MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.—ON THE CONDITIONS OF A TRUE PHILOSOPHY.

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SIGNS are not wanting of an approaching thaw in philosophy in this country, a break-up of that long and rigid frost which, reaching us as cold weather mostly does from Germany, set in some three-and-twenty years ago, an epoch marked and perhaps chiefly caused by the publication of Mr. J. H. Stirling's *Secret of Hegel* in 1865. If so, a little more open-mindedness, a little more readiness *audire alteram partem*, may shortly be expected. In the height of the preceding Bentham-Mill despotism, it was vain to expect that any adverse criticism, still less any attempt to reconstruct philosophy on non-empirical foundations, should have attention accorded to it. But that despotism, as was not unnatural, called out a reaction of equal, if not greater, intensity and rigour. Assumptions of one sort were then made up for by assumptions equally audacious of another, and all hope of recourse to the unpopular method of interrogating experience in its simplicity and in its entirety had for the time to be again abandoned.

The reaction from the Bentham-Mill form of empiricism, commencing, as already noted, about 1865, may be considered

to have reached its culmination with the publication of the well-known volume of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* in 1883, the Essays being the work of nine different contributors, and the whole prefaced by a few words from Prof. Edward Caird of Glasgow. It is not the least significant among the indications of coming change, that the writer of the first Essay, and co-editor of the volume, Prof. (then Mr.) Seth, should have so pointedly broken with anything like strict Hegelian orthodoxy as he has done in his recent Balfour Lectures on *Hegelianism and Personality*. In adopting this looser attitude, it is not likely that he should stand alone. We may reasonably anticipate that many others will be disposed to listen to suggestions and ideas, even when proceeding from non-German sources, to which they would heretofore have been inexorably deaf.

The present juncture, then, seems not unfavourable for bringing forward, in brief and compendious form, a statement of that method of philosophy which has grown up and commended itself to the writer during many years of philosophical work—a method which he certainly could not have formulated in its present completeness at first starting, but which has become more and more clear to him in advancing, as alike sufficient and consistent. Seized and followed at first only in its main principles, it has at last reached a stage of articulation at which it is capable of becoming a consciously used guide to philosophical analysis and construction. It was not till after his last publication in book-form, in 1880, that his attention was directed to formulate for itself the method he had followed. Moreover, it may be admitted, and the admission is not unfavourable to the method, that, tried by its rule, many things in the writer's former works are inconsequent and erroneous. It is these, not the method, that are in fault. It may also be added, that the method is equally opposed to the two rival tendencies or schools of thought mentioned above: to the so-called English school of Empiricism, and to the so-called German school of Idealism. In contradiction to both of these, 'Experientialism' may be its title. I have elsewhere called it the 'metaphysical method,' or 'method of subjective analysis'. I do not, however, intend to enter now upon the controversial topics which these terms may seem calculated to suggest. I wish simply to give a summary, as brief as may be consistent with clearness, of the method itself. And in doing this I shall endeavour to keep distinct the principles of method, the facts upon which they rest, the facts which they in turn

enable us to see, the further principles to which these facts serve as basis, and the resulting division of philosophy as a whole into its several departments, together with some of the chief problems which may best be treated under each.

I.

The fundamental principle of the method upon which the whole rests, stated in its barest possible form is this,—always in analysing experience to subordinate the questions of *how anything comes*, and *how behaves*, to the question *what it is known as*, what it is for us in our present knowledge of it. But it is obvious that this bare statement of principle requires some preliminary explanation, in order to show its applicability and bearing. Let us ask, then, in the first place, what is the chief aim proposed to itself by philosophy, to reach which this principle is adopted? It will be generally admitted, that its purpose is to get a consistent view of the universe of things, reducing it to intelligibility so far as our powers may enable us to do so, or, in other words, to give a Rationale of the Universe not involving contradictions.

Assuming this to be the purpose of philosophy, I remark, in the next place, that there are two other lines or modes of thinking which at first sight seem to have, and up to a certain point really have, the very same purpose, one being that of ordinary and practical common sense, and the other that of positive science. Both of these aim at understanding the universe of men and things, but also both of them aim at understanding it in the same sense, namely, as it is presented to a normal adult man before he begins to philosophise; that is, as an universe of ready-made beings, conscious and unconscious, in intercourse one with another. Both alike conceive the universe in the same general way, namely, as an universe of ready-made beings; the only difference is, that one interprets and deals with it by rule of thumb, the other by mathematical analysis, measurement and calculation. But the conception of ready-made objects is common to both, and dominates both. Science may resolve the material universe now existing into the cosmic nebula of ages ago, but still the cosmic nebula is conceived as a ready-made congeries. Or, to take another instance, science may resolve the phenomenon of the mechanical impact of one body on another, which is an apparently immediate perception of common sense, into a series of mutually dependent changes of velocity and changes of con-

figuration in the parts composing those bodies, and still the fundamental conception of an object is unaltered. The ultimate result which science can reach is an answer to the question *How comes this or that set of ready-made objects?* and is no answer to the question *What is a ready-made object?*

To answer this latter question, another line of inquiry must be entered on by asking what we know of objects as such, or what any such object is known as, in the actual and immediate experience which we have of it? This inquiry is the beginning of philosophy. And it must be remarked that it covers the whole field of the scientific and common-sense inquiries. In saying '*We know*' and '*Our knowledge*,' it does not assume the Ego as a ready-made object, called for distinction a Subject; but it inquires into knowing and experience *quod* knowing and experience, not *quod* the knowing and experience of a Subject as an already known existent. It is an assumption of common sense that all knowing or experience is the knowing and experience of some individual Subject, and we have no reason to suppose that this assumption will not, in some form or other, be verified by philosophy; but then the verification will be subsequent, not prior, to the inquiry. Philosophy refuses it as an assumption, in order to prove, disprove or correct it as a result. The assumptions of common sense are the *explicanda* of philosophy. And therefore the terms of common sense, describing things in which the assumptions of common sense are involved, must in philosophy be used only as terms provisional and merely denotative, until their meaning has been ascertained by philosophical analysis. The point of refusing the assumption of an Ego as a preliminary in philosophy, while retaining the right to hold it as a result in whatever shape it may be legitimately arrived at, is one for which I have always found it hard to gain acceptance. Perhaps I may be permitted to refer to a short paper of mine, "Subjectivity in Philosophy," in *MIND* viii. 92.

The position and bearing of the first principle of method, the bare statement of which we began with, will now I think be evident. That principle is to be applied to a subjective analysis of experience *quod* experience, and without assumptions, indeed, as the means of avoiding them. And the subjective analysis of experience *quod* experience is philosophy, the third and last of three modes of interrogating experience, common sense and positive science being the other two. Farther, it will have been noted that the principle itself is based upon the observation, that these other lines of thought can give no answer to the question *What?*

but only to the question *How comes?* leaving over and beyond them the further question, *What* is that which their inquiries assume to begin with? In philosophy, the question *What?* is the first question, and that necessarily; for experience, the stream of consciousness, is what is interrogated, and experience comes of itself in the first instance, without saying anything of whence or how. It simply comes, and as it comes we say, *What is that?* Till there is a *whatness* in experience, there is nothing about which the question *How comes?* can be put.

The moment of experience, the ever-occurring, ever-present, *now*, in which experience is constantly taking place, is the central fact in philosophy, as it is in experience, the fundamental fact which is the condition of all knowing. This moment or fact of experiencing is the Apperception of Leibniz, Kant and modern German psychologists. It is conceived as a more distinct perception superinduced upon a less distinct one. Prof. Wundt names its special object the *Blickpunkt* as distinguished from the *Blickfeld* of perception. I call it, not Apperception, but Reflection or Reflective Perception, whereby I mark the fact that it is always retrospective, looking back upon the less distinct perception of the prior moment. As we advance into the future, what we see in this superinduced moment of more distinct perception is not what is just going to be, but what has just been, in less distinct perception. By this I avoid the confusing imagery of a spatial world used to describe experience in its lowest terms, and I avoid also the necessity of distinguishing, at this early stage at any rate, between active and passive apperception, which merely for describing apperception is superfluous. Psychology indeed, treating apperception as a function, shows that all perception, and even sentience, requires some reaction on the part of the Subject. But even then there is no such thing as a purely passive state of consciousness, neither is there any purely active state of it. The difference between the faintest perception and the clearest apperception is a difference of degree, not of kind. Neither is it necessary to constitute apperception that it should contain the distinct element of a sense of effort or any other feeling (though as a fact it often does), marking that a reaction is taking place. We need not in any way know or surmise that we are apperceiving, in order to apperceive. Distinct consciousness of a process-content is the sole necessary and sufficient mark of it. Time, however, is requisite for any feeling to grow up from faintness to distinctness; and this priority of faint to distinct feeling is what is marked by the term Reflective Perception.

The fact of Reflection, and its cardinal importance both in philosophy and psychology, under the name Apperception, are pretty widely admitted. But the description here given of it, or the form under which it is here made the basis of philosophy, is due to the principle of method which I have laid down. In obedience to that principle, I abstract from the Subject or Agent of reflection, and consider only the content and process of the experience, or the consciousness, which enters through its ever-present moment. I abstract from the *how comes*, and consider only the *what is*, of Reflection. I abstract from it as the function of a Subject, and consider it only as experience. We shall see presently at what point the consideration of its *how comes*, of the agency and the agent concerned in it, has to be entertained. Since experience so taken includes all possible ideas and excludes none, and since we know of no other experience but this, it is evident that any ideas which we can form of a Subject or its agency, or of agency at all, must be gathered ultimately from this experience, and if taken up *a priori* must be taken up from pre-philosophic common sense.

When for instance Prof. Wundt says, speaking of Apperception, that we "feel it immediately as an inner activity" ("welche wir unmittelbar als eine innere Thätigkeit empfinden," *Phys. Psychologie*, ii. 304, 2te Aufl.), the statement is self-contradictory. We cannot feel anything immediately and as an activity also, for this would be to make it a feeling and a conception about the feeling in one, and no conception is immediate; to say nothing of the difficulty of seeing what can possibly be meant by an *inner* activity. Yet this activity of apperception and nothing else is regarded by Prof. Wundt as that which constitutes the unity of our Being: "darum ist eben jene Einheit unseres Wesens nichts anderes als die Thätigkeit der Apperception" (*ibid.*, p. 305). It would seem from this that "we" are pure agency without an agent; though in what sense this agency or activity can be an inner activity, without an agent to be inner to, is anything but luminous.

And here I pause for a moment to remark that the method which I advocate, whatever its final result may be, will certainly make philosophical analysis more searching and potent. The distinction which it applies, and which has hitherto been virtually neglected, is too fundamental to allow it to be otherwise. All existing philosophies mix up the *how comes* with the *what is*. Kant's philosophy, based upon his first hypothetical answer to the question, How is experience possible? is transcendental psychology, not

philosophy in my sense of the term. He begins with the nature of the Subject. And all existing philosophies that I am aware of either despair of apprehending anything whatever of the causal energy which upholds and guides the universe, or else imagine they can grasp its real essence by means of some positive but still anthropomorphic conception. That is to say, they are either agnosticism or psychology; in either case failures as philosophy. Indeed, there seems ultimately to be no other alternative, unless the distinction of method which I now propose, between the *whatness* and the *genesis* of phenomena, is made the basis of procedure. If this is done, and phenomena are fairly examined in the light of that distinction, the final outcome of our philosophy cannot fail to bear a very different impress from any of those with which we are now familiar. By this, however, I do not mean that it will materially or practically differ much from the views entertained by a sound and vigorous common sense.

Another change of great practical importance may also be expected to result, a change not in the form of philosophy itself, but in its relation to the sciences, and the classification and distribution of the whole group. Psychology, *Erkenntnistheorie* and Logic, which together seem to constitute what in this country is called the Philosophy of the Human Mind, will no longer stand at the head of a group called the Philosophical Sciences; but first and independently, and in a sense at the basis of all, will stand Philosophy simply, treated by the method now proposed, and then will come the several positive sciences, standing on a mathematical (as well as philosophical) basis, and grouped in three divisions, Physical and Inorganic Science, Biology and Psychology. Philosophy will thus be broadly distinguished by its purpose and its method from all the sciences, instead of a certain group of sciences being classed together as philosophical. At the same time it must be remembered, in reference to these and any other changes, that the method now proposed is a method only, and by itself neither condemns an old nor establishes a new result. It is simply a method for the more effective examination of the phenomena of experience, the results being left for experience itself to determine. Some of these results, it is true, I give as I go along, because they furnish the material for further applications of the method, later steps depending upon the result of earlier ones. But it is only by its last or rather total result, I mean as applied to the phenomena in their totality, that the method can be fairly judged.

But to return. Applying the principle of our method to the process-content of Reflection in the moment of perception, the moment at which it becomes experience, we find all instances of it distinguished, in the process itself, into two inseparable and correlated parts, the passing of a content into a distinct perception, and the distinct percept into which it has passed; or, in other words, the content while it is becoming, and the same content when it has become, a distinct percept. The former part we call the subjectivity, the latter we call the objectivity of that content. The subjectivity and the objectivity of a content may either be called its subjective and objective aspects, or they may be referred to the time during which their perception takes place, and called former and latter parts of that process. Or, again, the completed percept may be called the object of the process, the object of the perception. Knowing and known, or perceiving and perceived, is thus a prior distinction to knower and known, or perceiver and perceived. A *Subject* of perception is not given immediately in the simplest cases of reflective perception. On the other hand, these do give us *Existence*, in giving us objects. The moment of perception is the moment of experience, and neither our knowledge of existence actually, nor our conception of what the term means, can have any other ultimate source than this perception. By the term *existence* in the lowest and most general sense we mean the capability of being objective to reflective perception, without specifying any further limitation of the idea. The idea of objective existence is thus prior to and independent of the ideas of a Subject, or a Percipient, or an Activity of any kind. It is in virtue of possessing reflective perception, and of its commensurateness, so to speak, with the idea of objective existence, that man may be called *πάντων μέτρον*. He can think of nothing without bringing it into his experience by this process. An unknowable existent is a contradiction in terms.

The first stage of the application of the principle of method, namely, its application to the moment of reflective perception, which is the foundation of philosophy, I mark off as its first Rubric, under the title DISTINCTION OF ASPECTS. Its chief result is, that it sets the philosophical distinction of subjective and objective aspects of existence at the fountainhead of all knowledge, in place of the psychological distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' experience. This latter distinction rests on the presupposition, which comes from unanalysed common sense, that our self or its activity is something primarily and immediately *per se*

notum, and not only so, but also known in contradistinction from the not-self.

II.

The second stage or Rubric, to which we now come, is that under which the far greater part of philosophical work is done. This consists in analysing the whole process-content of experience as seen in reflection, the whole panorama of objective thought, and arranging and classifying its contents in accordance with that analysis. To this Rubric I give the name of ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS. The term *elements* is chosen, not from the circumstance that any concrete member of an analysis may be called an element of the whole of which it is a part, but in order to mark the fact, which comes out especially clearly by the present method, that every concrete member, which forms part of the whole, consists ultimately of features which, though distinguishable, are always inseparable from each other, so that no one of them is or can be perceived apart from the rest, however clearly it can be distinguished from others and denoted by an abstract name suggestive of a separate thing.

Thus, to take a simple instance, a sensation of colour is never perceived without its occupying some expanse of spatial extension, nor is any expanse of spatial extension ever perceived without some sensation of colour occupying it. Extension and colour are inseparable elements of the total perception or total sensation. And the same inseparability attaches to their representation or reproduction in thought. Pure sensation is thus an element in perception, and never stands by itself as sensation alone. But these facts are looked at quite differently under the influence of the idea that a Subject is receiving impressions, or reproducing impressions received. It is then usually admitted that we never have what is called a pure sensation, but it is added that the Subject has a synthetic power of combining pure sensations into perceptions, which latter are the lowest concrete thing in knowledge, while the pure sensations are conditions or prior steps towards them. Apart from this presupposition, and looking at the phenomena simply by themselves as phenomena, we find in them merely sensation and extension inseparably combined. And this result harmonises with the distinction of aspects in the first Rubric. For there we found that the distinction between what is objective and what is subjective fell within the whole, and within every part, of the total panorama of

experience. So also here, colour and extension are not contributed to perception, one by the Subject, the other by the Object, but are "equally and alike subjective, equally and alike objective," if I may be allowed to quote from my own work, *Time and Space*. The question of their genesis into perception is deferred till we come to treat of the genesis of consciousness altogether. And in fact it will be found that in order of knowledge we have perception of colour and extension before we arrive at the conception of a Subject, or at the perception of anything which can serve as the object of that conception.

Thus the first great result of analysis under the second Rubric is the discovery of the general fact just described, which I may call the '*Distinction of Inseparables*'. Closely connected with it is another of hardly inferior importance. It is this, that percepts as immediately given in experience, from always having a positive content, tell us immediately what they *are*, but do not immediately tell us what they *are not*; they do not tell us what they involve, or what *more* we may come to see in them on further examination, when brought into connexion by recollection and reasoning with other percepts. For instance, a percept tells us of itself that it is what we afterwards call a state of consciousness. But it does not tell us that it is *only* a state of consciousness; for to tell us this would be to suppose that we already had a knowledge of the distinction between states of consciousness and other things—a distinction which in fact presupposes percepts and not *vice versa*.

Or, to take another instance, the simple perception of a coloured expanse gives us colour and spatial extension, but it does not tell us that this spatial extension is superficial extension only, as distinguished from depth. The distinction of the three dimensions of space—length, breadth and depth—is our way of exhaustively describing space, when we have put together many experiences of percepts occupying it. There is no reason why the steps of actual perception should coincide with the distinctions of geometrical analysis, still less why the two first dimensions should be given first and separately from the third in perception. I do not indeed go the length of saying with Prof. James, in his admirable articles on "The Perception of Space" (*MIND* xii., Nos. 45-48), that we have an immediate perception of volume, that is, of space in what we afterwards call its three dimensions, depth included; or again, that sight by itself is competent to give us this perception. But so much, I think, is clear, that visual perceptions do not come ticketed

'we are in two dimensions only'. Supposing we adopt the terms of the space-dimensions to describe what we immediately see, we cannot, in my opinion, say that we see more than two, length and breadth; but then we do not see them in the terms which we use to describe them; there is no distinction from depth given in the simple perception of a visual expanse. This property of percepts is of great importance, inasmuch as it leaves them open to accretions from further experience. It may, perhaps, be called the '*Non-finality of Percepts*'.

The subject-matter of the first and second Rubrics of philosophy is precisely the same as that of psychology in point of range; but the phenomena which it covers, the thoughts and percepts which are its objects, are therein treated without reference to the Subject of them, without bringing in the consideration that consciousness is the *function*, either of a conscious agent or of consciousness itself. Refer the phenomena to such an agent or agency, and you are psychologising. The advantage of the philosophical method is that we are saved from making *a priori* assumptions about the nature of the agency concerned. This agency, whatever it be, can be learnt from nothing else but the phenomena examined without the assumption of it. These on examination will yield the perceptions on which the conception of agency is founded. We thus have to do in these two Rubrics with *causæ cognoscendi* and *causæ essendi*, namely, of states of consciousness or experiences, but not with *causæ existendi* or *fiendi*.

The sense of effort is a feeling which is very frequent and very prominent in experience. It is the mark or evidence in consciousness of volitional action as distinguished from spontaneous or involuntary. It is, for instance, an element in attention, and an element in choice, and an element in reasoning. All these are volitional actions. The content or object which is attended to or neglected, which is chosen or avoided, which is connected or disconnected with other objects, as in attention, choice and reasoning respectively,—all this falls under the analysis of these Rubrics, quite irrespective of the nature of that agency of which they are functions. Ultimately, therefore, it is to phenomena as examined by philosophy in these Rubrics that the practical sciences, as well as the theoretical, must be referred, as the examination which finally determines their real and essential character. The laws of Logic and the laws of Ethic have their source in the phenomena of consciousness or of experience thus examined. It is here that their validity or worth,

their *de jure* as distinguished from their *de facto* character, is ascertained and established. The same is true of Mathematic. The act of attention is the common root of numeration in Mathematic, of judgment in Logic and of choice in Practice. And both branches of Mathematic, calculation and geometry, are based upon what may properly be called the formal element in consciousness, time and space, considered as abstractions which retain nothing of their content but the divisibility and figurability which they derive from it. The problems relating to Infinity have here their origin, and consequently here, if at all, the ultimate means of solving them must be found.

The total object of reflective perception has been described above as a process-content. It is a process because it is something which takes place or goes on in time, and because its content is a changing one. The feelings which compose it are in some cases different and simultaneous, and in others different and successive. But in all cases they have duration. Time has been called specially the form of the 'inner sense' or 'inner experience'. But this is misleading. Time is the form of all experience without exception. It does not cease to be a form of those feelings which occupy spatial extension besides, in one or more or all of its modes, because they have space as their form also. Yet space has been contradistinguished from time, as the form of 'outer experience'. Wrongly, since in that case feelings which occupied space would have to be 'outer' to themselves, seeing that they occupy time simply as feelings. Spatial extension is, indeed, the condition of our having the perception of outness, of parts beyond parts, simultaneously existing side by side with one another. Coexistence in space is not the same thing as coexistence in time, which is simultaneity. Time and space, therefore, are not only irreducible one to the other, but each is immediate to perception and inseparable from it; time or duration being inseparable from feeling generally, and spatial extension, the rudiment of what we afterwards know as space in three dimensions, being inseparable from certain kinds of feeling only. There are no other forms of feeling of which the same can be said. The perception of difference and the perception of change require time only as their inseparable form or mode of existing. The perception of motion requires some mode of space also. Motion is change of place in time.

It is obvious that time and space are widely different from that which occupies or fills them. If we call them the

formal element in perception, that inseparable element which occupies or fills them may properly be called its material element, without implying physical materiality thereby. The analysis and classification of feelings belong to the present Rubric. Except the formal element, there is nothing in experience which does not fall under the head of feeling. Feeling, time and space are the three ultimates to which all experience may be reduced. All its varied forms are modes or combinations of two or all of these three. But the differences of feeling are inexhaustible. The functions of the Subject which are distinguished by psychology as appetite, desire, conation, *Trieb* (for which there is no good single equivalent in English), attention, volition, and others, are known to us mediately by means of some variety or other of immediate feeling. What have been called 'local signs,' by which we estimate size, distance and position of objects in space, are modifications of feeling. Pleasure and pain are feelings. Passions are feelings. The æsthetic emotions are feelings. It is under this Rubric that feeling of every sort must be analysed, classified and tested, as well with regard to its moral worth and value, as with regard to its similarities, dissimilarities and affinities.

The questions concerning pleasure and pain are perhaps as important and far-reaching as any. Are pleasure and pain, or either of them, general kinds of feeling upon which the varieties of sensation and emotion should be conceived as superinduced modes or developments? Or, on the other hand, are they modes attaching to other sensations and emotions, in which they arise when a certain degree of intensity is attained or overstepped? Or, finally, are they feelings separable from others and *sui generis*, though constantly and closely combined with others? Psychologists who begin by assuming a Subject will probably be more inclined to the first alternative, as tending to give a certain fulness and reality to its somewhat empty notion; metaphysicians to the second. But the matter is still *sub judice*.

Another most important inquiry belonging to this Rubric is into the order in which perceptions are retained or forgotten, reproduced and recombined, as well in imagination as in thought and volition, and as well without as with the introduction of new presentative perceptions, in short, the whole subject of the Association of Ideas. The first proceeding is to distinguish trains of purely representative perceptions from those with which presentative perceptions mingle. The next is to distinguish trains of the former

kind into those which are purely spontaneous or unmodified by volition, and those in which the train of spontaneous representations is modified by attention in view of some more or less conscious purpose. If these distinctions were strictly attended to, and the examination conducted on their basis, I cannot but think that the laws of association would come out very differently from what is now most usually supposed. It is not permissible to discuss the matter here, but I may say that I see no reason to depart essentially from the view which I have taken in works published several years ago.

The sense of effort for a purpose, which marks the transformation of spontaneous reintegration into voluntary, or which is the evidence in consciousness of the reaction by which it is effected, is a great turning-point in the analysis of this Rubric. It is the limit between perception on one side, and conception, judgment, thought and reasoning on the other. Moreover, since all content of consciousness is feeling, it is also the limit between likes and dislikes on one side, and conscious choice, or practical adoption of an alternative, on the other. The action of the Subject, which below this point was known only as a train of sequent and co-existent perceptions, is here known as a conscious modification of that train; while, at the same time, it bifurcates, as it were, though without a complete separation, into two lines plainly distinguishable from each other by the predominance, though not exclusive presence, of their characteristic mark,—the line of thought and reasoning on the one hand, and the line of choice and practical action on the other. The former is the domain of Logic, the latter of Ethic.

It is necessary to say a few words of the line of thought, conception and reasoning, in this place, because philosophy itself belongs to that line, and philosophical method depends to a great extent upon our knowledge of its true nature. The most elementary act in thought is a judgment. This is conditioned upon attention. But so long as attention is directed to following the train of percepts as they rise into consciousness, as in observation of events and objects purely as such, the judgment is purely existential, namely, that the percepts as perceived are really there. It then simply registers the result of the attention alone. But when more than this is done, as, for instance, when, looking, let us suppose, at a flower, I say mentally, 'This percept is white'—a judgment which we will call 'A is B,' I am then first distinguishing A, as marked by its location in the context of consciousness, from its own attribute B, and next reuniting

them as an attribute-bearing percept in the judgment. Difference is involved in the coalescence or partial identity which the judgment expresses. In another way also difference is involved in the identity. In saying 'A is B,' I am arresting the train of percepts at A, which is perceived as B, *i.e.*, white, and holding it fast in thought while I predicate B of it; there is difference in the time which elapses in passing from the percept AB as subject to the percept AB as predicate. There are two A's, one prior to the other in time, and similarly two B's. Logical thought requires me to hold the first A fast in thought, in order to predicate B of it, notwithstanding that the first A is replaced by a second A when I get to the predicate of the judgment. I choose an instance of extreme simplicity, though aware it may lay me open to the charge of over-refining; but its advantage is that the same analysis will hold good *a fortiori* of all more complex cases.

The result of a judgment is a concept. The AB, which is turned out at the end of the judgment A is B, is not a percept simply, but a percept modified into a concept. It has, so to speak, entered the mind as a percept, and has been reborn as a concept. The mind has stamped its *imprimatur* on it. The train of percepts, as it occurs originally in consciousness, is a train of differentials and similars which have no nexus but that of time or of time and space together. The order in which they enter into experience, or are reproduced by purely spontaneous reintegration, may be called a perceptual order. But when we attend to this train of percepts in perceptual order, with the purpose of understanding it, we modify the perceptual order, and make a nexus which suits our purpose. Similarity and contrast are made into a logical nexus which they were not before; so also are particular time and space relations, if they suit our purpose.

The whiteness B is prepared by the judgment which results in the concept AB for being classed with other instances of whiteness wherever they may be found, and AB brought into logical relation with them; and the simple objectivity or 'thisness' A, in the same concept, is similarly brought into logical relation with all other instances of simple objectivity or 'thisness,' which latter *per se* is merely the particular location of the percept in the context of consciousness. Both the object and its attribute are then *classed*, placed in a logical order of thought, over and above the perceptual order in which they primarily occur; this logical order consisting, in its totality, of piles of *concepts*,

i.e., abstract and general terms piled by means of *genus* and *differentia* into groups quite different from the perceptual or natural grouping, in which object and attribute, now in thought separated, were inseparable. But before this new grouping can be effected, it is evident that we must have had many instances of trains of perception which have been registered in memory by attention, and by what I called above purely existential judgments. Our purpose in referring percepts to a conceptual order may be described in its largest and most general scope as the purpose of understanding them—that is, reproducing them in the mind with logical consistency so far as this itself is consistent with all the facts.

It should also be noted that generality depends upon conception, not conception upon generality. Both A and B, as well as AB, become concepts from being percepts by the acts (1) of attention which separates them for the purpose of uniting them with something not themselves, and (2) of judgment which re-unites them with each other. They are then capable of use as general terms. And this general applicability they possess because they are abstracted, or taken out of the individual context to which they belong, and made the first step in our self-acquired knowledge of the whole context, a great part of which at that moment is itself *in futuro*. If there was no other white object in the world, *white* would still be a concept, ready to become a general term, if and when another instance of whiteness should occur.

While, then, I entirely agree with the school represented by Prof. Seth in his polemic against what he calls “the logic of abstract identity” (see his Balfour Lectures on *The Scottish Philosophy*, p. 167), I think that there is another side of the subject which writers of that school are too apt to ignore, if not to deny. I mean that the difference which is involved in logical identity has its source in the train of percepts which is the necessary condition and, so to speak, the material of logical and conceptual processes. There is, moreover, continuity of time, and continuity of space in time, in the perceptual process, as well as difference and as well as similarity. The elements of concepts, of the logical nexus, and of the conceptual order are all present in perception before perception is modified by thought. Difference and identity do not appear in the conceptual order because it is the nature of the Concept, *Der Begriff*, or *Das Denken*, to be identity in difference, the union of opposites, or the negation of a negation.

Thought modifies the perceptual order into a conceptual one, and gives back percepts in the form of concepts, in order to understand them. It is man's way of putting Nature. I cannot, therefore, agree with Prof. Seth when he says that "the individual is a universal—a set of universals—particularised" (*ibid.*, p. 171). This is only true of the individual when the word is taken to mean the real thing called individual *so far only* as it bears the *logical* character of individuality, and not the real thing to which that name is applied. *Universals* and *individuals* are terms of logic. The real things to which they are applied belong one and all to the general term *individual* and not to the general term *universal*. And these real individuals are each the "conflux" or union, not of "generalities," but of percepts, that is, of qualities or properties as perceived, and not of qualities or properties as thought. This is true not only of the train of percepts which we have now been speaking of, and of which the conceptual order is a modification, but also of the real world as it appears to common sense, and as it appears to positive science. The properties and qualities of natural objects meet and are combined in those objects in perceptual order; each property and quality is individualised in kind, quantity, intensity, and inextricably intertwined with the others in one real whole. A real individual thing, say a pebble on the beach, is not a plexus of general thoughts held together by a conception of the mind, but a plexus of perceivable qualities held together by natural forces, of which the conceptual plexus is the human and very imperfect version. Even the calculus of the algebraist is unequal to cope with the minuteness of the texture, the multiplicity of the shades of difference which go to constitute a single real thing, to say nothing of the modes as yet undiscovered, perhaps even unimagined, in which what we call chemical affinity operates. Logical thought is but an imperfect mode of bringing into intelligible shape the inexhaustible riches of reality. How vain, then, is the imagination that the power by which the universe exists is the identity in difference of the *Begriff*! What we have translated out of perceptual into conceptual order, for the purpose of understanding it, we must translate back again into perceptual order, if we would have it before us in consciousness in the same manner of existence in which it exists in nature.

But my limits warn me to hasten to the point at which, in the logical method of philosophy, the second Rubric closes and the third opens. I mean the analysis of the processes of perception and thought combined, by which we attain the

knowledge of things as opposed to thoughts, or in other words, the knowledge of *objects thought of* as opposed to the *objective thoughts* which represent them, which latter have been our sole companions hitherto. We find by experience that these objective thoughts, under which term I include percepts as well as concepts, percepts imagined and inferred by reasoning as well as presentatively perceived, and always represented ultimately in perceptual order, fall into various comparatively stable groups, and hold and act together as single things, as the common objects of everyday life and of the scientific mode of thought. So far as these are known to us, they are known as plexuses, so to speak, of objective thoughts, feelings, states of consciousness. They are our states of consciousness, yet we have not made them, in any other sense than that of discovering them, by perception and inference from perception. Something in, or represented by, the perceptions has compelled their formation, by operations in which conception and thought have played a necessary but still only a ministerial and subsidiary part. The perceptions have somehow by our means got grouped for us into concrete empirical objects. Still, so far as we have seen at present, they are only grouped percepts, feelings, ideas or states of consciousness after all.

One of these groups is what we afterwards call the body of the observer. I mean that, for consciousness observing experience, one of the groups which form themselves as its objects has this peculiarity, in addition to many others, that it is always present when any other states of consciousness are, that it always forms a certain constant inner sphere at or about the centre of the visual sphere of space, and that changes in it are in specially close and intimate connexion with other feelings and perceptions in the same consciousness. There is, moreover, reason to suppose that the perception of this particular group of percepts, and the perception of other particular groups more immediately surrounding it, proceed strictly *pari passu*. This is not perceived and distinguished as a single group before they are, nor they before it. The detail of the methods by which this takes place, by which we find ourselves as real percipients in a world of real objects, falls partly under the present Rubric and partly under the principles which are examined in the Rubric following. However, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to enter upon this part of the subject more particularly.

What concerns us here is the difference between objects thought of and the objective thoughts representing them,

together with the grounds for drawing that distinction. This question is logically prior to that of the distinction of objects thought of from one another, and is the last question of the second Rubric. How do we know that there is an object thought of other than the group of percepts which we say represents it? How does the objective thought develop, or develop itself into, an object thought of? In short, what is meant by an object thought of?

Let us begin by seeing what cannot be meant by it. It is clearly not an object out of relation to consciousness, not a 'thing-in-itself'. It is therefore something in consciousness additional to what we have hitherto called its objective thought. This something additional, however, is not the simple perception or thought of existence; for this existence is possessed by objective thoughts as such, all of which exist objectively to reflective perception. The addition must, therefore, be something within the limits of the objective thought itself, and yet, being an addition, must be something not yet perceived in it.

But what *can* be added to the content of an objective thought as now described? Clearly this—the thought of its complete determination as an individual thing beyond the point reached by our most complete knowledge of it at any given moment. The objective thought is not one but many. At one time it is this, at another that; it fluctuates with memory; it is liable to mistake; it is increased, diminished and corrected by new observation. It cannot possibly be said to hold and act together as a single thing in the same way as any given shape of it *plus* its supposed complete determination, whether positively known to us or not, can be conceived to do. The objective thought *plus* its complete determination at a given moment is the object thought of in or by the objective thought *minus* that complete determination.

This, I think, is what is meant by an object thought of, as opposed to the objective thought of it. This is its logical *differentia*. The idea of an object thought of differs from the idea of an objective thought by the additional thought-item of its complete determination at any given moment. But whether any such objects thought of really exist in the full sense of *real existence* which is included in the common-sense notion of reality is a question which must be determined under the following Rubric. Assuming that they do, then their logical *differentia* is completeness of determination at any and every moment of their existence. What that full sense of real existence is falls under the following Rubric

also ; in the present Rubric it would be an assumption that completely determined objects really exist in this full sense. The idea is expectant of its applicability.

An object thought of is taken in the present Rubric simply as an existing object completely determined at any given moment, excluding the consideration of its real nexus with other objects, excluding the *energies* of which it is the vehicle, and which connect it on one hand with its real conditions, on the other with its conditionates, its own future states in order of evolution among them. It is even yet, even as an object thought of, but the ghost of a reality in the full sense of that term. We abstract from the changes which it has undergone up to the moment at which we consider it, and from the changes which it will undergo after that moment. It is completely determined at every moment which we may select as compared to our objective thought of it at that moment. This is its *differentia* from that objective thought, and the first step towards our conception of its full reality.

Observe, in the next place, that this conception severs in thought the connexion between the group of percepts, which is the object thought of, and the process of perception by which its content has been given, which is the objective thought of it, because the supposed determination would not be complete if the group was still identified with any group of objective thought not completely determined ; for then the whole so formed would be incompletely determined, which would violate the supposition. At the same time the connexion between the group supposed to be completely determined and reflective perception altogether is not severed ; the group is still an object of reflective perception at subsequent moments, only in the form of a completely determined object, already made and finished, in virtue of the supposition. Reflective perception has then two objects before it in place of one—its own objective thought and the object thought of thereby. That is the outcome of the whole process.

The severance in thought thus effected is the necessary condition of regarding the objects severed as located differently in space from the perception of them located in the body, which is the starting-point of psychology. They are thus in a manner cut loose from their subjective aspect. When, besides this, the severance is conceived as total, in forgetfulness of the fact that the existence of the severed object in its complete determination can be known or surmised only by reflective perception, that is, by an

exercise of the same function as before, only at a different moment of experience, then the error is committed of regarding the severed groups, not merely as real and phenomenal, but also as absolute objects or 'things-in-themselves'.

The question we are now discussing is one of the cardinal questions of philosophy—the conciliation of the ideas of reality and subjectivity. Their attempted identification in the phrase an Absolute Subject is no solution, but merely a restatement of the question. We cannot get at the notion of a Subject but through that of an Object, and we cannot conceive any Object as absolute. The method set forth in the present paper begins by abstracting from the common-sense notion of a Subject; and its analysis has not disclosed one, so far as it has gone at present. The severance in thought of empirical objects thought of from one another, which again rests on the distinction between objects thought of and objective thought, is, in fact, a prior condition of disclosing it.

One word in review of our present position. We begin, I may repeat, by abstracting from the common-sense fact, that consciousness is always some one's consciousness, possessed by some Subject, or, as each one says in his own case, *my* consciousness. Accordingly we examine the process-content of consciousness simply as a process-content. But this imposes on us the task of looking in the process-content for the grounds of the common-sense fact abstracted from. We cannot ignore that fact, neither can we assume it as self-evident without analysis. We have as it were to work up to it, or, if it be illusory, to the grounds of the illusion, from the analysis of the process-content. This we proceed to do by showing in the first instance the grounds on which we sever, in the process-content, a group of percepts from the perception of it, namely, by considering it as completely determined, without severing it from reflective perception altogether. The objectivity of groups of percepts as empirical realities, or, as we may also express it, their reality as well as their objectivity, thus secured, becomes the ground on which we base, or justify, the conception of the relative or partial independence of the several groups of percepts as real things in presence of each other; and this again is the means of referring perception and consciousness generally to a seat or seats in groups of one particular class, namely, living organisms, which is the conception with which psychology begins.

III.

A great part of the observation and reasoning upon which the two latter conceptions depend belongs to the next, or third, Rubric of the present method. The second Rubric closes with the distinction between objective thoughts and objects thought of; the third opens with a distinction within the latter. The work of analysing experience as it comes to us in consciousness, of discovering *what* the process-content of experience is, being provided for by the second Rubric, it remains for the third to ask the remaining question of the method, the question of the *genesis* of experience itself, and of the various components or objects which it contains. The question is, first, *How comes* consciousness itself into existence? and, second, *How comes* this or that object of consciousness to be what it is and where it is in the panorama of Experience? What determines these things and upon what do they depend? We thus, by asking this question of the whole panorama and of its parts, think of them as constituting, in their totality, an order of conditions and conditionates, an order of Nature, working under uniform laws. The question in the two former Rubrics was, *What is* this or that? Here it is, *How is it conditioned* and what does it *condition*? Accordingly I entitle this third Rubric the ORDER OF REAL CONDITIONING.

It is here that we find ourselves face to face with that full sense of the term *reality* which has been mentioned above. A real object in the fullest sense is something which is not only real as an existing object of consciousness, but which also *does* something, contributes actively to determine other things or events, or has them depending on it; and that not merely in the character of being evidence for them, or of forming an element in the knowledge of them, but in the sense that they depend upon it for their existence, whether we have a particular knowledge of it or not. Such real objects are called real conditions.

It is clear from what precedes, that all real conditions must at least be objects thought of, but it does not follow that all objects thought of are real conditions. They may be conditionates only, which have no reaction. A fiction of the imagination, a chimæra for instance, may be assumed to be completely determined, and in that sense a real existent, but it does not follow that it is a real condition of anything. On the other hand, the imagination or objective thought of it may be itself an object thought of, and being real as a state of consciousness, idea or feeling, may (con-

ceivably) act and react with other states of consciousness or with the Subject, and in this way be a real condition, contributing to mould the course of Nature.

For now it is the place to observe, that objective thoughts may *in that character* be taken as objects thought of. We have only to consider an objective thought taken at any given moment to be completely determined as what it is, and we *ipso facto* treat it as its own object thought of. The logical *differentia* between them remains the same, but the things distinguished by it have precisely the same content, and become opposite aspects of each other, or are like the two A's in A is A. It would have been confusing to have mentioned this before, because we arrive at the knowledge of this case only by first seeing the difference in cases where the content is different. But this latter case it is, which, by enabling us to treat states of consciousness as objects thought of, enables us to examine, without prejudging it, their claim to be real conditions, that is, realities in the fullest sense of the term, and real links in the chain of causation.

What we have to do, then, under this Rubric is first to treat all things as completely determined existents, that is, as objects thought of; feelings, ideas and states of consciousness, as much as everything else; and then to inquire which among them are real conditions as well as real conditionates. This being done, the remainder of the work consists in discovering the laws which govern the action of real conditions *inter se*, and the production of the conditionates which depend upon it but have no reaction. In other and more popular words, the whole of Nature considered as a concatenation of causes and effects is its subject-matter.

Let us see, then, more particularly what is meant by a real condition and what by a cause. It is plain that we must begin by taking some conditionate and putting to it the question *How comes?* This being done, we may define a real condition as—any object thought of, without which another given object thought of (the conditionate in question) would not exist. Following this, we may define a cause, in accordance with J. S. Mill, as—that combination of its real conditions, upon the completion of which a given object thought of begins and continues to exist. (See MIND iv. 516.) For instance, in an eclipse of the moon, the attainment of a certain series of points in the relative movements of the sun, moon and earth, in presence of a percipient, is the combination of real conditions upon which the apparent spreading of darkness over the moon's disk begins and continues. The conditionate is said to *depend* upon the

conditions in combination, and not *vice versa*, because the apparent spreading of darkness over the moon's disk cannot be thought of as a reality existing of itself, but must have some real conditions other than itself. What can these possibly be, if what we now call its real conditions are conditioned upon it? There is no answer. Sun, moon, earth and percipient have an existence independent of it, but it has no existence independent of them. True, it is among their *causæ cognoscendi*, it is *evidence* for their existence; but they are among its *causæ existendi*, which is the relation we are here concerned with.

The foregoing illustration is, of course, merely an example, by which my distinction, between conditionates which are and conditionates which are not real conditions, may be made clear. That the sun, moon, &c., are the real conditions in this case requires distinct proof. And the first question for this Rubric is, to what kind of phenomena do the real conditions in the order of real conditioning, or dependence of fact on fact, commonly called causation, belong,—whether to so-called physical phenomena, or to consciousness as such, or to Subjects of consciousness, or to two of them, or all three? This is not a question to be begged by an illustration. At the same time it is most important to observe, that it does not presuppose a knowledge of the real nature or ultimate essence of causation. This is a question which is probably beyond the reach alike of science and philosophy, even if the very form of it as now stated does not involve a misconception. We may discover to what class of phenomena the phenomenon known as causation is to be referred for its explanation, or, in other words, in the line of what kind of events real conditioning flows, without discovering in what its essence consists. The question where it is to be found is prior, not indeed to the question what it is known as, but to the question what it would be known as if fully known.

But the chief point I would insist on is, that in stating the alternatives as to the vehicle or line of causation,—physical phenomena, consciousness and Subjects,—these must be taken as objects thought of, and not as objective thoughts merely; inasmuch as the question of causation, or dependence of phenomena *inter se*, does not arise unless and until phenomena are taken in this restricted sense. If consciousness, for instance, is held to be a real vehicle of real conditioning, it must be so on the same footing as physical phenomena; that is, on the footing of objects thought of, and not on the ground that it is our sole means of *knowing* pheno-

mena. The fact that we know phenomena only through or in the shape of objective thoughts does not show that objective thoughts stand in causal relation to one another. This point, the question of genesis, requires separate proof, and this is the very reason for bringing it under a separate Rubric. We shall shortly have occasion to recur to this point in another connexion.

The ground covered by the third Rubric is the same as that covered by the several positive sciences, inorganic, organic and psychological. But it is needless to say that philosophy does not infringe upon these sciences. The same relation which mathematic holds to the first and second Rubrics is here held by the positive sciences to the third. The task of philosophy is simply to assign their relations to itself, and for that purpose to review and give a philosophical shape to their fundamental conceptions, which are the points at which they are, so to speak, incorporated into the philosophical organisation. The conceptions of matter, motion, force, energy, molecules, atoms, action and reaction, organic matter, life, and others of similar importance, must necessarily fall within the province of philosophy as well as science, at least for treatment on their logical side. Philosophy cannot do more without overstepping its boundary and entering on that of physical science, which is concerned with the discovery of the *de facto* order of Nature, or Real Conditioning in physical matter.

Precisely similar is the true relation of philosophy to psychology, only that here the boundary is by no means so obvious, and consequently by no means so generally recognised. As Prof. Wundt most truly says, psychology, like every explanatory science, requires a fundamental presupposition to which it may refer its phenomena for their explanation. Its fundamental problem, he adds, is to form a conception of the Soul as such a basis of explanation, analogous to the basis possessed by physic in its conception of Matter (*Logik*, ii. 502). It seems indisputable that, if psychology abdicates the function of framing such a fundamental conception of the agent or agency upon which consciousness depends, it abdicates thereby its claim to be considered an explanatory science, and takes up instead with the position of a descriptive or classificatory one, which is but the preliminary of the explanatory or, as I should call it, the positive branch.

Yet there are not wanting those in this country who are ready to abdicate the function without expressly renouncing the claim; for instance, Mr. James Ward, in his otherwise

able article "Psychology" in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. He there speaks of "the purely formal notion of a subject or pure Ego," and then immediately adds—"For empirical psychology this notion is ultimate; its speculative treatment falls altogether—usually under the heading 'rational psychology'—to metaphysics" (*Encyc. Brit.*, xx. 85). His article describes the gradual attainment of the notion in consciousness, but contains no speculative treatment of its object, the pure Ego or Subject. Yet it is not headed "Empirical Psychology". The pure Ego, when once assumed, is no doubt an embarrassing topic. It is an entity made of an abstraction, a class of beings to which no legitimate positive science is devoted, still less Metaphysic. Herein Mr. Ward's ideas have a decidedly pre-Comtian complexion.

The old psychology was built on the assumption of a special agent for consciousness, different in kind from Matter. Mind was opposed to Matter, or Subject to Object, as an ultimate and self-evident fact. The difficulty is to say *what* Mind or Subject (or by whatever name the agent may be called) is known as. What is the analysis or content of the notion? I do not say, What is its ultimate essence? But it is requisite that it should have some content, if it is to be brought into such relation with its phenomena as to afford an explanation of them. Otherwise it is a mere word, nothing but a *that which* causes the phenomena to be explained, tautological with them. If psychology is to be an explanatory science, it must give its explaining agent (or agency) some positive content. Now this is just the position which the present method assigns to it. I would no longer base psychology on the assumed difference between Mind and Matter, Subject and Object, Ego and non-Ego, or the like, but on that between consciousness and its real conditions. Consciousness being first analysed simply as process-content, the next step is to connect it with its real conditions. Psychology begins with this latter step; the proof of which is that psychological analysis of consciousness is always analysis of it, not as process-content simply, but as the function of a conscious being. It then falls into line with the other positive sciences, the relations of which to philosophy are assigned in the third Rubric of the latter.

To show this sufficiently for our purpose we must go back a little on our steps. Consciousness is knowing or knowledge; it is also the objects known in that knowledge. But it is not production or causation of the objects known by the knowing them. The knowing and the known are commen-

surate, opposite aspects of each other. But production or causation is one class of objects known, the particular relation of dependence of object on object in order of existence. We are bound to put the question of dependence, conditioning, causation or production to everything, because this relation is everywhere discovered in objects known. Every object known has something to which it is bound by the relation of dependence; and to know it thoroughly we must know what that something is. But when we put the question to consciousness itself, or knowing, including *all* objects known, we find that we are asking a self-contradictory question. To put the question is necessary, in order to bring out the contradiction which putting it involves. The contradiction is this: We are asking for something else beyond objects, some object not included in *all* objects.

It is at this fundamental point that Idealists go astray. They identify consciousness, not only with all its objects, but also with production or causation. They would probably argue thus: Consciousness is all its objects; causation of object by object is an object; therefore consciousness is causation of its objects. But if that is their argument, the reply is obvious. Consciousness is all its objects in the sense of being the opposite aspect of them, in the sense that knowing and known are commensurate. There is a difference of aspect in their identity. And in this sense it is quite true that consciousness is causation, namely, as a knowing or knowledge of it; we have no knowledge of causation but by knowing it. But this is very different from saying that knowing is causing simply, whereby the two are identified without difference of aspect.

Common sense is here with me against the Idealists; everybody sees that knowing is not causing. But I should be sorry to rest my case on common-sense intuitions alone, in which there is no analytical test of truth or falsity. The process-content of consciousness as it takes place in the successive moments of experience tells us nothing of causation, nothing of any dependence of the percept on the subsequent perception of it, or of the perception on the preceding percept. What *more* there may be in the process-content than the relation of aspects is not a *datum* of consciousness; causation is not a *datum*; and whatever we may learn about its being contained in the process-content must be learnt from the analysis of its whole objective panorama. Now what we actually have in consciousness, in this panorama, is an objective thought of causation; causation being the object thought of. Assume our objective thought to be

completely determined in all its relations,—which we can do on the principle, mentioned above, of the non-finality of percepts,—and it would be causation itself, the secret of the universe, as known to omniscience. But even this knowledge would not be identical with causation itself, that is, with omnipotence, except as its subjective aspect ; it would not be real causation in the full sense of reality, the sense in which it is possessed by real conditions, which can *do* as well as *be*.

Yet there is a sense in which we can put the question *How comes?* to consciousness, without contradiction. It is by severing in thought the relation of aspects, and thereby taking the term *consciousness* in a restricted sense as something separate from its objects, or knowing as something separate from the known. There is then, taking it in this restricted sense, something left outside consciousness, to which to refer it, as the condition on which it depends, in case the facts permit. But then also, by separating it from its objects, it is *eo ipso* treated as an object itself. Both they and it are then treated as objects thought of, our treatment of them being the objective thought which represents them, being in fact our knowing or knowledge of them. This treatment of consciousness, the search for its real conditioning in this restricted sense, is the fundamental question of psychology, and the following it out in detail, into the particular phenomena of consciousness, makes up the body of the science. We have to ask here whether consciousness itself can be the condition of its own states ; or whether an Ego or other immaterial substance is its condition ; or whether this part is played by physical substance or physical energies. All these are legitimate questions, in the sense of coming legitimately within the province of psychological science. Psychology is thus based, not on the distinction between Subject and Object, or any analogous distinction, but, as stated above, on the distinction between consciousness and its real conditions.

If in psychology taken as a science it should be clearly demonstrated, either that an immaterial Subject is the agent or proximate real condition of consciousness, or that consciousness itself without any Subject is an independent agency, either of these results would react upon philosophy, and impress upon it an indisputably Idealistic character. In the first case we should have a partial, in the second a total, Idealism, since both the process-content and the real genesis of consciousness would be accounted for at one and the same stroke, without requiring the intervention of

Matter. This remark is intended to show, that the method which I now propose by no means prejudices or carries with it a foregone conclusion of philosophical problems, in one sense or in another. It provides only for their full and fair examination, without surreptitious assumptions.

One remark remains as to the feasibility of putting the question of genesis to consciousness. If consciousness is the total panorama of existence, how, it may be asked, is it feasible to inquire into its genesis? The answer is plain. By taking it in its moment of genesis, the moment of reflective perception. It is by passing through that moment that the objective world takes its place in the panorama. Experience is the series of all these moments in the whole life of an individual. They are indefinitely numerous, but one in kind. Just as the panorama of visual space is centred in the organ of visual perception, so the panorama of existence is localised, in time and space together, in the organ or agent of reflective perception.

It is sometimes made an objection to what is called introspective philosophy, that we cannot both perceive and analyse our perceiving at one and the same moment. This is true, but then it is not required of philosophy to do so. The moments of reflective perception are many in number, though one in kind, and earlier moments are reviewed and analysed by later ones. Reflective perception is the name for that which is common to all the instances of it. When this is referred to an individual Subject, it is treated as a function of the Subject. And it is consciousness *as function* of an individual conscious being that is examined in psychology. The phenomena are the very same as those analysed by philosophy in its first and second Rubrics; sensations, feelings, pleasure and pain, emotions, thoughts, volitions, &c., &c., are all analysed again by psychology, but in relation to that real condition, agent or agency, which, be it what it may, *has* those moments of reflective perception through experiencing them, and whose agency is coloured and distinguished by them into the various modes which we call its several functions. Feeling, sensation, emotion, volition, thought, memory, recollection, and so on, are all words importing functions. Psychology analyses as functions of the mind what philosophy analyses as process-content of experience.

IV.

Now perhaps it may seem that, when philosophy has

provided for the complete analysis of consciousness or experience as such, under its first and second Rubrics, and for the incorporation of the whole series of the positive sciences with philosophy, by means of the conception of real condition or genesis under the third, its task is ended. But this would really leave its special purpose, a Rationale of the Universe so far as attainable by man, unattempted. There yet remains the work of putting together the results acquired both by philosophy and by the positive sciences (so far as the latter bear upon the problem), of taking their total *factit*, and exhibiting the conclusion in the form of a general estimate, both of what we know and what we do not know, of the Sum of Things. The fourth and last Rubric I accordingly entitle THE CONSTRUCTIVE BRANCH OF PHILOSOPHY.

And first with regard to man. The analysis of his feelings, reasonings and volitions has been here attributed to philosophy, that of the *de facto* conditioning of them to psychology. Now it will be admitted that all the questions of Ethic have a twofold root, one in the estimate of the comparative worth and moral dignity of the feelings, ideas and purposes which enter into the conduct of life, the other in the comparative strength and efficacy of these same feelings, ideas and purposes considered as motives, in combination with the natural tendencies and appetitions of man as an animal being. It is essential in Ethic to keep these two roots distinct; it is equally essential, while doing so, to observe and maintain their living combination. This is facilitated by the method now proposed. The separation of the first two Rubrics from the third provides for the first requirement, the addition of the fourth provides for the second. Ethic as a whole we must accordingly assign to the Constructive Branch of philosophy, taking its *data* from the results of philosophical and psychological analysis under the preceding Rubrics.

The question whether wholly disinterested benevolence is possible, or whether all forms of altruism are not ultimately refined or disguised egoism, receives an easy solution, when we have learnt to distinguish between self as referred to reflective perception and self as referred to the psychological Subject. The former self may surely be wholly detached from the self-interests of the latter.

Again, the question of Free-will is really a question of genesis, a question of function, a question for psychology. But how often do we see its advocates endeavour to prove its reality by giving it a definition drawn from purely philoso-

phical considerations, defining it, for instance, as the action of the true or higher self as opposed to the lower; or again, as the action of the whole of Nature distinguished from the mechanical action of part upon part. What really has to be shown is, that action, as action simply, can be free. Freedom is a *mode* of action. It is no use to call in a special agent *ad hoc*, whose action is freedom simply. Yet supposing freedom of choice, or free-will, established, we have still only the preliminary of Ethic, only the psychological or functional part of Conduct. The question of right or wrong still remains. The strength of the so-called English or Utilitarian school of Ethic consists in an exclusive attention to the psychological or functional view of the phenomena of conduct. From that point of view alone nothing that is *de jure*, but only what is *de facto*, can possibly be seen. Questions of what is right or wrong, and why, can be answered only by purely philosophical analysis. Thus here also the method now proposed seems appropriate to the problem dealt with.

A similar position to that held by the question of freedom in the moral world is held in the world of Nature by the questions of Contingency and Necessity, Possibility and Impossibility. To answer these in application to the world requires not only subjective analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, in which these conceptions have their roots as conceptions, but also a knowledge of the facts to which they are applicable, as these facts are given by the positive sciences. The combination of these two analyses is their application to the world as a whole. The two senses of necessity, (1) uniform law and (2) superior force, have been the source of endless confusion, especially in application to moral freedom; and merely pointing out its source is by no means the same thing as remedying the confusion. The question remains, what is involved in the union of law and force in the world which we actually know, when it is conceived as a process of as yet unfinished evolution?

Similarly the question whether the universe is to be considered as infinite or as absolute, that is, a rounded off whole, has its roots in subjective analysis on the one side, and in observation of nature on the other. Without the combination of both, no application of them to the universe is possible. It is the use of the forms of *perception*, Time and Space, by the positive sciences, or, in other words, their laying Mathematic (not Logic) at the basis of their whole method, which gives those sciences their predominant importance in experience. They explain things as they are

perceivable, that is, as they *exist*, and not merely as they are *thinkable in concepts*; they explain the genesis and relations of natural objects in perceptual order prior to its modification by any re-active thought, except the effort of attention. Time is the *continuum* at the basis of all *change*; time and space together at the basis of all *motion*. The ideas of beginning and end, of limit and boundary, of division of *continua* without residuum, as, *e.g.*, lines in geometry by mathematical points, belong to subjective analysis. The idea of Quantity itself depends on the fact that percepts are *continua* in time and space, not this fact on the idea of quantity. The Kantian Antinomies must find their solution, if at all, in the application of the subjective analysis of these ideas to the world as positively known to us.

Another great question which demands, first the distinction, and secondly the combination, of subjective analysis with positive science is that of Teleology. In the first place, what is meant by a *Telos*? Its meaning is drawn partly at least from practice;—something desirable, a purpose aimed at. Is there any purpose in this sense discoverable in the universe as a whole? Or is consistent intelligibility alone sufficient to satisfy the meaning of the term? A law of a sequence of events, simply as a law, connects its end with its beginning, so that, if the universe is a process in time subject to law, it would seem that its end must be implied in its beginning, quite irrespective of desirability. Yet this threatens to abolish the idea of a time-process altogether, and along with it that of a *telos*.

Again, are we to consider the *telos*, in either of these senses, as contributing to condition the actual order of events? It would seem that *telos* in the sense of purpose aimed at could not do so, unless a Subject of the purpose was discoverable. It is only as *foreseen* that a result can be readily conceived as a *motive*, that is, an efficient condition of action. Hence, perhaps, it is that positive physical and physiological science restricts itself to investigating the *de facto* or efficient order of events, refusing to speak of final causes at all. Granting that causes may have a final character, yet, unless and until they appear as efficient causes, they have no place in science. True, this rule can hardly be said to be observed by psychology as understood at present. Indeed, the current idea of the Subject or Ego is that of an agent acting from purpose, a kind of action in which the idea of the purpose, simply as an idea in consciousness, is a necessary link in the chain of real causation, and must therefore be conceived as possessing energy. That is to say, the current psychology

assumes that consciousness as such has energy, in assuming the action of final causes as something *per se notum*. Where it is something *per se notum*, and indeed an indisputable fact, is in the domain of common sense; it cannot be said to be so in science. This remark alone would suffice, in my opinion, to show the necessity of some such method as the present, in which subjective analysis should have its distinct place and its due weight secured to it.

I cannot here do more than indicate a few of the more important problems, or rather directions in which problems lie, the proper treatment of which demands a clear distinction of subjective analysis and scientific investigation, followed by its necessary corollary, their combination in what I call a Constructive Branch of Philosophy. What is very often understood by *Philosophy* is little more than this single branch, isolated from its necessary preliminaries, and based on some supposed self-evident intuitions or necessary axioms. The really fundamental work of philosophy lies in my first and second Rubrics, which it will be remembered are marked off from the third by the guiding principle of the method, namely, the subordination, in philosophy, of questions of genesis to questions of essence.

One more class of questions, however, it is impossible to omit mentioning, both on account of its intrinsic interest, and because it in a manner gathers up and comprises under it all those which have hitherto been mentioned in the present Rubric. I mean the class of questions relating to Religion. When we put together the questions of Ethic, that is, those which relate to man's practice as distinguished from his knowledge, with those which relate to the world in which he finds himself, and consider what we know or can make out of the universe so composed, the universe with man as its highest positively known constituent, we are standing, as it were, at a higher level or plane of construction than in taking the two former classes of questions separately. It is a kind of Teleology of the universe, man included, that we are then considering the possibility of attempting. The questions of contingency and necessity, of possibility and impossibility, of infinity or absoluteness, are therein comprised as subsidiaries; and the teleology is considered as traceable, if at all, in the purpose or system of purposes for which man as representative of the whole is designed.

Here it is plain that we are on ethical ground; it is predominantly a practical problem that we have before us. But at the same time it is Ethic carried to a higher level, Ethic

in presence of the whole imaginable or surmisable universe, not merely in presence of mundane and social relationships. The attitude and frame of mind naturally inspired by considerations of this kind, quite irrespective of demonstrable knowledge, is the religious attitude and frame of mind. The possibility, and indeed the necessity of it, seems to me to be founded in the function of all distinct consciousness, that of reflective perception, which, as we have seen, is the cardinal fact of experience and the basis of philosophy. Experiencing is always looking back upon consciousness while moving forward into the unexperienced future. But the mental attitude of expecting the future does not depend upon what or how much we are entitled to anticipate of its nature from our knowledge of the past. Supposing our grounds for a speculative knowledge of the universe, beyond a certain limit, to fail us, we have still a knowledge of what it is ethically desirable for ourselves to do and to be, whether within that limit or beyond it.

I say *if* our speculative knowledge fails us beyond a certain limit, because it would be out of place here to argue the question, whether it does so or not. If it does not, and we can consequently frame a positive conception of the nature of that Power which sustains and governs the universe in its totality, our philosophy will belong to what Prof. Fraser, in his excellent little work *Berkeley* (pt. iii. ch. 4) has well called Gnosticism. If, on the contrary, it fails to enable us to frame such a conception, then we shall have what the same writer calls a Faith-philosophy. Only that here, before adopting so convenient a catchword, it will be necessary to distinguish two very different modes of thought to which at first sight it seems applicable. One is where faith is made to supply the deficiency of evidence in support of some definite conception. The other is where it means practical trust in the universal and unseen power, beyond the reach of any definite conception at all. Prof. Fraser, in speaking of our ideas as requiring to be "cemented" by faith (*ibid.*, p. 232), would seem to be contemplating the former kind only. But faith can never legitimately be among the premisses of philosophy, though it may be among its conclusions.

The ideas in which a faith, which is the conclusion of philosophy, may be embodied would then appear as purely anthropomorphic symbols, enabling us practically to think of it and realise it. They would be objective thoughts incapable of positively representing the object thought of, because incapable (by the supposition) of being completely determined as

objective thoughts. Not that this incommensurability with their object thought of would imply a non-phenomenal nature in the latter. This is forbidden by the nature of reflective perception, which is the central fact on which all philosophy and experience are built. The positive content of the object thought of, not its existence relatively to ourselves, is what is beyond the grasp of speculation. It must be characterised as unknown, but not unknowable *a parte rei*, provided adequate powers of knowing were supposed. The distinction between a noumenal world of *real* reality and a phenomenal world of *apparent* reality, the former being the hidden ground of the latter, and existing (as it is sometimes expressed) "out of time altogether," is a distinction impossible to sustain as true, seeing that the mere thinking of such an existence, so as to draw the distinction, is *eo ipso* bringing it within the panorama of consciousness, and rendering it phenomenal to reflection. The same thing cannot, in respect of its existence, at once belong and not belong to the panorama.