

tions from leading historians, philosophers, scientists and theologians. The author expresses himself in clear, vigorous English, and, in this volume, gives to the world a valuable treatise on a vital subject with flash lights from many points of view and with emphasis on the true Bible doctrine of divine Providence.

BYRON H. DEMENT.

**The Moral Life: A Study in Genetic Ethics.** By Arthur Ernest Davies, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Ohio State University. Review Publishing Co., Baltimore. 1909. Pages 179.

This is the first volume of the "Library of Genetic Science and Philosophy", instituted by the editors of the Psychological Review and intended to include such acceptable essays as are too long to be included in their Monograph Series.

By the genetic method, which the author seeks to follow, is meant "the quest for the constant conditions under which, in the empirical world, specific results are known to occur". It is not a search for absolute beginning. "There is no material for ethics, genetic or other, except in an already morally organized community," or, it is an attempt to determine "what are the factors which constitute a moral situation moral". On the execution of this task the author has written a very interesting, and, in some respects, illuminating book; and, when not illuminating, he is always vigorous. It is not the fashion in the review of scientific and philosophical books to place emphasis on style, but in this case it should be said the style is almost a model for philosophical writing, midway between the ostentatious display of learning by the use of abstract terminology and the condescending simplification which discredits the intelligence of the reader.

Especially interesting and important are the chapters on "The Moral Ideal", "Motive", and "Moral Freedom". The ideal is the construction of the imagination. Ideal developments in general are possible and demanded only "when empirically given data are no longer adequate or available for the purposes of life". The moral ideal is built up in the effort to solve moral situations which are problematical, in which

the customary standards and reactions are inadequate. He defines the ideal, therefore, as "any content of experience which serves as a means for the growth of experience at the same time that it determines the direction in which growth takes place". Motive, the discussion of which constitutes a very considerable portion of the book and, perhaps, its most distinctive feature, he defines accordingly as "the moral ideal functioning in human life for its complete moralization". At first it functions as the memory *image* of the end required of the individual by society; with the advance of intelligence it becomes the *idea* constructed by the imagination out of the elements of past experience, and may be a variation from the socially accepted ideal as embodied in institutions. It is by means of these variations that society progresses in its moral standards.

As the motive develops from the memory image to the individually constructed idea of the end, the individual attains to moral freedom. Freedom is not absolutely unconditioned, unregulated; but is personal. The individual personality as organized in the social progress "has the consciousness of ability to effect results which are of social consequence". The author very acutely remarks that, if in the decision of the will it is not the motive which is chosen but the free choice of the motive, which is the antecedent of moral behavior, "this seems only a rather shame-faced way of saying that motives have nothing at all to do with the matter". While he has, of course, not solved the age-old problem of freedom, he has helped to glorify the theory that moral freedom lies midway between the two extremes—mechanically caused action, on the one hand, and absolutely unconditioned, incalculable and inexplicable action, on the other.

This discussion, however, though interesting and illuminating, has certain manifest faults. One is the labored and finally unsuccessful attempt to establish a clear line of demarcation between the provinces of sociology and ethics. He vigorously resists and one might say resents the claims of the sociologists, especially as represented by Small, that ethics must

be included as a department of sociology. In resisting this absorption, he limits the province of sociology to the consideration of the *structure* of society. But if sociology be concerned with the social *process*, or with the evolution of the social structure, the genesis of social forms, then his own method is a conclusive demonstration that ethics must be included within it. Simmel, who has insisted above all others that sociology is properly limited to the study of social forms, maintains that the subject matter of ethics should be divided between the sciences of sociology and psychology. But why should the author so seriously concern himself about this question of delimitation? There is some confusion of boundaries, unquestionably. It is the inevitable result of our rapidly expanding knowledge. Let each one contribute what he can, and cease to concern himself as to whether his contribution is to receive its final classification under the head of sociology, psychology or ethics.

But one other defect must be noted. The author introduces much confusion into his discussion by the antithesis which he sets up between personality, as the embodiment or organization of that which one has in common with others, and individuality, as that which differentiates one from the common life. Such an antithesis it is quite impossible to maintain with any consistency, as is clear from his definition of personality. "To be a person means that the larger life, the common, shared life of the group, comes to a particular expression in each of its members in such a way that the originality of the expression does not subvert, but conserves the fundamental and primary meaning of the constitution which confers the rights, and sets the limits of personal activity." Is not individuality included as an element of personality in this definition? Contrasted with personality as here defined, individuality has no meaning; unless we should understand by a person a single member of the social body which conforms to the common or general type, and by an individual a single member of the group which did not conform. But this cannot be the author's meaning; because he

speaks of the personal and the individual as different aspects of the constitution of the single member of the group. The distinction, as drawn, is a most confusing one. What he has in mind is the distinction between that which is generic and that which is specific in personality.

C. S. GARDNER.

**An Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics.** By Dr. P. Lobstein, Professor of Theology in the University of Strassburg. Translated from the original French edition by A. M. Smith, D.D., University of Chicago. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. \$1.62 net.

The translator of this able volume states in his preface his belief that Dr. Lobstein has made a valuable contribution toward the removal of the misunderstanding between the traditional churchman and the scientific theologian who differ more in method of treatment than in the essentials of Christian truth.

The traditional conception of dogma is subjected to a close scrutiny which by philosophical analysis, differentiates dogma from popular preaching and from moral and practical decisions; by psychological analysis, shows the development of religious sentiments into a collective compactness and supreme authority; and, by historical analysis, indicates how the Christian faith chrysalized into a dogma which is "obligatory belief decreed by an infallible Church and sanctioned by an absolute State".

But the traditional idea of dogma is in direct contradiction to the religious principle of Protestantism as shown in the Protestant idea of faith, the Church and seat of religious authority. The development of doctrine and its scientific statement becomes necessary for the spiritual welfare of the Church, for the practical ministry of the pastor, and for the settlement of doctrinal and ecclesiastical disputes. Thus it was inevitable that Protestantism should have a dogma which is the scientific expression of the Protestant Church at a given time. This conception of dogma gives intelligent solidity to doctrine, and permits a vital and progressive flexi-