ART. XXII.—*Philo's δυνάμεις and the Amesha Spenta.* By
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THERE is one well-known place in Philo (*De profugis*, 18, 1,560) where the 'powers' seem for the moment to be limited to six. And this has naturally struck the attention of those who have been looking for coincident similarities between the philonian pieces and the documents which mention the Amesha Spenta of the Zend Avesta. For, as one commentator, Siegfried, has supposed, some of us might consider his treatment of these six cities to be equivalent to the citation of seven (as to which see below), this equalling the number of the 'immortals' of the Avesta.¹

Let me first cite the passages, for they differ naturally from Philo's method of arrangement elsewhere, as he, in common with all authors of his class, differs from himself at different times in his life and at different phases of his experience.

The matter in hand is Philo's treatment of the passage at Numbers, xxxv, 6, where the names of the six cities of refuge occur. He allegorises as usual, keeping up his reputation as being the boldest of all writers, we might almost say, who have ever indulged in that method of procedure. The first 'city of refuge' which he mentions is a 'metropolis' rather than a 'city.' It is the *θεῖος λόγος*. This has been supposed by some to correspond to the zoroastrian *vohuman* (*vohu manah*). But I beg to say that even if the entire delineation were purely zoroastrian, yet this would be a mistake, for the *θεῖος λόγος* is only to be classed with an *asha* = *ῥιτά*, the 'rhythm of law' in

¹ The Amesha Spenta (Amshaspendes) are the 'bountiful immortals'; some render the 'holy.'

universal nature; see the logos of Heraclitus and the Stoics. The other five cities he calls rather 'colonies,' and chief among these was the formative power, the ποιητικὴ δύναμις. This could make a far better *vohu manah* than the 'city' just mentioned, for the idea of creative formation in itself implies 'benevolence,' and a good many expressions in consonance with this appear in connection with this ποιητικὴ (see below, where I endeavour to recapitulate).

The third is the βασιλική, the 'kingly power,' according to which the one "who has created governs what has been brought into existence." This certainly, at first sight, looks like Khshathra, but see below. The fourth, the δυνάμις ἰλεως, is the power of 'mercy,' through which the "constructor is tender towards and pities his own work," and this ought to correspond to *ārāmaiti*. The fifth 'power' conceived of as a 'city' is the 'legislative,' the νομοθετικὴ, through which he forbids what ought not to be done; and this should correspond to *haurvatāt*, 'healthful weal.' The sixth is the κόσμος νοητός, not mentioned in *De profugis*, 18 (1,560), from a loss of text, but legitimately supplied from *De confus. ling.*, 1,431, and from elsewhere, and this should correspond to *ameretatāt*, 'deathless long life!'

Now let us ask what is the truth as to the whole matter; and first we may recapitulate the particulars and enlarge upon them. I was for some time inclined to regard any objection to the figure made use of as a quibble, unworthy of the discussion. But we should not be too hasty even here. The Gāthas make no use of such an illustration as that of 'cities,' whether as 'refuges' or otherwise; nor are 'cities' much more familiar to the later Avesta than they are to the older Veda.

Ragha (Rages, *Ῥάγα*, etc.) is the only one that is really prominent, and that occurs in the later Avesta; Bawri, which is Babylon, is mentioned incidentally merely, while the list at Vendīdād I, also very late, is not at all in analogy as to the number 'seven,' or as to any other particular; and I naturally dismissed the association as possessing little influence upon our results one way or the other.

But we are searching for mere *signs of origin*, for graphic items which indicate literary relation. Such details would be of greatly more importance for our purpose than others which possessed in themselves far more significance, and this feature is wholly lacking in the Avesta. We have no 'six,' nor indeed any 'seven,' cities of the kind depicted. But what have we to say to this supposed number as here present in Philo? First of all, it really does not exist at the place; the cities are six, not seven. To be sure, the Amesha Spenta (as distinct from the Supreme Being), i.e. the archangels, were also six. The number 'seven' as involved with them is, indeed, not insisted upon in the Gāthas, nor had the name Amesha Spenta (Amshaspends) been applied to either the 'six' or the 'seven' personified attributes in those early hymns. But when the name was invented Ahura became immediately included with the 'six,' under the general designation, and the 'seven' became a most marked, if not a supreme, element in the general concept, as it appears in the later Avesta, yet here we have but six.

It struck Siegfried, indeed, that Philo intended to play upon the number 'seven' here; and that we should supply the *ὧν* with which he represented the Supreme Being, otherwise designated by the tetragrámmaton *y-hw-h*,¹ so making up the six to seven; but the *ὧν* does not seem to occur in the vicinity of the passage, and the point did not strike Heinze, who has searched the expressions closely. The author of the Book of Numbers may have retained in his mind some idea of the 'six' days of creation with unexpressed allusion to the seventh. We are, however, in search of *expressed analogies* in mere external diction, and this 'six' of the refuge cities makes but a lame 'seven.'

Yet let us concede the matter freely, even throwing in the *ὧν*, as I do not wish to push any accidental advantage. Philo's cities, let us suppose, were indeed 'seven'; and so we may call his *δυνάμεις* 'seven,' notwithstanding the harsh violence necessarily present, if we include the *ὧν*

¹ "Philo von Alexandria als ausleger des alten testaments," s. 215.

within the number of his own 'powers.' What, then, does the analogy amount to?

The mention of it even should be censured. 'Seven' is everywhere absolutely common property in similar religions, chiefly on account of the natural divisions of time, while from the three here involved it would be especially difficult to exclude it. Whole masses of a discussion in Philo abound in occurrences of 'seven' (this in allusion to Genesis), while 'seven' is as marked in the indian as it is in the iranien; cf. the seven *dvīpas* of the indians corresponding to the seven Karshvars of Avesta (regions of the earth). Then there are the seven *hótri's* (or *hotars*), the seven-wheeled car, the seven tongues of Agni (fire), the seven-horsed sun, etc., etc. 'Seven' is even used for 'many,' see *saptá-pada*. 'Seven' could not well, or even possibly, be absent; and its occurrence, even if it really were genuine (at *De profugis*, 18, 1,560), would possess no force whatsoever as a factor in the analogy between the 'cities' and the Amesha Spenta. Let us pass to the *θεῖος λόγος*. At first sight this concept seems to make an excellent Asha, for 'Asha' as *arshá* and *ritá* is, in fact, an indo-iranien logos, as I would hold, of a certain sort. But it is conceded that the *θεῖος λόγος*, like its predecessor among the Stoics, generally included all the lesser logoi, the ideas, or the *δυνάμεις*. He, this *θεῖος λόγος*, is here the 'metropolis,' not one of the 'cities' without qualification.

Wishing to help out the argument that I am opposing, I will recall that Asha is exceedingly prominent among the Amesha in the Gāthas; compare the expression 'with Asha consenting,' etc., a point lost sight of by those whom I am opposing.

But he, or it, so little included the others that *vohu manah*, owing to a mistake in the pahlavi translation of a certain passage, really elbowed itself, or himself, into the foremost place within the later citations; but let us concede this too, and call the *θεῖος λόγος* a good analogon.

Can we forget that Philo's *λόγος*, *θεῖος*, or otherwise, though arising from his greek predecessors, had just been

seized by him (amusingly enough) as a product of his own holy lore (stolen property recaptured)? Remember even Zeller's perhaps extreme remark that his "Lógos was hebrew under a greek dress," for his logos was the 'Word,' that "word of the Lord by which the heavens were made," such as "let there be light" and "there was light."

What trace is there of any such 'logos' anywhere in the Gāthas, or even in the later but still genuine Avesta? Surely no one will seriously recall the time-honoured allusion to the *honover* (*sic*), a singular mistake which curiously illustrates the total absence of even incipient study on the part of so many who make allusions to the Avesta. That *honover* is, indeed, referred to in the late piece, Y. xix, as "It was that word which was before the sky and before the water, before the plants, and before the fire, and before the saint and before the demon-gods," etc. (see Y. xix at S.B.E., xxxi, 260 ff.).

Surely people should 'look' at a time so late as this before they make their points in argument. This wonderful logos at Y. xix is the mere corrupted name for the post-gāthic piece, the *yathā ahū-vairyō*,¹ *ahū-vairyō* having become *hono-ver*. It has nothing whatever to do with a logos in any interior or exterior sense whatsoever, either in the Avesta or elsewhere, or with anything analogous to one save the name 'word'; moreover, it may be very late Avesta, as it is *zand*, or 'commentary' as well. How is it possible that either the gāthic or the later logos could derive its origin from the jewish-greek philonian one, and so soon after Aristobulos (-bulus) or Philo, and yet show no trace anywhere of such an origin, all the shreds and fringes of resemblance being lost?

The one which is "above all of them, the *θεῖος λόγος*," says Philo, "did not come into any visible manifestation, as not being like anything visible to the senses; but it is itself the image of God." How does this accord with even

¹ A short formula in the gāthic metre of Y. xxviii-xxxiv. The later name by which the earlier Y. xxviii-xxxiv was known was taken from that of this piece. Y. xxviii-xxxiv is called the Gātha *ahuna vaiti*; i.e. like the *ahū-vairyō*.

the *asha* of the Gāthas, which is sometimes so 'incarnate' that the word actually represents the 'holy people' in their entirety, the 'congregation,' while in the later Avesta and later zoroastrianism it actually often means the 'Fire'? Was not that a manifestation 'visible' enough? One expression occurs (but not just here, with reference to the 'cities') which recalls a strophe in the Gāthas, as it would recall strophe upon strophe in all anthologies or poetry. The *logos* is named the 'charioteer,'¹ and the 'God' gives orders as to what concerns the straight charioteering of the 'all.' The Gātha place speaks of "the 'yoking-on' of the mighty steeds with the law (*asha*) and driving to our help." And in the later Avesta the sub-deities, some of them, drive in chariots. What is the force of this as an analogon? I ought not to have introduced the point, as it deserves no answer.

The image is universal; moreover, the colouring of the Gātha at this place is all vedic (see below), the most so in all the hymns.

Then the ποιητικὴ δύναμις, which, be it understood, is ranked among the 'colonies,' so coming second and not first as in the later Avesta, might still make a tolerable *vohumanah*. That is to say, at our first glance at it (though *vohumanah* is supposed by my opponents to be the first and the θεῖος λόγος), for the ποιητική, as representing the 'formative power,' naturally calls up creative beneficence. See also the expressions made use of in allusion to it, ἀγαθότης, χαριστική, εὐεργετική; they certainly apply well to *vohu manah*, but this curious *vohu manah* and λόγος (as some will have it) is actually called 'God' by Philo in one especial place; see below on p. 563; see also Heinze, 247,² where our place is followed up. Where is *vohumanah* called *ahura* in the supreme sense in Gātha or late Avesta? He was included, of course, as one among the minor *ahuras* in the inferior sense at Y. xxviii, 8 or 9, but so are all the others. Even the

¹ *De profugis*, xix, 1,561, ὡσθ' ἡνίοχον μὲν εἶναι τῶν δυνάμεων τὸν λόγον.

² "Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie," von Dr. Max Heinze, Oldenburg, 1872.

human prophet was a lord *ahura*; but neither it, nor any of the six, is termed *ahura* quite alone, and in that highest sense which alone is applicable here.

And surely no one intends to ignore such features as the human side of *vohu manah*; he (or 'it') not only often represents the orthodox citizen very seriously at times in the Gāthas themselves, but he is so closely used for the 'church member' in the later Avesta, the Vendīdād, that he is actually spoken of as being 'defiled,' precisely as one would speak of a mahomedan or a brahmin being 'ceremonially unclean.'

Where does the ποιητικὴ δύναμις appear in any such a light in Philo? There is no telling what odd occurrences may be noticeable in obscure passages, but in the Avesta the occurrence is not odd, or indefinite, where it really exists.

The third δύναμις, the βασιλική, might be thought to be a good Khshathra, and according to *De Cherub.*, 1,144, it possesses 'justice' and becomes 'legislative.'

Khshathra has governing power indeed, or, rather, he is 'governing power,' and would be by implication punitive, but he is nowhere legislative; it is *Asha* who is *par eminence* the 'law' in his leading rôle. Still, let us not be too exacting; let us pass the βασιλική, together with the ποιητικὴ and the θεῖος λόγος. I will not even insist upon the fact that Philo might have omitted his βασιλική altogether if he had not blundered with the Targum on Psalm lxxv, his hebrew being rusty, for it is Elohīm there who is (*sic*) 'legislative,' and he, Philo, makes use of κύριος—cf. the βασιλική (thinks Siegfried, p. 214)—under the impression that it was the best word for the Elohīm as 'legislative,' not noticing, or being aware, that the Septuagint use it for the tetragrámmaton *stehend*,¹ while they translate Elohīm with θεός.

It is indeed true that we might have had no βασιλική had Philo been a better hebraist, or one at all. But then, again,

¹ Do they?

the *βασιλική* was greek fast enough and good platonian,¹ entirely aside from either the tetragrámmaton, which he represents as the *ὄν*, or this Elohīm, which is his (Philo's) *κύριος*.

And our point, let us distinctly recall, is literary colour. We are not discussing here (at this place) the history of the doctrine at the philonian stage, but the strange question of philonic influence upon the authors of the Avesta, even of the old Avesta, the Gāthas.²

In this light we do not care where or how Philo arrived at his *βασιλική δύναμις*, except to look for the traces of this origin in what was said to be its echo.

But, again, where is the *βασιλική* taken to represent 'metals,' for which Khshathra came to be used sometimes, even in the later but still genuine Avesta, and in the later zoroastrianism almost predominantly? And with these three, or (with the *ὄν* dragged in) with these four, even such a halting analogy as might be supposed to exist comes utterly to an end, the *ὄν* being before all of them the flimsiest representative of its impossible successor; for the *ὄν* was, of course, the 'being,' but still the 'non-existent'³ God' (*sic*). What parsi would like that said of Ahura?

The *δύναμις ἵλεως*, "in accordance with which the Creator is tender toward His own creatures," should correspond to *āramaiti*, but *āramaiti* is thought to be a feeling of reverence from the creature toward the Creator by some, and by others (so better) it is rendered 'zeal'; while at the next stage in the historical development it represents the earth, owing to the just sanctity of early agriculture; for, as I would hold, the *ar* of *āramaiti* is the *ar* 'to plough,' cf. *aratrum*, etc., and *āramaiti* was originally perhaps the 'ploughing zeal.' This

¹ Cf. Philab. 30, C.: οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὴν δὲ νοῦν . . . See also Hirshig, p. 412.

² Let me say that for a long time I considered these suggestions as to the later ages of the Gāthas and philonian influence upon them as being not at all worth an answer. It is only now, and at the especial request of respected friends in Bombay, that I enter upon it. I seriously fear that I encourage the view by giving it the dignity of a discussion.

³ He was among other things "everywhere and nowhere"; see *De confus. ling.*, 1,425, quoted by Heinze.

may shock some tastes, but we must endeavour to freshen our suggestions, and explain this idea of the 'earth.' Where does the 'δύναμις' ἢ ἔλεως represent any such object? It comes direct from the jewish ἱλαστήριον (mercy-seat); where is there a trace of this in its supposed descendant?

Siegfried justly thinks that the ἔλεως was included under the 'goodness' of the 'formative power'; see the abstracts applied to this latter concept as cited above. And I for one, among others, have little doubt that Philo was merely spinning¹ out the number of the 'cities' to the required 'six' (by no means 'seven'), and that his ἔλεως has no significance in the supposed analogy. Then, as to the νομοθετική, the 'legislative power,' it hardly deserves more notice, being clearly an after-thought included under the βασιλική, which itself only by an error (see above) was made so 'legislative.'

Yet it should correspond to *haurvatāt*, 'healthful weal, freedom from illness,' the supreme desire of so many then as now. Still more pointedly, let us ask: "What has 'legislation' to do with 'water'?" Even supposing that they thought of 'water' as a source of health, hydrostatics at that period did not occupy the attention of governments local or more general; but the *haurvatāt* of the date of Philo was most used for 'water.'

Where is the point of junction? The last δύναμις, the κόσμος νοητός (*De confus. ling.*, 1,431), seems to be intended to include all the other five retrospectively *a parte post* (so), as the θεῖος λόγος included them prospectively *a parte ante* (so), who would ever assert that *ameretatāt*, even if it were otherwise fully in analogy, included all its preceding colleagues.

¹ And let us never forget that the powers in general 'streamed forth from God,' sometimes just as 'light' does. They were, as elsewhere, viewed 'infinite.' Zeller, for one, attaches little importance to this sixfold or sevenfold delineation; see p. 369 on Philo. He dwells upon the two first only, the ποιητική and the βασιλική, with the λόγος between as a bond of union, to which last Heinze justly takes exception. The λόγος was indeed a bond uniting those two most prominently, and as 'a bond' he is momentarily spoken of as intermediate; but it is inconceivable that Philo could have meant to refer to the logos as occupying an inferior position even just here.

And what has the *κόσμος νοητός* to do with 'deathless long life,' the hope to 'live a hundred autumns,' as we have it in the other lore (the Veda)? And what has the 'ideal world' to do with *fuel*? For *ameretatāt* actually means 'fire-wood' in certain places in the later but still genuine Avesta, just as *haurvatāt* means 'water,' and both are used together in this sense in the peculiar dual construction.

Yet, supposing for a moment that a relation existed, what could that prove? This thought of an 'ideal world' is pretty nearly universal in religions. I would even volunteer to hunt up analogies; if there is none between the 'ideal' world and 'good old age,' or 'firewood,' there certainly is many a trace of an 'ideal world' in the Avesta. Recall our very striking *summum bonum* at Y. xliii, 2, the 'better than the good'; see also the state called 'best mind' at Y. xxx, 4, which gave the persians their name for heaven as the 'best.'

If we understand Philo's *κόσμος νοητός* as an ideal state free from illness, thirst and hunger, etc., there was indeed enough of it in the Avesta, as in every religion of the kind. But we are looking for definite analogies as signs of parentage; and these should be incisive and un mistakeable; and the *κόσμος νοητός* had none such with the 6th or 7th *amesha*, 'immortal,' *ameretatāt*. It is in spirit a thoroughly platonic concept. These 'six' cities, or 'seven' if you will, have absolutely nothing to do with the Avesta either as cause or as effect, except in so far as the Avesta, in common with the Veda, and more closely than the Veda (because geographically nearer), exercised an original influence upon the entire Greek development through the school of Heraclitus as well as otherwise. In fact, as Zeller says (see above), of all these six or 'seven' *δυνάμεις* only the two which correspond to the 'goodness' and 'might' of another passage have significance as united by the *logos*, *De cherub.*, 112 D., 144 M. Qu. in Gen. i, 57; iv, 2, etc. (Zeller's figures; see Siegfried); cf. also the 'goodness and severity' of God in Romans, xi, 22 ff.; see also ix, 22 ff.

The eschatology of Philo is, of course, fully developed in many respects, as much so as that of the Avesta, if not as much so as that of the New Testament. He lived at the very moment when Jewish thought was ripe for the logos of St. John.¹ His remarks about these symbolical cities of refuge are very evangelical in the moral-spiritual sense. They (the cities) are "in every way beautiful as refuges for souls that are to be saved, having the best of walls." "They are effectively useful and philanthropic, for they arouse men to hope for the good." "He (God or the author of the Numbers) urges the fleetest to make breathlessly for the highest city (i.e. the furthest in the territory of grace), the *θεῖος λόγος*, that, drinking of this fountain (*sic*) of wisdom, he may find eternal life as his reward in place of death." Here we have 'eternal life,' as in the Avesta; but the idea was by that time entirely Jewish also, and, if we must take notice of it, it should belong to *ameretatāt*, 'deathless long life,' and not to an *asha* like this *θεῖος λόγος*, nor, indeed, to a *vohu manah*; whereas, against the *ameretatāt* of the Avesta, we had the utterly dissimilar *κόσμος νοητός* (see above).

The "sinner not so fleet was to try to reach the next highest or 'farthest' city, the *ποιητική δύναμις*, which Moses called God" (see above); "for when a man comprehends that the 'all' has been created, he acquires a great possession of good, and this good is the understanding, or knowledge, of the one who has made him. And this immediately persuades the created thing to love the one who has brought him into being." I am not aware that the 'good mind,' *vohumanah*, was particularly speculative; its interior sense was pietistic, or moral, at best orthodox; though Philo's wording here is well enough in point if we wish to trace analogy, but see what has been said above. "The sinner flying from vengeance, but still less swift (than the one in the state just mentioned), has the 'sovereign power' as his city of refuge, the *βασιλική δύναμις*, so Philo proceeds; for by the fear of his ruler a subject is

¹ Whether it appears so early, or whether later.

admonished; even if as a child he is not admonished by his father's kindness, still this fear will do him good." This is all excellent and sufficiently near the New Testament, cf. St. Paul's "behold, therefore, the . . . 'severity' of God," but it bears no literary resemblance to anything in the Avesta, certainly not to the migrations in the Vendīdād, which present a picture totally dissimilar (see above). The "still slower fugitive is to head for the *δύναμις ἰλαῶς*, which enjoins what we should do and forbids what we should not do, for he who understands that the Deity is not implacable but benevolent will repent of his sin, influenced by the hope of pardon." Here we have St. Paul's "(Behold the) goodness . . . of God."

Once more very excellent, but not exactly *āramaiti*, which was 'zeal' in the old Avesta, and the 'earth' in the new. "And he who accepts the opinion that God is a legislator, νομοθέτης ὁ θεός (probably thinking of *τίθημι* as a root for *θεός*, which some might ridicule), obeying whatever he prescribes, will be blest." All very well again, but not very similar to 'healthful welfare,' the genius of good luck, plus the 'waters.' While the last of the fugitives will strive for the *κόσμος νοητός*, which Philo neatly defines as an "escape from evils, if not, indeed, a participation in the more preferred advantages" (*sic*). This, indeed, is far enough from either 'long life' or our 'fuel.'

Above I have emphasized the very singular usage in accordance with which *asha* represents the 'people,' *vohumanah* the 'saint,' etc. I did not mention at that point a similar development among the devices of Philo. These *δυνάμεις* are in a sense personified; they are "servants surrounding God's throne," they are "ambassadors making known His will, they are mediators between Him and finite things." And they are especially called 'angels.' This looks like the Amesha; nay, they are actually called 'souls.' The historians only accede cautiously to a true personification here, and Zeller, with Heinze, adds a last word in query as to whether Philo, or, indeed, his earlier greek master, had really ever reached a full idea of

personality at all (as understood under the usual terms); surely the 'soul of the world' was not a person. But what of the analogy? Beyond any question it exists. The Amesha Spenta are first abstracts expressing the quality of the actions of the Deity, then those of His saints, and at the next stage they become archangels, and at a still later one the community and the saint, and finally the genii presiding over metals, over the earth, the waters, and plants. And what of this? We must firmly answer as before that a similar hypostatisation, whether rhetorical (as a figure of speech) or positively believed in, was and is universal in every known or conceivable religion of the sort. *Moreover, the entire body of the philonian and of the platonic concepts here is wholly excluded in one compact mass by the simple fact that the philonian logos was first introduced to bridge the supposed gulf between God and impure matter; for the idea of the impurity of material substance was abhorrent to the iranion mind (see the Asiatic Quarterly Review for July).*

And it is really time that we should close up this debate and recall at once what every freshman ought to know, which is that this process of personification, and the development of such ideas themselves as well, regularly appear as an inevitable growth in the sister lore.

The Veda, far off in the indian east, beyond all reach of Egypt, was near akin to the Avesta; nay, we might almost call it the same lore in its extreme south-eastern home. Everywhere there we have abstracts appearing, and everywhere soon personified, not always all of them, but a great mass of them. Take the very *ādityá* with their 'mother,' as we might indeed so call it, or her. *Āditi* is first the abstract 'unboundedness,' 'infinitude,' 'unfettered power,' and then the 'mother goddess'; so *bhāga* is 'good luck,' and then personified; *dáksha* is 'cleverness,' and then the god of it; *án̄ṣa* is 'property,' the 'sharing,' and then its god, etc. So, where it is not the abstract, but a material object which meets us, *váruṇa* is the 'enfolding heaven,' and then *Váruṇa* its god; *sūrya* is the sun, and then *Sūryá* its goddess; *agní* is the fire, and then *Agni* its endeared protector. So,

also, where the word is first a common descriptive (of a living person), as *mitrá* 'the friend,' and *Mitrá* 'the god'; *aryamán* 'the ally,' and *Aryamán* 'the god,' etc.

And, to make an end of it, all of our Amesha Spenta, instead of being the recrudescence of Philo's cities, are some of them even more familiar to the indian Veda than to parts of the iranian book; of course, as abstract there as here, in fact, sometimes not yet personified like those just named.

The *ritá* of the Veda is the *asha* of the Avesta, as no one doubts, a true indo-iranian *lógos*; and it, or he, occurs close on three hundred times in the Veda and in its very ancient parts, say some of them as old as 500 to 800 years before Philo lived in the egyptian town. *Kshatrá* is *Khshathra*, and it occurs some forty-four odd times; *arámati* is *āramaiti*, and it occurs about eleven times, and often (as Sāyaṇa understood it) even of the 'earth.' *Sárvatāti* is *haurvatāt*, and it occurs some score of times; while *vasumamas*, which is *vohu manah*, is the name of a vedic seer.

Here are all the Amesha Spenta, which some would trace to Philo's cities. They thronged as household words (some of them) for centuries before even Plato, Philo's real instructor, weaved his theories.

There was no greek school in Egypt anywhere when indian *ṛishis* first sang these ancient names—see, too, how far away. The whole suggestion of philonian parentage or influence seems to be puerile in the extreme, unworthy of the source from which it came—the slip of a gifted brain, preoccupied. The Avesta and the Veda are ancient sisters, and if Philo inspired the abstracts of the one, he inspired those of the other; and this would be a clear 'reductio' to the 'silly,' for it would be a 'reduction' to a joke. Both the iranian and the vedic concepts go back till they are lost in the mists of the ancient east; and as far back as we can trace them they are wonderful indeed, some of the deepest and most beautiful that the human mind has reached. If it were not simple fact, it would indeed be hard to credit. And those which appeared in the iranian Veda (the Avesta)

became personified, just as those sister concepts did which I have named. Philo drank in his iranian lore from the pages of his exilic Bible, which recorded iranian edicts by persian kings, and was itself half made up of jewish-persian history. Surely it is singular that so many of us who search the Scriptures should be unwilling to see the first facts which stare at us from its lines. The religion of those persians, who saved our own from an absorption (in the babylonian), is portrayed in full and brilliant colours in the books of the Avesta, because the Avesta is only the expansion of the religion of the sculptured edicts. The very bywords are strikingly the same, and these inscriptions are those of the very men who wrote the Bible passages.¹ This religion of the Restorers was beyond all question historically the first consistent form in which our own eschatology appeared.²

Before the Exile the jewish creed was very dim as to resurrection, immortality, forensic judgment, and all we hold most dear;³ the people of Ragha (Rages, *Párga*, etc.), whose name the alexandrians knew so well from their Tobias, lived and died under the strong personal influence of these beliefs, with other elements beside them so searching that we can scarcely trust our eyesight as we read. Even the harsher features are recalled; the very demon⁴ of the Gāthas figured in the tales of Philo's youth.

And these facts no serious expert will dispute. It is a case of simple record. The irano-vedic lore developed in Iran the first definite form of our own ideas as to the future state, according to the obvious data in the case. There are more traces of the doctrines named above, with heaven and hell, as orthodox Christians hold to them, in the texts of the Avesta than in all the pre-exilic books

¹ Sceptics, indeed, might doubt the Scripture passages, but what sceptic can doubt the sculptures of Behistān, not that all they say is accurate.

² Not that ours was derived from it, but only matured and ripened through its influence under the providence and will of God.

³ See the dogmatik of the Old Testament.

⁴ *Ἀσμοδαῖος* is, however, really not more original than the hebrew form, though the book itself was probably first worked in greek.

combined ; and the history of zoroastrianism is one living witness to their perpetuity. What, therefore, Philo believed about these doctrines, if indeed he believed at all, he got from his native documents, which in these respects are almost persian lore, nearer to the Avesta, indeed, than they are to the tablets of Persepolis or the polished squares of Behistān.