The Classical Review

THIS well-known passage in the Phaedo possesses an extraordinary and double interest in that it contains the earliest instance in European literature of a mental history traced through its various phases, as well as the first clear, if tentative, statement of the teleological view or ideal. Commentators and historians have accordingly bestowed ample attention upon i t : but there remain certain points of obscurity as regards both the inner nexus of thought in the passage itself and its precise relation to the presumably later and certainly more developed treatment of the same subjects in the Republic ; and these obscurities have given rise to discussions which, in the view of the present writer, are largely at cross purposes, and admit of a more definite solution than has yet been reached. In this note I shall endeavour to establish: (1) in what sense the Seurtpos irXoiSs of 99D is really a ' second best ' ; and, closely connected with this question, what is the exact nature of the surrender implied in the words iireiSr] airtiprJKri TO ovra (TKOTTWV, ib. ; (2) that the 'sun in eclipse' of Phaed. c. xlviii is not on a par with the avaXoyia of the sun in Rep. Bk. vi, and that to explain the former by the latter only leads to confusion; (3) that the method thereafter introduced is rather an imperfect and tentative version of the higher intellectual method (SiaXc/crun;) of Rep. vi, vii than to be identified with the lower (Sidvoia), as has been contended by Dr. H. Jackson followed by Mr. Archer-Hind ; (4) incidentally, that the passage in Phaed. 101D CI 8c rts avrijs . . . Suujxovei has been

THIS well-known passage in the Phaedo possesses an extraordinary and double interest in that it contains the earliest instance in European literature of a mental history traced through its various phases, as well as the first clear, if tentative, statement of the teleological view or ideal. Commentators and historians have accordingly bestowed ample attention upon it: but there remain certain points of obscurity as regards both the inner nexus of thought in the passage itself and its precise relation to the presumably later and certainly more developed treatment of the same subjects in the Republic ; and these obscurities have given rise to discussions which, in the view of the present writer, are largely at cross purposes, and admit of a more definite solution than has yet been reached.
In this note I shall endeavour to establish: (1) in what sense the Seurtpos irXoiSs of 99D is really a ' second best'; and, closely connected with this question, what is the exact nature of the surrender implied in the words iireiSr] airtiprJKri TO ovra (TKOTTWV, ib. ; ( 2 ) that the 'sun in eclipse' of Phaed. c. xlviii is not on a par with the avaXoyia of the sun in Rep. Bk. vi, and that to explain the former by the latter only leads to confusion; (3) that the method thereafter introduced is rather an imperfect and tentative version of the higher intellectual method (SiaXc/crun;) of Rep. vi, vii than to be identified with the lower (Sidvoia), as has been contended by Dr. H. Jackson followed by Mr. Archer-Hind ; (4) incidentally, that the passage in Phaed. 101D CI 8c rts avrijs . . . Suujxovei has been NO. CLIV. VOL, XVII.
unjustly condemned as an interpolation by the same authorities; (5) again incidentally, that the expression TOS V7ro0«r«s avaipovva in Rep. 533 c, formerly rejected but now defended by Mr. Adam, can hardly be reconciled with what seems to be the drift of the whole passage, and was probably not what Plato wrote.
(1) The true meaning of Sevrcpos 7r\ovs in 99 D can only be arrived at by a careful consideration of the context, which again is conditioned by the preceding narrative. Socrates had begun (96A) by showing how his early physical investigations (ircpt <£wo-eo)s loTopia) had only led to darkening counsel (OVTOD <rtj>6Spa irvifaXw&qv, 96c) and hopeless confusion of thought. He therefore (97B) finally abandoned this, i.e. the physical, method of enquiry, but retained a dim notion of another and better method of his own (dAXa TIV' aAAov rpoTrov avros ««# <pvp<o).
Here we may pause to ask what the latter may be. Jowett (Introd. to Phaed. p. 397) doubtfully suggests 'mathematics.' But surely this ' confused notion' is rather a modest anticipation of that very method which is to form the Sevrcpo? irXous. Note the present tense, <j>vpa>, which, though it may extend into the past, brings the statedescribed into contemporaneity with a the narrative.
Next we have, what is really an episode, the ' marvellous hope' excited by the discovery of Anaxagfcras's^ book (96c-98) and his theory of the ' ordering mind,' which seemed to imply design and the principle of ' the best'; the disappointment of that hope c c owing to the propounder's inconsistency; and then, once more, the return to the same fantastic ' physical' theories-confusing the true cause with the material conditionfrom which Socrates had resolved to escape. Since then, he concludes (99 c, D), no one had been able to show him the true cause (fiys Toiavnjs amas = the principle of ' the b e s t ' , TO ayaOhv KOU Seov o~w8civ KOX crwe^ew aTravra) and he could not find it for himself, he will proceed to expound the ' second best' course he has himself devised in his search for the cause.
But here comes the callida iunctura of a transition in the argument which may easily lead, and has led, to false antilogies. The difficulty arises from the phrase aireipyxri ra ovra O-KOTIW, and may be thus stated : (1) If ra ovra a-Koiriiv -' to investigate nature ' after the manner of the ' physicists' described above-and this is what is implied in the opposition in this section between Xoyoi and irpa.yfia.Ta or epya-is the Seurepos irXovs of Xoyot and vn-o&o-cts then to be considered inferior to physical speculations? Is not this contrary to Platonism, contrary to the previous rejection of TOVTOV TOV Tp&irov (97B), contrary to what follows soon after (100A) ov yap iraw <Tvy\u>pS> . . . Ipyois ? (2) But' if ra ovra = the higher reality, i.e. the ideas, or ' things-in-themselves' as a modern is tempted to say, how then could the philosopher declare that he had 'given up the search ' for them (' I had failed in the contemplation of true existence' is Jowett's translation) and then immediately set out to ' seek in discourse the truth of existence,' making his very first hypothesis the existence of the ideas in their most transcendental form ? Could this be called a ' second best' course at all 1 Such are the difficulties occasioned by this passage, and it can hardly be denied that they are serious, and raise ebropuu affecting the most vital parts of Platonic theory. I think it will also appear that the best interpreters have failed to steer •clear of one or other of the hidden reefs in the argument. It will tend to clearness if I at once set forth what appears to me to be the do-^aXijs Xo' yos by following which our course will become (to continue the Socratic metaphor) ' plain sailing.' (1) The passage about Anaxagoras and his doctrine of ' mind ' being, as above hinted, in the nature of an episode or parenthesis-because that doctrine led to nothing-it follows that the Scirrepos irXoIs is ' second best' only to that ' wonderful hope' which Anaxagoras had inspired, and to nothing else. (2) c. xlviii *E8o£e TOLVVV IXOL K.T.X. links back immediately with the point where the narrative had , previously been broken off, at 97B, TOVTOV Se ovSafiy irpoo-Ufiou. K. T. X. The words iirciSr) aTrciprjict) (I adopt the plupf. from ' Prof. Burnefc's text, though I am not prepared to stake much of the argument on this reading) TO. ovra O-KOTTOIV must refer to the physical speculations previously described and condemned (as to this and other views of ra oVra, more anon). (3) Though the Scvrepos 7rXovs is carried on into c. xlviii, and now takes shape as the discursive method )(the contemplation of things (the method of the physicists), yet in this context it lays aside its inferiority, its Sevreponjs (if the word may be allowed), as Plato himself warns us (100 A OU yap irdw <nryx<i)pc3 K.TA.). We need not therefore be puzzled by supposing here any un-Platonic subordination of Xo' yos to alo-Or/o-is; the former is no longer a ' second best' but an alternative which turns out to be the better of the two. Ntxa 6 TeXcvrcuos Spa/uov.
The whole force, then, of the expression Scvrepos irXoSs is relative to the vision of ' the good' hastily conjured up and as hastily withdrawn by Anaxagoras-' a moment seen, then gone for ever.' In relation to the physical method the discursive is by no means a ' second best'; but Plato sees that such a misconception might arise from the context (as also from his figure of the 'sun' and 'reflections') and is therefore careful to guard against it (100 A), And even in its true application the Scurepos 7rXous is only inferior in a qualified sense. IIpos 17/xas, as Aristotle would say, it is the best. Here it may be observed that according to its original signification Sevrtpos irXovs indicates rather a change of method than a change of goal. Now Anaxagoras had arrived at his doctrine of mind as the regulating principle in the universe only by a flash of intuition; this doctrine had no secure foundations, and was fitfully and inconsistently applied ; Socrates's hope of a thorough-going teleology founded upon it was therefore a delusion. A true teleology could only be reached by the /uucporcpa irepioSos of dialectic so much insisted on in the Republic; and though to the enthusiast cheated by Anaxagoras into the hope of a speedier and more direct revelation, the ' longer way ' seemed for the moment but a ' second best,' yet this ' second best' appears to fall short of the higher dialectic only in that the chain of ' hypotheses ' is less clearly and confidently linked to the uncon-ditioned supremacy of ' the good.' (See the first of Dr. H. Jackson's well-known articles in J. of Ph. xix. pp. 137, 149, where, however, though the method of the Phaedo is identified with the lower intellectual method of the Republic, it is yet maintained that in the former ' the supremacy of the ayaOov is as distinctly asserted as anywhere in the republic.') The view taken above of the Seurepos n-AoSs is substantially in accord with that of Mr. Archer-Hind (Excursus n to his ed. of Phaedo, 1894). As against Prof. Geddes he is right in maintaining that Sevrepos TTXOVS must mean an inferior course, and that it is inferior to the ' great and wondrous hope' of a teleological theory of the universe. But when we come to the TO ovra o-Korreiv the plain sense of the whole passage seems entirely in favour of Prof. Geddes and the majority of commentators, who take TO ovra as = ' phenomena ' or '.the external world.' Mr. Archer-Hind, however, having established his first position, and not seeing that, as above contended, the inferiority of the method of A.dyot disappears in c. xlviii, where it is simply opposed to wpbs TO •n-pdyiiara /?A.«reiv, is then led on to identify TO ovra (TKoireiv with the irpfiros irAoSs. Wliat, then, is this irpuyros TTAOUS I ' Certainly not the investigation of phenomena by means of physical science. On the study of phenomena Plato is perpetually heaping the most contumelious epithets, etc' The analogy of the sun, compared with that in the Republic, then comes in to confirm the equation TO oira = the ideas. I can only say that here Mr. Archer-Hind seems to be out-Platonizing Plato. For, to show that even at the height of his idealism the latter still concedes some kind of ova-la to phenomena, we have only to refer to Phaed. 7 9 A ©o)ft«v ovv /3ov\u, e<f>r), Svo elSr/ T£>V Svr<ov, TO [lev bparov, rb 8k aeiSe's; I t is unnecessary to labour this point further. ' What is matter 1' 'In what sense are yiyvo/icva also ovra 1' These are questions which are and remain to the end difficulties in the Platonic theory. But we are not here concerned with such problems; for at this stage of the narrative the theory of ideas has ex hypothesi not yet been reached. We are required to put ourselves back into the position of the physicists, or of the ' plain man J of any time or country, for whom undoubtedly ' things,' ' the external world' = • reality' (whatever other reality there may be). Even the term ' phenomena,' therefore, however difficult it is to avoid it, would be better kept out of this context. So far, and so far only, am I in. agreement with the more guarded language of Dr. H. Jackson (1. c. p. 138 note). ' It would appear that ovra generally not OJTWS oira as opposed to yvyva-/xcra, are here contrasted with \6yoi. Hence I am careful not to identify the avaXoyia. of this passage with the avaXoyia of the sixth book of the republic. The commentators with one accord assume that yiyvofieva as opposed to ovrw ovra are here contrasted with Aoyot. This limitation seems to me inconsistent with Socrates's narrative of his search for the ayaOov as well as with the parallel passages.' . The latter objection has already been abundantly answered above, if it is conceded that the episodic character of the ' search for the ayaOov' cuts it off from any direct bearing on c. xlviii. To sum up once more the view here adopted of ra. ovra (which = irpdyfiara = epya in this passage) : the term must certainly be taken to refer to the material world as the physicists investigated it (see c. xlv. passim), i.e. the world as visible, tangible, numerable, etc., but not yetjviewed as 'phenomenal' )( 'noumenal.' Only when we come to the words iv EicetVcus aKOTTtiv r&v ovrtov rrjv aXqOeiav does the vision of ' things-in-themselves' begin dimly to suggest itself behind the presentments of sense. (2) To come now to the figure of the sun. Passons au deluge. For here Mr. Archer-Hind (though the suggestive and stimulating character of his writings must be acknowledged by all students of Plato) seems to be steering us into still deeper waters. In condensing his argument, 1 trust I shall not do it injustice. It comes to this : (1) TO ovra must = the ideas, because Plato generally speaks with contempt of ' phenomena'; (2) so too ' the sun' must = the ideas, because it does so in Rep. 508c, 516A, and to suppose that here the sun -the material world, would be to reverse all Platonic analogies, for ' Thought is always to him the region of truth and light, matter of dimness and uncertainty.' This is true and finely expressed; yet Plato was not therefore bound to ride one metaphor to death ; and there is much in this passage which is unique. But to continue: the words fir) vavrdirao'i rv<pX.o>6eir)V fi\tTru>v irpbs ra. irpdy/xara TOIS ofifuwi Koi kK&<rTQ r&v aurOrj-<r£ci>i/ imxeipiov airrt<rOai avrS>v offer considerable resistance to the theory under criticism, and accordingly we learn that ' though by a certain amount of strain capable...of reasonable explanation, yet for sundry reasons it seemed to me, as it had to c c 2 Dr. Jackson, that they were probably due to an interpolator'! But a way of adapting them, in the only sense they will bear, to the ' sun-mytb ' is found in an interpretation suggested by Mr. C. G. Campbell ' by making the eclipse a material part of the similitude,' from which results this parallel: (1) 17X105 = ret ovra, i.e. ideas.
' Thus yLyvofieva are regarded as eclipsed ovra, the light of the latter everywhere struggling through the darkness of the former. . .' There is more to this effect: and it must be confessed that in this delicate chiaroscuro light and shade are so skilfully blended that the most sensitive Platonist can find nothing to offend his susceptibilities. But surely the Platonic sun has indeed dazzled or blinded the interpreters! It seems almost brutal to point out that the foundations for this ingenious structure of interpretation are entirely wanting in the text of the original. Yet such appears to be the case. The words SuufrOtlpovrai evioi ra are in themselves conclusive against the view just given ; for they clearly refer to a vision ' blasted by excess of light/ and not to one dimmed by the interposition of obscuring' phenomena.' A much simpler explanation is forthcoming of the eclipsing of the sun in the figure, namely that it is only when the sun is eclipsed that people are tempted to gaze at it, and doing so become dazzled and blinded, unless they use some medium, whether of smoked glass or of ' reflections.' The latter is the medium here adopted, and it consists in Xdyoi, which, by a simile surely not without parallel in the history of philosophy, are said to be' reflections ' of the ' external world ' (= the sun), though Plato at once corrects himself by adding that with reference to a higher reality, 17 aXrjdaa rmv ovrmv, discourse is no more a reflection than are material objects. We may conclude, then, that any comparison of the figure of the sun in this passage with the avaXoyia of the sun in the Republic is quite out of place, and only the more dangerous because of a superficial resemblance. If this explanation is not found to satisfy the requirements of the argument, the burden of proof or disproof surely lies with those who would see Ko/juj/orepov rt iv re A.dyo>.
W. J. GOODEICH. HAVING lately had occasion to study the reference to Aristotle's theory of the Voluntary in the Introduction to Poste's Gaius (2nd edn. p. 14), the writer was struck by a fact which is probably not generally known to students of Aristotle. In quoting Nic. Eth. v. viii. 7 Poste reads f/ apxq . . . T^S dyvotos, without comment, though as well known, the MSS, with the exception of some not first rate ones, which read rat/a'as, have OITMS. Really the exceptions confirm am'as for they probably originated in a gloss, Kcuctas, to explain curias which is usually taken in the sense of ' fault.' The emendation is doubtless Poste's own, made sub silentio, for he was not the man to conceal an obligation. A few years later the same correction was proposed independently by H. Jackson, and introduced by him, into the text of his edition of the 5th book of the Me. Ethics. It was accepted by Susemihl (from Jackson) and inserted in the text of his Teubner edn. of the Ethics. The expression -q apxr] -rijs alr(p.s is difficult and unusual, while the emendation yields an excellent and natural sense: yet the corruption of a reading so easy and appropriate into one so hard and so unusual has never been satisfactorily accounted for. Those who keep the MS text generally seem to explain alria as ' fault' or ' blame ' ( = guilty act). But recently Mr. J. A. Smith, of Balliol College, has discovered a passage in the M^avtKa which, one must venture to think, is decisive in favour of alrias and also shews that the word here does not mean ' guilty act.' The place is as follows (847 b 16),--irdvroiv Se rani roiovrtov