

STRONG'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

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THIRTY-TWO of his best years Dr. Augustus Hopkins Strong, the honored president of the Rochester Theological Seminary, has devoted to bringing his textbook into its present highly organized and highly polished form and he is expecting to devote several years more, if life should be spared, to such a thorough revision and such a complete recasting as will bring the work in every respect into full accord with the results of his best thinking. The present writer was a deeply interested and highly appreciative disciple of Dr. Strong during the early years of his career as a teacher and he then experienced the advantages and the disadvantages of following the lecturer closely in the working out of his system and of being obliged to take down from dictation his freshly prepared outlines. It was evident then, as it is abundantly evident to the readers of the published editions of the lectures, that the teacher laid great store by the dogmatic works of the great contemporary Lutheran theologians, such as Thomasius, Philippi, Luthardt, Kahnis, and Martensen, and the philosophical works of Ulrici. That the writer was stimulated by his distinguished teacher to read largely in the works of these and other German theologians while still a young student he regards as one of the most valuable elements in his theological training. The familiarity with a wide range of dogmatic thought thus acquired under the wise guidance of a competent teacher, together with extensive subsequent study of the history

of doctrine pursued in connection with the teaching of Church History and the fresh knowledge of the subject gained through several years of instruction given in Systematic Theology as a secondary subject, with Dr. Strong's work used as a text-book, may be accepted as a partial vindication of the writer from the suspicion of presumptuousness on his part in his attempt to deal somewhat critically with a work that has gained a position in the very front rank of books of its class.

The influence of the mystical elements that inhere in the Lutheran theology of the more conservative type is responsible for many of the objectionable features of the "Systematic Theology" in its earlier as well as its later editions; while the influence of the Platonizing dogmatics of Dorner and of the recent exponents of the Ritschlian mode of thought is in part responsible for Dr. Strong's marked modification of his views within the past ten years—a modification not yet fully embodied in the text-book.

It need scarcely be premised, that in many of the cases in which the reviewer takes issue with the author there is ample ground for difference of opinion and the author may be presumed to be abundantly able to make good his position not only to his own satisfaction but also to that of readers in general accord with his point of view. It will be understood that where the reviewer suggests emendations he does so in no arbitrary or dogmatic way.

The first and second chapters of Dr. Strong's Prolegomena seem to the reviewer models of careful analysis and clear statement. The third chapter is far less satisfactory. Under "Divisions of Theology" (p. 21) he gives "Biblical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical" as the commonly employed classification of the theological sciences. The reviewer does not consider this to be the case, and could not give such a classification his approval even if it were. A more logical division would be into

Exegetical, Historical, Theoretical (Dogmatical and Ethical), and Practical. Exegetical theology has for its task not merely the ascertainment of the exact meaning of the Biblical books by applying to them linguistic knowledge and correct methods of interpretation, but a similar treatment of inter-biblical Jewish literature, and post-biblical Christian literature in all languages so far as it is to be studied for any theological purpose. Historical Theology includes not only Church History and the History of Doctrines as developed during the Christian era, but Biblical and inter-biblical history and Biblical and inter-biblical Theology as well. The author's definition of Biblical Theology does not seem to the reviewer to be adequate or in accordance with the best usage: "Biblical Theology aims to arrange and classify the facts of revelation, confining itself to the Scriptures for its material, and treating of doctrine only so far as it was developed at the close of the apostolic age." He regards as "questionable" the use of such expressions as "Biblical Theology of the Old Testament," "Biblical Theology of Christ," "Biblical Theology of Paul," etc. This is the terminology employed by the great scholars who have given us the best wrought-out works on the subject, and it would seem better to accept their nomenclature, even though we should feel obliged to repudiate their methods and results. Biblical Theology, as the term is now employed, is nothing more or less than the doctrine-history of the Bible as a whole or of any particular part of the Bible. When applied to the Bible as a whole, it is an historical tracing of the development of the various doctrines from the earliest appearance of each in the Old Testament to its completest statement in the New Testament. Its methods are precisely the same as those employed in the history of post-biblical Christian doctrines. The author is hardly justified in denying to Theological Ethics a place among the theological sciences. Far better grounded seems to the re-

viewer to be Dorner's position: "In the science of divinity considered as an organic whole ethics occupies a position of its own as one part of systematic theology." It seems better still to substitute "Theoretical Theology" for "Systematic Theology" and to make Systematic or Dogmatic Theology and Ethical Theology coordinate subdivisions of Theoretical Theology. In Historical Theology, too, ethics deserves a place side by side with matters of faith. Biblical Ethics is as much entitled to separate consideration at the hands of the theologian as Biblical Theology, and the History of Christian Ethics in the post-biblical time is as susceptible of separate handling as is the History of Christian Doctrine or Dogma. Church History, as the term is commonly employed, is the Historical Theology of the Christian religion in its most comprehensive sense, including doctrine, church organization, worship, preaching, propagandism, Christian life, Christian literature, the relations of Church and State, etc.

The author's section on the "History of Systematic Theology" is too brief to be of much value; but if he had made his treatment strictly genetic, i. e., if he had carefully traced the relation of each later theological leader to his predecessors and had sought to account for the changes in doctrine and in method of treatment by reference to the changing conditions of church life and thought, even a brief outline would have been helpful to the student. The classification borrowed from Hagenbach is in many respects inadequate. Apart from the general defects just suggested, there occur a number of imperfect individual statements. On page 24, in the very brief notice of Calixtus, there is a marked omission of any mention of his syncretism and his powerful influence in breaking down Lutheran dogmatism and exclusiveness. Calovius is said by Dr. Strong to have followed the method of Calixtus. As a matter of fact, he was the most uncom-

promising defender of Lutheran orthodoxy and the most drastic polemicist against Calixtus. If he followed Calixtus in any respect it must have been involuntarily and unconsciously. On the same page the author seems to confound Peter Ramus and Peter Martyr Vermigli. He represents Peter Ramus as a follower of Calvin and puts in parenthesis " 'Peter Martyr'—in St. Bartholomew, 1572." Now it is true that Peter Ramus suffered martyrdom in the massacre of St. Bartholomew's day; but the reviewer is not aware that the term "Peter Martyr" was ever applied to him. Such an application is all the more unlikely because of the eminence of Peter Martyr Vermigli, his older contemporary (died 1562). Peter Ramus was a dialectician (Professor of Philosophy in the Sorbonne) rather than a theologian, and though a few years before his death he became an avowed Protestant and suffered martyrdom as such, he was, so far from being Calvinistic that his teachings were among the influences that led to the breaking down of Calvinism in Arminianism. Peter Martyr Vermigli, an able Italian Protestant theologian, contemporary with Calvin, was more a Zwinglian or Bucerian than a Calvinist. If in saying that "Calvin was followed by Peter Ramus" the author had in mind mere chronological succession and wished to introduce Ramus as representing a transition to Arminianism, the only mistake would consist in his applying to him the designation "Peter Martyr"; but as his name is followed in Dr. Strong's list by those of Chamier and Beza, real disciples of Calvin, this more charitable interpretation seems highly improbable. On the same page the author states that the "Prayer-book of the English Church is Arminian." This is a misleading anachronism. The anti-Augustinian type of theological thought represented by the English High Churchmen and embodied in the Prayer-book, while it has much in common with Arminianism, so far as mere literary expression is con-

cerned, differs *toto coelo* from it in its point of view and its spirit. The former is the semi-Pelagianism that grew up in connection with the sacramental system of the Roman Catholic church; the latter is the direct growth of humanistic rationalism as embodied in the philosophy of Ramus and the theological speculations of the Socinians, and represents an extreme reaction against the hyper-Calvinism of Beza, Gomar, Piscator, *et al.* It would be equally inaccurate to designate the anti-Augustinianism of Wesley "Arminianism". It was rather a combination of English High Church Semi-Pelagianism with the Semi-Augustinianism of the mediaeval evangelical sects (Waldenses, Bohemian Brethren, etc.), perpetuated by the Anabaptists and by the Moravian Brethren, and communicated by these last to Wesley.

Dr. Strong's discussion of "The Origin of Our Idea of God's Existence," including his justification of the thesis that the existence of God is a first truth, is not without merit. Less satisfactory is his elaboration of the corroborative evidence of God's existence. The reviewer is unable to understand why the teleological argument in proving, as the author rightly insists, that "the causative power which we have proved by the Cosmological Argument has now become an intelligent and voluntary power" (p.45), should not be taken as proving at the same time the personality of God. Such intelligence in planning the universe and such volition in executing the plan in creation and in keeping the universe going would seem to involve personality in the planning, creating, and upholding power. In close connection with this denial to the teleological argument of the proof of personality stands the author's definition of pantheism (p. 55): "Pantheism is that method of thought which conceives of the universe as the development of one intelligent and voluntary, yet impersonal, substance, which reaches consciousness only in man." It is the conviction of the reviewer

that no thoroughgoing and self-consistent pantheist would admit intelligence and volition as attributes of the infinite All. So far from attributing intelligence and will to the Absolute, the pantheist thinks it a degradation to the All to ascribe to it even existence or to name it "God." The pantheist also denies the reality of the phenomenal world and regards man's self-consciousness as an illusion or delusion to be got rid of by fixing the mind unswervingly upon a contentless infinity. The most he would admit is that to the finite and illusionized mind the phenomenal world appears to indicate intelligence and volition in its planning and development.

On p. 51 Dr. Strong has introduced into his later editions a necessarily brief and undeveloped statement of what he calls "Ethical Monism," a view which he fully expounded a few years ago in some published articles afterwards incorporated in a volume of essays. The passage in the text-book reads: "Ethical Monism: Universe=Finite, partial, graded manifestation of the divine Life; Matter being God's self-limitation under the law of necessity, Humanity being God's self-limitation under the law of grace. Metaphysical Monism, or the doctrine of one Substance, Principle, or Ground of Being, is consistent with Psychological Dualism, or the doctrine that the soul is personally distinct from matter on the one hand and from God on the other." It does not appear to the reviewer that the author has made good his contention either here or in the articles on Ethical Monism. If man's soul is in reality personally distinct from God and from matter, Monism in the common acceptation and the proper meaning of the term is excluded; if, on the other hand, there be only one substance in the universe, pantheism, with the utter negation of human personality and responsibility, as well as of divine personality, would seem to be inevitably involved. It seems to the reviewer that Dr. Strong needlessly exposed himself to attack by

applying to his theory an offensive name, while his views were, as a matter of fact, innocent of monism in any proper sense of the term. It will be interesting to compare the author's "Ethical Monism" as above defined with one of his arguments against pantheism (p. 56): "Its assumed unity of substance is not only without proof, but it directly contradicts our intuitive judgments. These testify that we are not parts and particles of God, but distinct personal subsistences." This criticism applies to monism as well as to pantheism; but the pantheist would hardly assert or admit that we are "parts and particles of God." His All admits of no divisions and no distinctions. In this connection Dr. Strong remarks: "Many systems of monism contradict consciousness; they confound harmony between two with absorption in one." Again (p. 374) he criticises Dorner's statement that "the unity of essence of God and man is the great discovery of this age." "He (Dorner) doubtless thinks that he excludes pantheism by his earnest assertion of personality . . . ; but it is difficult, upon the assumption of a single essence, to see how there can be any such thing as distinct personalities at all."

Dr. Strong's extended discussion of "The Scriptures a Revelation from God" is in almost every respect admirable; but it was written when the author was less hospitable toward the "Higher Criticism" than he has since become. The reconstructed work will doubtless show somewhat radical changes in this section. A leaf inserted in the latest edition between pages 104 and 105 presents a less rigorous view of the inspiration of the Scriptures, involving the abandonment of inerrancy.

The chapter on "The Attributes of God" is one of the author's very best. The only criticism that the reviewer thinks it worth while to make is in respect to "The Rank and Relations of the Several Attributes." The author asserts and seeks to prove that holiness is the funda-

mental attribute. The reviewer sees many objections to this contention and thinks it would be quite as easy to prove that love is the fundamental attribute (the Scriptures nowhere declare that God is holiness, but they do declare that "God is love"), or that truth occupies the foremost position ("I am the truth"). It seems far better to give to the attributes of perfection (the moral attributes as a whole: Truth, Love, and Holiness) the prëeminence and to place these upon a basis of entire equality. This view involves objection to the use that Dr. Strong makes of the theory that holiness is the fundamental attribute in his treatment of other doctrines. It is not correct to say God must be just, he may or may not be loving or benevolent. The exercise of benevolence is as necessary a function of the divine nature as the exercise of justice, and truth is as necessary as justice or love. We are to regard the moral perfection of God as a solidarity, and we cannot think of the exercise of one of the elements of the divine perfection in isolation from or in contradiction to either or both of the others. Instances of what seems to the reviewer a needless pressing of the assumption that holiness is more fundamental than truth and love are found on pp. 196, 197, 198, 262, 276, 278, 359, and 410. In every case the substitution of "moral perfection" for "holiness" would give, in the reviewer's opinion, a better balanced teaching than is embodied in the passages as they stand.

The arguments against Materialism, Idealistic Materialism, and Pantheism, while they may carry conviction to one whose philosophical and religious principles are in substantial agreement with those of the author, seem to the reviewer to be almost wholly destitute of convincing force for those who intelligently hold to the views combated.

The positive part of the chapter on the Trinity is of a high degree of excellence. The refutation of opposing

views is unsatisfactory, because it does not begin with the earliest phases of anti-trinitarian teaching and trace the anti-trinitarian mode of thought genetically even to the time of Arius and Athanasius, and because it gives no history at all of the early efforts to formulate a doctrine of the Trinity in opposition to Ebionitic Adoptionism, later Adoptionism, Monarchianism, and Gnosticism. Room should have been found for a succinct genetic presentation of both lines of development as far at least as the middle of the fourth century. The author makes no mention of the wide-spread Adoptionism that prevailed even during the apostolic age and that was perpetuated for many centuries, in fact to the present time, in Armenia and elsewhere. Sabellius is the first anti-trinitarian that he mentions; but he was in no sense the originator of the modalistic monarchianism that he advocated with considerable zeal and success about the beginning of the third century. Dr. Strong makes no mention of the bearing of the writings of Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Novatian on the development of the doctrine. He gives no antecedents and no historical setting to Arius, even to the extent of describing his conflict with the great Athanasius.

Dr. Strong has handled the difficult problem of creation with excellent judgment, and while there is room for differences of opinion on many points, there is little in his positive elaboration of the doctrine that calls for criticism. Here as elsewhere it is in his statement and refutation of opposing views that he is least successful. His section on Dualism abounds in imperfect statements, not to say errors. One might have expected that he would have started out with a clear, succinct statement of the dualism of the Zend Avesta, from which later dualism has for the most part been directly or indirectly derived. Instead, he begins with the Alexandrian Gnostics to whom he attributes the theory that God and matter are two self-

existent principles. "These are distinct from and coeternal with each other. Matter, however, is an unconscious, negative, and imperfect substance, which is subordinate to God, and is made the instrument of his will." The Alexandrian Gnostics did not hold that matter was self-existent. They did not represent it as coeternal with God. They did not regard matter as subordinate to God or as made the instrument of his will. They did not hold that God had a will or made use of any instrumentalities at all. Hippolytus attributes to Basileides, whose theory Dr. Strong intends to set forth, the following ontological and cosmological statement: "Since, therefore, there was nothing, neither matter, nor substance, nor unsubstantial, nor simple, nor compound, nor inconceivable, nor imperceptible, nor man, nor angel, nor God, nor in short any of the things that are named or perceived by the senses or conceived by the intellect, but all things being thus, and more minutely than thus, simply obliterated, the non-existent God . . . inconceivably, insensibly, indeterminately, impassively, unactuated by desire, willed to create a world. When I say willed, I mean to signify without will and without thought and without sense; and by the world I mean not that which was afterward made and separated by size and division, but the seed of the world." This may be somewhat of a caricature of Basileides's teaching; but he was evidently pantheistic rather than dualistic. The seed spoken of contained a threefold sonship, and out of the seed sprang the Great Archon who ignorantly and indirectly became the means of creating the etherial and celestial regions. From the same seed developed the second Archon, whose son seems to be identified with the God of the Old Testament and became the demiurge or world-framer, etc. To the Syrian Gnostics Dr. Strong attributes "Emanation" as a theory antagonistic to creation. It is a fact that the Alexandrian Gnostics carried the idea of emanation very much

further than the Syrian. Marcion, of Asia Minor, seems to have regarded the Demiurge and his kingdom (identified with Jehovah and the material world) as eternal. Dr. Strong's references in connection with these discussions are to out-of-date and unauthoritative books; but even these can hardly be held responsible for the representations of Gnosticism here given. Cöordinate with the theories of Dualism, Emanation, and Creation from Eternity, the author treats Spontaneous Generation. As the other theories are designed to account for the existence of the universe at large (matter) and this last only to account for the origin of life, it seems scarcely to be in place here. The theory of evolution, with the assumption that matter with its potentialities is eternal or does not need to be accounted for, and that the differentiations of matter including life in all its forms have evolved, would seem more appropriate; but evolution with spontaneous generation is a part of modern materialism and should be treated as such.

It is not easy to see the conclusiveness of the following statement (p. 200): "If the world be eternal, like God, it must be an efflux from the substance of God and must be absolutely equal with God." The assumptions from which these inevitable conclusions ("must") are drawn would seem to be: If two eternal substances exist, one must be the efflux of the other, and a substance that is the efflux of another must be absolutely equal with the other!

The section on Preservation is reasonably satisfactory; though there is room for difference of opinion as to the reality and the utility of the distinction between the first cause and secondary causes. The word "automatic" does not seem a happy one to use in the sentence (p. 203): "Since will is the only cause of which we have direct knowledge, second causes in nature may be regarded as

only secondary, regular and automatic workings of the great first Cause."

The discussion of the doctrine of Divine Providence is excellent, but Casualism, as a doctrine opposed to Divine Providence, is so lacking in modern advocacy and so completely out of accord with current modes of thought, that it is doubtful whether Dr. Strong has done well to devote nearly three of his pages to its refutation.

It would be out of place to criticise Dr. Strong for maintaining the dichotomous theory in his section on "The Essential Elements of Human Nature"; for theologians are about equally divided on the question of dichotomy or trichotomy. But the grounds on which he declares the trichotomous theory untenable seem to the reviewer lacking in conclusiveness. These are: (1) That "*pneuma* as well as *psuche* is used of the brute creation." The passage of Scripture relied upon is an agnostic or skeptical utterance in Ecclesiastes (3:21): "Who knoweth the spirit of man, whether it goeth upward, and the spirit of the brute, whether it goeth downward?" Such a question seems utterly worthless as a proof for dichotomy. (2) "*Psuche* is ascribed to Jehovah." The Scriptures on which reliance is placed are those in which Jehovah is said to have sworn by his soul and his soul is said to delight in his chosen ones. The fact is, that the Hebrew idiom uses the word *nephesh* (soul) as a reflexive pronoun, and these passages can hardly be taken to prove that Jehovah has a soul; and if they could, would only mean that the center of his being which constitutes his personality is his soul, which is precisely what trichotomists maintain with respect to man. (3) "The disembodied dead are called *psuchai*." This is precisely what they ought to be called according to the trichotomous theory. (4) "The highest exercises of religion are ascribed to the *psuche*." This is precisely what trichotomy maintains and requires. (5) "To lose the *psuche*

is to lose all." So trichotomy insists. Dr. Strong attempts to get rid of the only passages in the New Testament in which there is definite teaching on the subject by a somewhat ingenious interpretation, but fails, in the opinion of the reviewer, to make his position tenable. There is no evidence that the author has taken the trouble to understand the thichotomous theory as it is held to-day or the way in which it may be successfully applied to the doctrine of man in his original, in his fallen, in his regenerated, in his glorified, and in his finally lost states. His attempt to discredit trichotomy by stating that Gnostics, Apollinarians, and Annihilationists have held to it is not much more to the point than it would be to seek to discredit immersion by pointing out the fact that it is practiced by the Mormons. The trichotomy of these parties was a very different thing from that maintained by well-reputed modern theologians, and few heretics have failed to mingle some truth with their errors.

Dr. Strong's section on "The Origin of the Soul" is good; but it would have been far more satisfactory, in the reviewer's opinion, if he had had the trichotomous theory as his basis. He does well to reject the theory of præexistence. Whether a theory so out of accord with modern modes of thought and so little likely to be embraced is worthy of elaborate refutation may be open to question. Commendable, too, is Dr. Strong's rejection of the Creatian theory of the origin of the soul, a theory that on the dichotomous supposition, and especially when combined with a strong doctrine of imputed guilt, involves difficulties of the gravest character. If he must needs be a dichotomist and make spirit a mere phase or upper story of soul, he does better in adopting the Traducian view than he would have done in adopting the Creatian. Augustine felt grave difficulty about adopting the Traducian view as being too materialistic, and though his theory of hereditary sin and imputed guilt seemed to require the

supposition that the soul is propagated from parent to child, he could never consent to become a pronounced Traducianist. According to the trichotomous theory, the soul (including intellect, emotions, and will, and constituting the center of personality) is propagated, with its sinful nature and its hereditary traits, while the spirit is a direct impartation from God to each individual, constituting him a moral and spiritual being, with self-consciousness, self-determination, capacity for religion, and (probably) immortality. Man has soul in common with the brutes that perish, more highly developed no doubt because of the influence of the spirit nature. It is spirit that differentiates him from the brute creation and fixes a great gulf between the two that can never be bridged. Even if science could demonstrate the evolution of body and soul from lower orders, man on this theory is still radically differentiated from the brute creation. It is the prompting of the spirit that comes to the soul as the categorical imperative and produces in the soul the phenomena of conscience. It is the presence of the spirit that gives the soul its intuition of God. In the unfallen man spirit controlled soul and body and gave to the soul the joyful sense of harmony and communion with God. In the fallen man the spirit asserts in the soul the requirement of obedience to God and produces in the soul a sense of obligation and feeling of fear, contrition, remorse, etc., in view of duty unperformed. In the process of regeneration the Holy Spirit works in and through the human spirit in reconquering the soul which has come through the prompting of spirit and through a knowledge of the truth and the emotional awakening of fear of the consequences of sin to desire salvation, and in bringing it back into obedience to God and joyful communion with him. From being carnal (sarkical) or psychical man thus

becomes spiritual. In the glorified state spirit now completely triumphant gives to the soul its capacity for communion with God and the angels. In the case of the lost the spirit, itself incapable of suffering or change, becomes, we may suppose, the means of inflicting torture on the disobedient soul—"the worm that dieth not."

Acceptance of the trichotomous theory would, in the opinion of the reviewer, have enabled the author to give a more satisfactory account of the conscience than he has done. His definition itself is good: "Conscience is man's consciousness of his moral relations, together with a peculiar feeling in view of them." He also rightly attributes uniformity and infallibility to that which produces in the soul the sense of "oughtness": "Since conscience, in the proper sense, gives uniform and infallible judgment that the right is supremely obligatory, and that the wrong must be forborne at every cost, it can be called an echo of God's voice, and an indication in man of that which is supreme in the nature of God." Now, if man's soul (including spirit) is by virtue of direct derivation from Adam totally depraved, as Dr. Strong teaches, how are we to account for the fact that in this particular function it is in a position uniformly and infallibly to insist upon the right? Trichotomy avoids the difficulty by the supposition that the chief function of spirit, which is a direct impartation by God to each individual man, is to bring perpetually to bear upon the soul of every man, even the most depraved, the categorical imperative, and that the conscience is no more nor less than the consciousness of conformity or lack of conformity with the divine requirement, attended by feelings of complacency, contrition, or remorse. The reviewer is far from claiming that the phenomena of conscience can be accounted for no otherwise than by the trichotomous theory, and he is not to be understood as criticising the author for failure to adopt this method of explaining conscience.

Dr. Strong's long chapter on Sin, occupying nearly a seventh of the volume, is one of his very best. It seems to the reviewer that under "The Essentials of Man's Original State," "the image of God" might have been defined more simply and truly in terms of trichotomy. Would it not be better to say, instead of "natural likeness to God, or personality" and "moral likeness to God, or holiness," "endowment with a spirit that dominated soul and body, constituting the soul personal, immortal, morally responsible, and conformed to the moral perfection of God?" And would it not be better, instead of saying (p. 267): "The first man possessed a body and a spirit so fitted to each other that no conflict was felt between their several claims," to say: "In the first man the body was so fitted to the spirit-controlled soul," etc.?

The author is right in making selfishness the essential principle of sin and his psychology of the fall is satisfactory from the dichotomous point of view; but would it not be more Scriptural and more intelligible to define the fall as the emancipation of the soul from the dominion of the spirit through the choice of a selfish end in preference to God's will, so that from having been spiritual man became carnal (sarkical)? In asserting (p. 290) that "avarice, envy, pride, ambition, malice, cruelty, revenge, self-righteousness, unbelief, enmity to God, are none of them fleshly sins," the author seems to have lost sight of the fact, which he elsewhere fully recognizes, that all such things are fleshly (sarkical) according to the New Testament use of this term and that the Apostle Paul in Galatians 5:19-21 expressly declares such things to be "the works of the flesh."

The section on "The Imputation of Sin to Adam's Posterity" might be very greatly improved by a rearrangement of the material involving no great amount of labor. It would have been very much more logical if the author had given his own theory at the beginning instead of the

end of the discussion, pointing out its close relationship with that of Augustine and showing in what particulars he has seen fit to modify the view of the great Latin theologian. This might well have been followed by a brief account of Eastern and Western opinion up to the time of Augustine and Pelagius, with a succinct statement of Pelagius's views on this matter and their relation to his entire system of thought, of the conflict on this point between the followers of Pelagius and those of Augustine, of the views of representative mediæval theologians on the subject, of the Lutheran and Calvinistic modifications of Pelagian teaching, of the breaking down of Calvinistic Augustianism which had been carried to extremes by Beza and Gomar in Arminianism, of the revived semi-Pelagianism of the Roman Catholic type in English High Churchism, of the perpetuation of Calvinistic Augustianism in modified form in the Federalism of Coccejus and his followers, of the perpetuation of Calvinism of an Arminianized type in the teachings of Placaeus, New England divines (Hopkins, Emmons, Dwight, Taylor and Finney), New School Presbyterians, etc. After the exposition of the accepted view with a statement of the Scriptural and rational grounds, the mere statement of opposing views with occasional references to the points in which they contradict that which has been accepted would constitute a sufficient refutation. Moreover, the author has wasted space and needlessly burdened the student by repeating in different language and in varying order the arguments against the same type of thought under different names.

This criticism applies with equal force to the author's treatment of theories of the atonement opposed to that which he has adopted, and here also such a genetic treatment as has been suggested would, in the reviewer's opinion, be a decided improvement upon the method actually pursued. In fact, in the discussion of the theories

of the atonement, there is an even more flagrant disregard of historical order and genetic relationship than in the case just considered. Instead of beginning with the appearance of the example theory in the writings of Clement of Alexandria (or even earlier) and following this up with a succinct account of the development of opinion on this matter up to Pelagius and on through Socinianism to modern Unitarianism and recent New Theology, he actually begins with Socinianism! This form of the theory he follows up with "the Bushnellian, or Moral-Influence Theory," which is of course only a modification of the example theory and little different from that of Clement of Alexandria. After a number of other theories given without regard to chronological or genetic order, he ends, rather than begins, with the composite theory that he has adopted and which, without sufficient reason, as it seems to the reviewer, he designates "the Ethical Theory."

This so-called "ethical theory," while it is in some respects acceptable, is yet open to criticism. The statement that "the Ethical theory holds that the necessity of the atonement is grounded in the holiness of God, of which conscience in man is a finite reflection," would be improved, in the reviewer's opinion, if "moral perfection" (including love, truth and holiness) were substituted for "holiness." The following remarks on the humanity of Christ (p. 412) seems highly questionable: "If Christ had been born into the world by ordinary generation, he, too, would have had depravity, guilt, penalty. But he was not so born. In the womb of the Virgin, the human nature which he took was purged from its depravity. But this purging away of depravity did not take away guilt, or penalty. There was still left the just exposure to the penalty of violated law. Although Christ's nature was purified, his obligation to suffer yet remained. He might have declined to join himself to

humanity, and then he need not have suffered. But once born of the Virgin, once possessed of human nature that was under the curse, he was bound to suffer. The whole mass and weight of God's displeasure against the race fell on him, when once he became a member of the race."

It is utterly inconceivable to the reviewer that a human nature free from depravity should be guilty before God or should be exposed justly or unjustly to the penalty of violated law. One must have a strange conception of God to suppose that the "mass and weight of his displeasure" fell on an absolutely pure divine-human person, his beloved son in whom he was well pleased. Such an idea of the solidarity of humanity as involves the guilt of an absolutely pure member is as contrary to sound ethics as it is to sound metaphysics and to sound theology. Christ's sufferings atoned for human guilt not because as man he must needs suffer the penalty of human sin, but rather because he voluntarily bore our iniquities. Some further expressions by way of explanation really make the matter worse. Christ is said to have taken upon himself "solely the guilt of Adam's sin, which belongs, prior to personal transgression, and apart from inherited depravity to every member of the race who has derived his life from Adam." Such guilt as that described seems to the reviewer a mere fiction, inconsistent with any proper conception of God. Again: "If it be asked whether this is not simply a suffering for his own sin, or rather for his own share of the sin of the race, we reply that his own share of the sin of the race is not the sole reason why he suffers; it furnishes only the subjective reason and ground for the proper laying upon him of the sin of all." Again: "It follows that he who is the life of humanity must, though personally pure, be involved in responsibility for all human sin." It seems to the reviewer that the author's theory is not much less objectionable than

that of Edward Irving, who maintained that Christ took human nature as it was in Adam after the fall, and that by his overcoming of all sinful propensities and his sacrificial death he succeeded in completely purifying it and reuniting it to God.

To bring into clearer light Dr. Strong's well-wrought-out and strenuously maintained position, a few more sentences should be quoted: "When and how, did Christ take this guilt and this penalty upon him? With regard to the penalty, we have no difficulty in answering that, as his whole life of suffering was propitiatory, so penalty rested upon him from the beginning of his life. . . . But penalty and guilt are correlates; if Christ inherited penalty, it must have been because he inherited guilt. . . . The baptized person (Christ) went down into the water, as one laden with sin and guilt, in order that this sin and guilt might be buried forever, and that he might rise from the typical grave to a new and holy life. . . . If it be asked whether Jesus, then, before his death, was an unjustified person, we answer that, while personally pure and well-pleasing to God, he himself was conscious of a race responsibility and a race-guilt that must be atoned for." The statement regarding the baptism of Christ would doubtless be construed by advocates of baptismal regeneration as in accord with their position.

The section on the Person of Christ is among the least satisfactory portions of Dr. Strong's work. His historical survey in this case comes nearer to following a chronological order than does any similar attempt of the author at doctrine-history; but here also there is a complete lack of effort to trace the genetic relations of the different phases of doctrine. It is not strictly incorrect to speak of the Docetæ as a Gnostic sect, for Hyppolytus mentions a sect under this name; but docetism could not have been their distinctive tenet, for all Gnostics were, it seems, docetic. But when the author speaks (p. 261)

of Patripassians and Sabellians as "sects of the Docetæ" he seems to go completely counter to the facts. Patripassianism was not the name of a sect, but only the designation of a phase of doctrine in accordance with which eternal distinctions in the Godhead are denied, and whatever can be attributed to the Son is *ipso facto* attributable to the Father. Sabellius, Praxeas, Noetus and Beryl were all charged with Patripassianism by such opponents as Hippolytus and Tertullian. Sabellians were as far as possible from "denying all humanity to Christ," as Dr. Strong represents, and it is not at all likely that they were even remotely connected with the Docetæ or any docetic party. If Dorner regards them as docetic, it is not in the sense that they denied all humanity to Christ, as was the case with the Gnostics, but in the sense that they denied the reality of the personal distinctions of the Godhead.

The author states and condemns the Eutychian doctrine, in accordance with which complete human nature was so united with the divine that all divine attributes were communicated to the human, and only one nature, the divine, could be spoken of after the union; and he states and approves the "orthodox doctrine" or the doctrine formulated by the Council of Chalcedon, in accordance with which the two complete natures were united in one personality yet each retained its own properties. And yet he proceeds to adopt as his own all the essential features of Eutychianism, including the doctrine of the communication of all divine attributes to the human nature, which is unintelligible if it be not equivalent to the absorption of the finite humanity by the infinite deity, as well as the doctrine that the divine-human Christ had only one will, namely the divine. Such acceptance of the view that he has just definitely rejected and rejection of the view that he has accepted as orthodox can be accounted

for only on the supposition that he did not have the distinctive features of either view clearly in mind.

The following is Dr. Strong's statement of the Orthodox or Chalcedonian doctrine: "That in the one person of Jesus Christ there are two natures, a human nature and a divine nature, each in its completeness and integrity, and that these two natures are organically and indissolubly united, yet so that no third nature is formed thereby. In brief, to use the antiquated dictum, orthodox doctrine forbids us either to divide the person or to confound the natures." Compare this with the following reasonably full statement of the doctrine: "Our Lord Jesus Christ is perfect in deity and perfect in humanity. He is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us. He was born of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God. This one and same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-Begotten, is to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of the natures being by no means taken away through the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one person and one subsistence." Professing to accept the doctrine of which this latter is an authentic statement, Dr. Strong proceeds to prove the reality and the integrity of the humanity of Christ. He rightly defines integrity to mean "not merely completeness, but perfection." It is when he comes to the discussion of the "Union of the Two Natures in One Person" (p. 368 onward) that he abandons the Chalcedonian doctrine and joins company with the Eutychians: "The two natures are bound together . . . by a bond unique and inscrutable, which constitutes them one person with a single consciousness and will." Again (p. 376): "Person is nature separately subsisting, with powers of consciousness and will. Since the human nature of Christ has not and never had a separate subsistence, it is impersonal, and in the God-man the Logos

furnishes the principle of personality. It is equally important to observe that self-consciousness and self-determination do not belong to nature as such, but only to personality. For this reason, Christ has not two consciousnesses and two wills, but a single consciousness and a single will." This teaching is distinctly Eutychian or Monophysite. The Monophysites of the seventh century were ready to compromise with the adherents of the Chalcedonian symbol on the basis of the elimination of the human will (Monothelitism); but as a result of long continued discussion, the doctrine of the two wills (Dyothelitism) triumphed in the East and the West alike, and the great majority of Christian thinkers from that time to the present have insisted that the integrity of Christ's human nature requires the supposition of a human will in complete accord with the divine. It seems more correct to attribute will to nature than to person.

On p. 377 the author falls into a most remarkable confusion respecting facts and dates: "The theory of two consciousnesses and two wills, first elaborated by John of Damascus, was an unwarranted addition to the Orthodox doctrine propounded at Chalcedon. Although the view of John of Damascus was sanctioned by the Council of Constantinople (681), 'this Council has never been regarded by the Greek Church as oecumenical, and its composition and spirit deprive its decisions of all value as indicating the true sense of the Scriptures.'" Now John of Damascus died about 754 and was probably born some time after 681, when the Council of Constantinople is said by Dr. Strong to have sanctioned his view. He was by no means the first to elaborate the doctrine of two consciousnesses and two wills. This matter was thoroughly exploited in the Monothelite controversy (626-81). If by quoting the disparaging remark regarding the Council of 681 the author meant to intimate that the Greek Church rejected the Dyothelite doctrine, as would

seem to be the case, the intimation would be directly contrary to the fact; for John of Damascus long after this elaborated the doctrine more fully than it had ever been elaborated before, and his great "Fountain of Knowledge" was for many centuries the most authoritative text-book in theology for the Greek Church.

In describing the "effect upon the human" of the union of the divine and the human natures in the person of Christ, Dr. Strong again aligns himself with the Eutychians and with Luther against the Greek and Roman Catholic and the various Reformed communions: "The union of the divine and the human nature makes the latter possessed of the powers belonging to the former; in other words, the attributes of the divine nature are imparted to the human without passing over into its essence,—so that the human Christ even on earth had power to be, to know, and to do, as God." This involves the supposition that from the moment of the conception the human nature of Christ was omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, etc., except as the exercise of these attributes was limited by the voluntary humiliation or self-emptying (Kenosis). What else can this mean but the absorption of the humanity by the deity? A humanity with all divine attributes is no proper humanity at all. If it be thought of as distinct from deity, this would involve the supposition of two infinite beings with all divine attributes, a divine and a nominally human, which is absurd. The Eutychians illustrated their conception of the union of the human and the divine by a drop of honey in the ocean. The illustration falls short of their conception by reason of the fact that the ocean is not infinite. If a drop of honey in the ocean is virtually lost so that the whole becomes to all intents and purposes ocean; so finite humanity merged in infinite deity can only result in deity pure and simple.

Dr. Strong does not well in rejecting Dorner's theory

as to the process of the union of the divine and the human in the person of Christ, which he incorrectly characterizes as the "theory of a gradual incarnation." As a matter of fact, Dorner rightly regards the union of divine and human as complete from the conception, but supposes that the human nature of Christ had a normal development and only gradually become capable of the divine, a consciousness of the union on the part of the humanity appearing first, so far as we know, in connection with Jesus's experience in the temple when twelve years of age, a still clearer realization occurring at the baptism, etc. The humanity, Dorner rightly teaches, was developed from the first in connection with and under the control of the divine; but the consciousness of the union grew with the development of the humanity.

Much might be found to commend and something to condemn in portions of the work that have not been mentioned; but enough has been given to show that in the thoroughly wrought out discussions, no less than in the historical statements, the book needs a painstaking revision. It is not to be expected, of course, that the author will modify his well-matured doctrinal views in response to criticism, but he can hardly fail to see the necessity of removing such blemishes as those that have been pointed out. It is the earnest desire of the reviewer that a work which possesses so many excellences should be made as nearly perfect as possible by its distinguished author while he is in full possession of his powers.