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ESSAY.

DISCIPLINE: ITS IMPORTANCE TO AN ARMED FORCE, AND THE BEST MEANS OF MAINTAINING AND PROMOTING IT.

By Captain A. M. MURRAY, R.A.

"Force is no remedy."

PART I.—*Introductory.*

"I am more and more convinced from the experience of this, as well as from the last campaign, that our want of success is entirely due to the want of discipline in the army."—MARLBOROUGH.

THE first part of the title of this essay would seem to be the statement of an axiom rather than the theme for argumentative discussion. It needs, indeed, no argument to demonstrate what history conclusively proves, that military discipline and success in war go hand in hand together. There may be differences of opinion as to how the discipline of an army should be maintained; there can be no difference as to the importance of maintaining it in as high degree as possible. Whether we judge from the utterances of successful Commanders, or from the results of their campaigns, we may affirm it to be a matter of fact, established beyond all risk of contradiction, that discipline is the first and most necessary condition of success for an armed force which seeks to fight its way to victory.

The student of military history will find during the course of his reading numerous examples of the truth of this assertion. There is in the first place the great and striking example of the English Army, the records of which—especially during the past century—will be made the subject of constant reference for the purpose of this inquiry. It will be well, however, in the interests of exhaustive discussion to go further abroad than England, and even to look for examples in classical as well as modern times, so as to ascertain whether military discipline is founded upon ancient and ever-existing principles of war, or is merely the outcome of the changed conditions of modern fighting. With this object in view it will be convenient, without accumulating instances, to select one example from ancient

and one from modern history, and, with the help of such evidence as may be forthcoming, examine the conditions under which each example offers itself for instruction. Such examination will be useful, not only by way of preface to the matter under discussion, but also as affording means for ready reference when the second and more practical part of this essay comes to be considered.

In ancient times, the Persian invasion of Greece is a conspicuous and ever-instructive example of the value of discipline in war. The overthrow of Xerxes and his vast host shows what the presence of discipline can do when unattended by science, or preparation, or numerical superiority, or, indeed, by any of those conditions (except the one mentioned) which are generally supposed to contribute to belligerent power. The Greek armies were badly equipped,¹ and badly led. Hardly any preparation had been made to oppose an invasion, which, after the battle of Marathon, was known to be inevitable,² but which was awaited both in Athens and in Sparta with an apathetic calmness inexcusable even in the face of conscious strength.³ The commanders appointed to lead the armies did not understand the most elementary principles of scientific strategy. Nor did they make up by energy for want of military wisdom: they would not even take steps to ascertain the necessary topographical features of their own selected battle-fields.⁴ At Thermopylæ, at Salamis, and at Plataea, they allowed themselves to be out-generalled in such a way as actually to court defeat. Combination of action, moreover, was paralyzed by want of political union no less than by divided military counsels. The Persians, on the contrary, brought to the encounter all the resources of a rich country, and all the experience acquired by long practice in war. They were led by a man who, though a coward at heart, and with other great faults of character, was until his defeat regarded, and not without reason, as the first soldier of the day. He had laboured for seven years to organize the army of invasion, and had elaborated his plans with extraordinary pains. Considering the difficulties which must have existed in those days in the way of transport and supplies, it cannot be denied that both the plan of the invasion and the manner of its execution afford an exceedingly high testimony to the military capacity of Xerxes.⁵ Yet in spite of advantages of numbers, skill, organized plan, undivided command, and superior military knowledge, when it came to actual

¹ Except only in arms.

² Herodotus, VII, 239.

³ The Athenians were celebrating the Olympic, and the Spartans the Carnean festivals (Herodotus, VII, 206), at the very time when Xerxes had reached the Greek outposts.

⁴ Grote: "History of Greece." Part II, chap. xl.

⁵ It is not necessary to accept Herodotus's ridiculously exaggerated estimate of the numbers of the Persian army to give Xerxes the credit due to great foresight and organizing capacity, as shown in the mobilization of his army, in its successful march through the wild and unknown country of Asia Minor and Macedonia, in the engineering feat of bridging the Hellespont, and cutting the ship canal through the promontory of Athos (an authenticated fact), and in the collection of the supply depôts along the line of march.

fighting the contest was never even doubtful. Discipline asserted itself from the first, and maintained its power until the last Persian had been driven from Greek soil. "The Greeks," we are told by Herodotus,¹ "fought in order and preserved their ranks: the barbarians, without either regularity or judgment. . . . They discovered no inferiority either in strength or courage, but their inferiority with respect to discipline was conspicuous."²

Turning from ancient to modern history, many instances at once occur to the mind of well-disciplined forces, under otherwise unfavourable conditions, achieving remarkable and repeated successes against armies numerically superior and not less brave, but deficient in the essential quality of military discipline. The irruption of Gustavus Adolphus into Germany in the 17th century, the conquest³ of Mexico by Cortes, the present unhappy condition of Poland,⁴ our own struggles in India in 1857-58, and more recently in the Soudan, the wonderful victories achieved by the German armies in 1870-71, these are a few out of many examples which exist to remind us of the invincible influence which discipline exerts in war.

The first case quoted above is perhaps the most striking example of this influence. Embarking at the head of only 13,000 soldiers, the Swedish King, up to that time unnoticed, almost unheard of—the "King of Snow," as he was contemptuously termed in Vienna—without allies, or even the promise of assistance, but strong only as the champion of the Protestant faith in Europe, undertook of his own accord to invade the dominions of the Emperor of Germany. The result of the invasion is within the recollection of every student of military history. In little more than two years from the date of landing at Stettin, Gustavus had beaten the Imperial armies out of the field and established his power over the whole of the country which extends from the borders of Hungary and Silesia to the banks

¹ Book VIII, 86:

ληματι μιν νυν και ρωμη οτκ εσσονες ησαν δι περσαι.

² The historian Grote endorses this view of the Persian overthrow in the following corroborative words: "Their signal defeat was not owing to the want of courage, but to their want of orderly line as compared with the Greeks, and to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice others in order to effect his own escape."

³ "Singly," writes Prescott, "and with the same weapons, the Indian might have stood his ground against the Spaniard, but the success of the latter established the superiority of discipline over mere physical courage and numbers."—"Conquest of Mexico."

⁴ Poland undoubtedly owes its present divided state to the habitual want of discipline which has ever characterized Polish armies in the field. Individually the Pole is excellent fighting material: brave, chivalrous, high-spirited, possessing military instinct in a marked manner, capable of being roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, he has never been able to submit to the necessary restraints which the laws of military discipline impose on battle-winning armies. "Weakened," writes Alison, "in these contests with their enemies equally by their freedom as their tyranny, knowing of liberty nothing but its licentiousness, of government but its weakness, inferior to all around them in discipline, the Poles are the only warlike nation in the world to whom victory never brought either conquest or peace."

of the Rhine, and from the Baltic Sea to the Lake Constance. He achieved his conquests, moreover, against the fiercest troops and the most renowned¹ Commanders of the day. What ultimate limit would have been placed to his victorious progress, had he not been prematurely killed at Lutzen, it is impossible to say; but it was known before his death that, after securing his position in Bavaria,² he intended to cross the Inn, and establish his power in the Imperial capital of Vienna.³

The success of this wonderful two years' campaign was principally due to the excellent discipline maintained in the Swedish army. Without this discipline⁴ the genius of Gustavus, his tactical reforms, and the superior mobility of his troops, would never have carried him through his career of continuous conquest.

"All Europe," wrote the historian⁵ of the Thirty Years' War, "was astonished at the strict discipline which at the first so creditably distinguished the Swedish army within German territory; all disorders were punished with the utmost severity, particularly impiety, theft, gambling, and duelling. The Swedish Articles of War enforced frugality. In the camp, the King's tent not excepted, neither silver nor gold was to be seen: the General's eye looked as vigilantly to the morals as to the martial bravery of his soldiers; every regiment was ordered to form round its Chaplain for morning prayers. In all these points the lawgiver was also an example. A sincere and ardent piety exalted his courage. The hardships of war he shared with the meanest soldier in the army. . . . Such a leader was followed to victory alike by the coward and the brave, and his eagle eye marked every heroic deed which his example had inspired."

Strictly but kindly enforced, willingly obeyed, and never relaxed, this⁶ discipline was the secret of Gustavus's success, for it caused the

¹ Tilly, Pappenheim, and Wallenstein.

² Gustavus never went into winter quarters.

³ "History of the Thirty Years' War," by Anton Gindely; translated by Andrew Ten Brook.

⁴ "Gustavus Adolphus was the first General who grasped these facts, and who saw that mobility must be dependent on discipline."—"Précis of Modern Tactics," by Col. Home, C.B., R.E.

⁵ Schiller.

⁶ The following interesting description of the discipline maintained in the Swedish army is from the pen of Dr. Harte, who took immense pains to collect material for his life of Gustavus Adolphus:—

"The discipline between the respective contending forces was widely different, for the Imperialists had been corrupted by long prosperity. In a word, making the single exception of courage, they were just the reverse of the Swedes. One uniform succession of conquests had rendered them audacious, avaricious, and cruel. Though they had seen and performed great things, yet they were obliged to submit to younger and less experienced men, merely because they were moral, more virtuous, and better disciplined; for the camp of Gustavus was a school of order, decency, and religion. The King lived with his soldiers and knew them all. Luxury was a stranger in his camp, and so was gaming. Their hardness of constitution was such that they could extend the duration of a campaign almost equal to that of the year, being alike patient of heat and cold. Their camp was their home, their inn, their farm, their city, and their country. One would think an army no very excellent school either of learning to read or apprehending one's duty to God; yet Gustavus, and the

people of Germany, who had long been suffering under the cruel oppression of Tilly's lawless soldiery, to welcome the Swedish troops as deliverers from the Imperial yoke. Everywhere the inhabitants received Gustavus with acclamation; recruits crowded to his standards; his small force soon swelled with deserters from the Imperialist armies, and after providing for the garrisons of the strong places which he had captured, he was enabled to place nearly 35,000 men in line at his final battle of Lutzen.

It is well to dwell on these examples which so emphatically bear witness to the necessity of discipline, as the tendency of the age is rather to minimize its value, and place it in the background behind other military qualifications. We may, however, be certain that discipline is necessary now, nay, more necessary than ever, and that, altered as the conditions of war are in many respects, they still demand the observance of a strict code of discipline, not less strict than the code of Lycurgus, or that which Gustavus Adolphus drew up for the government of Swedish soldiers. The growth of wealth and luxury, the increased opportunities for self-indulgence, the craving after liberty, the levelling spirit of the age, which is becoming more and more developed,—all these influences, which are brought to bear on soldiers as well as civilians, need to be counteracted by the firm control of disciplinary law. It is not easier to face death now than it was 2,000 years ago, and if a high state of discipline did enable the Lacedæmonians to place fear of disgrace before thought for life, so is it equally necessary now to bring men up to the enemy and give them courage to die. Courage—unreasoning, reckless courage—as we have lately learnt on high¹ authority, is only the natural gift of a few individuals; but it can be acquired in a high degree by men who are bound to one another by the sentiment of mutual attachment formed in the presence of common danger. It is discipline which trains men to this sort of courage, which nerves the timid, and strengthens the weak, which makes heroes of cowards, and stimulates all to the highest deeds of daring.

The dust of education must not be allowed to blind our eyes to the necessity of discipline. Education, we are sometimes told, has superseded the use of discipline, and an instructed soldier does not require to be restrained by the strong arm of military law. Undoubtedly the spread of education does require modifications both in military law itself, and in its method of administration; but far from superseding the use of discipline, education has only increased the necessity of its existence.

Swedish Generals after his death, paid particular attention to these points. Public schools were opened every day with the same regularity as in a country town; and the moment the forces began to intrench themselves, the children went to a safe place marked out for the school.—“History of Gustavus Adolphus,” by Harte.

¹ “Fortnightly Review,” August, 1888. “Courage,” by General Viscount Wolseley, G.C.B. “The instinct of self-preservation comes to view at every turn. It is only the pride of regiment, of the country to which it belongs, of the traditions attached to it, and the sense of honour that springs from these sources, that can make the ordinary John Jones or William Smith so far disregard his personal safety as to face a deadly storm of bullets.”

"The spirit of criticism," to quote the words of an eloquent military¹ historian, "spreads with the growth of education, and considerably out of proportion with it. The reasoning obedience which a soldier should yield is perhaps confused with an obedience which requires to know the reason of an order, instead of that which is readily yielded in the belief that what may be unintelligible in detail is necessary for the general plan. That such obedience is not always easy to give may be true. The possession with a strong will, of but pigmy power is undoubtedly trying; but the self-denial which is demanded stands among the highest of all military virtues, as it is the alphabet of all military training. He only is fit to rule who has first learnt to obey."

This is how the influence of discipline steps in, and asserts its authority. Education, in fact, may either be a source of great strength or of great weakness to an army, according to the use that is made of it. If it teaches men to think without teaching them also to obey, it can only be productive of the utmost evil. If, however, limits are placed by the necessary restrictions of discipline to its otherwise boundless range, then it becomes a great moral lever of tremendous advantage to an armed force. Education and discipline, we may say, are necessary to one another. There is no antagonism, but on the contrary, close affinity between the two, and the nearer this affinity approaches complete incorporation, the greater is the influence exerted by the combined power of both forces.

The question may here be interposed, What is military discipline? What is the meaning of the term, what are its special attributes, and its sources of strength, and upon what does it depend for the power it possesses? It will, however, be impossible to give a categorical answer to these questions, or attempt to limit the use and meaning of the word which we are discussing, by a concise definition. Discipline has been defined by one² authority as "obedience to superiors": yet

¹ "History of the Royal Artillery," by Colonel F. Duncan, C.B., M.P. The value of education as a means of preserving discipline, and which is so much insisted on in the German army, was well brought out in a work which appeared some years ago on the "Army of the North German Confederation," by a Prussian General. "The instruction," he wrote, "existing in the army is of high importance both for its moral value and the military worth which is closely connected with it. Any understanding that is not quite uncultivated must comprehend that in all institutions of human society order and submission to commands are necessary, and therefore also obedience. It must also comprehend the necessity of lawful punishment for any rebellion against order and obedience; and just because he comprehends the necessity, an educated man submits to it more willingly than an uneducated one. Education is, therefore, a useful foundation for military discipline, and nourishes a sense of honour."—"The Army of the North German Confederation," by a Prussian General. Translated by Colonel E. Newdigate.

² "Drill is a means to discipline, but drill is not discipline, which may be defined as obedience to superiors."—"Précis of Modern Tactics," by Colonel Home, C.B.

Another high authority, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, once said that "Dress is discipline" (see Q. 8689, "Report of the Militia Committee of 1876"). His Royal Highness did not of course intend his words to be a complete definition of discipline, but his answer is instructive as showing how many elements there are in military discipline, and how impossible it is to exhaust the meaning of the word in a single definition.

the scope of these words hardly seems wide enough to satisfy the conditions of a complete definition. For discipline, in its application to an armed force, implies something more than mere passive obedience. Xerxes commanded the obedience of his soldiers; but he did not maintain discipline in his army. The same, as we shall presently see, may be said of the relations which existed between the Duke of Wellington and the English Army during the Peninsular War.¹ Discipline is perhaps best described by saying that it is a living principle—an active moral force deriving its power from constituted authority extending from leader to follower. What the spirit is to the body, discipline is to an armed force. It is the soul of an army. It inspires the thoughts, directs the aims, and controls the actions of every individual who comes under its laws. Discipline, as the author of the "Operations of War" has pointed out, is the union of very different qualities, each of which is an important element in war. "It means cohesion of the units, and suppleness of the mass, it means increased firmness and increased flexibility, it means the most efficient combination of many and various parts for a common end."

Having thus far disposed of the introductory part of the subject under discussion, and having formed some conception of the importance of discipline to an armed force, the way seems clearer for passing to the second and more practical part of the inquiry, viz.: "the best means of promoting and maintaining it."

Discipline we have seen to be an active moral force depending for its power on its ability to impress individuals, and masses which are collections of individuals. What organization is best suited for ensuring this object? This is the first question which suggests itself for answer. (Part II.)

Then again, moral force rests upon authority, and authority upon law. What are the best laws for establishing this authority, and for investing the moral force of discipline with power, strength, and respect? This is the second question to be answered. (Part III.)

Thirdly, what are the principles which should guide the conduct of

¹ It is hardly necessary to remark that no personal similitude between the Duke of Wellington and Xerxes is intended in this passage, the full signification of which will be explained further on in the essay. It would, indeed, be difficult to conceive two men differing more widely in personal character than Wellington and Xerxes. No one understood better than the great Duke in what true military discipline consists; or how painfully ignorant many of the Officers serving under him in the Peninsula were of the plain meaning of the term. Perhaps the best definition existing anywhere of discipline is to be found in a general order dated Badajoz, 24th September, 1809, an extract from which is here given:—

"The Commander of the Forces wishes the Commanding and other Officers of the regiments, particularly the field Officers, to recollect that there is a great deal to do to keep their regiments in order besides attending to the parades and drills of the men.

"The Commander of the Forces desires that Colonel Peacocke will pay attention to the state of discipline (meaning by that word habits of obedience to orders, subordination, regularity, and interior economy) of the 2nd battalion 83rd Regiment, and 2nd battalion 87th Regiment, as well as to their parade discipline and drill."

those who are entrusted with the administration of the laws of military discipline? (Part IV.)

When answers can be found for all these questions the inquiry will be complete, and the best means of "promoting and maintaining" discipline in an armed force will have been discovered.

PART II.—*Organization.*

"An army is but an instrument, and according to the way in which you construct that instrument it will work."—The late PRINCE CONSORT.

Organization begins with the individual soldier. His treatment, training, and assigned duties should be such that he may be made the best use of when acting in combination with others. After the individual comes the first small mass or collection of individuals under an appointed leader. Two or more of these small organized masses are then combined together under the command of a superior leader. This method of collecting masses of gradually increasing strength under leaders of ascending rank is continued until the Army is built up, and a chain of responsibility stretched from the supreme Commander down to the individual soldier.

The arrangement of every armed force which pretends to be called an organized army, should be based upon this principle, viz., the gradual decentralization of authority and responsibility, from the highest leader to the lowest individual; and an examination of all the best types of armies, whether in ancient or modern times, will convince the student that perfection in discipline has been reached, or fallen short of, according as this fundamental principle of organization has been fully or incompletely adopted.

There would seem to be three leading characteristics of sound organization, which should never be lost sight of, and which are essential features of perfection. They may be stated as follows:—

(a.) *The Individuality of every Member of the Force.*—This individuality¹ should be preserved both when the soldier is acting in his individual capacity as a fighting unit, and in his corporate capacity as a portion of an organized mass. For where the observance of military discipline is concerned, the harmonious working of those laws which are necessary for its maintenance, and to which reference will presently be made, depends entirely upon the way in which each indi-

¹ On this point Lord Wolseley makes the following remarks in the "Soldier's Pocket-book:—"The greater the individuality you give to the soldier himself, and to his company, and to his battalion, the more he feels that his individual conduct is of importance. No pains should be spared by Officers in impressing upon their men the consequence that attaches itself to the behaviour of each of them. Make a man proud of himself, and his corps, and he can always be depended on."

So too Frederick the Great observes: "In an army every individual part of it should aim at perfection to make it appear to be the work of only one man."—Extract from the "Military Instructions of Frederick the Great to his Generals." Translated by Major Foster.

vidual can be impressed with the necessity of obeying the laws himself, and inculcating their obedience on others.¹

(b.) *The Unity of each Mass.*—This will be found to have been a marked feature of the military systems of Lycurgus and Gustavus Adolphus, as indeed it also was of the Roman military organization, of that established in the French Army² by Napoleon, and of the German system³ when it had been brought to perfection after the war of 1866. This unity should be preserved intact down to the lowest organized mass of individuals, and no attempt should be made to assign a conventional limit to its extension.⁴ The controversy over the size and constitution of "units," which was at one time carried on with so much vigour, has at length been settled in this sense, and the necessity is now recognized of preserving the identity not merely of the Division, the brigade, and the battalion, but of the company, the half-company, and the section. There can be no doubt that the principle⁵

¹ This principle was fully recognized and admirably brought out by the author of the Wellington Prize Essay in words which are well worth reproducing in support of the text of this essay.

"For an army," wrote Colonel Maurice, "that would be able to meet all the circumstances of present warfare with the same freedom with which the Prussian has met them, the first great necessity is that the free action of every rank, from the General to the private, should be fully developed—not in order that each rank may interfere with and claim independence from the rank above it; but in order that each may more effectually co-operate with and carry out the work assigned by that immediately superior to it."

² "Each Corps was formed into four or five Divisions, varying in strength from 5,000 to 7,000 men, commanded by Generals of Division, who received their orders from the General of the Corps. The troops in these Divisions always remained under the same Officers; the Divisions always belonged to the same Corps; no incorporation or transposition, excepting in cases of absolute necessity arising from extraordinary casualties in war, disturbed the order established in the camps. In this way the Generals came to know their Officers, the Officers their soldiers; the capacity, disposition, and qualities of each were understood. An *esprit de corps* was formed not only among the members of the same regiment, but among those of the same Division and Corps."—Alison, "History of Europe," chap. xxxi.

³ "Every man seems to be in his place, and to know his proper business. The finished intelligence of large reach and measure, which presides over the whole strategic operations of Von Moltke, is proportionally represented in every military organism, from the *corps d'armée* to the company. Miscarriage or mistake seems no more to adhere to their ordinary operations than to the working of the machinery of a cotton factory. But, when any of these masses are resolved into their parts, the units, too, of which they are formed have each had their separate training, and each is capable of acting alone in his own sphere."—"Edinburgh Review," October, 1870. "Germany, France, and England."

⁴ To again quote the author of the "Wellington Prize Essay": "What we really require is that each body shall be so perfectly built into every other that at each successive stage of the building a perfect unit shall be formed. A brick is not less complete because it is arranged in a course, or a course less regular because it is built into a wall; nor does a wall less perform the special part assigned to it because it forms one of the sides of a house."

⁵ In the English "Infantry Field Exercises" this principle is in theory extended as low down as the section of fours, which is composed of a right and left file of the company:—

"The four men composing a right and left file will be considered as comrades in the field, and will act together, not only in forming fours, but on other occasions; they should therefore take notice of one another when they are told off."—"Infantry Field Exercise," 1884.

is one of the utmost value in regard to the maintenance of discipline, for if the permanent identity of each organized mass is constantly disturbed,¹ it must be to the detriment of its unity, cohesion, and *esprit de corps*, the "union" of which qualities, as we have already seen, constitute what we understand by the word "discipline."

(c.) *The Responsibility of each Leader.*—This requires to be scrupulously maintained from highest to lowest. Regard for it ensures obedience; disregard cannot fail to lessen authority. "It is perfectly clear that to establish and maintain discipline there must be personal contact between the superior and inferior."² Military organization then should seek to draw leaders and followers together, and render this contact as close as possible. This can only be done by rigid observance of the chain of responsibility.³ No leader should ever be passed over by a superior, either in the communication of his own orders, or in transmitting instructions which he may have received from higher authority. As each individual should be taught to look to his immediate leader for action and counsel, so if he receives instructions from any superior or otherwise extraneous source, the influence of the leader is diminished, and the interests of discipline are proportionally injured.

The altered conditions of modern battles more than ever demand the decentralization of responsible leadership. The functions of executive command have indeed passed out of the hands of superior officers into those of subordinate leaders. At the most critical moments of modern battles the smallest group leaders have greater influence in determining the result of the fight than the Commander-in-Chief himself can possibly hope to exert. The maintenance of discipline will be in their hands, and must remain there till death or victory relieves them of its burden. The truth of this was long ago recognized by the Germans at the time when the late Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia addressed his famous "Military Memorial" to the regimental Officers of the Army.⁴ If it has only met with tardy

¹ Sir Frederick Roberts brought this point out very clearly in his famous Mansion House Speech on the 14th February, 1881, when he was urging the importance of not transferring soldiers from corps to corps without strong necessity:—

"When once they have been posted, if that spirit of loyalty to their own corps is to be maintained, a spirit which every soldier knows often prompts men to do so much more than their duty, they should not be removed from their regiment, except by their own choice, or at the most pressing demands of the Service."—"Times," 15th February, 1881.

² "A Précis of Modern Tactics," by Colonel Home, C.B., R.E.

³ It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of maintaining this chain of responsibility intact down to the individual soldier. However great the temporary temptation may be to break through the chain, or however apparently convenient it may seem to do so, the sin of giving way is certain to find itself out. No more fruitful source of insubordination exists than neglect of this great vital principle of military organization. It is impossible to talk for five minutes to any intelligent recruit without feeling that this is so. He likes the Army, he will tell you, he is fond of military life, and finds his duties pleasant and agreeable. He has only one complaint, and that is, that he has "so many masters," whereas in civil life he only had one. It should be the aim of organization to give him this one master.

⁴ Since these words were written their truth has received fresh confirmation in the newly issued German Drill Regulations. "The most important requirements of

belief in England, this is not because we are unwilling to learn, but because the necessity of believing it has never been brought home to English troops on a modern European field of battle. There are, however, signs¹ that the principle of decentralized leadership is at length becoming recognized in the English Army as a necessary development of the new conditions of fighting, and we may safely affirm that the more practical the shape this recognition assumes during peace training, the surer is the guarantee that discipline will be maintained in war.

The three essential characteristics of good military organization, as set forth above, will be found to have existed in the case of both those armies which have been selected for reference in this essay as models of sound discipline.

Turning first to the case of Sparta, we find the smallest recognized mass of individuals in the Spartan Army was the enomotia, consisting of 25, 32, or at most 36 men. Each enomotia had a separate captain or enomotarch, the strongest and best man in the company. He was always in the front rank, and led the enomotia when it marched in single file. Above the enomotia were larger masses of gradually increasing strength, the pentecostæ, the lochi, and the moræ. The Commander-in-Chief transmitted his orders through the polemarchs, who commanded the moræ, to the locharchs, from the locharchs to the pentecostarchs, and from the latter to the enomotarchs.²

The enomotia was the foundation of the Spartan organization.³

war," so runs the official preface to the Regulations, "consist in the maintenance of the strictest discipline and order, even when all the faculties are at their highest tension." It is then described how this discipline can alone be secured by the decentralization of responsibility down to the lowest individual. In commenting on these new Regulations with special reference to the English Army, Dr. Russell, who has been an eye-witness of nearly all recent European campaigns, makes the following pertinent remarks in his journal: "While we in England are jealously guarding the rights of superiors, and never descend below the Colonel and his Adjutant, the Germans not only emphasize their old custom of allowing every opportunity to the commander of each unit, but go a step further, and extend their confidence to each individual man composing those units."—"Army and Navy Gazette," 20th October, 1889.

¹ The demand for the abolition of special instructors, and for placing the instruction of recruits entirely in the hands of company Officers and non-commissioned officers, is one of the "signs" of the awakening alluded to above.

"The days of special instruction," wrote Lord Wolsley, now more than ten years ago, "for the education of recruits are numbered, and company and troop Officers must learn to teach their own men to drill, to shoot, and to ride, without the assistance of musketry and gunnery instructors, or of riding-masters."—"Nineteenth Century," March, 1878.

Without entering into the controversial part of the question, it seems clear that the interference of specialists, whether necessary or not, does contribute to divide responsibility, and, in so far as it does so, to weaken the bond of "contact" between leader and follower, or, in other words, to weaken discipline.

² So far as can be ascertained, there were four enomotia in each pentecostæ, and four pentecostæ in each lochus. According to Xenophon, the mora consisted of four lochi. Xenophon and Thucydides differ slightly as to the composition of the Spartan Army, but both agree upon the principle of the triple organization as set forth in the text of the essay.

³ "It was upon these small companies that the constant and severe Lacedæmonian

The men in each of these small companies were drilled together, and bound to one another and to their leader by a common oath. The "individuality" of each member of the enomotia was strongly emphasized, and to such an extent was this carried that a Spartan soldier named Pantites, who was absent on civil business from Thermopylæ, where his enomotia was engaged, put an end to his life when he heard that his comrades had fallen.¹ Aristodemus, who was the only one of the 300 who escaped the disaster by flight, was loaded with disgrace. No one would speak to him, or offer him fire; he was branded, his face shaven, and the opprobrious term of "trembler" (*τρεσας*) was annexed to his name.² Nor, though he afterwards fell honourably at Plataea, was death allowed to wipe out the lasting infamy of his cowardice, and he was refused the usual burial rites accorded to those who were killed in battle. By such lessons as these was the necessity of discipline brought home to Spartan soldiers, who were taught to believe that the safety and honour of their country depended, not upon the skill of their Generals, nor the numbers of their troops, but on the personal exertions and individual discipline of each member of the State Army.³

It was the perfection of her military organization, and the admirable state of discipline maintained through its machinery, that marked Sparta out for leadership among the Greek States, as early as the first Persian invasion under Darius. The manner in which she was then appealed⁴ to for help and counsel at a time of imminent

discipline was brought to act; they were taught to march in concert, to change rapidly from line to file, to wheel right or left, in such a manner that the enomotarch should always be immediately opposed to the enemy."—Grote's "History of Greece," vol. ii.

¹ Herodotus, Book VII, chap. cccxxx.

² *Ibid.*

³ The Macedonian phalanx, and afterwards the Roman legion, were constructed on the same broad principles of organization as those followed by Lycurgus. Both were built up from small units. The "lochos," with its single file of 16 deep, was the foundation of the phalanx. 16 "lochi" constituted one "syntagma," 256 strong; and two "syntagmas" formed one "pentakosiarchy," 512 strong. This was the ordinary regiment. Among other changes which Alexander made in the constitution of the phalanx, he put four "syntagmas" to one "pentakosiarchy," and two or more of these regiments he grouped into a "taxi," under a superior leader.

In a similar way the "century" was the foundation of the Roman legion. Two centuries—each at first 100 strong, but afterwards decreased to 60 strong when the tribes were increased in number—formed one "maniple," four maniples one "cohort," and ten cohorts one "legion."

It is not intended to discuss the constitution of the phalanx and legion at further length, but merely to point out that the high state of discipline, for which the armies both of Alexander and Cæsar were renowned, was maintained by applying to their organization precisely the same principles of decentralization and gradually descending authority which were such essential characteristics of the military system of Lycurgus.

⁴ "Grote," part ii, chap. xxxvi.—The fact that the Spartan Army came too late for the battle of Marathon, which was won by the brilliant generalship of Miltiades with Athenian troops alone, does not alter the nature of the appeal made to Sparta by Athens, or do away with the fact that her aid was considered indispensable to resist the invasion.

national danger is a tribute to the military ascendancy which she had insensibly gained over the other Greek communities. What, however, for the purpose of this essay it is specially important to note in this connection is that this ascendancy, which came to Sparta from the first naturally and without seeking on her part, and which she maintained after a long and bitter struggle with her brilliant rival, was acquired in spite of many disadvantages—such as she owed for instance to her inferior geographical position, and to the prejudices and dull intellect¹ of her people—was due to the sheer force of a high standard of discipline maintained in her army by means of a sound system of organization.²

It is time now to turn once more from ancient to modern history. After the decline of the Roman Empire military organization fell into neglect. Wars ceased to be conducted on scientific lines, and degenerated into mere contests of brute strength. Large masses of horse and foot soldiers were collected together, as best they could be, considering the want of system and consequent want of discipline. It was not till the early part of the seventeenth century that Gustavus Adolphus appeared, and once more raised war to the dignity of a science. He began by making a complete revolution in the organization of the Swedish army as he received it over from his father king.³ He broke the huge unwieldy columns, which then existed, into small self-supporting "pelotons," varying in size from 96 to 214 men. Giving each peloton a separate leader, and reducing the depth of the columns to six men—the Imperialist columns were eighteen deep—he arranged these small pelotons or companies in "battaglia," half brigades, and brigades; while, instead of placing all his troops in one line, he supported his first line with a second line of reserves in rear. Here, after an interlude of 1,500 years, we find Gustavus reorganizing his troops on the same principle which, as has already been seen, governed the organization of the Spartan armies, and which had been extended with so much effect to the Macedonian phalanx and the

¹ Grote speaks of the "selfish dulness" of the Spartans. Part ii, chap. xxxvi.

² "The military forces of the other cities of Greece, even down to the close of the Peloponnesian War, enjoyed little or no special training, having neither any small company like the *enomoty*, consisting of particular men drilled together, nor fixed and disciplined officers, nor triple scale of subordination and subdivision."

—Grote's "History of Greece," part ii, chap. viii.

³ The following description of Gustavus's organization, although from the pen of a civilian, gives such an admirable idea of the changes introduced by the Swedish king that it is well worth reproducing:—

"Thus the whole army was one complicated but unperplexed machine, consisting of innumerable parties or pelotons of men, all little systems by themselves, all acting under a chieftain of their own, yet all contributing to the grand establishment of the whole together. By these means, and by the power of moving easily from place to place, he brought more hands to act than the enemy could; and, though his men might be killed, they could not be routed, for help was ever at hand, and the destruction of one part did not necessarily involve the destruction of another. The directions of the General had always free passage, as the blood is poured from the heart, and then regularly dispersed, not only through arteries and veins, but even through the smallest capillaries."—"History of Gustavus Adolphus," by Harte, vol. ii, p. 23.

Roman legion.¹ It was with an army thus organized that Gustavus routed the huge solid columns of the Imperialists at Leipzig and Lutzen; and when the high state of discipline which prevailed among the Swedish troops is given, and rightly given, as the cause of their surprising victories, it is again necessary to remember that discipline without organization is only an empty title, and that the famous Swedish code compiled by Gustavus himself would have remained a dead letter incapable of practical application had he not so organized his troops that both the letter of his laws and the spirit of his own example might descend from the soldier-king to the humblest follower in his army.

No one understood better than the Duke of Wellington what an important bearing organization has on the discipline of an armed force, and when, in 1829, the Government of the day proposed to abolish corporal punishment, and adapt the stern system of repressive discipline which existed in the English army to the milder method of treatment which had been tried with so much effect in the Prussian Service, the Duke replied that it would be useless to alter the discipline without altering the organization also.

"The army of Prussia," said his Grace, "is at all times regularly organized, each battalion in its regiment, each regiment in its brigade, each brigade in its Division, each Division in its Corps d'Armée—the whole under the personal inspection of the King; so that there is not a Corps, Division, brigade, regiment, battalion, company, or individual whose conduct is not checked and controlled by his superior as well as by the view and knowledge of the whole of the profession. Compare this state of things with the British Army, with our total want of inspection and control over either Officers or men, in nearly all parts of the world, and we shall see cause for astonishment that there is any discipline in the Army at all I recommend that we should stand firm upon the establishment of our discipline as it is."²

The Government adopted the advice of their military adviser, and did "stand firm," until an improved organization which began to be extended to the Army in 1871 enabled the discipline to be gradually relaxed in severity with corresponding increase in efficiency.³

The ghastly testimony of the Crimean War may be finally cited as an illustration of the connection which exists between *morale* and organization. If in the month of August, 1855, the English Army

¹ "For the first time since the decline of the Roman legion an organized and well-disciplined army appeared in Europe."—"Life of Wallenstein," by Colonel Mitchell.

The military student is indebted to Lord Reay, who was in the King of Sweden's service, for an exact plan, showing the composition of one of Gustavus's brigades. The diagram gives the position of every Officer and soldier, and shows how each peloton is itself capable of subdivision into numerous sections under allotted leaders.

² "Memorandum on the Proposed Plan for Altering the Discipline of the Army," 22nd April, 1829, by Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G.

³ Authority for this statement will be given in Part III of this essay.

was, as an eminent authority has asserted,¹ "in a discreditable degree of demoralization," this is only what must be expected by any nation which hurries into war without previous organization during peace. How lamentably defective that organization was when the Russian War burst on the country may be learnt from the Memorandum² on the Army which the Prince Consort drew up in 1855, and which has since been supplemented by Mr. Kinglake's caustic indictment of the "War Administration of England" in the sixth volume of his gorgeous narrative.³ Happily the lessons of the war have not been thrown away, and it is some consolation to feel that the sufferings of our troops in the terrible winter of 1854 awakened the English people to a sense of forgotten duty, and have resulted in a reorganization of the Army on lines of improvement which is being steadily maintained during these long years of continuous peace.

PART III.—*Law.*

"The law, which is the perfection of reason."—COKE.

"It is an intermixture of mercy and justice that will bring you fear and obedience : for too much rigour makes people desperate."—BACON.

Discipline rests, as we have seen, on authority, and authority on law. Ordinary civil law takes no cognizance of military rank, and, in order to secure discipline, it has to be supplemented by military law, which determines the functions, status, and rights of every one in the force. There are, moreover, certain offences, such, for instance, as desertion and disobedience, which, when committed by a soldier, are crimes, but when committed by a civilian are at worst only breaches of contract. Military law defines these offences, and fixes the penalties for their commission.

It is very necessary in the interests of discipline that military law should have the same status as civil law, and should, in fact, be "part of the law of the land relating to the government of the military forces, and having for its object military discipline."⁴ It is thus impressed on the soldier that while he is in the military service of his country his military character is merely "superinduced"⁵ on his civil character, and does not obliterate it.⁶ This is the view which now generally prevails with civilized nations, and especially in the case of those countries which have risen to pre-eminence in war we

¹ "The Soldier's Pocket-book," by General Viscount Wolseley, G.C.B., p. 6 of 5th edition.

² Memorandum dated Windsor, 14th January, 1855.

³ "I hazard the opinion," wrote Prince Albert, "that our army, as at present organized, can hardly be called an army at all."

⁴ Kinglake's "Crimean War," chap. iii, vol. vi.

⁵ "Treatise on Military Law," by Lieutenant Rollin. A. Ives, U.S.A.

⁶ "Manual of Military Law," War Office, 1887, chap. i.

⁶ It was well said by Mr. Clode, in alluding to the English Military Code of 1872, that "Arbitrary in its provisions and severe in its punishments, such a code, far beyond any other, needs both the sanction of experience and the weight of high authority to command loyal acceptance."—"Military and Martial Law," by C. M. Clode, Barrister-at-Law.

find their military codes, instead of deriving their authority from the prerogative powers of the Crown or Commander-in-Chief, form part of the statute law of the land. In our own Army military law remained till 1879 in the unsatisfactory position of being outside of and divorced from the civil law of England. "No permanent statute law now exists," wrote an eminent authority¹ on military jurisprudence in 1872, "the jurisdiction exercised by the military tribunals has been advisedly withdrawn from public observation. Raised as the Army originally was under an influence supposed to be antagonistic to freedom, the people have willingly remained ignorant of the peculiar laws and institutions under which both Officers and soldiers were governed."²

In 1879 Parliament took up the question, and the Army Discipline and Regulation Act of that year, re-enacted with some amendments in the Army Act of 1881, consolidated³ in one statute the provisions of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, under which the Army had up to that time been governed. Military law in this country has now the full force and dignity of statute law, and all jealousy of the military courts has been removed, inasmuch as they derive their powers from the same source as the ordinary civil courts of the country.

The passing of this Act is an important landmark in the military history of England. From that date the English Army ceased to be an "exotic"—a caste apart from the nation, viewed with suspicion by the civil authorities, and containing in its constitution elements which were "antagonistic to freedom." It became instead a great national institution closely identified with the national life, and subject, like any other English institution, to the constitutionally exercised control of the Crown. What a portion of the Army—the Militia force—was formerly called, the whole Army may now be truthfully named—a "constitutional" force. Military obedience has been placed on precisely the same footing as civil obedience, the importance of which change in the interests of loyal discipline can hardly be exaggerated, and has a most distinct and direct bearing on the subject of this essay.

Precision, clearness, and completeness would seem to be the chief characteristics of a good military code. Offences should be distinctly specified, and penalties proportionally fixed. The powers of courts, and of executive Officers charged with administering the law, require

¹ "Military and Martial Law," by C. M. Clode, Barrister-at-Law.

² "The British Army is an exotic in England, unknown to the old constitution of the country; required or supposed to be required only for the defence of its foreign possessions; disliked by the inhabitants, particularly by the higher orders, some of whom never allow one of their family to serve in it."—"Memorandum on the Discipline of the Army," April 22, 1829, by Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G.

³ "Thus has been accomplished, after the lapse of more than a century, a wish expressed by Mr. Justice Blackstone in his Commentaries, 'that it might be thought worthy the wisdom of Parliament to ascertain the limits of military subjection, and to enact express articles for the government of the Army.'"—"Manual of Military Law," War Office, 1857.

to be defined beyond any possibility of misconception. It is above all important in defining the summary penal powers of Officers to leave as little room for the exercise of individual personal discretion as is compatible with the necessity of fixing a maximum and minimum penalty for certain offences. It should be the aim of military law to impress all ranks with a sense of the equal justice¹ of a code to which all are amenable, and the provisions of which can be enforced against any Officer who abuses the powers conferred on him by law.

The delegation of summary penal powers is specially a matter for careful determination, and is one as to which there is considerable difference of practice among European armies. In certain countries summary powers of punishment are not conferred on Officers below the rank of company commander. This is the case with the armies of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Servia.² In the armies of Portugal and Greece all commissioned Officers are vested with certain penal powers corresponding to their rank.³ In the case of Russia, France, Italy, Turkey, Finland, Switzerland, and Roumania, not only do all Officers possess these powers, but even non-commissioned officers, down as low as the rank of corporal, are considered competent to inflict summary punishment.⁴ In defence of this system it is urged that everyone who is charged with maintenance of discipline requires to be vested with power to enforce obedience. It would seem, however, necessary for the just administration of military law, as it is for that of civil law, that penal power should be associated with judicial responsibility, and that if this responsibility be removed there is no safeguard against the abuse of authority. It is contrary to the accepted principles of jurisprudence to intermingle police and judicial duties, and if executive (not commanding) Officers possess proper police powers these should be sufficient to secure their authority without the addition of judicial power also. This principle⁵ is recognized in the English military

¹ "Justice ought to bear rule everywhere, and especially in armies; it is the only means to settle order there, and there it ought to be executed with as much exactness as in the best governed cities of the kingdom, if it be intended that the soldiers should be kept in their duty and obedience."—"The Art of War," by Louis de Gaya in 1678.

² "Military Law, with a chapter on the Military Law of Foreign States," by Lieut.-Colonel Torcy.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ It was not, however, till 1879 that this principle was thoroughly recognized, when the vexed question of the duties and position of Provost-Marshal, which gave so much concern to the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular War (vol. iv, "Gurwood Despatches," p. 311, and vol. vi, *ibid.*, pp. 517, 518), was settled by the introduction of a clause, now clause 74 of the Army Act, 1881, which restricts the duties of a Provost-Marshal to those of a police officer. He is thus deprived of the power to inflict summary punishment conferred on him by General Order of 1st November, 1811—a power which was afterwards confirmed in the 16th Article of War, by Lord Hardinge when Commander-in-Chief. This change, though apparently trifling, is in reality one of the utmost importance, both in respect of the theoretical principle of law involved, and also of the practical bearing which it must have on the future discipline of English troops in the field.

code; and while certain penal powers of minor severity are conferred on company and troop Commanders under proper restrictions and safeguards, and are not allowed to be delegated below these Officers, the exercise of full disciplinary power is confined to Commanding Officers of corps. There is thus ample guarantee against the hasty infliction of punishment on insufficient evidence, while the deliberate procedure which English military law requires, strengthens the exemplary effect of the punishment awarded.

Punishment for military crime should be appropriate to the peculiar nature of the offence. The end of military discipline being to infuse a high standard of honour in an army, degrading punishments ought to have no place in a code of military law. The "custom of war" recognizes this by requiring the extreme penalty of death to be inflicted by shooting instead of by the ignominious means of hanging. For the same reason the punishment of flogging is now generally condemned on the ground that its infliction degrades the soldier, who is employed in an honourable calling. Corporal punishment did not exist in the code of Lycurgus, and though it appeared as a penalty in the regulations drawn up by Gustavus Adolphus, it was rarely if ever enforced.²

Among the armies of European States it has been retained only by those of Russia and Turkey.³ It was preserved in the English Articles⁴ of War till the passing of the Army Discipline and Regulation Act

¹ The procedure in the American Army is more deliberate than in that of any other country, the military code not conferring any summary penal powers on individual Officers, and requiring all offenders to be arraigned, even for trifling crimes, before a regimental court-martial, consisting of three members. In time of war, however, a field Officer may be detailed from each regiment to try offences committed in the field, and this Officer's court has the same jurisdiction in war as regimental and garrison courts have during peace.—"American Articles of War."

² "It was a principle with Gustavus Adolphus that even a common soldier shall rarely, if ever, receive corporal punishment; for he was fully persuaded that such a disgrace cast a damp afterwards upon his vivacity, and agreed not well with the notions which a high spirit ought to entertain of honour. It was his idea that a man of bravery would sooner forgive a sentence of death inflicted upon him by court-martial than pass by the scandal of corporal chastisement. His rule, therefore, was to degrade or banish."—"History of Gustavus Adolphus," by Harte.

³ In some codes corporal punishment is expressly forbidden, in others no mention of it is made at all. In abolishing it in 1830 the Provisional Government of Belgium described it as "insulting to Belgian soldiers, and a crime against the dignity of man."

⁴ The question was very fully enquired into by the Royal Commission of 1836, which thus summed up the evidence of a large number of Officers; non-commissioned officers, and privates, who had recorded their opinion against the retention of the lash:—

"It is said to be inefficient for its object, to degrade the character, and tend rather to harden than reform the individual. Its effect upon those who witness it is said to be that of disgust and sympathy for the offender. It is said to fail before the enemy. It is also said to be so contrary to the feelings of the country in its present state of civilization, that the public mind is irritated against it, and that circumstance alone calls for its abolition."

In spite of much strong evidence, however, against its retention, the Royal Commissioners were unable to resist the Duke of Wellington's powerful appeal not to abolish it.

of 1879, when its infliction in a modified form was only sanctioned on active service. In 1881 corporal punishment disappeared altogether from the English military code, although the civil criminal law permits its use under certain circumstances. The manner of its abolition was much criticized at the time, and was attributed in some quarters to false sentiment; but the resolution, which an eminent statesman¹ moved in the House of Commons, to the effect "that no Bill for the discipline and regulation of the Army will be satisfactory to this House which provides for the permanent retention of corporal punishment for military offences," embodied a principle which the public sense of the country recognized as sound, and in accordance with the best ideas of military jurisprudence.²

Flogging of English soldiers had in fact long stood condemned alike by its practical inefficiency as a punishment as by its degrading influence on the minds of the men. Based as corporal punishment is upon physical fear, it appealed to the very feeling to which, as Napier has somewhere remarked, English soldiers are most insensible. Flogging was for this reason powerless to deter from crime.³ But worse than this; so long as the punishment was sanctioned by English military law, it was a standing testimony to the distrust of soldiers by their own Officers, and destroyed the feeling of mutual confidence, which is—we have the word of the Duke of Wellington⁴ for it—the foundation of Military Discipline. Until the code was cleared of this blot, it was impossible to establish those relations of intimate comradeship which now mark the intercourse between commissioned Officers and the rank and file of the Army, and which, as will be shown in Part IV of this essay, are a far surer guarantee than the fear of the lash for the future discipline of English soldiers in the field. The greatest enemy this country ever had has something to teach England in regard to the treatment of her soldiers.

¹ The Marquis of Hartington.

² The question was very much complicated at the time by party feeling, and the resolution was lost by a majority of 106 in a House of 472 ("Times" newspaper, 18th July, 1879); but, after the discussion which took place, it was felt that corporal punishment was doomed. The following sweeping assertion, however, made in an influential magazine by Mr. Archibald Forbes, was allowed to pass unchallenged: "What I aver broadly is that the suffrage of the ranks would be given in favour of corporal punishment, and that too on very sound, manly, and intelligible grounds."

It would be impossible to make war if recourse to corporal punishment was forbidden; and in making this assertion I am perfectly confident I have with me the Army, from the Commander-in-Chief down to the drummer-boy.—"Nineteenth Century," October, 1879; "Flogging in the Army," by Archibald Forbes.

It is hardly worth while now to enquire upon what evidence this "confident" assertion was made at the time, as the question has passed from the region of controversy to that of settled conviction. Mr. Forbes's statement, however, is in direct variance with the evidence of numerous Officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates who were examined before the Royal Commission of 1836; and public opinion is hardly likely to have changed for the worse between 1836 and 1879. It is a sufficient answer to Mr. Forbes to say that it has been found possible to "make war" without corporal punishment, and to secure a far higher state of discipline than was the case when "the fear of the lash was the beginning of wisdom."

³ Napier's "History of the Peninsular War" is a testimony to this.

⁴ Despatch to Marshal Beresford, Badajoz, 8th September, 1809.

"The English soldier," said Napoleon, "is brave; nobody more so. I think that if I were at the head of a number of them I could make them do anything. I would alter your system. Instead of the lash I would lead them by the stimulus of honour. Whatever debases a man cannot be serviceable. None but the dregs of the *canaille* voluntarily enter as soldiers. This disgraceful punishment is the cause of it. What honour can a man possibly have who is flogged before his comrades?"¹

A very high idea of the dignity of the military profession is inculcated in the Articles of War of the American Army. Not only are corporal punishments, such as branding and flogging, positively forbidden,² but confinement in a penitential prison cannot be awarded unless the offence is also one under the common law of the United States.³ The crime of desertion is associated with a peculiar degree of dishonour, and by the civil statute⁴ law a soldier, who has been convicted and punished for deserting, forfeits all rights of citizenship, and is for ever afterwards incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under the United States. It is also worthy of notice, as an instance of the spirit which pervades the American Articles of War, that the award of extra guard duty as a punishment is prohibited;⁵ and when, during the Civil War, a soldier was sentenced to perform a certain number of extra guards, the Secretary of War refused to confirm the sentence of the court-martial, and in a general order to the Army called the attention of Officers to the "danger of associating with the honourable and important duty of guards any idea of punishment or degradation."⁶

¹ "Napoleon in Exile," by O'Meara.

When it is asked what is to be done with the "*canaille*," the answer is that there is no place for such people in the reformed Army of England. The following evidence of a private in the Guards, who was examined before the Royal Commission of 1836, may be quoted as showing the feeling of the rank and file of the Army at that time in regard to corporal punishment. Much other similar evidence was recorded:—

Q. (1179).—Do you say that flogging is degrading to the man himself?

A.—Very much so.

Q. (1184).—Supposing the power of inflicting punishment at the halberds were done away with do you think it would make it easier to obtain recruits?

A.—I think it would.

Q. (1186).—When an immediate example is necessary—as a man's refusing in the face of the regiment—what is your opinion of the punishment of such a man for the sake of example?

A.—I would imprison him. If that had no effect I would discharge him from the regiment. Such a man is not fit to be there.

² Article 38.

³ Article 97.

⁴ Revised Statutes, 1993.

⁵ Military Law (U.S.A.), by Ives, chap. xii, p. 173.

⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. XII, page 173.

So also when a court-martial sentenced a soldier for absence without leave to a year's prolongation of his service, the sentence was quashed by the War Minister on the ground of its impropriety. "The military service of the United States," to quote the words of the general order, "has always been considered honourable. It does not, therefore, comport with the honour, dignity, or security of the Service to

In fixing scales of punishment for military offences it should be borne in mind that the object of punishment is to deter¹ others rather than to reform the individual punished. "I consider all punishments," wrote² the Duke of Wellington in 1813, "to be for the sake of example, and the punishment of military men in particular is expedient only in cases where the prevalence of any crime, or the evils resulting from it, are likely to be injurious to the public interests." Prompt, certain, regular,³ and exemplary⁴ punishment secures the object in view better than the infliction of lengthened and severe penalties. Publicity⁵ is an important fact to be considered in regard to the exemplary effect exercised; and was invariably insisted on by the Duke of Wellington during his campaigns. The shame of public punishment, even when short and light, brings home to all concerned the certain consequences of crime. The idea is much countenanced in the German Army, and when an Officer or soldier is reprimanded, the publication of the censure in garrison orders is frequently resorted to, and has been found to have powerful effect in promoting that high condition of discipline which characterizes German troops both during peace and war.

That severity is not necessary to deter from crime may be seen from the remarkable diminution in punishment in the English Army which occurred in 1887, at the beginning of which year new disciplinary instructions were issued by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, directing courts-martial to reduce the severity of their sentences, while at the same time the summary powers of Commanding Officers were enlarged. Commenting on this fact, the "Times" newspaper wrote as follows on the 18th October last:—

use it as a punishment for an offender. Such use will go far to destroy the *esprit de corps* which is so essential to the efficiency of an army."—*Ibid.*

¹ "The object of the penal element is more to deter others than for the effect on the individual subjected to punishment."—"Punishment and Prevention of Crime," by Colonel Sir E. F. Du Cane, K.C.B., Surveyor-General of Prisons.

² Letter to Major-General Lambert, dated St. Jean de Luz, 25th November, 1813.

³ "According to this mode of procedure the trial and punishment of an offender will not be quite so quick as we might wish, but it will be certain and regular."—Extract of a letter of Sir Arthur Wellesley to Colonel Murray, dated Bombay, 1st April, 1804.

⁴ "The repression of crime by corrective discipline depends mainly on the punishment operating widely as an example."—"Aide-Mémoire to the Military Sciences," part i, vol. iii.

⁵ G.O., dated Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811.

"As the object in assembling the troops in any station to witness a punishment is to deter others from the commission of the crime for which the criminal is about to suffer, the Commander of the Forces requests that upon every occasion on which the troops are assembled for this purpose, the order may be distinctly read and explained to them, and that every man may understand the reason for which the punishment is inflicted."

Public punishment of this nature, deliberately inflicted for the sake of example, after due consideration and hearing of evidence, is not to be confounded with the hasty, intemperate reproof of juniors by seniors in the presence of others. The maintenance of discipline specially requires this to be guarded against, and in the case of the English Army resort to this method of rebuking juniors constitutes a breach of regulations.—"Queen's Regulations," para. iv, s. vi.

"The substitution of comparative leniency for severity has in the first year diminished more serious crimes by about 15, and more venial irregularities by about 10 per cent. That these figures constitute honest evidence may be deduced from the fact that they apply, though in varying proportions, to every arm of the Service, to almost every place in which a portion of the Army is quartered, and with rare exceptions to every regiment. They are, we may assume, not affected by incidental, local, or special considerations, and they tell us plainly that throughout the Army a considerable diminution of severity has been at once followed by a considerable diminution of crime. We are beginning," the writer goes on to say, "to learn that long terms of imprisonment have a demoralizing rather than a deterring influence, and that we can have the Army better behaved without them. Not improbably if the enlightened general orders of 1887 in the direction of leniency were to be further extended the result might be still better."

Military degradation and summary dismissal have been found to act as powerful deterrents from crime in those armies in which a high spirit of honour and discipline have been encouraged. Dismissal was Cæsar's chief punishment for military crimes. Holding, as he did, that the Roman military service was an honourable calling, and one upon which a premium should be placed, he never allowed an unworthy legionary to follow his standards. During his last campaign in Africa he publicly degraded and dismissed¹ several superior Officers of the 10th Legion, who had been convicted of inciting the men to mutiny.² At an earlier period of his wars, finding his Officers were afraid to march against the German chief, Ariovistus, he told them in the presence of the whole army to take their men back to Mals, and he would go forward alone with the 10th Legion. "Upon this," says Plutarch, "the 10th Legion deputed some of their corps to thank Cæsar. The other legions threw the whole blame on their

¹ The following are the words of Cæsar's sentence: "You, Caius Avianus, instigated soldiers in the service of the State to mutiny against their Commanders. You oppressed towns which were under your charge. Forgetting your duty to the Army and to me, you filled a vessel with your own establishment, which was intended for the transport of troops, and at a difficult moment we were thus left through your means without the men whom we needed. For these causes and as a mark of disgrace I dismiss you from the Service, and I order you to leave Africa by the first ship which sails.

"You, Titus Salicenus, Marcus Tiro, Caius Ausinas, Centurions, obtained your commissions by favour, not by merit. You have shown a want of courage, and encouraged a mutinous spirit in your companies. You are unworthy to serve under my command. You are dismissed, and will return to Italy."—Cæsar's "Commentaries."

² In setting before the Roman people a high standard of military honour Cæsar was only carrying out the traditions of Roman policy, which made military service the first duty of every citizen. How high this standard of duty was is shown during the Second Punic War, when the Senate refused to allow the refugees from Cannæ to join the army of Marcellus.

"The Senate could see no reason for entrusting the service of the Commonwealth to men who had abandoned their comrades at Cannæ while they were fighting to the death."—Livy, Book XXV, 5-7.

Officers, and all followed him with great spirit and alacrity."¹ In the case of the English Army, the right, which is provided by the Army Act of 1881,² to discharge soldiers from the Service has of late years been largely used by courts-martial, and by those "competent military authorities" who are empowered to carry out the discharge of unworthy men. The adoption of this system, which was recommended in 1869 by the Royal Commission on Military Punishments, and is a necessary consequence of other important reforms introduced into the Army, is having a marked effect in improving the tone and discipline of English soldiers.³ The following statistics, extracted from the General Annual Return of the British Army for 1887, show that this is the case during the last decade:—

	1877.	1887.
Strength of the Army, exclusive of Officers and warrant officers.....	182,412	201,621
Number of men fined for drunkenness	25,909	21,122
Proportion of these per 1,000 men.....	140	104
Number of minor punishments.....	232,687	240,448
Proportion of these per 1,000 men.....	1,549	1,237
Number of court-martial punishments.....	15,154	11,688
Percentage to average strength.....	8	6
Net Loss from deserters.....	2,551	1,453
Proportion of net loss from deserters to 1,000 men ...	14	7
Number discharged by purchase ⁴	2,970	1,493

In the case of those armed forces which are recruited by voluntary means and not by conscription, the conditions of enlistment of recruits, of their periods of service, appointment, transfer from corps to corps, re-engagement, and discharge, as well as the duties of recruiting authorities, require to be determined by law. Upon the wisdom of such law, and upon the degree with which it is in sympathy with the habits and customs of the civil population, must depend in a large manner the discipline of the armed force which is raised under its authority. In conscript armies the duties of the recruiting officers are periodical and mechanical; but in voluntary armies they are constant and responsible. The physical conditions of the enlistment of recruits need not be discussed in this essay as they only have a

¹ Plutarch's "Lives"—"Julius Cæsar."

² S. 92, Army Act, 1881.

³ "The only head under which there was an increased waste for 1887, was discharge for misconduct. This, however, was not owing to increased misbehaviour on the part of the soldier, but to the fact that discharges for misconduct were much more freely authorized. The Service has in every way benefited thereby."—"Report of Inspector-General of Recruiting," 2nd February, 1888.

⁴ These last figures are quoted to show the increasing popularity of military service in England owing to the elimination of bad characters, whose presence in the Army used to disgust respectable recruits, and drove them to purchase their discharge.

remote bearing on discipline. They are regulated, on the one hand by the wish of the State to secure the best physical material available for its soldiers, and on the other hand by the ever-varying conditions of supply and demand, and by the attractions which civil life may offer as compared with military service. Age, however, is a matter of very direct concern to discipline. As a rule, the younger a man enters the Army the better. Habits of discipline are more easily acquired in early manhood than later on in life, when the character of the recruit has been already formed. If recruits are taken for military service at an early age, the necessity of closely inquiring into their antecedents and character is not so important, for it is the function of discipline to form character, and to mould the rough material into required shape. Similarly mental proficiency need not concern the recruiting officer when the recruit is young, and when facilities exist for mental improvement after enlistment. These considerations all point to the necessity of obtaining recruits at an early age, and where, as is now the case in England, service with the colours during peace is regarded as a period of training for the reserve, in which the military strength of the country really rests in war, there would seem to be good reason for assimilating the age of recruits to that fixed for conscript armies: As regards the English Army this would involve a reduction in the limit of age from 25 to 20 or 21 at highest.¹ If difficulty were found in obtaining a sufficient inflow of recruits at such ages, it would then be necessary to consider whether it would not be preferable to increase the attractions of military service by offering higher rates of pay, or other advantages, than to continue a system which enables deserters and men discharged for misconduct from the Army to elude the vigilance of the recruiting and approving officers, and re-enter the ranks. Public attention has been much drawn of late to this question of fraudulent enlistment, and in the interests of discipline and the further development of the reorganization of 1871, some drastic change in the recruiting law seems necessary to stamp out an evil which is one of great magnitude.² The feeling of the country has been so often expressed against any attempt to revive the practice of branding, or even against marking Officers and soldiers on entering the Army, that it would be useless to discuss any such proposal under existing circumstances. A reduction in the age of recruits would undoubtedly strengthen the hands of the recruiting officers in their efforts to prevent fraudulent enlistment.³ Whether

¹ If recruiting continues to improve at the same rate as has been the case in recent years, there would be little difficulty in reducing the limit of age. In his Report for 1887, the Inspector-General of Recruiting wrote as follows on the 2nd February last. "The Army is now up to its establishment, and the real difficulty at present is to keep it from overflowing." Out of 31,234 recruits who joined the Army in 1887, 23,382 were under the age of 21.

² "It will be seen that the cases of fraudulent enlistment still continue frequent. . . . In 1887 no less than 2,235 men serving in the Army claimed their discharge under the Royal pardon as having fraudulently enlisted."—"Report of Inspector-General of Recruiting," dated 2nd February, 1888.

³ A further remedy may be found in the proposal made by the Inspector-General of Recruiting that an attempt to fraudulently enlist into the Army should be an offence at common law.

this change is eventually made or not, the last word on the discipline of the English, or any other voluntarily recruited army, will always rest with the recruiting officers, and with the higher authorities who are responsible for the laws which guide them in performing their duties.¹

PART IV.—Administration.

"No General can accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of his men as well as their bodies and legs."—SHERMAN.

Good law will not alone secure good discipline in an armed force. Good administration of the law is also required. Fear of punishment prevents open crime, but is no guarantee against its "screened existence." Nor will fear promote a sense of duty, or of honour, or *esprit de corps*, and without these elements discipline is a mere negative quantity instead of an active force. Prison discipline,² it may be said at once, is not military discipline, and in discussing the conditions necessary to ensure the latter in an armed force, this is the first fact to lay hold of, and with regard to which a right understanding is indispensable. The stern repression which is required to control the felon will crush the spirit and destroy the self-respect of the soldier. Cheerful, ready, loyal obedience is not obtained by driving men into sulky submission. "Discipline should be iron," said Skobelev, with the recollections of Plevna still fresh in his memory. "There can be no doubt about that: but it is established by moral authority of Officers over their men, not by the use of force."³

No better example can be quoted in support of this assertion of

¹ How true this is may be seen from the following description of English soldiers in 1829 by the Duke of Wellington:—

"The man who enlists into the British Army is in general the most drunken, and probably the worst man of the trade or profession to which he belongs, or of the village or town in which he lives. There is not one in a hundred of them who, when enlisted, ought not to be put in the second or degraded class of any society or body into which he may be introduced; and they can be brought to be fit for what is called the first class only by discipline, and the precept of the old soldiers of the company, who, if not themselves in the second or degraded class, deserve to be placed there for some action or other twenty times in every year."

The question as to how discipline should be "promoted and maintained" among such men must indeed have seemed beyond the reach of any law, no matter how well drawn up, or how wisely administered.

² Even in the case of convicts it has been found that "force is no remedy," and the "moral" treatment of civil prisoners has led to a constant annual diminution of the convict population of Great Britain. In 1852, the convict population was double what it is now, while the general population was only two-thirds of its present strength. Sir Edward Du Cane attributes this to the establishment of reformatories and industrial schools, and to the endeavours, which are now made in all prisons, to "work on the higher feelings of the prisoners directly by moral, religious, and secular instruction, and indirectly by ensuring industry, good conduct, and discipline through appealing to the hope of advantage or reward."—"Punishment and the Prevention of Crime," by Sir Edward Du Cane, K.C.B., Surveyor-General of Military Prisons.

³ "Skobelev," by Nemirovitch Dantchenko.

Skobelev's than the fate of the Persian army under Xerxes—already used to illustrate arguments brought forward in the early part of this essay. Xerxes relied on the "use of force;" while Spartan discipline rested on "moral authority." Before crossing the Hellespont the Persian monarch called before him Demaratus, an exiled king of Sparta, and explained the principles upon which he ruled his army.

"They who, like us, are under the command of one person, from the fear of their leader, and under the immediate impression of the lash, are animated with a spirit contrary to their nature, and are made to attack a number greater than their own; but they who are urged by no constraint will not do this."

Demaratus pointed out in reply that the Spartan view of discipline was exactly opposite to that held by Xerxes, resting as it did, not on fear, but on a high sense of duty, which enforced obedience even unto death.

"Although free, the Spartans are not so without some reserve; the law is their superior, of which they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of you: they are obedient to what it commands, and it commands them always not to flee from the field of battle, whatever may be the number of their adversaries. It is their duty to preserve their ranks, to conquer or to die."¹

There have been armies, such for instance as the Prussian Army under Frederick the Great,² and the English Army under the Duke of Wellington,³ which, governed on the principles laid down by

¹ Herodotus, Book VII, chap. ciii, civ.

² "He worked on man only through his passions; he, in fact, regarded the race as machines of organized animal matter to be moved into action, or restrained from activity, by the force of material things. As he thus appears to have considered man as an automaton, or mass of animated matter, he was led to despise him, and to mock the idea of his mental independence. He employed force as an engine of government, civil or military, and in this manner he laboured to extinguish independence of mind, which is all that gives value to man as a rational being. . . . It is generally known that the impression of fear was the principle assumed by the King of Prussia in driving the Prussian recruit into military form."—"Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies," by Jackson.

An army disciplined by fear may win battles; but it can never hope to achieve permanent political results. How insignificant were the political results of the Seven Years' War as compared with those of the Seven Months' Campaign of 1806-07! German unity would never have been accomplished by Frederick the Great.

"The elevated feelings which are necessary to the best kind of army were then wanting to the Prussian Service. In those ranks were not found the religious and political enthusiasm which inspired the pikemen of Cromwell, the patriotic ardour, the thirst for glory, the devotion to a great leader, which inflamed the Old Guard of Napoleon."—"Macaulay's Essays"—"Frederick the Great."

³ The following answer to a question put to the Duke of Wellington by the Royal Commission of 1836 gives in the Duke's own words a description of the English military system of discipline as in vogue during the Peninsular War: "I have no idea of any great effect being produced by anything but the fear of immediate corporal punishment. I must say that in hundreds of cases the very threat of the lash has prevented very serious crimes. It is well known that I have hundreds of times prevented the most serious offences by ordering the men to appear with their side arms. The first thing I did was to order that all the men must appear, if they appeared in the street at all, in their side arms. That was the first thing. I then

Xerxes, have yet been victorious in the field. The success of both these armies, however, was due to other causes than their discipline, which in neither case was founded on any durable basis. It lasted so long as the influence of fear remained, and disappeared when its pressure was removed. No one can read the account of the Peninsular War without coming to the sorrowful conclusion that the state of discipline of the English Army at that period of its history was as bad as it possibly could have been. It was not only that excesses, fearful and disgraceful, were committed after the assaults of fortified places, but at all times, except only in battle, whether in advance or retreat, on the line of march and in cantonments, down to the very end of the campaign, the conduct of the troops came under the continual censure of their Commander. Writing to the Military Secretary from St. Sever, as late as the 8th March, 1814, the Duke of Wellington thus alludes to the discipline of the Army:—

"There is no crime recorded in the Newgate Calendar that is not committed by these soldiers who quit their ranks in search of plunder.

. . . There is not much difficulty in posting a British Army for a general action, or in getting the Officers and men to do their duty in a general action. The difficulty consists in bringing them to the point where the action can be fought, and in the exertion to be made afterwards to derive all the advantage which any other troops in the world would derive from victory. . . . I have always found we lose more men in a pursuit than we do in any general action. . . . In ordinary circumstances, that is to say, when the army is quietly encamped in a position or cantonment, all goes on well enough, and the ordinary regimental discipline is sufficient to keep the soldiers in tolerable order, but when an exertion of any kind is to be made, the whole machine falls to pieces."

. When it came to actual fighting the splendid courage of the Officers and soldiers, directed by the genius of their great Commander, brought victory to the English arms, but the results of victory were never what they might have been had the discipline of the troops enabled the Duke of Wellington to make the most of his successes. As it was, each hard-won battle seemed only to be the signal to prepare for a new encounter, and each advance but the precursor of another retreat. It is impossible to follow the tedious progress of the campaign, relieved only as it was by the heroic deeds of our brave countrymen, without feeling that had the same state of discipline existed in the English Army in 1809-12 as characterized the Swedish Army in 1630-31, the retreats after Talavera and Salamanca would never have been necessary, and the Duke of Wellington, sweeping the Peninsula of Spain as Gustavus swept the territory of Germany, would have established his army in Paris before Napoleon had extricated himself from Moscow.

The greatest soldiers in the world—Alexander, Cæsar, Gustavus

ordered that the rolls be called every hour; and all those restraints were enforced by the fear of the lash. If it were not for the fear of the lash, who would appear in his side arms? I was quite sure that no man would venture to disobey, because if he ventured to disobey it would come to corporal punishment."

Adolphus, and Napoleon—all comprehended the superior value of moral power over that established by fear, and a study of their lives shows that this power, which each possessed in a very high degree, never deserted them even at times of greatest peril, "Fly, cowards, I will subdue the world without you; Alexander will never want soldiers as long as he can find men,"¹ such were the words with which Alexander rallied his troops when on the point of being abandoned in Asia. Cæsar's² methods of enforcing discipline have already been described, but another allusion to his life will perhaps be pardoned if only to recall the prompt way in which he brought the mutineers of the 10th Legion to their knees by means of one word³ pregnant with meaning to those who had so often followed him to victory.

With Napoleon⁴ moral power was an art as well as a gift, and he owed his extraordinary influence over French soldiers not merely to the "personal magnetism" of his character, but to his habitual study of the means of rousing their enthusiasm and exciting their military

¹ "Plutarch's Lives"—"Alexander and Julius Cæsar compared."

² The moral hold which Cæsar had of his legions is testified to by nearly every writer on Roman history, though curiously enough Dr. Arnold, who has done ample justice to Hannibal's memory, could find nothing admirable in the character of Cæsar.

"Such likewise was the affection of his soldiers, and their attachment to his person, that they who under other Commanders were nothing above the common rate of men, became invincible where Cæsar's glory was concerned, and met the most dreadful dangers with a courage nothing could resist."—"Plutarch's Lives"—"Julius Cæsar."

Another authority writes: "A born ruler, he governed the minds of men as the winds drive the clouds. . . . No General has ever collected an army out of unyielding and refractory elements with such decision, and kept them together with such firmness."—"Momsen's History of Rome," vol. iv.

"Truly," writes Montaigne of Cæsar, "he ought to be the breviary of all true soldiers as being the absolute and perfect chieftain of military profession."

. . . . No General of warre had ever so much credit with his souldiers."—"Montaigne's Essays."

³ He addressed them as "*Quirites*" (citizens) instead of by the usual familiar name of "*Commilitones*" (comrades) telling them at the same time they might retire into civil life as he did not want them any more.

⁴ One of the finest instances of Napoleon's moral power occurred in the Italian Campaign of 1796, when he restored discipline among the men of Vaubois' Division after their disorderly retreat on Verona. Both Officers and men had displayed great cowardice and want of discipline in abandoning their position at the front, but instead of trying them up to the halberds, Napoleon addressed them in the following words: "Soldiers, I am not satisfied with you. You have shown neither discipline nor constancy. You have yielded on the first reverse. No position was sufficient for you to rally at. There were some in your retreat that were impregnable. Soldiers of the 85th and 39th, you are no longer French soldiers. Give me those colours, and let me have written on them, 'They belong no more to the Army of Italy.'" Then we are told by La Cases, writing at the dictation of Napoleon, "that a gloomy silence prevailed through the ranks, and the old soldiers were seen to wipe away their tears. 'General,' they cried, 'place us in the vanguard, and you shall see whether we belong to the Army of Italy.'"

The above is a typical example of the effect so often produced by Napoleon's addresses and proclamations to his troops. Florid, high-flown, and sometimes written in deplorable taste, his words nevertheless went straight to the heart of the French soldiers, and over and over again restored them to a sense of their forgotten duty.

spirit. After all that has been said of Gustavus Adolphus his name can now be passed over, but Hannibal must not be forgotten, as, though mentioned last, his life affords the most notable example in military history of the moral ascendancy of man over man. Hannibal is the only great General of ancient times whose memory history has never been able to slander.¹ Although the records of his career are scanty, and derived from foreign sources, the simple narrative of his life is sufficient testimony to the constancy of his conduct and the chivalry of his character.² In that brilliant sketch of the great Carthaginian soldier, which Dr. Arnold happily lived to revise, Hannibal's military characteristics are thus alluded to:—

"As a General his conduct remains uncharged with a single error. . . . His knowledge of human nature and his ascendancy over men's minds are shown by the uninterrupted authority which he exercised alike in his prosperity and adversity over an army composed of so many various and discordant materials, and which had no other bond than the personal character of their leader. . . . The long inactivity of winter quarters, trying to the discipline of the best national armies, was borne patiently by Hannibal's soldiers. There was neither desertion nor mutiny amongst them; even the fickle men of the Gauls seemed spell-bound. For the Gauls and the Spaniards and the Africans were overpowered by the ascendancy of Hannibal's character; under his guidance they felt themselves invincible. With such a General the yoke of Carthage might seem to the Africans and Spaniards the natural dominion of superior beings."

The foregoing considerations, supported as they have been by a few out of many examples which can be cited from military history, seem to establish the fact that moral authority is a matter of upper-

¹ Even such a hostile critic as the Roman historian Livy thus writes of Hannibal: "Such was his behaviour, and so conciliating, that in a short time the memory of his father was the least among the inducements to esteem him. Never man possessed a genius so admitted to the discharge of offices so very opposite in their nature as obeying and commanding; so that it was not easy to discern whether he were more beloved by the General than by the soldiers."—Livy, Book XXI, chap. iv.

² The best authorities reject Livy's account of the slack discipline maintained by Hannibal during the winter of B.C. 216 in Capua. If some indulgence was allowed to the troops after the severe campaigning which ended with Cannæ, this must have been speedily checked when the army marched out of Capua in the spring of B.C. 215. An army so debauched and disorderly as that pictured by Livy in the 18th chapter of Book XXIII could never have remained, unaided and unrecruited, for thirteen years after the victory of Cannæ in a hostile country, and then finally embarked unopposed when Hannibal was recalled to Carthage.

As regards the charge of cruelty, which Livy brings against Hannibal, it is noteworthy that neither he nor Polybius instance any single specific act to substantiate the general charge.

No act of Hannibal's during all his wars can be compared for inhumanity with the manner in which the Consul Nero announced Hasdrubal's defeat to the Carthaginian Chief by throwing his brother's head in front of Hannibal's outposts.

The story about Hannibal compelling the Roman prisoners who were taken at Cannæ to fight as gladiators in his presence, rests on no better authority than that of Diodorus and Pliny, and ill tallies with the clemency shown by the release of the prisoners taken at the Battles of the Trebia and Lake Trasymene.—Polybius III, p. 85.

most moment for the promotion and maintenance of discipline in an armed force. How can such moral authority be acquired, or, in other words, what should be the relations existing between Officers and soldiers, and how far should these relations be carried in the course of daily duty? This is the final question which remains for investigation.

The first great necessity, and one which is the foundation of true military discipline, is that Officers should know their men. Moral authority depends on personal power, and this can only be acquired by an intimate acquaintance with those whom it is sought to influence. The excellent discipline maintained in the German Army of the present day is undoubtedly due to the closeness of the intimacy which binds the soldier to his Officer.¹ In our Army the regimental Officers, down to a period as late as the outbreak of the Crimean War, lived wholly apart from their men,² and during peace the "personal contact" (the value of which was explained in an earlier part of this essay) can hardly be said to have existed at all. Generally speaking the soldiers only knew their Officers as awarding them punishment. As during the Peninsular War, so at all times, English Officers have led their men in battle with the utmost bravery, but when fighting was over their duties to those under them were formerly supposed to have ended.³ In natural consequence discipline, which was maintained with a stern hand in the presence⁴ of the

¹ "The Captain and his assistants, the company Officers, occupy themselves almost continually with their men. These two classes are brought into very close personal relations without prejudice to discipline, but rather with a contrary effect. This happy reciprocity has this merit, that besides the genuine military spirit which prevails in the army generally, in the most murderous battles of the present war the soldiers followed their leaders amid the destructive shell, mitrailleuse, and chassépot fire of the enemy, with a devotion which was truly touching. The soldier has confidence in his Officer, and the Officer knows that he can depend on the soldier."—"Army of the North German Confederation," by a Prussian General.

² To such an extent was this separation of Officers and men carried in those days that, on the death of Sir John Moore, the Duke of York drew attention in general orders to the marked exception which that great disciplinarian was to the general rule of Officers.

The following are the terms of the G.O. :—

"The character of Sir John Moore exhibits one feature so particularly characteristic of the man, and so important to the best interests of the Service, that the Commander-in-Chief is pleased to mark it with his peculiar approbation. The life of Sir John Moore was spent among the troops."

³ "Our Officer," wrote the Duke of Wellington in 1829, "is a gentleman; we require that he should be one, and above all that he should conduct himself as such; and most particularly in reference to the soldier, and to his intercourse with the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Indeed, we carry this principle of the gentleman, and the absence of intercourse with those under him, so far, that in my opinion the duty of a subaltern Officer, as done in a foreign army, is not done at all in the cavalry or the British infantry of the line. It is done in the Guards by the sergeants. Then our gentleman Officer, however admirable his conduct on a field of battle, however honourable to himself, however glorious and advantageous to his country, is but a poor creature in disciplining his company in camp, quarters, or cantonments."—"Memorandum on the Discipline of the Army," by Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G., 29th April, 1829.

⁴ There were occasions, however, when even in the presence of their Officers the

Officer, was relaxed behind his back. The Duke of Wellington repeatedly expressed his bitter sense of disappointment at the feeble touch kept by Officers on their men, and his general orders and despatches home during the Peninsular War abound with reflections on their conduct. In his letter to the Military Secretary written from St. Sever on the 14th March, 1814, as already quoted, he gave vent to his feelings in the following words:—

"I have no hesitation in attributing the evil to the utter incapacity of some Officers at the head of regiments to perform the duties of their situation, and the apathy and unwillingness of others, and to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of punishing any Officer for neglect of duty when he is to be tried by others, each and all of whom have been guilty of the same if not greater neglects. I attribute the want of discipline in the Army entirely to the regimental Officers who neither know, nor understand, nor endeavour to carry into execution any of the Orders of the Army which have for their object the prevention of the committal of crime."

In spite of all his efforts, and his own fine example, which was never at fault, the Duke of Wellington was unable to instil discipline into the armies which he commanded. For the system which he was required to administer was radically defective, and in the presence of such defects as existed individual effort was powerless to achieve any lasting good. "Habits of obedience to orders, subordination, regularity, and mutual confidence between Officers and soldiers," these qualities, which constitute the Duke of Wellington's definition of discipline,¹ are not the sudden outcome of war, but the gradual result of systematic training during peace. It was a sense of helplessness to cope with acknowledged evil which seemed to increase the disappointment of the great English Chief, and led him, not always generously, to attach blame to individuals who were in no way responsible for the system which they had been taught to follow.

The change of system dates from the close of the Crimean War. Then, for the first time in the history of the English Army, the regimental Officers began to undertake duties which had previously been relegated to non-commissioned officers. Forsaking the rôle of

spirit of disorder ran riot among the soldiers. The following G.O. is by no means a solitary instance of its kind:—

G.O., Lesaca, 8th October, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be under the necessity of publishing again his orders of the 9th July last, as they have been unattended to by the Officers and troops which entered France yesterday.

2. According to all the information which the Commander of the Forces has received, outrages of all descriptions were committed by the troops in the presence even of their Officers, who took no pains whatever to prevent them.

3. The Commander of the Forces has already determined that some Officers so grossly negligent of their duty shall be sent to England that their names may be brought under the attention of the Prince Regent, and that His Royal Highness may give such directions respecting them as he may think proper, as the Commander of the Forces is determined not to command Officers who will not obey his orders.

¹ G.O., Badajoz, 24th September, 1809.

policemen, they sought to qualify themselves as the instructors, the trainers, the masters of their men. The alteration in the system of enlistment which took place later on increased the necessity for the interference of Officers, as it decreased the number of trained men and non-commissioned officers available for instructing recruits. In carrying out these new responsibilities, the Officers were compelled to associate with the rank and file in a way that was never before necessary. This intercourse is no longer confined to hours of drill and instruction, but is continuous during times of recreation—at athletic meetings and evening amusements, which are now as much matters of concern to English Officers as the actual official duties of their men. The intimate comradeship which has thus been created between Officer and soldier is having a marked¹ effect in raising the tone of the rank and file of the Army, and in correspondingly raising the discipline.

The Duke of Wellington was not a military reformer; but had he lived to see the working of the new system described above, and which has enabled His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief to dispense with the halberds and rely on the General Orders of 1887² to maintain discipline, he would surely have endorsed the words which have been chosen as the motto for this essay, and which were uttered on a memorable occasion by a late venerable Englishman³—"Force is no remedy."

Passing now from the special case of the English Army, which, however, is particularly adapted to illustrate the arguments contained

¹ "Of late years there has been a great change taking place in the relations between Officers and men, and the social standing of soldiers has year by year improved."—Extract from speech of Major-General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., K.C.M.G., Annual Meeting of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, 6th May, 1888.

² In his evidence given before Lord Randolph Churchill's Committee on the Army Estimates (Q. 2553, Second Report), Colonel Lascelles, A.A.G. at Headquarters, described the change introduced by the General Orders of 1887, as "One which may almost be called a revolution in the administration of the discipline of the Army."

³ Mr. Bright. Speech at Birmingham, 16th November, 1880. "Force is no remedy." Though uttered by a member of the Peace Party, these words might have been appropriately placed at the head of the Circular Memorandum addressed by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge to General Officers commanding districts and Officers commanding corps in introducing the changes made by the General Orders of 1887, in the administration of discipline in the Army. The following extract from this Memorandum shows the spirit in which these changes were conceived:—"Love of his regiment, and a regard for its reputation, soon come to the young soldier, and he should be impressed with the conviction that it is his interest, and should therefore be his object, to maintain its high name and character by his own individual good conduct. He should learn to feel, through the manner in which he is dealt with by his Captain and his Lieutenant-Colonel, that they are solely actuated by this regimental feeling, by their love of the Army, and the deep interest they take in the reputation of all their comrades of every rank. Nothing tends more to impress soldiers with this conviction than the maintenance of a healthy, manly discipline with the minimum of punishment."—Extract from Circular Memorandum, War Office, 1st January, 1887.

It is interesting to compare this with another Circular Memorandum quoted further on, and dated Freneda, 28th November, 1812.

in this essay, to a more general consideration of the subject under discussion, there are certain characteristics of sound disciplinary administration which it may be well to examine in regular order.

I. *Popularity*.¹—This, as may be supposed from what has already been said, is not to be despised as an element of power in promoting discipline in an armed force. A popular Officer can command obedience at times when another Officer would only receive a half-hearted support. It is important, however, to notice that popularity is not acquired by courting its advent, but rather by avoiding the appearance of seeking it. The most popular Officer, whether General or subaltern, is he who is most firm, most just, most hardworking, most attentive to the wants of his men, most able to lead them in war and train them in peace. The best disciplinarians—using the word disciplinarian as it is understood in its application to such men as Hannibal, Cæsar, and Gustavus Adolphus—have always been popular with their followers. Cæsar's popularity with the 10th Legion is proverbial, yet the discipline of the 10th was firmer and stronger than of any other Roman legion. Gustavus Adolphus was worshipped by his soldiers, and we have seen how perfect was the discipline of the Swedish armies, both before and after victory. Skobelev, perhaps more than any other Commander of this generation of soldiers, commanded the love of his followers; yet no General ever exacted more from his troops, worked harder with them, or maintained a stronger rule over them. The 16th Division, which he commanded during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, was a model of exemplary discipline. "There was scarcely anywhere a corps," writes an eyewitness who accompanied Skobelev during his famous march from Kazanlik to Adrianople, "where the power of the Officers was greater or the discipline more severe."²

II. *Attention to Details of Interior Economy*.—This is specially a matter of concern to junior regimental Officers. "The discipline and regularity of all armies," wrote the Duke of Wellington,³ "must depend upon the diligence of the regimental Officers, particularly the subalterns." Material comfort is essential to healthy morale, and a contented army has always been found to preserve its discipline. Everything connected with the soldier's welfare and training—his pay, clothing, food, health, education, and amusements—should be a matter of concern not to an orderly Officer changed from day to day, but to the immediate superior Officer⁴ of the soldier in question; and

¹ "The greatest talent of a General," writes Plutarch, "is to secure obedience through the affection he inspires."

² Nemirovitch Dantchenko. Skobelev was born a leader of men, and possessed, in a high degree, that "personal magnetism" of character which Lord Wolseley describes as necessary to a successful Commander. The Russian authority quoted above thus alludes to Skobelev's relations with his men: "He was not one of those Generals who like their men at a distance. The dandified, spoilt, and fastidious Skobelev could live the same life as his soldiers, share their discomforts, their equal, and their privations, and do this so easily that they were not astonished at it."

³ Despatch to Viscount Castlereagh, Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

⁴ This is a most important point in the maintenance of discipline. It is some-

the "moral authority" of the Officer is strengthened or weakened just in proportion as he exercises, or neglects to exercise, direct personal supervision over details of interior economy. What it is of special importance to emphasize is that the force of discipline should be binding at all times and in all places. A soldier ought to have one nature, and one only, and that nature should always be disciplined, and everywhere under control. The system which teaches him to have two natures—one for parade and another for the barrack-room, one before his Officer and another behind his back—such a system will not satisfy the conditions which are essential for success in modern war.

III. *The Force of Example.*—This is another important element in the relations between Officers and soldiers. In the enforcement of discipline in an armed force, example¹ has even more influence than precept. A high, bright, cheerful example coming from above will be speedily caught up below. A superior can exact readier obedience from an inferior when he himself shows a readiness to obey. The obedience, too, that is here meant is not mere technical compliance with orders, but loyal submission to superior will. An Officer receiving an order should seek to catch its tone, as well as understand its letter, and should pass it on in this spirit to those below him. Nothing is so detrimental to military discipline as any inclination to "carp"² at orders received, or to criticize them in a spirit adverse to the intentions of the authority from whom the orders emanated.

"Subordination in the Officers is the soul of discipline; for if they do not exhibit the most explicit obedience in executing orders given to them, their example will soon be followed by the soldiers, and pervading the whole army will taint the very principle of military order."³

IV. *Regularity.*—Regular administration is also essential to the promotion and maintenance of discipline in an armed force. Relaxation of rule is fatal to discipline, which, it should never be forgotten, is hard and strict, and requires the practice of habitual self-denial. In time of war when the reality of active service is present; the

times said that "duty has to be got through," but that it does not much matter by whom, and that the orderly Officer can very well perform it for other Officers. If, however, the arguments brought forward in this essay are worth anything at all, they do oppose a most distinct contradiction to this notion of "duty," which is not something to be "got through" merely for name's sake, but to be performed by Officers in the interest of their own self-discipline, as much as in the interests of their men. Everything depends on the close union of Officers and men in small bodies, and upon this union being maintained intact on all occasions.

¹ "Unless we should ourselves set an example of obeying strictly the orders of our superiors, we cannot expect that our inferiors will obey ours."—Extract from letter of the Duke of Wellington to the Conte de la Biebal, dated Frelicda, 17th March, 1813.

² This was another difficulty the Duke had to contend with during the war in Spain. Writing to Mr. Stuart on the 11th September, 1810, he observed that there "was a spirit of 'croaking' in the Army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise means of putting an end to, or it will put an end to us."

³ Essays on "Military Duties and Qualities," by Lieutenant-General Lord de Ros.

necessity of discipline is always apparent, but during peace the temptation to relax routine and soften law continually recurs. The tendency to yield to this must be resisted, and a sustained effort made to preserve discipline at constant high pressure. Idleness is particularly to be guarded against as a fruitful source of deterioration in discipline.

"An army is composed for the most part of idle inactive men, and unless the General has a constant eye upon them, this artificial machine will very soon fall to pieces, and nothing but the bare idea of a disciplined army will remain."¹

The value of barrack life cannot be exaggerated. A militia force is never so highly disciplined as a regular force which is kept in barracks or camp, when the touch between all ranks is constantly preserved. During periods of long-continued peace, camps of exercise should be resorted to, and the reserves of the National Army called out for training. It was in the Camp of Boulogne² that Napoleon perfected the discipline of the French Army which gained the victories of Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram.

V. *Self-discipline*.—The necessity of self-discipline should be constantly impressed on all ranks of an armed force. It was with this idea in view that so much stress was laid in Part III of this essay on the principles which should govern the laws of discipline. In order to secure self-discipline, or, in other words, the co-operation of all ranks in preserving order among themselves, military law must be clear, straight, intelligible, and immutable.³ Unless this is so, the necessity for obeying the law cannot be brought home to those concerned, and the virtue of obedience will be degraded into mechanical submission to superior will. Immutability of law is assuredly a point of extreme importance. There will remain ample scope for wise and circumspect administration even when the law is so immutably fixed as to be placed beyond risk of disturbance by arbitrary alterations and personal whims of individual Officers who are entrusted with the duty of administering it. It would be easy to multiply instances of the stress laid upon self-discipline by great Commanders of both ancient and modern times. A notable example occurred when Xenophon assumed command of the Ten Thousand Greeks after the Battle of Kunaxa. "Above all things," he said, in

¹ "Military Instructions of Frederick the Great to his Generals;" translated by Major Foster.

² "Satisfied with their lot in this great encampment, the soldiers were singularly tractable and obedient. Constantly occupied and amused by the spectacle of sea-fighting or frequent reviews and mock battles, they neither murmured at the exactions of a rigid discipline, nor experienced the usual monotony and languor of a pacific life in camp. . . . Constant employment was the true secret both of their good health and docile habits. Neither Officers nor soldiers were ever allowed to remain any time idle."—Description of the Camp of Boulogne, Alison, chap. xxxix.

³ Immutability as far as regards those who have to administer its provisions. The necessity of altering military law from time to time, and adapting it to meet the ever-changing conditions of a progressive science, is indisputable. This, however, is the function of the governing authorities, not of executive Officers.

his first address to his troops after his election to the chief command, "let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the Commanders, upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to the Commander in punishing any disobedient individuals."¹ It was owing to the loyal support which Xenophon received during his celebrated retreat from all his followers, and which he secured by his own tactful command, that the force was extricated from the desperate position in which it was placed after the seizure and execution of the Greek Generals by Tissaphernes. So well maintained was the self-discipline of the force to the very end of the retreat that when outrages were committed by some individual soldiers at Kerasus, Xenophon called the army together, and demanded the punishment of the mutineers, who were sentenced to death by the unanimous vote of the assembled troops.²

VI. *Self-respect*.—Self-discipline is the result of self-respect. No opportunity should therefore be lost of developing this latter quality in every Officer and soldier. In this connection praise and blame are useful factors, provided they are apportioned with discrimination. Praise when merited promotes friendly emulation, when undeserved it only fosters jealousy. Blame should be reserved for censuring crime, and not used to condemn errors of judgment or mistakes at drill. Officers must bear in mind that when their instructions are not carried out exactly as they intended, the mistake is generally owing to the instructions being incomplete, and therefore not understood. It is of importance in encouraging self-respect to strengthen the hands of subordinate Officers and non-commissioned officers, and most particularly to avoid weakening their authority by hasty and intemperate censure in the presence of their inferiors. Mistakes should be quietly and deliberately corrected, and not seized on as occasions for indiscriminate abuse. Much might be written on this subject alone, but it would be impossible to find better words than the

¹ Xenophon: "Anabasis," III, pp. 2, 25.

² *Ibid.*, V, pp. 27—30, and Grote, chap. lxxi.

Xenophon's speech on this occasion, and his appeal to the troops to obey him and the subordinate Generals on the ground that they had all been elected by the universal suffrage of the army, abound in matter calling for deep reflection on the part of the military student.

Grote thus alludes to the speech in chapter lxxi of his "History of Greece." "This," referring to the election of Xenophon, "is the cardinal principle to which he appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of each man, as the condition of all success, all safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity either as soldiers or citizens. The success of the speech shows that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards, though the army collectively went wrong. And, what is not less important to notice, the influence of Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to have sensibly augmented."

Montaigne, in his essay on Julius Cæsar, gives a remarkable, and presumably authenticated, example of the self-discipline of Cæsar's troops, "when, having had some defeat near unto Dyrrachium, his souldiers came voluntarily before him, and offered themselves to be punished, so that he was more troubled to comfort than to chide them."—"Montaigne's Essays."

following, which are a perfect essay in themselves, and which, though written with special application to the English garrison of India, are profoundly true of the relations which ought to exist between the Officers and soldiers of all armed forces:—

"All depends in the various gradations of military control on the spirit in which the controlling power is exercised, and on the tact of him who exercises it. Be kind, considerate, and conciliatory; scrupulously regard the feelings of those under you; avoid aught that can weaken their legitimate authority, or diminish the respect of their inferiors; treat not blunder as a crime; assume that what is evidently unknown is simply something forgotten; and if you have to do with well-conditioned men, not as an offence. I speak from the experience of more than forty years both in civil and military life. I can only plead my profound conviction that the British soldier, even of the roughest stamp, is, if wisely and kindly treated, susceptible of culture—physical, intellectual, moral, and professional—far in excess of that which is generally supposed to be attainable by him; that just as you approximate a private soldier intellectually, morally, and professionally to the standard of his Officers, do you increase his commercial value; and that the interests of India demand that the highest possible culture of all kinds should be bestowed on the members of the English garrison, and the highest possible development given to their capacities both individual and corporate."¹

These are not the words of a mere military student, but of a practical English soldier—James Outram, the "Bayard of India." They are weighty words, and their weight is increased by the fact that they were written soon after the termination of those terrible struggles round Lucknow, and were doubtless inspired by the recollection of the discipline which the writer had maintained during long months of severe trial in the gallant little garrison of the Alum Bagh.

PART V.—*Conclusion.*

"We are an excellent Army on parade, and an excellent Army to fight; but we are worse than an enemy in a country; and take my word for it that either defeat or success would dissolve us."—WELLINGTON, Letter to Lord Castlereagh, June 17, 1809.

The principles laid down by Sir James Outram are the principles which are gradually taking root in the British Army, and which received official ratification in the General Orders of the 1st April, 1887. That the new system of administration is working to a successful issue may be seen from the figures of consecutive annual Returns. There is better evidence, however, than the evidence of figures. There is the testimony of war itself. The contrast between the disorderly conduct of the English troops during the retreat from Burgos in

¹ "Miscellaneous Questions affecting the Organization and Efficiency of the Indian Army."—Memorandum by Sir James Outram, Bart., G.C.B.

1812, and the discipline maintained in all the recent operations of the Army, whether in Afghanistan, Egypt, or elsewhere, is an indisputable witness to the truth of statistical evidence.

For what were the circumstances of the retreat from Burgos? The retirement of the Army had become necessary for strategical reasons, not after defeat, but after a victorious campaign, which had included such successful operation as the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the assault of Almaraz, and the Battle of Salamanca. The Army was not pressed by the enemy, nor were the marches long, nor the weather inclement, nor the privations great;¹ yet the discipline of the troops so deteriorated that the historian of the Peninsular War estimates the loss from stragglers at not less than 9,000;² and describes the retreat as being marked throughout by most "intolerable disorders" due to the "habitual negligence of the regimental Officers." So incensed was the Duke of Wellington with the conduct of the troops that, when he arrived in winter quarters, he issued that celebrated Circular,³ the justice of which Napier⁴ is reluctantly compelled to admit,⁵ and which will remain on record as the most scathing rebuke a General in the field has ever addressed to an Army under his command. "I am concerned," wrote the Duke, after enumerating the irregularities committed, "to have to observe that the Army under my command has fallen off in this respect (discipline)

¹ Vide Lord Wellington's Circular to Officers Commanding Divisions and brigades, dated Freneda, November 23, 1812.

² Napier. The following extracts from the "History of the Peninsular War" may be quoted to illustrate the want of discipline which characterized the retreat:—

"Five hundred of the rear-guard, under Cole, chiefly of one regiment, broke open the houses, plundered, and got drunk. On this occasion there was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the men, and yet I, the author of this History, counted on the first day's march from Madrid seventeen bodies of murdered peasants."

Again he writes—

"Such outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants along the whole line of march that terror was everywhere predominant, and the ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted by hundreds. Hence Kennedy's operation in some measure failed; the greatest distress was incurred, and the Commissariat lost nearly the whole of the animals and carriages employed; the villages were abandoned, and the under-commissaries were bewildered and paralyzed by the terrible disorder thus spread along the line of communications."

Again, later on in the retreat—

"The Army bivouacked in the evening behind the Manilla stream; but though the march was not more than 12 miles the stragglers were numerous, for the soldiers, meeting with vast herds of swine, quitted their colours by hundreds to shoot them, and such a rolling musketry echoed through the forest that Wellington at first thought that the enemy was upon him. It was in vain the Staff Officers rode about to stop this disgraceful practice; it was in vain that Wellington himself caused two offenders to be hanged; the property of whole districts was swept away in a few hours, and the Army was in some degree placed at the mercy of the enemy. The latter, however, were content to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured 2,000."—Napier, Book XIX, chap. v.

³ Dated from Freneda, November 23, 1812.

⁴ Napier's "Peninsular War," Book XIX, chap. vii.

⁵ Napier, however, exonerates the Guards and the Light Division.

to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read."¹

Turning now to the case of the retreat of the River Column down the Nile in 1885—a small measure of war as compared with the retreat of the English Army from Burgos in 1812, yet none the less useful as an illustration—we find a totally different state of discipline in existence. The order for this retreat, which like the retreat from Burgos, was also undertaken for strategical reasons, came upon the troops as a crushing disappointment;² yet, so far from leading to misconduct, the signal to turn back seemed only to stiffen the discipline which had marked the advance of the column under physical difficulties without parallel in war. "I cannot," wrote the Officer in command of the column on the occasion of its break up, "close this report without dwelling upon the splendid behaviour of the regimental Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the column. The life of the men has been one of incessant toil from the first to the last day of the expedition. In ragged clothing, scarred and blistered by the sun and rough work, they have worked with constant cheerfulness and increasing energy. *Their discipline has been beyond reproach*: and I do not hesitate to say that no finer, more gallant or more *trustworthy* body of men ever served the Queen than those I had the honour to command in the River Column."³

If a further example is asked for from recent English military history, there is the case of the now historic march undertaken by Sir Frederick Roberts from Cabul to Candahar in 1880, during which operation of war not a single man was lost by straggling, and not a single instance occurred of serious crime. The discipline maintained was as perfect as it is possible to exact from any troops, and was due, as Sir Frederick Roberts repeatedly said⁴ after his arrival in England, to the loyal co-operation which he received from all ranks in his efforts to preserve order. "I may say with truth," he said in his speech at the Fishmongers' Hall, "that there was not an Officer or man, British or native, who was not animated by the same high spirit of courage and discipline, which are so essential to all military success."⁵

When, then, the question is asked, as it has been in the subject of this essay, by what means discipline can be best promoted and main-

¹ Is it possible to conceive the circumstances under which Lord Chelmsford, or Lord Wolseley, or Sir Frederick Roberts, or any other General who has lately commanded troops in the field, would have to address such words to English Officers and soldiers of the present day?

² The Officer in command of the column describes the effect of the order, when he first received it, as sending a "cold shiver" through him.—"The River Column," by Major-General H. Brackenbury, C.B.

³ Despatch of Brigadier-General H. Brackenbury, C.B., to General Lord Wolseley.—*I*de "The River Column."

⁴ See his various speeches, especially that delivered in the Mansion House when the freedom of the City of London was conferred on him.—*I*de "Times" report, dated February 15, 1881.

⁵ Fishmongers' Hall, December 10, 1880.—"Times" report, December 10, 1881.

tained in an armed force, the answer is to be found, not only in the numerous illustrations existing in both ancient and modern military history—a few only of which have been quoted in these pages—but especially in the experience of the English Army during the last 100 years. That experience shows that true military discipline—discipline, that is to say, which is equally maintained before, during, and after battle; discipline which is relaxed neither in victory nor in defeat—can only be secured by the moral power of Officers deriving their authority from good law wisely administered by means of a sound system of organization. How moral power is acquired, and what are the attributes of good law, wise administration, and sound organization, it has been the endeavour of the writer, however unworthily, to show during the course of this essay: Imperfectly brought forward as the arguments have been, there is some consolation in feeling that the lessons of history are a witness to their truth; and it is for this reason possible to assert, not in any spirit of egotistic confidence, but with the force derived from confirmed conviction, that no other way of promoting and maintaining discipline in an armed force exists except that which it has been attempted to describe in this essay, which is now respectfully and humbly submitted for the consideration of the Council.

All that it seems necessary to ask leave to say in conclusion is that, as with our allies, so with ourselves, finality has not yet been reached. Much remains, much must always remain to be done in the further progress of that new departure, which was openly taken last year. The general orders of 1887 have committed us to a "revolution," from which there can now be no loophole of escape. Having put our hands to the plough it is not possible to look back. The spirit of an army can no more lie fallow than the spirit of an individual. It is for ever living, moving, changing. While we take care that it moves onward in its course of conservative progress it is for us—the Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Army—to see that it moves, not by leaps and bounds, but patiently, surely, hopefully, and always kept under the influence of firm control. Not with pessimist minds, not with any hankering after the dry bones of bygone days, yet ever mindful of the lessons of history, must this movement be directed by those, to whom it has fallen to carry forward into a bright future the traditions of a glorious heritage. Then shall be presented to the world such a spectacle as has never yet been seen, of a great National Army, voluntary in its origin, democratic in its sympathies, imperial in its instincts—loyal to its Sovereign, loyal to its country, loyal to itself, respected and self-respecting—a tremendous weapon of resistless strength,

"A glorious company, the flower of men,
To serve as model for the mighty world,
And be the fair beginning of a time."

Tennyson's "Guinevere."