers and camp followers, with baggage and provisions. On arriving at the frontier, a mission was sent on in advance, promising good terms to the Sâkalâva, who, however, rejected the message with scorn.

The first stronghold on the borders of Menabé is the rock fortress of Modongy (the Village of the Sulky). The inhabitants defended themselves with much bravery, but the place was stormed, many of the defenders putting an end to their own existence rather than fall into the hands of the Hovas.

Another engagement took place within the Sâkalâva territory, and to show his determination to retain his conquests and to remain in the country, Radama ordered a party of 2,000 men to clear the site of the battle, and build a village and stockade on the spot. Here he established a garrison, and left Rakizoarivo as Governor of the district.

This determined attitude caused Ramitraha to give in his submission, and he therefore proposed that the Hova King should enter into an alliance with him by marrying his daughter Rasalima. This was agreed upon, Ramitraha acknowledged the suzerainty of Radama, and the latter returned with his Sâkalâva bride to the capital, accompanied by the representatives of Ramitraha, who swore allegiance and friendship in public assembly at Antananarivo.

Meantime Rafaralahy, Radama's officer at Foule Point, was threatened by a coalition of the malcontent chiefs of the northern provinces. These chiefs were therefore summoned to swear allegiance, an order with which they were forced to comply, although they were secretly plotting a rebellion against the authority of the Hova supremacy.

This threatening appearance and discontent caused Radama to march his army to the east coast, and he appeared before Tamatave, where his suzerainty was acknowledged by the half-caste chief of the Betsimisarakas, Jean René. Then he proceeded to Foule Point, where H.M.S. "Ariadne" was lying, commanded by Captain Moorsom. Captain Moorsom conveyed Radama and about 200 of his men across Antongil Bay, whilst the main body of his troops marched round

through Maroa. Radama established his troops in various posts, and returned through Antsihanaka to establish direct communication with Imerina. The chief of the Antsihanaka, thinking himself secure on his island in the large lake Alaotra, refused to come in and give his submission, whereupon Radama constructed rafts on which he placed his cannon and attacked the island. The first assault was repulsed, and the Officer in command was tried by court-martial and burnt. Another attack was successful, and the island taken, upon which the subjection of the Antsihanaka was accomplished. Simultaneously another Hova Officer, Rataffe, proceeded against the northern Sâkalava of Iboina, who accepted the terms offered by Radama. The Hovas thus were acknowledged supreme throughout the northern portion of Madagascar.

1824. Radama now felt that he had acquired his sovereignty by his military power, that he must maintain his supremacy by the same means, and that instead of leading into the field a lawless horde of rapacious savages, he now commanded a disciplined force. Governor Farquhar, who visited Foule Point at this period (1823), describes the garrison there as "a well-accounted, very respectably-disciplined body of soldiers, whose conduct and regularity in all their exercises and evolutions marked at once a considerable degree of sagacity, subordination, and sense of propriety."

In the spring of 1824, Radama, still bent on reducing every chief in the island to a state of vassalage, determined upon undertaking another expedition into the north Sâkalava country, leaving his capital on the 28th May.

By the 12th June the army was encamped at Anaslavoor, when intelligence was received that Andriansolo, instead of delivering up the flag he had received from Commodore Nourse, was prepared to resist. Mr. Hastie went forward and attempted to make terms, but Hussan Barroched, the Arab Commandant of Mojangà, refused to submit, and was killed by the Hovas, whilst Andriansolo took refuge on an island. Radama's Generals Ramanetaka and Rameno occupied Mojangà and put a stop to the slave trade carried on there by Arabs and Moormen; whilst after some delay Andriansolo came in and submitted to Radama on the 19th July.

The province of Iboina submitted, and Ramanetaka, with a garrison of 1,100 men, was left to garrison Mojangà and to rule over the country from the river Manamboho to Majambo Bay; Rameno to govern the country between the Betsiboka and the Sofia rivers from his post at Trabonjy; Razatova to the north Antankara district at Vohémar; Ramarosikina to govern all Iboina west of the Betsiboka.

Radama and a portion of his army turned south through the forest of Manerinerina between the Bemaraha Hills and the Bongo Lava Mountains, where there are quantities of wild cattle. Here the celebrated leader and sorceress Triemanosinamamy was captured and killed. In October the troops returned to Vonizongo and reached the capital during the following month. "The whole island is now mine," said Radama.

1825. On the 1st January, General Ramananolona left Imerina

with 2,000 troops and took Fort Dauphin, remaining there as Governor of South Madagascar. During the same year some thousands of troops were sent in detachments to garrison various fortified villages and posts throughout the conquered provinces, and to enforce the disarmament of the inhabitants. The Sâkalava, however, again revolted, cut off and massacred several of the garrisons, whilst Andriansolo refused submission to Ramanetaka, and fled to an island on the coast. It was only by great exertion that Ramanetaka was able to hold Mojangà until General Rainimaka joined him with reinforcements and suppressed the rebellion.

General Rafozehana at the same time led a division of troops through Menabé in fruitless search for Ramitraba, disarming the tribes.

In June, the districts of Maroa and Betsimisiraka revolted, the inhabitants refusing to surrender their firearms. Mr. Hastie suppressed Maroa, and Rafaralahy restored tranquillity among the Betsimisiraka. Andriandina at this time subdued the country of Anonibé east of Antongil Bay, although unable to make the chief, Isasy, prisoner.

1826. Rafozehana was again despatched with troops through Menabé in 1826, searching for Ramitraba, whose daughter, Rasalima, was also sent to treat with her father, accompanied by an escort of 1,000 Hovas under M. Robin. A nephew of Ramitraba, attempting to surprise the escort of his cousin, was killed, and the Sâkalava chief sent an embassy to Radama, thus preventing further hostilities.

In June Radama proceeded to the coast at Tamatave, whilst General Brady left the capital with an army of 9,000 troops and 5,000 bearers on an expedition into Vangaidrano, south of the Betsileo country. More than nine months were employed in the subjugation of this difficult country, where every village was a natural fortress, and the opposition formidable.

At last Rabadoka the chief was captured by stratagem. He and several of his principal adherents and their followers had taken up a position at Hiàranàny, where they bravely defended themselves. Unable to take the place by storm in open daylight, the Hovas collected a quantity of straw and dry grass, with which they constructed a number of bonfires. Suddenly lighting these bonfires by night, they made their attack on the superstitious savages, who were terrified by the unforeseen fires, and fled down the valley of the Mandranafotsy, where the survivors submitted unconditionally the following morning. Rabadoka and twenty of his chiefs were slain, their bodies being exposed on poles at the entrance of his town.

On the return of the troops several Officers and men, having been convicted of cowardice, were condemned to death and publicly burnt alive.

Ralahifotsy, who was in command of a force checking insubordination in Betanimena and Antèva, was also convicted of defrauding the King of captured spoil, and with his colleague Rafaralahindera suffered death by being shot.

On July 27th, 1828, King Radama died, having firmly established Hova supremacy throughout the island of Madagascar.

1828. *Military Despotism of Queen Ranavàlona I.*—The principal man in all the events that conducted Ranavàlona I to the throne of Madagascar was the young Officer, Andrianmihaja, who had previously distinguished himself in the wars against the Sàkalàva under the late sovereign. He was immediately chosen on his accession as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief.

Radama, as already intimated, enlarged his kingdom of Imerina by conquest, until he had obtained more than half the island. To secure these additions, and ultimately carry out the predetermined plans of Radama by subjugating the whole island of Madagascar, was now the principal object of Ranavàlona's government.

For this purpose the attention of the Hovas was chiefly directed to annual predatory excursions and raids, such as had been the customary system of warfare throughout the island from time immemorial; but the Hovas had now appreciated organization and reaped its advantages, so that these annual raids had become a systematic method of obtaining revenue for the Hova sovereign. In fact they were military expeditions ostensibly for enforcing the sovereignty of the Hovas over the less civilized tribes, and disarming the rebellious populations; but in reality the commanders of the Queen's forces gained credit by returning with as much spoil, in the shape of slaves and oxen, as they could capture to the capital; enriching their sovereign and themselves indeed, but devastating and depopulating the richest districts in the island, and impoverishing as well the province of Imerina itself by draining it of its youth for the great standing army amounting to no less than from 20,000 to 30,000 men. As large numbers perished annually from disease and exposure during these campaigns, new levies had constantly to be made until the flower of the Hova people disappeared.

These warlike excursions for the purpose of subduing the provinces that had not submitted to the Hova rule were attended with melancholy results and cruelties abhorrent to humanity. A division of the army, amounting to perhaps some 2,500 or even 10,000 men, as the circumstances of the case seemed to require, was despatched about the close of the rainy season, in June, to the selected locality with orders to return home before the commencement of the rainy season in October or November. This army was attended by a large following of non-combatants ready to share in the opportunities for plunder. No regular commissariat or system of supply existed, and the troops and camp followers lived upon the country through which they marched like a flight of locusts.

The first military operations, however, in which the troops of Ranavàlona had to participate were of a defensive character, as the French Government had determined to enforce its rights at the hands of the newly constituted Malagasy Cabinet.

Gourbeyre's Expedition, 1829-30.—Early in 1829 the Government of Charles X decided that a squadron should make a demonstration off the coast of Madagascar to ascertain the feeling of the new Queen of Madagascar and to uphold French interests.

The then Minister of Marine, M. Hyde de Neuville, accordingly

notified this decision to the Count de Cheffontaines, Governor of Réunion, impressing on him the necessity of only occupying such points on the coast as could be safely held by the troops available.

In accordance with the Minister's instructions the following vessels were collected at Réunion and St. Marie in June, whence they assembled at their appointed rendezvous in the roadstead of Tamatave on the 9th July, 1829, viz.:—"La Nièvre," "La Chevette," "L'Infatigable," "La Terpsichore." These were joined by the transport "Madagascar," carrying expeditionary land forces as follows:—85 artillery, 21 military labourers, and 33 infantry (including *Yolofo*s, black troops from Senegal). Capitaine de Vaisseau Gourbeyre arrived in the despatch vessel "Colibri," and hoisted his broad pendant on board the frigate "Terpsichore."

The French Commodore landed with presents for the Queen, in order to ascertain the dispositions of the Hova Government, and observed that preparations for the defence of Tamatave were being made, the garrison of the fort being increased, and ammunition arriving from the interior.

M. Gourbeyre therefore at once despatched an *ultimatum* to Queen Ranavalona notifying the French complaints, and demanding an answer within twenty days. Meantime the squadron proceeded north to Tintingue of which possession was taken on the 2nd August, and here earthworks were at once thrown up, armed with eight guns, and garrisoned. The small fort was occupied, and the French colours hoisted on the 19th September, without resistance.

About this period the French deserter Robin, who had served with Radama, came to M. Gourbeyre to offer his services in raising the Sâkalava tribes of the north-west coast, under the exiled chief Ramanetaka from Anjouan: but M. Gourbeyre would not entertain the project.

Leaving the "Infatigable" corvette at Tintingue with 300 men in garrison, the Commodore took the rest of his force to Tamatave, where he moved his ships within easy range (300 toises) of the Hova battery, Taomasina, by the 10th October. Having sent on shore to the Hova Chief, Coroller, to know if the Queen had sent down the necessary authority for him to treat with the French, on a reply to the negative effect being received, the French Commander sent a formal declaration of war and intimated that he would commence hostilities immediately. The first few shells fired were sufficient to explode the powder magazine of the fort, upon which the Hova garrison abandoned the works, and 238 men under Captain Fénix landed and took possession of the place, finding 23 carronades and 200 muskets left behind with 50 bodies of Hova soldiers slain by the effects of the French fire and the explosion.

M. Gourbeyre did not occupy Tamatave, but proceeded to Foulé Point, where the squadron anchored on the 26th October.

On the 27th the ships opened fire on and silenced some batteries on the coast, and landing parties were put on shore to spike the guns and take possession of the village, in rear of which the Hovas had constructed a retrenchment.

Disaster at Foule Point.—The French (writes M. Barbié du Bocage),¹ having seen the Hovas evacuate their batteries, extended themselves without orders on the beach, discharging their muskets at the fugitives and pursuing them with the bayonet. Thus they traversed the streets of Foule Point; but on reaching the furthest huts they found themselves in front of a new redoubt whose existence they had not suspected. At first sight they attempted to form a column of attack whilst the Yolofs should make a détour round the enemy's flank under Captain Schœll, but by some fatality whilst rallying, the Hovas discovered them and discharged grape and canister from seven or eight guns in the redoubt, which fire caused disorder and loss in the ranks not yet re-formed. A panic ensued and the soldiers fled to the shore. The Hovas seized this opportunity to make a sortie and would have infallibly cut off the retreat of the French troops, had not Ensign Charvau, who commanded the frigate's cutter, fired case into them with the boat's gun. Unfortunately Captain Schœll was killed, together with five or six French sailors. In this disastrous affair the Hovas were said to have lost 75 killed and 50 wounded: whilst the French loss was 11 killed and 26 wounded: but this difference, says M. de Bocage, did not diminish the moral effect of the rout, and the Hovas naturally exaggerated their victory.

Commodore Gourbeyre did not attempt to make reprisals or repair the repulse of his force on shore, but withdrew to Tintingue, which fort was threatened by the enemy. Thence he proceeded against a post which the Hovas had established at Pointe à Larrée, which he attacked on the 4th of November. Here, reinforced by 50 artillerymen and 20 Yolofs from Tintingue, the French squadron bombarded the fort for two hours, after which a storming party in two columns was landed and led to the attack by Captain d'Espagne. The right column advanced and penetrated the fort by one entrance, under Lieutenant Baudson of the artillery, who fell covered with wounds. The left column under Lieutenant Somsois, Marine Artillery, and M. Dambané, succeeded in forcing their entrance at another gate, and the fort was taken. The Hovas left 119 dead on the ground, 27 prisoners, 8 guns, 700 pounds of powder, and 250 oxen. The French loss was one dead, and nine wounded.

The season was now at an end, and the French squadron was withdrawn, leaving a garrison of 400 men under Captain Gailly, at Tintingue, and 150 men under M. Carayon at Ste. Marie, the intention of the Government being to prosecute the campaign with vigour during the next good season. The Revolution of July at Paris overturned the French Government and the policy of M. Hyde de Neuville.

General Sébastiani and Vicomte d'Argout, the new Minister of Marine, shelved the Madagascar question, and in May, 1831, the evacuation of Tintingue was effected in the face of a force of 3,000

¹ "Madagascar, Possession Française depuis 1642:" par V. A. Barbié du Bocage, 1858.

Hovas, who at once took possession of the place. Ste. Marie was still held by the French, and has since remained a French colony. The French did not again hold any port on the mainland of Madagascar for over half a century.

During all these operations in 1829, it may be remembered that the coast tribes held aloof from the French and could not be persuaded to rise against the Hovas, their masters. They are still the same that they were in the days of Flacourt, of La Case, of Benyowski, and Hastie, mistrustful of Europeans, and advisedly so.

1831. *Expedition of Rainiharo and Ramboasalama.*—Among some of the earliest expeditions sent out during the Queen's reign were those under the command of Rainiharo and Ramboasalama to the south in 1831. These chiefs on their march southwards came to a town in the Betsileo country, and determined to sacrifice it for the sake of plunder.

There were about 300 families residing there, living in quiet and peaceable submission to the Hovas, regarding them as friends, and never dreaming of attempt to escape on the approach of the army.

The Officers of the Queen's troops then invited all the men from the village to a friendly repast with them in their camp, and the invitation was accepted. The soldiers had private orders given them to be provided with lashings, and that as soon as they heard the drum beat they should seize and bind their guests. At the appointed hour the unsuspecting villagers arrived, entered the camp, and sat down quietly waiting for their cooked rice; when the drums were beaten, and at the signal the soldiers seized their visitors, bound their hands, and leading them outside the lines, deliberately speared them in cold blood. The second Officer in command on this occasion, Ramafadrahona, boasted that he had killed eleven of them with his own hands.

One of the villagers who happened to remain at home, hearing what was taking place, effected his escape to Ikongo, a natural hill fortress, about 60 or 70 miles from the scene of treachery. Here several Betsileo and Tanala chieftains collected, and many thousands of their people. As soon as they heard the fate of the man's companions, they determined to accept no terms from the deceitful Hova, but to defend their mountain home to the last.

The Hova army arrived outside Ikongo in three days. One division of it was told off for the attack under Ramafadrahona, with instructions to retreat for the day at four o'clock if the place were not taken by that time. The single path that leads up the mountain is exceedingly narrow, and leads over a tremendous precipice. Close to the entrance to the village is a piece of level ground, which the Hova soldiers at last reached with their guns and opened fire on the defenders, who could only reply with stones. Meantime a large number of non-combatant followers had got in advance of the troops ready to rush in and seize the plunder as soon as the troops advanced. But when four o'clock arrived, the order was given to withdraw the guns and descend, upon which the camp followers, dreading their being left unprotected against a sortie of the Ikongo, made a rush to gain

the narrow pathway, and a panic took place; the Officers, soldiers, and mob of camp followers and bearers pressed one another indiscriminately pell-mell over the precipice, where it is said that not less than 2,000 Hova perished. Among them were Ramafadrahona himself and his second in command, Rafalimanana. When the Ikongo tribesmen at length ventured out, they were astonished at the numbers that had perished, and the quantities of muskets and spears, besides the two guns, which they took possession of. This attempt to take Ikongo failed; the Commander of the Hova forces returned to Imerina for reinforcements, but it does not appear that Ikongo was ever captured, and it yet remains in possession of the Tanala tribesmen.

Another Hova expedition, under Ravalontsalama, proceeded into the Sâkalâva country to the west, the same year, and although more successful as to booty, the methods employed were not less cruel and unprincipled than those just mentioned. The chiefs of a district in Menabé were accused of concealing firearms. This was a mere pretence. An appeal was made to the ordeal of the *Tangena* poison, and of course it convicted the parties whom it was intended should be convicted. All the principal men that could be found were seized and thrown bound into a deep excavation dug for the purpose, and after being kept there about two days without any kind of provision, were taken out one by one, and actually crucified at short intervals from one another, forming a long line of excruciating agony round the chief village of the district. It is recorded that many of the wives and female relations of the victims refused to submit to their hard fate of slavery, cruelty, and insult. "This," said they, "is the land of our fathers, our husbands, and our brothers, whom you have murdered in our sight, and shall we now accompany you far away to Imerina to live and die as slaves there?" The spear soon silenced their complaints, and they perished, as they desired, on the spot. Some thousands of the Sâkalâva were, however, seized as booty and conveyed to Imerina by the Hova troops.

1832. *Barbarous Cruelty at Ivato*.—A most revolting instance of barbarous cruelty occurred again in 1832, when Rainiharo and Ramboasalama headed an expedition of 10,000 men, with as many camp followers, to the south. When they reached Ivato, a village in the Manandriana division of the Betsileo country (lat. 20° 32' S., long. 47° 20' E.), they found the people posted on a hill, prepared to fight in defence of their homes. The village is almost inaccessible, and within it were ten or twelve powerful chiefs with their clans. The wily Generals, finding it would be almost impossible to take the village by force, employed stratagem, and endeavoured to persuade the people to submit, promising in the strongest terms that if they would quietly deliver up their arms no one should injure them. This negotiation was carried on for three days. At length a division of opinion arose among the Betsileo chiefs, some of whom were disposed to place confidence in the Hova promises, others strongly resisting a measure so full of danger. One end of the village was connected with a large forest, and the latter

party made good their escape through it during the night. About 20,000 persons, however, remained, and these deluded wretches, after again being assured of the most friendly dispositions towards them, delivered up their arms, spears, and muskets.

They were then surrounded by soldiers, and all the men found able to carry a spear were ordered to pass from one circle of soldiers to another, while the women and children remained within the first circle. They were each carefully examined as they passed between the soldiers to see whether they had any concealed weapons upon them. The soldiers then commenced tying their hands behind them, when their fate was evident. Those not yet bound made a desperate rush through the ranks, and some few who tried to escape were caught outside and killed at once. Those that were bound were killed at leisure the following day, the massacre commencing early in the morning and lasting until late in the afternoon.

The expedition then returned to the capital, flushed with their success at the shambles, bringing 13,000 captives. Multitudes of them, filled with grief and horror at the fate of their husbands and fathers, refused to eat on the road, and suffered for it by being beaten. Those who remained inflexible were speared with those who from illness were unable to keep up with the troops. Grief, fatigue, and famine destroyed many long before the capital was reached, where the survivors were sold to the highest bidder.

In 1833, Ratsimanisa conducted an expedition to the south, killed many people, and returned home with 2,000 captives. He administered the ordeal of *Tangena* to four chieftains, pretending to ascertain thereby their intention of rebelling against Ranavàlona. Three out of the four were convicted, and of course put to death with all the able-bodied men in their respective districts, the women and children as usual being made captives and sold into slavery.

Several other expeditions were sent to different parts of the island this same year, and their operations were of the same outrageous character.

In 1834, troops were again despatched to the south, when they destroyed an immense number of the people, and returned home to Antananarivo with about 10,000 captives.

In 1835, a large expedition was despatched to the south-west, to the vicinity of St. Augustine's Bay, under the command of Rainiharo, Andrianisa and Ratiaray being the Officers under him.

There were about 10,000 or 11,000 men in this affair, accompanied by an unusually large number of non-combatants, making a total of not less than 30,000 or 40,000. After advancing beyond Fianàrantsoa, the capital of the Betsileo, a large part of the troops and people being without provisions, were permitted to requisition the property of the peaceable inhabitants, who were the acknowledged subjects of Ranavàlona, so that multitudes were left without any support for the remainder of the year and perished of famine.

The main body of this army proceeded to Mahafaly, thence to Taboara, and across the River Onilahy. Here the army separated; Rainimarolahy and Rakodia took 2,000 men to the west, and Andria-

maro and Rasoarivo with other 2,000 to the east, Ramazava with 1,000 men to the north, and Ramandranto with a similar number to the south. On the return of these divisions from their reconnaissance, a large camp was formed on the north bank of the Onilahy River, whilst 6,000 troops were sent south to Andriampierenana and Andriamabaka, under Razakandrianaina, Ratsitohaina, and Ravelo (all 11 honours). Raningory (11 honours) proceeded with a party down the Onilahy to the port of Isalary. Here they found a fleet of twenty-one American whalers, at sight of which the Hovas were greatly dismayed, and the whole expedition retired to Imerina, expecting an invasion of foreigners.

In 1836, Ratsimanisa was despatched with 6,000 troops to the south, Rainingitabe with 2,000 to the north, and Ravalontsalama with 3,000 to the west. All these returned home in September or October. Ratsimanisa had destroyed upwards of 4,000 men in one day, and carried home with him upwards of 9,000 captives.

On the arrival of Ratsimanisa in the Betsileo country, messengers were sent out by him in every direction to invite the people to assemble, and to assure them that he was only sent by Ranavàlona to administer to them the oath of allegiance and to take their arms, which they must deliver up to the Queen.

Having thus collected all the inhabitants that he could, he divided them into three parties, the first consisting of adults capable of bearing arms, the second of youths about 4 feet high, and in the third he placed all the women and children.

The first party of men were then all bound, a ceremony insisted on and too tamely submitted to, as a form in which they were to take the oath of allegiance. They were then ordered to accompany the soldiers to a large swamp, where the oath was to be administered by striking the water. On arriving at this spot the drums beat a signal, and every one of the adult natives was put to death by the spear. An examination was then made of the youths, and all who were found to be even half an inch above the given arbitrary standard of stature, which the Officers carried with them by the Queen's instructions, were placed by themselves, and soon shared the fate of their fathers. The cries of the women and children had no effect upon the ruthless conquerors. On his return home Ranavàlona highly praised Ratsimanisa for his consummate skill and success, observing that she had no Officer to be compared with him in capturing slaves and booty.

Rainingitabe returned from his raid to the north with about 1,000 captives, after putting to death upwards of 400 men. He had encountered a pretty smart struggle with the Boeni Sàkalàva, and many had fallen on both sides.

Ravalontsalama, having killed about 400 of the enemy in Menabé, returned home with 700 captive Sàkalàva women and children.

These details are sufficient to illustrate the military character of the government of Queen Ranavàlona which thus desolated the whole island, and proved as ruinous to the Hova themselves as to the provinces they subjugated by the method of merciless extermination of all the adult males.

1837. *Close Investment and Capture of Itsàranóro*.—Itsàranóro is now but a small village in a valley on the borders of the Betsileo and Bara countries south of Tsi-afa-batála (*not to be climbed by grasshoppers*), on a rounded boulder-topped hill covered by a small wood. Although now but a few huts remain, in the days of Ranavàlona I the place could boast of a large population. During the reign of that Queen in 1837 Ramiándrivólo (15 honours) brought Hova troops against the place, and not being able to take it by assault, regularly invested it until the occupants should be forced to surrender.

The inhabitants preferred to die of starvation rather than submit to the mercies of the Hova soldiers, and carried out their determination with Spartan stoicism. When at length the Hova troops entered the town of Itsàranóro every human being and animal was dead. Even now the rocks are full of human bones.

The country was now closed to all communication with the outer world, but we know that the annual raids against the weaker tribes continued. It was, in fact, the normal mode of collecting revenue. The only European who was resident at the capital was one M. Laborde, formerly an artificer in the French Army, who greatly enriched himself in property and slaves by manufacturing arms for the Hova troops.

A record of the building of the great palace at Antananarivo, however, furnishes us with the numbers of the troops employed as military labourers in 1839. These are the numbers of the troops that were brought for the work:—

				Men.
Imerina.	{ From Avaradrano ..	Northern Division ..	8,000	
	" Isisaozy ..	Southern " ..	6,000	
	" Imarovatana ..	West " ..	2,500	
	" Ambodirano ..	South-west " ..	2,500	
	" Vonizongo ..	North-west " ..	7,000	
	" Vakinankaratra ..	Extreme South Division	8,000	
				<hr/> 34,000

It was stated in 1840 that the province of Ankova (Imerina) had been drained of its youth to maintain the standing army of 30,000 to 40,000 men; that in their expeditions which were attended by a more than equal number of camp followers, scarcely more than half the number returned. But this admitted of no comparison with the numbers that perished by the treachery and carnage of these troops. It is stated that at the above time 100,000 human beings had been killed in Queen Ranavàlona's wars, and double that number, including women and children, sold into slavery, or divided as booty among the Officers. The Queen's Government now thought that their forces would be as efficient against foreigners as they had proved against their own neighbours, and the army, which included the large proportion of the manhood of Ankova, was increased.¹

1845. *Disastrous Attack on Tamatave by the Allied Squadron*.—

¹ George A. Shaw, "Antananarivo Annual," 1876, p. 101.

In consequence of complaints made by British subjects to the Government of Mauritius in 1844, Her Majesty's ship "Conway," 26 guns, commanded by Captain Kelly, was despatched to Tamatave, with instructions to call upon the authorities there for an explanation of the circumstances which had led to the infliction of imprisonment and fine on Englishmen. No satisfactory result ensued, and the "Conway" returned to Mauritius for further orders, when suddenly a peremptory order from Queen Ranavàlona arrived, ordering Razakafidy, the Governor of Tamatave, to expel all the European traders from the island.

Lieutenant-General Sir William Gomm, Governor of the Mauritius, and Admiral Baroche, Governor of Réunion, on hearing of this hostile move by the Hova Government, at once took steps to protect the European merchants on the coast of Madagascar. Accordingly the "Conway" anchored in the roadstead off Tamatave on the 12th June, where the "Zélée," 12 guns, commanded by Captain Fiéreck, had already arrived, and on the same day, the French Commodore, Romain Desfossés, made his appearance in the "Berceau" frigate, of 26 guns.

During the 13th and 14th the Europeans were embarked on board the merchant ships in the roads, under protection of the guns of the men-of-war, but their houses were plundered by the Malagasy, an outrage which the English and French Commanders, who were in complete accord, resolved to punish.

On the morning of Sunday, 15th June, therefore a joint protest against the proceedings of the Hova authorities was sent on shore, with a notice that fire would be opened from the ships unless a satisfactory answer was received by 2 P.M.

The Hova soldiers retired into their fort, and the inhabitants fled from the town in expectation of the attack.

The allied ships were moored in a line parallel to the shore, opposite the Malagasy works, at a distance of 700 yards from the principal fort.

The fortified works of Tamatave consisted of two elevated batteries with guns *en barbette* and open in rear, connected with and flanking the principal fort, an enclosed work of considerable strength, which had been built under the direction of two Arabs of Zanzibar, subsequent to the expedition under Captain Gourbeyre in 1829, and only lately completed. This fort, which still remains, is of peculiar construction, and consists of a circular citadel, with massive rampart and parapet of coral rock, in which are casemated galleries and embrasures. Round the body of the work is a dry ditch, 32 feet broad, and perpendicular scarp and counterscarp. On the crest of the counterscarp is an outer enceinte, forming another parapet with large ports corresponding to the embrasures of the inner and main work. The exterior slope of this parapet at an angle of 45° is strongly palisaded, and the whole thickly screened by groves of trees and bushy scrub, down to the beach.

The garrison at the time was estimated at 400 regular Hova troops, with 600 Bestsimisaraka and Betanimena auxiliaries.

At noon Captain Desfossés (whose official report is followed) harangued his crew, and informed them and the French refugees that the Hovas were to be punished that day; whereupon the refugees requested permission to be armed, and were furnished with muskets and cutlasses, &c.

At two o'clock the answer to the ultimatum arrived from Razakafidy, the Governor, who expressed the intention of his Government not to rescind the offensive proclamation, and within five minutes afterwards fire was opened upon the fort from the guns of "Le Berceau" and the "Conway," whilst "La Zélée," at the head of the line, directed her fire on the flank battery to the south.

The fire was returned from the Hova batteries, not very energetically, but with astonishing precision, their artillery being directed, according to M. Desfossés, by a renegade Spaniard. After firing had gone on for a quarter of an hour a violent conflagration in the vicinity of the northern battery bore witness to the effect of the shell; and by half-past three, as a great number of shell had been observed to burst within the fort and other battery, it was considered by Captains Kelly and Desfossés that a large proportion of the defenders must have been destroyed, and that it was time to land some detachments to take possession of the place, and terminate the operation before evening set in. Accordingly, 100 sailors and 68 marines of the "Berceau," 40 sailors and 30 marines of the "Zélée," with 80 blue-jackets and marines of the "Conway," were embarked in 14 boats in perfect order, forming a line parallel to the shore, the English on the right, the "Berceau" in the centre, and the "Zélée" on the left.

At a given signal the boats proceeded simultaneously under cover of the fire from the ships, and the combined French and English force landed and formed in order of attack on the beach at 200 yards from the fort.

	Men.
Right (English) "Conway"	80 Lieutenant Heseltine.
Centre (French) "Berceau"	168 Lieutenant Prevost de la Croix.
Left " " "Zélée"	70 Captain Fiéreck.

Total..... 318

Two small howitzers on mountain carriages were taken by Lieutenant de la Croix, and brought along in the centre.

The Hovas contented themselves with firing some rounds of case during the disembarkation which produced but little effect, and the combined force advanced at a quick pace against the "Malagasy" work, which was in a great measure screened by thick groves of bushy trees. Some men of the "Zélée," with others of the "Berceau," under a midshipman, gained the south battery, where they spiked three guns, overturned two others, and drove its defenders into the principal fort, which the French in vain attempted to enter with the fugitives. Whilst the south outwork was thus captured the main body marched straight up the glacis and outer slope of the enceinte and crowned the covered way, thinking it was the fort itself they had

thus taken; on reaching the summit the mistake was apparent, there was a broad deep ditch between them and the body of the work, the escarp of which was 30 feet high, and the attacking party had brought no scaling ladders. The assault failed inevitably. From their casemated galleries the Hovas were able to fire on the allies, who maintained possession of the outer works for forty minutes, when, their ammunition failing, Captain Desfossés sounded the recall on the beach and the various detachments retired and, re-forming in their original formation on the shore, re-embarked with their guns, their killed and wounded, at least the majority of them.

Repulse at Tamatave.

	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
English, "Conway"	0	4	1	11
French { "Berceau"	2	7	1	32
{ "Zélée"	1	6	0	11
Total.....	3	17	2	54

Total casualties : Officers, 5; Men, 71 = 76.

The "Berceau" was struck by thirteen shot, one of which broke the fore topmast. The "Zélée" was also struck several times and also had her topmast cut. Unfortunately, thirteen bodies, which could not be carried off, were left in the hands of the enemy, and when the expedition sailed away, the sailors could see the heads of their comrades fastened on poles along the beach, where they remained for nearly ten years, until the merchants of Mauritius and Réunion subscribed 3,125*l.* for the renewal of trade in 1854, when the heads were taken down and interred at Ste. Marie. Thus ended this unfortunate expedition, which was not renewed, the policy of the Governors of Mauritius and Réunion being disavowed by their respective Governments in Europe.

This effective repulse of the two great marine Powers by their fort at Tamatave naturally gave great impulse to the military pride of the Hovas, and encouraged the old, or what may be termed the idol party, to keep aloof from all exterior intercourse, and, in consequence, Imerina, and indeed all Madagascar, was closed to European influence for a period of nearly twenty years.

1849. *Insurrection at Nosi-Bé.*—An attempt to drive the French out of Nosi-Bé was made by the Sâkalava in June, 1849. The Sâkalava Chiefs, Linta and Tsimandroho, who had ceded Nosi-Bé to the French eight years previously, left the island, and the Sâkalava assembled at Ankify on the mainland opposite Hellville at the end of June, and landed during the night in considerable numbers on the island. The small French force available consisted of sixty Marine Light Infantry and 800 liberated slaves, who however could not be depended upon and were armed only with spears. The only Officer, a Lieutenant of Marines, was unfortunately

shot whilst making a reconnaissance, whilst the garrison held an entrenched position defended with two small guns in a sand-bag battery. At daylight, the Sàlakàva delivered their assault, led by some twenty or more of their *Ombiasy* and fanatics. They were permitted to advance close to the guns, which being suddenly unmasked fired two rounds of case, by which thirty-two of the Sàkalàva were killed, upon which the savages fled and left the island precipitately. On the following day reinforcements arrived from Mayotte, and the Colony was placed in a state of defence.

1851. *Sàkalàva Raid on Tafondro*.—After the Sàkalàva revolt of 1849, Tsimandroho again took up his residence under French protection at Tafondro, in Nosi-Bé. But in April, 1851, a party of 500 Sàkalàva crossed over from the mainland, and overcoming the small French post, killing the corporal in charge, murdered Tsimandroho, cut off his head and carried it off as a trophy to their country at Morontsanga.

The Commandant of Nosi-Bé sent over 600 Sàkalàva allies to punish their compatriots. But on reaching Morontsanga, they found the place deserted, so they burnt the village by way of reprisal.

1856. *The Affair of Bavatoubé*.—A French factory was established at Bavatoubé by M. Lambert on the coast at the entrance to Passandava Bay, almost immediately opposite to Nosi-bé, the French Colony before mentioned, in 1855. Throughout the locality deposits of bitumen and mineral oils were exploited for nearly twelve months by the *employés* of Lambert's company, who constructed buildings and fortified the station with a regular rampart and stockade with five ships' guns mounted in position, whilst a number of Mozambiques, *i.e.*, slaves, were armed, and the position was deemed well defensible and able to hold out in case of any attack until assistance could arrive from Nosi-Bé, which is within signalling distance, and where a French man-of-war is generally stationed. M. Lambert placed M. d'Arvoy, formerly French Consul at Port Louis, in charge of the establishment, but the Hova Government warned him, when the former departed for Europe in 1856, that having learned of the armed occupation by a foreigner of a position at Bavatoubé, he would remain there at his peril. M. d'Arvoy seems to have trusted to his armed retainers and defences and remained at his post. Accordingly, on the 19th October, a force of Hova soldiers proceeded to Bavatoubé, and M. d'Arvoy refusing to surrender, the place was surrounded and captured. M. d'Arvoy and a number of his followers, Creoles and Sàkalàva, were slain. The Hova commander took 100 of the *employés* prisoners to Antananarivo, with the guns, muskets, and a quantity of ammunition; the place was razed to the ground and has not since been occupied.

This affair, eleven years after the unavenged repulse at Tamatave, naturally rendered the Chiefs of the Hova Government still more arrogant in their dealings with Europeans.

1859. *Bombardment of Mahogoulou*.—The constant shipment of so-called free labourers (*engagés*) from Baly Bay on the north-west coast led to several disastrous revolts on board the French ships.

In one instance, in 1859, the "Marie Angélique" was on the point of sailing for Réunion, when the Malagasy on board attacked the crew, who jumped overboard and swam to a neighbouring vessel, ran the "goëlette" ashore, burnt and pillaged her.

On this event becoming known at Nosi-Bé, Captain de Langle took his ship "La Cordelière" and anchored off Mahogoulou, the village of Outzinzou, in Baly Bay, on 13th February, 1859. A boat was sent on shore to bring off the Jesuit Missionary Fathers, and attempts to negotiate were made in vain. The French boat was fired upon by the Sàkalàva, who deserted their village and took to the woods. Whereupon the guns of the "Cordelière" opened fire, and with a few rounds of shell destroyed the village of Mahogoulou.

Six months afterwards the "Cordelière" returned, found the village rebuilt, and exacted a fine of 14,000 dollars, which fine was paid in cattle.

1861. The border lands between the Hova and Sàkalàva peoples at this time were desolate. Long tracts of country, twenty or more miles in width, were destitute of inhabitants, and the Hova villages, as well as those of their allies, were, even with that width of open neutral territory, never safe from night surprises and assaults, in which the cattle were driven off, the men killed, the women and children hurried into slavery, and the village left a heap of blackened stones and ashes.

At length the Queen died, in 1861, and her son, Radama II, came to the throne. The new King had been thoroughly disgusted by the sanguinary scenes of his youth, and his first act was to proclaim that the soldiers should only muster once every two months, and he also at once reduced the *fanompoana* or service required of the non-combatants.

The next act of the liberal-minded Sovereign was to set free all the Sàkalàva captives. He then sent all the Sàkalàva chiefs in the Hova power back to their country loaded with presents and messages of goodwill to their people. He also sent what they would esteem more than any gift, the bones of the chiefs who had died in captivity, that they might be buried in the tombs of their ancestors.

The Sàkalàva, who had lately plundered a portion of Vonizongo, at once reinstated their captives and restored what property they could. Embassies under selected chiefs of the Sàkalàva were sent to Antananarivo to accept the welcome friendship and to offer allegiance to the King and Hova Government, the tribes along the whole line of country, with scarcely an exception, following this example. Radama II received these embassies with frank good nature, feasted them, and dismissed them with presents to their homes. They offered to surrender their arms. "Keep them," he said; "when I want your help, you will have them ready."

The Sàkalàva agreed to furnish recruits to the Hova Army. The Hova people extended to the west, the Sàkalàva to the east, and occupied the adjacent no-man's-land; the inhabitants interchanged visits and peace prevailed throughout the country.

Revolt of the Sàkalàva.—In May, 1863, the unfortunate Radama was slain in the course of a palace revolution.

The Sàkalàva heard with indignation of the death of Radama, who was their friend, and at once invaded Vonizongo, killing some herdsmen and driving off 800 oxen of the Prime Minister of the new Government. They remembered the ravages they had suffered during the former Queen's reign, and expected their renewal under Rasohérina; they therefore collected their forces and invited other tribes to join them in a march on the capital to avenge Radama's death and destroy his murderers.

No message of peace or friendly explanation of the cause of the revolution and change of Government was sent by Rainivoninahitriony, the Prime Minister, to these tribes in revolt; but a force, accompanied by some guns, was despatched under the command of one of the chief actors in the recent *coup d'état*. The usual Hova strategy was employed, viz., treachery. The Hova force moved quickly before the allied tribes could collect, and after proposing negotiations, in order, as they said, to draw them together, attacked them, opening fire upon them from their artillery, which was masked, until the Sàkalàva were cut off from retreat. The Hova commander reported 2,000 slain, and returned to Antananarivo, followed by a long line of captive women and children and herds of cattle. Rasohérina, however, sent back the captives and recouped the Officers and men with money.

This act of clemency by Rasohérina had no immediate effect on the Sàkalàva, in consequence of the carnage and treachery by which it had been preceded. They declared they would make no peace with the murderers of Radama.

The country continued to be unsafe, and the inhabitants of Vonizongo had to betake themselves to their fortified villages.

Preparations to invade Imerina from another quarter were at the same time threatened. The Antsihanaka and the Ibouèni Sàkalàva assembled on the northern borders of Imerina, and the Governor of Ambohimanga collected a Hova force to oppose them. Neither party, however, crossed the frontier; negotiations were carried on, and an arrangement entered into, without bloodshed, and peace has been unbroken since in Antsihanaka and the north.

The whole island of Madagascar was now considered as but one kingdom, and it was considered necessary to maintain a comparatively large standing army to occupy the garrisons and posts on the frontiers, and at the ports, their chief occupation being the collection of taxes and the prevention of smuggling.

Modern Reforms.—During the five years of Queen Rasohérina's reign (1863-68), no special energy was shown in direction of military organization, and the army appears to have then become less efficient than formerly. In consequence, some of the Sàkalàva and Anosy tribes, only nominally under Hova authority, became restless and even threatening.

On the accession of Ranavalona II in 1868, under the present energetic and able Commander-in-Chief, Rainilaiarivony, the attention of the Government was turned to the reorganization of the army.

In 1872 Rainilaiarivony applied to the Governor of Mauritius for an English drill-sergeant. This application was complied with, and a non-commissioned officer was sent to Antananarivo, who trained a certain select number of young men of good family, who, when qualified, drilled the soldiers. This non-commissioned officer remained for about two years, when he was replaced by another sergeant, who remained three years. By this means the native army was supplied with a number of young Hova Officers capable of instructing their men, and foreign assistance was no longer needed.¹

In 1867, shortly before the death of Rasoherina, and subsequent to the payment of the French indemnity at Tamatave, the Hova Government thought that a demonstration of power was needed on the east coast. Radama's famous march half a century previously forming a good precedent, as well as that by Ranavalona I in 1815. The Queen was hopelessly ill, and the pretext was made that a Royal progress to the coast would be for the benefit of her health, and the salubrious hot springs of Ranomafana, near Andovoranto, were recommended by the doctors to the moribund Sovereign. In June the Queen's camp equipment, and the escort were mobilized: roads were cut through the forest, supplies furnished to the different stations *en route*, and the order of march arranged. On the 10th the Queen's palanquin left the palace, and the Army, with followers, numbered upwards of 60,000 men. One month was occupied in moving this enormous retinue to Andovoranto, where the force remained until the end of August, returning by the same route to the capital. The fatal casualties from sickness and exposure alone, during this progress, amounted to 1,000 deaths, whilst the number of sick was in proportion. The Prince Ramonja and several Officers of high rank succumbed to fever, and the Queen herself did not survive her return to Antananarivo many months.

This march, which was made slowly and with ample preparation, gives an example of the unhealthiness of the line of country between Antananarivo and the east coast.

1873. In 1873 several of the Sâkalava tribes in the south-west had become so turbulent and daring, that it became necessary for the Hova Government to adopt some active measures in order to prevent further difficulties. Under the circumstances, the Government appeared to have had no alternative but to enforce submission, and with this purpose, arrangements were made for sending out two military expeditions under two of the chief Officers in the Government. (One of them, Rainivoninahitrinarivo, was subsequently well known as the principal Ambassador to Europe in 1882.) The two forces together numbered 5,000 men in addition to a large number of *dekana* and personal followers. The Prime Minister addressed the expeditions before they started, and instructed the Officers to deal honourably with the Sâkalava, and do their best to settle matters without

¹ During the residence of the second drill-sergeant, the French Consul, evidently a little jealous of the preference shown to English instruction, procured a young French Officer from Réunion, and offered his services to Rainilaiarivony. This offer was accepted in order that no offence might be given to the French.

bloodshed if possible. This advice was well received and faithfully acted up to by the commanders. From numerous reports the Europeans at the capital received of these expeditions they had every reason to believe that they were conducted in an honest, honourable, and straightforward manner. The conduct of the Officers and men towards each other in the camp and on the line of march, their dealings with the people after they had arrived in the enemy's country, the manner in which they endeavoured to settle the matters in dispute, and, in fact, the general management of the operations—all seem to have been characterized by a spirit of the highest discipline and self-restraint—a great contrast to former operations of the kind.

The object of the Government in sending these expeditions was not to obtain territory, military renown, or plunder, but simply to protect the weaker tribes which had been cruelly oppressed and robbed. The different Officers in charge appointed trustworthy overseers to the camps to prevent all disorder and unfairness, and especially took care that none of the Officers should give extra burdens, consisting of their own baggage and provisions, to be carried by the bearers under their authority. Strict orders were enforced that no acts of violence or oppression on the people along the route, through whose villages or markets the line of march might lead, would be permitted; guards were stationed at these places to see the orders carried out, and all offenders were severely punished. Accommodation was provided for the sick, and Officers were known to give up their *filanzans* (palanquins) to them, and even to assist the bearers. When treating with the enemy the chief Officers behaved with dignity and firmness, and, conscious of their strength, never permitted oppression or plunder. Only one engagement was fought, when the town of the rebel chief, Mahabo, was burnt as a punishment, and the expedition returned without a hitch, having accomplished the object for which they had been despatched. The greatest harmony prevailed throughout, and the manner in which the business was carried out had a most lasting moral effect on the Sàkalàva tribes with whom they came in contact. No better proof could be wished of the solidity of the army reform which Rainilaiarivony had initiated and carried out in spite of opposition and jealousy of the older chiefs in Imerina.

1876. *Reorganization*.—For many months during 1876, especially in June, July, and August, great excitement prevailed throughout Imerina, for a military conscription was talked about and anxiously expected, but two preliminary matters required to be attended to before the proposed conscription could be carried out. One was the reorganization of the existing army, involving the redistribution of Officers and brigades, and the discharge of old and worn-out veterans; and the other was the reorganization of the *deka*,¹ which of late years had become a scandal of large proportions; for most of the higher Officers had appropriated to themselves a much larger number of followers and personal attendants than they had any right to. Both

¹ *Deka* = *aides-de-camp*.

these measures of reform required delicate yet firm handling, and any weakness or hesitation might have led to a revolution, and cost the life of the Minister and the ruin of the country.

At last on the 6th June, a grand *Kabary* was held at Imahamasina, when a message from the Queen was addressed to the *Fololindahy* (literally = *the ten thousand*), that is the army. By this message all who had *deka* were required to make out lists of their names, and send them in to the Government within a fortnight. The teachers were also required to write down and send in lists of all their scholars. On the 13th July, after the numbers of *deka* possessed by each Officer had been sent in to the Government, another *Kabary* was held, at which a Royal Message was read by the Prime Minister. It condemned in very strong language the recent action of the Officers in withdrawing young men from the army and other departments, and attaching them to themselves as their own private followers. The address concluded by fixing the number of *deka* which each Officer was entitled to possess, and by declaring that, in future, any one exceeding that number would be treated as a transgressor of the law. The number of *deka* allowed is, therefore, now regulated by the honours of the Officer, which also indicate his rank, social position, and regulate his official standing. The highest number of *deka* which any Officer can now possess under the new regulations is 30. and this is only admissible in Officers of the highest rank, viz., of 16 honours. Those of 15 honours are allowed 25 *deka*; 14 honours, 20; 13 honours, 15; 12 honours, 10; 11 honours, 5; 10 honours, 3; and 9 honours, only 1; the rest are not allowed any.

By this law a large number of young men improperly kept away from military service were added to the army, and they were at once ordered to join as recruits, and were drilled with all possible despatch.

1878. In July, a great military review took place at Imahamasina, the large level plain west of the capital. This review extended over three days, when each company was reviewed separately, and went through the various exercises satisfactorily. The foreign words of command were ordered to be abolished, and have now been given in the Malagasy vernacular.

1879. On the 25th March, a great *Kabary* was assembled, and the popular anxiety in regard to the apprehended conscription was set at rest.

The following are the principal features of the new system of recruiting the Hova Army:—

I. All classes are required to serve in the ranks, none being exempt except—(a) the sick and incapable, (b) pastors of churches duly appointed and recognized, (c) such as the Queen shall be pleased to free.

II. Instead of service for life, the time of service is fixed at five years, while those who are diligent and acquire the necessary qualifications before the expiration of that time will be treated with special favour.

III. The enrolment of recruits will not be at irregular intervals, but take place annually.

IV. The soldiers will be no longer called up to the capital to drill, but will be drilled in their own districts.

V. The soldiers will only be sent to distant garrisons for periods of twelve months, and the posts will be regularly relieved annually.

A number of minor regulations are given, with a view to prevent oppression, bribery, and deception; whilst fines varying from 10 to 100 dollars are imposed on any found guilty of such misdemeanour.

Immediately after the publication of this *Kabary*, large numbers of young men were enrolled and at once placed under instruction; and on the 8th January, 1880, a review of these new recruits was held at Imahamasina in the presence of the Queen, and was declared to be highly satisfactory.

1881. *Admiral Gore Jones's Report*.—Admiral Gore Jones proceeded to Antananarivo in July, 1881, and in his report to the Admiralty he mentions that he considers the Prime Minister one of the ablest men he has ever met. He (the Prime Minister) had given cohesion to the Hova nation, and drilled, armed, and formed an army of 40,000 men, and thus prepared the way for his people to govern the whole island *de facto* as well as *de jure*. His great difficulty was want of money. They had no revenue, except import duties; and in order to buy arms he had been obliged to get, occasionally, a *squeeze* on property, but this had to be done very judiciously.

The Hova troops were twice reviewed before Admiral Jones, who states that they are carefully drilled in the manual and firing exercises, but had only recently been armed with rifles. The words of command, originally given in English, were then being altered into their own language. Great attention was being paid to the drilling of the recruits, and some 40,000 men were said to be available.

I had intended to give some account of the late operations in Madagascar from 1883 to the present year; but I find that the present paper has already reached the limits that can be allotted to the subject, and, therefore, I must postpone the notice of the recent and present events to another occasion, more especially because there is some reason to hope that the present operations may be brought to a termination this season.

However, at the expressed desire of our Chairman, I must not conclude without a brief reference to the recent operations of the French in the country which was once named "*La France Orientale*." Of the rights or the wrongs of the much-vexed Madagascar Question it is not for me to judge or express my sentiments here. For certain diplomatic reasons it was thought proper by the Republic to use force against the Hova Government, and in accordance with the latest practice, hostilities were commenced, without any formal declaration of war, by the destruction of the Hova posts at Morontsanga and Bemaneviky, on 8th May, 1883. The port of Mojangà was bombarded next by Admiral Pierre on the 16th May, a

force lauded and the place occupied. The French next proceeded to Tamatave, whence an *ultimatum* was sent to the capital, demanding certain conditions which were to be accepted by the 9th June. The terms were refused by the Hovas, whereupon the French opened fire on the fort of Tamatave from the six ships of the squadron. As Captain Charles Johnstone, R.N., is present, we may venture to hope that he will give the audience some of his personal experiences of that trying time, when a number of distressed British subjects depended upon him for protection; and when the presence of H.M.S. "Dryad" exerted a moral influence, of wonderful proportion considering the inferior size of the sloop and her incapacitated armament. The Hovas, who had never exhibited their flag, retired to their entrenched position at Manjakandrianombana, some 6 miles in rear of Tamatave, where they have since maintained a defiant attitude.

The French Admiral, as we all know, after an unfortunate illness, was summoned back to France only to die, being succeeded by Admirals Galiber and Miot. The operations have since consisted of the repeated shelling of all the small stations, which can hardly be called ports, but landing places, wherever the Hovas have established Custom-houses. Vohemar was taken last year at the close of the season, and I am informed that when the Hova garrison of Ambanion was driven out of that place, a number of Antankara pursued the retreating garrison and massacred a large portion who were unable to escape. By the latest news the Hovas are said to be investing Mojangà, but until authentic intelligence is published, no opinion can be expressed on the tactics of the Hova soldiers, or on their behaviour in the field. One thing appears certain, that the Hova military authorities have steadfastly set their face against the savage and barbarous practices which were characteristic of their warfare in former days. This advance in civilization has received lately most notable illustration by the kind treatment bestowed by the Hovas on the French prisoners in their hands.¹

¹ A despatch from Admiral Miot, dated Tamatave, September 25th, gives the following particulars:—The column advanced to within 500 metres of the enemy's entrenchments, and notwithstanding the difficulties experienced owing to the ground to be traversed, carried on a brisk artillery engagement with the Hovas for a space of two hours. The French were thus made aware of the importance of the new lines of defence constructed by the Hovas and the strength of their armaments, consisting of Remington rifles and several cannon of long range. Simultaneously with the advance of the troops the war vessels in the roads bombarded the heights of Farafate, while a landing party from the "Naiade" effected a diversion on the extreme left by feigning an attack on the village of Ampassiemandour. The Hova forces around Farafate are estimated at from 7,000 to 8,000 men. The French column started at 5 A.M., and re-entered their cantonments at five in the evening, having lost 2 killed and 31 wounded. The Admiral adds that on the west coast of the island, on the night of the 29th August, the Hovas set fire to the village of Zougoo, situated 24 miles from the military post of Amboudimadirou. Leaving a sufficient garrison to defend it in case of attack, Captain Penneguin, the Commandant, went in search of the enemy with a small column of 120 men, of whom 70 were Sakalavas. He came up with the Hovas on the following day in the valley of Sambirano, and completely routed them with heavy loss. The French had 1 Officer killed and 2 Officers and 9 men wounded. The general health of the troops on shore and on the vessel in the harbour is satisfactory.

Captain CHARLES JOHNSTONE, R.N. : Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen, I have some diffidence in beginning a discussion of this sort, because my acquaintance with Madagascar is very small compared with that of many who are here present, and therefore in any remarks which I may make about that country I shall be prepared to be corrected. The native races of Madagascar are not, as might be imagined, all one people. They are composed of different tribes. Some of them are curly-headed races and others straight-haired. The straight-haired are Hovas, and I believe I am correct in saying that they are the only straight-haired race in the island. The others apparently are connected with the native races on the mainland. The origin of the Hovas is very obscure, in fact, they have no written history. Their language was only a spoken one up to the time when the Christian missionaries from England began to educate the races, and reduced the language to writing. Up to that time the race was a very savage one; in fact, they have no records at all. From various investigations it is concluded that they have in some way found their way across from the islands of the Eastern Archipelago to Madagascar, and have gradually worked their way up to the centre of the island, and established themselves in the province of Imérina. We have by a sort of courtesy of late called the Queen of Madagascar by that title, but I am bound to say I think her claim to it is not derived by actual right. Radama I, as our lecturer has told us, was the first to extend the rule of his race from the province of Imérina down towards the coast-line; but there is no question about it, the Hova race is not absolute all over the island, nor over a very large part of it; a portion of it does not at all submit to the Hova rule, and especially the part marked on the map Tulear, where the Hovas are utterly unable to restrain the barbarous people. Therefore, there is something to be said for the French in the action which they have taken with regard to Madagascar. It would be difficult for anyone to approve entirely of the way in which the French have gone to work, but I think if any European Power had arrived on the coast of Madagascar, and found many parts of the island unoccupied and not under Hova rule, they would have established themselves there, and considered they had a right to do so. The fault that must be found with the French by all civilized people is that they have not gone there with a distinct view of improving the people, and, in fact, it is very difficult to say that they have gone there with any distinct view at all. To my mind it may fairly be called a filibustering expedition. In undertaking the conquest of a country I imagine you incur certain duties and responsibilities, and the French do not seem to me to have gone entertaining that view at all, or with the sense of those responsibilities. The result is that they have an insufficient force there, a force which does not appear able to overcome any difficulty other than that of just keeping small places on the coast-line. But of that I hope the lecturer will tell us something further. It would be very interesting if he could tell us what possibility there is of a European force getting up from Tananarive to the capital Antananarivo, and taking possession of it; and, moreover, our Chairman might give us complete information on that subject, as he made the long and difficult journey up to the capital itself. Therefore, it would be very interesting to know exactly what prospect there is of the French, with the power they have, establishing themselves and conquering the island altogether. I believe one of the principal reasons why the French have got there is that they were pushed on by the Colonists of Bourbon. Madagascar was a sort of Eldorado, a promised land to them. They were urged on by different people to go to the conquest of Madagascar, but now, not having been able to get on as rapidly as they hoped to do, the thing has rather fallen through. It is supposed that there are considerable riches in Madagascar in the shape of mineral wealth, but the present Prime Minister, who is virtually ruler of the country, has with, I think, perhaps much wisdom, absolutely refused to allow any search to be made in the soil for precious metals. He understands thoroughly well that if gold or silver were found, there would be an influx of certainly not the best people from other countries, and that the country would be overwhelmed with foreigners of a very doubtful sort. Therefore, he thinks, in the present state of civilization of the country, it is very much better to discourage it, and I am inclined to think he is perfectly right. If the French had gone there with a single object I do not know that there could be so very much to be said against their position, but when they

went there the other day they suddenly came down upon the Hovas, who undoubtedly looked upon themselves as possessors of the whole island, and they demanded all the northern portion of the island down to the 16th degree of latitude, which was certainly a very strong demand. Since that time they have been receding from their former demand, and it is likely now they would be satisfied with but little. It is very singular to observe how, in spite of very serious menaces from a great and overwhelming nation like the French, the Hovas have still been enabled to hold out. One of the things greatly in their favour is that there are no roads in the island. There is not even a road that a pack-horse can go along. In going from Tamatave to Antananarivo I am told you could not so much as take a loaded pack-horse under the trees. Everything has to be carried up on the backs of men. Everybody who travels is carried in a palanquin, and all weights are carried up on men's backs. This is a very serious difficulty for an invading army, but I believe it is a matter that our lecturer has gone into, and he can explain how it might be overcome. The French are not disposed to go up to the capital from Tamatave. They suppose the best line of advance would be from Bembatoka Bay on the north-west coast by the river to Ikopa. The boats of H.M.S. "Ruby," some years ago, went 100 miles up from the sea, and it was said the remainder of the way up to Antananarivo would be comparatively easy. The Hovas are very far from being a warlike people, and if it comes actually to fighting I am not at all sure how they would stand. Up to the present time the difficulties of the country have been so great that the French have been able to do very little. As I said the Hovas are not warlike, in fact, their plan of fighting is this, they push all the lowest soldiers to the front, and the Commander-in-Chief is always a mile or two in the rear, so it may well be supposed that an army would not fight particularly well in that state. If they have European leaders they will alter that, but the first thing that was done in the case of a recent attack on one of the seaports was that the Commander-in-Chief cleared out and left his troops to do the fighting. The population of Madagascar is a decreasing one, as unhappily the curse of strong drink is amongst them. Rum is manufactured in the Mauritius and Bourbon, and brought over. It is imported by unprincipled traders, and sold to the natives, who drink it like water in many cases. They are utterly ruined; and not only that, but they have a way of making spirits themselves of a most poisonous description, which is undermining the physique of all the northern races. I was told by the French that the Sakalavas, the people that the French themselves propose to put forward in opposition to the Hovas, were quite a dying-out race in consequence of their vices. So that it is very questionable what the future of Madagascar with regard to the races will be, and unless they improve, and civilization has a much better effect upon them than it has had up to the present time, I am afraid the native races of Madagascar will gradually die out. The soil is particularly rich, especially on the sea-coast and along the eastern shore. It is a very unhappy thing for some of our fellow-countrymen that they have embarked large sums of money in commercial enterprises, especially in the neighbourhood of Tamatave. Large sugar plantations have been set on foot, and at the time of the French attack, the people who suffered mostly were our own people, natives of the Mauritius as a general rule. Large sums of money were invested in these sugar plantations, and at the outbreak of hostilities it was known that if native labour could not be obtained to gather in the sugar-cane, the crop for that year would be lost. They then said if it were not gathered in at the end of the second year the plants would be entirely destroyed, and this, I believe, in almost every case has taken place. Not only have the crops been destroyed, but the plants also, and the whole money spent on these things with the exception of perhaps a little material saved in the workshops, everything has been absolutely lost. I saw a gentleman in the Mauritius who had been a rich landowner not very far from Tamatave, and I was told he scarcely knew where to look for a meal. This is the unfortunate result of hostilities between Madagascar and a Power like the French, and I think it is a matter which deserves the consideration of civilized people whether war ought to bring such misfortunes not upon people's enemies but upon their friends. As far as our interests go with Madagascar they are principally those connected with the Mauritius. Of course that affects the United Kingdom more or less, but there are very large British interests

connected with the Mauritius, and should the French take possession of Madagascar, as it is supposed they wish to do, I am afraid our interests would die out completely, and this would be a very serious loss to many of our people.

MR. ABRAHAM KINGDON: I hope we do not mean to let the interest in Madagascar die out. It is a large and important island. The land abounds in mineral wealth, timber, india-rubber, cattle, and rice, and it will produce almost anything. We can get away up into altitudes of about 5,000 or 7,000 feet; we can grow and cultivate many things which can be grown and cultivated in the southern parts of England; then we get a variety of productions on the coast, the differences in the climate being very great. All that is very much in its favour as a country for production. Its woods are almost invaluable, comprising ebony, sandal wood, satin wood, *lignum vitæ*, and woods the like of which have never been seen here—of beautiful grain. I have woods at home similar to the finest boxwood, and also one of the commonest woods in the country very similar to Spanish mahogany. It was only a few weeks since that a large timber merchant asked me, "Is there in Madagascar any substitute for Spanish mahogany, for we are getting very short of that; in fact, after a time, we shall not be able to get it at all." "Well," I said, "in Madagascar the wood that people use for making their floors and doors and the general wood-work in their houses is equally close grained and good with Spanish mahogany." Then as to mineral wealth, we do not want to say too much about that, but I think we are all pretty well agreed that Captain Johnstone is right in saying the Government is justified in prohibiting the influx of a very doubtful class of foreigners, but I think when the right time comes it will be a splendid thing for the Government to allow mines to be worked under supervision, or under the royalty system. I think it would add very materially to their ability to protect themselves. It is the money they want; they have the men, but it is the money they want wherewith to buy arms, and they are perfectly justified in defending themselves against aggression. And they are men of brains and good natural parts. Those of us who have lived long in the island know very well that the Malagasy are capable of doing anything that it is possible for a European to learn. I could show you some samples of beautiful work in water-colours, also in gold and in iron work. They are not barbarous, as some people imagine. They are an intelligent race, capable of advancement, and no man who lives amongst them and has any feeling of brotherhood at all can experience their hospitality and generosity without feeling an affection for them. I therefore speak with feeling when I say that I hope Englishmen will not lose interest in Madagascar. We want to be cautious and careful in order to retain our interests there. We do not want the French to take our place in commerce or in instructing the people in a great deal in which we do not believe. The outcome of the instruction of the Hovas has been their superior position, and what Captain Johnstone has said about the decimation of the Sakalava population through the exterminating effects of intoxicating liquors does not apply to the people in the interior, where there is a prohibitory law, and the result is that the people are increasing and not decreasing. It therefore behoves us not to give up our interest in these Malagasy, but to do all we possibly can to bring about an amicable and peaceful settlement of this long- vexed question.

MR. COUSINS: There is just one point that occurs to me arising from the discussion, that is, the question of the position which Europeans might occupy in the island of Madagascar. I do not think the Malagasy will ever be able to develop their own resources unassisted; I have thought so now for some years. I think they need European guidance; they need the stimulus of European thought and enterprise; but under guidance, with help, they are certainly capable of very remarkable development. Before this difficulty with the French occurred, I think many of us who were living in Madagascar thought the policy of the Hovas was decidedly false, that they were seeking to repress the energy of Europeans, that they were putting difficulties in the way of the introduction of European capital, and so on; but the French have completely turned one's thoughts from this into other directions through the foolish and I may say the cruel way in which they have gone to work. They had practically no grievance that other European nations had not. Their difficulties were the difficulties of all, and could there have been anything like a joint protest or a joint action, I think a certain amount of pressure would have been very useful to the Malagasy.

The resources of the country were to a large extent shut up, whereas they ought to have been developed, and I doubt whether, excepting as the result of pressure, there would have been any great development. But the French have gone to work in such an altogether extravagant way—such an unjust way—trumping up charges which are positively babyish when you come to look into them, that it is almost impossible to look at the matter in the fair all-round way in which one would naturally have been disposed to do, and whilst they are acting as at present our sympathies are naturally with the weaker party. But apart from that, I think the influence of Europeans ought to increase rather than decrease in Madagascar, and if any arrangement could be made by which this present difficulty could be overcome, and a satisfactory treaty made with the French—our own is made—and if freedom could be given to people with capital to introduce, I think the future of Madagascar would be one in which we should all rejoice. I am personally very much indebted to Captain Oliver for the interest and sympathy he has shown with the island, and especially for the excellent book which he has recently written on the true story of the rupture.

The Rev. G. SHAW: We have heard a great deal this afternoon of the *Sakalava*; we have heard that they are unconquered, that they are a savage race, that they are divided into a great number of tribes, and that those tribes are continually fighting one with another. Now I think this requires a little explanation. These so-called tribes, if I understand it aright, of the *Sakalava* who are so continually at war are not, as we should account them, tribes in the true sense of the term. Each is a small community, generally speaking, consisting of one family. That is to say, the whole inhabitants of a small hamlet or village are united by some kind of family tie; they are ruled over by a so-called king, and the various jealousies which arise may be looked upon as family jealousies—jealousies between the head of one family and the head of another, and these have caused the various raids which I think should hardly be called wars. It has been represented that in these wars very few are killed, that perhaps one is wounded, or that one may be killed, and that the news of this spreads from one village to another, and that then the war is over. Now I think this creates a slightly false impression. It is quite true that there have been wars among the *Sakalavas*, but I do not think that such raids from village to village ought to be dignified by the name of wars, and by being so called they certainly give a wrong impression to those who live outside Madagascar, and do not know exactly how the matter stands. Another point in regard to the wars which has not been brought with sufficient prominence before us—it may be in the paper, but unfortunately I have not seen the paper—is that we have heard that the *Hovas* in former wars, that is, under Radama I and under Ranavalona I, were excessively cruel and savage. There is not the least doubt that this is true. When the *Hovas* went with the endeavour to overcome some of the surrounding tribes, their conduct of the war was doubtless very cruel; they massacred all those who were unfit to be slaves, that is to say, those who were too old or too infirm to be used in after-time as slaves in another part of the country; but since the time of Ranavalona I there have also been wars which correspond in very great measure to the wars of Radama I and Ranavalona I so far as the object is concerned, that is to say, the *Hovas* have been sent from the interior of the island to some of these outlying tribes in order to subdue a rebellion or to make them thoroughly subject to the *Hovas*. These wars have been marked with anything but severity; indeed, they have been characterized by a greater amount of leniency and mercy than is very often shown in so-called civilized warfare. A *Hova* army was sent on one occasion to the south-west in order to overcome a certain rebellion, and it is well known that the late Queen, before despatching the army, gave explicit instructions that unless it was absolutely necessary, no one was to be killed; it was to be a war in which, if possible, bloodshed was to be entirely avoided; and so stringent were the Queen's orders to her Officers that this was actually the result. I believe I am correct in saying that although some 10,000 or 15,000 soldiers and camp followers were engaged in that war, not a single person was killed: and this has marked all subsequent wars in Madagascar. There has been, I believe, no war in Madagascar since the time that Christianity actually took possession of the minds and hearts of the rulers, which has been marked by anything that can be called cruelty, but rather on the other hand by the

utmost mercy. This, I think, it is important should be made very clear, and I have therefore laid some stress upon it.

The CHAIRMAN: Before Captain Oliver sums up I should like to call attention to a few dates. Madagascar was discovered by the Portuguese under Ferdinand Suarez in 1506, and to them belong all the honours of first discovery. When we had some discussion with regard to Delagoa Bay, the matter was referred to the President of the French Republic, and he decided against England, because the Portuguese were the first discoverers, and that is a very important point to be remembered in dealing with the present position of the French in Madagascar. In 1509 King Emanuel of Portugal sent Lopez de Sequera, and the following year Juan Serrano, to examine the country and organize an establishment for trade. Missionaries established themselves at that period, the Christian religion was introduced, and several natives, including the son of a great chief, were sent to Goa for education. However, they disappeared, like all the early settlers, and in 1595 the Dutch formed trading settlements, the remains of which are seen to this day. They also disappeared, and in 1613 the French, in the days of Richelieu, formed La Société de l'Orient, and to colonize Madagascar was their great object. They came there, and established themselves due south at Fort Dauphin, having previously prospected the country a little. Flacourt was the first Governor, and five or six years after his return to France at that period he wrote a "History of Madagascar," and in that history he states that there was an English Colony of 400 in the Bay of St. Augustine in 1644. Now a Colony is not a mushroom; it does not spring up in a night; and this shows that the English had a Possession or Colony in Madagascar a long time before the French. Some of the French attempted to desert from Fort Dauphin, and found their way to St. Augustine, to take shipping for Europe; but on arriving at the Colony it was found that there were 300 or 400 graves, the Colony itself having virtually disappeared. It also showed another thing, that at that period Madagascar was a general place of call for shipping. There seemed to be no difficulty to get to or fro from it, and therefore the only conclusion we can come to is that the English were there as colonists before the French. The right of discovery belongs to the Portuguese, and the introduction of civilization first to the Dutch, then the English, and lastly the French. In his lecture Captain Oliver speaks of thirty or forty years ago, but the whole world has altered within the last ten or twenty years, and the Malagasy have altered with it, and now I consider that the Hova population, governed by the Prime Minister, are as moral a people in every respect as can be met with in Europe. They are kindly-hearted, hospitable, and well-mannered. I have met men there as perfect gentlemen as you could meet in any room in London. We have had their Ambassadors over here, and these men were gracious in their manner, pleasing in their conversation, and in fact thorough gentlemen in every respect. It must be borne in mind, too, that this is due to themselves as well as to the missionaries. They had received their education from the missionaries, and it is being handed on to the third generation. There is no doubt but that they are a highly intelligent people. If you went into the rooms of Mr. Rassange, who is well known to many here, you would find there all the standard works of English authors, and he has read them all. Now, then, can the people to whom he belongs be called savages? The journey that I made up to the capital occupied six weeks, and if you were to ask me whether it was possible for an army to go up there I should say certainly not. We all travelled in filansanos, which are like a child's perambulator stuck on a couple of poles, the covers of which were painted to keep off the eternal wet. It was with the greatest difficulty that we manœuvred these filansanos through the fissures of the rocks and across many of the streams, and when traversing the forests we were two days without seeing the light of heaven. If there were a decent enemy to oppose an invading force I believe that not one person could get up to the capital. The inhabitants of the villages pay no taxes, that is, those living on the high road up to Antananarivo; they are, therefore, obliged to give Government travellers free lodgings and entertainment, and thus at each village the number of rooms we required were cleared of the people, animals, poultry, &c.—for they all lived together—and then some new pieces of matting were spread over the old filth and dirt; and hence new matting is the name applied to the scriptural trans-

lation of hypocrisy. Their language is expressive, and sentences are used for words: for instance, the name of a turkey-cock is "the bird not to be afraid of," because they soon found that though it made a good deal of bluster there was nothing in him to cause fear. Our marneeds (domestic slaves) were soon drilled in placing properly everything required, so that our European servants had but little to do besides making the beds and arranging the meals. When we arrived at our halting village we generally found an ox stretched full length on its side, with its four legs tied up, and a number of turkeys, geese, fowls, sugar-canes, and parcels of rice around it. Then a deputation waited upon us, headed by the chief man of the village, who made us an address of welcome, expressing their pleasure at seeing us, and enumerating the offerings they had brought. We always paid them for their presents pretty nearly the full value, so that they did not suffer anything. The houses were made of rushes, and thatched with palm leaves. That was the case until we got on to Hova ground; there we found adobe buildings and houses made of rough sun-dried bricks, and placed on far more favourable sites than among the coast tribes. When we were about 50 miles from the capital we met a deputation of five gentlemen of the Queen's household, which was considered a great honour. Two days afterwards, a deputation of higher officials met us, and we had a repetition of the first reception. On the sixteenth day we halted half-an-hour from the capital, to let us rest and put on our uniforms for the grand entry the next day. Here we were visited by nearly all the foreigners in Antananárico. During the last three days of our journey we were in the Hova province of Imérina, and there was a marked improvement in the condition of the land and houses; the rush hut had disappeared, and cottages were built with solid adobe walls, or of rough bricks, and as we approached the capital the houses got better and better, and the one I was lodged in was as well got up as an English suburban villa. The next day, Friday, July 1, we made our entry in swords and epaulettes. The band, troops, officials, and all the Europeans joined in the cortège. We were carried in the Royal *filansanos*, and the chief military officials were on horseback. Although the distance was little over a mile it took us two hours to reach the capital. Shortly after starting we stopped and saluted the two Queens, the whole of the troops presenting arms, and the band playing the national airs. The peculiarity of the whole country we had travelled over was its unevenness; except the Ankey plain it was all up and down. The scenery was varied, and in some places beautiful, it never approaches the grand. The upland soil generally produced a long coarse grass, which seemed well adapted for pasture purposes; the patches which were cultivated did well, and coffee, sugar, manioc, rice, and other vegetables seemed to flourish; but the land as a whole seemed uninhabited, and even the cattle were few. From its formation there can be little doubt that there must be much mineral wealth in the country. The forest we passed through had no fine timber, but a small and twisted undergrowth and tall lanky trees, suffering from excessive moisture and want of sun. When we were received by the Queen it was really a most imposing sight. 200 or 300 people were there; the Queen was on the throne, with a diadem on her head, silks and satins and grand dresses were to be seen in all directions, and all the pretty young ladies sat on the steps of the throne. Altogether the scene was one which bespoke extreme civilization, and everyone was exceedingly courteous in manner. Now, the point we want the lecturer to speak to is the getting of troops up to Antananárico, and it is with regard to that question that the Prime Minister is such an extraordinarily clever man. He knows very well the difficulty of the roads, and the almost impossibility of passing them, but he does not want foreign troops to reach the capital, and so he prefers the less evil of bad roads to the greater evil of the French coming up. If they altered their route, as they talked about doing, to the north-west coast, I think it would be wise, because the Prime Minister tried to send his troops round in that direction when the row took place and the flags were cut down, which brought on the first part of this disturbance. The misunderstanding arose chiefly from misconception, for the French imagined from the expedition which went up with me that we were taking some very decided steps to do what they were wishing to do—to annex Madagascar. It hurried them, and then they sent out their new Consul, who was well known to be a fireater, and after that all chance of peace was at an end.

Captain OLIVER: I hope it is quite understood that in my paper I did not attempt to give any description of the country, or of its topographical or commercial advantages and disadvantages. I confined my paper entirely to examples of military operations. At the same time, as there has been a great deal of interest exhibited with regard to the topographical features of the Hova country, its distance from the coast, and the character of the harbours, I shall be happy to make a few remarks upon those points. Our Chairman said that there was a question as to the route for troops up to Antananárico. He has traversed that country himself, I believe in a chair or sedan, but I myself walked up nearly the whole distance, so that I pretty well know what the road was like in 1862. It is certainly a very difficult route for troops, and the Malagasy up to the present time have been wise in not making a road as they have been advised to do by European Powers, especially by those most disinterested people, the French. The present Prime Minister is quite alive to the advantages which will accrue to making a road, and there is no doubt that as soon as affairs are settled, as I hope they will be this session, a very short road will be made up from the coast to the capital, which will then allow of the country being properly developed.¹ The great defence that the Hova country has had from Europeans has been their two Generals,² forest and fever, and they have stood them in very good stead, as they have other civilized countries. Of course, civilization must make its way up, and then roads will be made, and I have no doubt that we shall be able shortly to take return tickets to Antananárico by tramway if not by railway. By that means the fever will be escaped, because it is confined to a very small belt on the coast, and even this may also be conquered by quinine. There are several other points raised by speakers this afternoon, amongst which I think the most important is that in which it has been said that the Malagasy cannot depend upon themselves, that they need European guidance. There is no doubt that any strong European nation, the French especially, if they chose, could march up and take the whole place, but whether it would pay them to do so is quite another question. We ourselves know what our troops have done in a similar country, for it is very much like Afghanistan. Any one of our flying columns could march over the whole place, here, there, and everywhere, and think nothing of it. The French have had not quite similar, but perhaps somewhat parallel, experiences in Annam and Tonquin, and if they like to expend the lives and the money they can do the same; but I do not think it will ever pay them to do so unless they mean solid, permanent occupation, colonization, and administration of the island, and that they are not likely to do, for M. Brisson's Government seems perfectly opposed to anything of the kind. I have no doubt that at the next French elections the one great cry will be not to expend more French lives and money in Madagascar, and to withdraw from the island. In fact, it is almost settled that they will do so.³ Then comes the question whether the English, French, and other nations may not see it to their advantage to hold possession, by the leave of and in conjunction with the Hovas, of the ports in the north of Madagascar which cannot otherwise be developed. As long as they are under the Hova Government they cannot be developed. They might be made free ports, for they are the most splendid harbours in the world. They are half way to India. We saw how the Suez Canal was blocked for several days very recently by the sinking of a dredger, and by the sinking of a few lighters, designedly or undesignedly, the whole Suez Canal transit could be stopped for a long period. Then English trade would go round the Cape, and then the possession of good harbours on that side of it would be everything. The future welfare of the Malagasy will depend upon their being acknowledged in Europe, in the same manner as the new Congo State is acknowledged as a free State by the Great European Powers. The free ports of Madagascar will then do a great deal to extend trade and promote the safety of English, American, and all other com-

¹ Antananárico is only about 70 miles as the crow flies direct to Andovoranto, 60 miles south of Tamatave. The native runners, stationed in relays, manage to accomplish the journey to Tamatave in four days.

² Generals "Hazo" and "Tazo."

³ The result of the elections in France has since justified this remark.—S. P. O.

mercial trade in the Indian Ocean. The harbour at Diego Suarez Bay is infinitely superior to anything you can find in Mauritius. Diego Suarez Bay is about halfway between the Cape and Ceylon, and I think we may look for the opening of several free ports there. You may call them Hova, but they must be under the protection of some European Power, and there is no doubt what that European Power will be, because it is the only European Power that has dominion of the sea in all the seas. With regard to the remarks of Mr. Shaw, who has experienced the contrasting mercies of the combatants on both sides in Madagascar, I have tried to point out in my paper that which I hope he will read in detail afterwards—the difference between the Hova and Malagasy warfare of olden days, and the warfare of the present time. It appears certain that lately the Hova military authorities have steadfastly set their faces against the savage, barbarous practices which were characteristic of their warfare in former days. Now, the Hovas conduct their wars—such wars as they have to carry out—with every knowledge of the canons of warfare as far as regards its civilization and amelioration. They acknowledge the ambulance and the Red Cross, and behave themselves like civilized nations. I do not know that they have always received the same consideration themselves, but there is no doubt that the change which has been effected is due to some of the gentlemen here this afternoon—Mr. Cousins, Mr. Kingdon, Mr. Shaw, and others—and to the example of some Englishmen who have lived a good life among the Hovas, and have induced them to give up their savage practices and conform themselves to modern ideas of warfare. War has been forced upon them by an invasion of their country, but it is not for me to pronounce on the rights or the wrongs of the quarrel, though I may say this, that the Hovas will yield to none in their merciful and humane procedure of warfare. Perhaps I may quote a few figures of Admiral Galiber, who was examined on a Committee last year by the French Government. He said that out of a force which the French had of 1,100 men of all services there were 30,658 days in hospital, that is, for a period of six months 690 men were invalidated to Réunion. The cases of malarious fever amounted to 27 per cent.,¹ and, inclusive of those cases at the hospitals in Réunion, the total was 40 per cent. On the 12th February, 1884, there were 268 cases of fever in the force, which shows that with their present numbers the French have no chance of advancing into the interior. Of course, if they liked to send a large force there is no doubt that they could walk over the Hovas as they liked, but to keep a small force at Tamatave and Mojangà of 2,000 men with 12,000 surrounding them will be useless. Unless the French really mean to make a conquest and advance a large portion of men, it will be impossible for them to subdue the Hovas. Admiral Wilson wrote to me the other day, and he said he did not think that a force under 14,000 men could advance on the capital. Unless the French are absolutely determined to make up their mind to expend the amount of money required for an expedition of that size they had best retire. They may hold Mojangà and Tamatave and small ports on the coast for a certain time, but the Malagasy can afford to wait. I think that all civilized nations will join in hoping that the Hovas may be allowed to develop themselves into a nation. They have shown themselves capable of progress, though up to a few years ago they were a very cruel race. They are the only people who can make Madagascar a real country. If we tried to annex the island we should have to depend upon them to rule the interior, and we should also have to depend upon the natives to do our work as coolies. Unless the French make it a real French Colony, which seems to me impossible, they cannot hope to succeed. We can only trust that in future they will leave the Hovas alone.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure, ladies and gentlemen, you will all join in giving a vote of thanks to Captain Oliver who has so kindly given the lecture, and imparted so much information to us to-day.

¹ The French possess a delightful convalescent establishment at Salazia, some 3,000 feet above the sea in the island of Réunion.