III.—KNOWLEDGE AS IDEALISATION.

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THAT the word 'idea,' as commonly used, is about as ambiguous a term as could well be invented, is an old story. I need here to call attention only to two connotations. It implies *existence*, and it implies *meaning* or the content of the psychical existence. When we speak of the idea of virtue, we may mean either the 'idea conveyed' by the term, its significance, or we may mean the particular psychical existence, which occurs now and here in experience, and stands for the meaning. But this double connotation is not confined to abstract terms. It holds equally of the most definite perception,—say, mine of my pen as I write. There is the idea 'in my mind,' an existence coming after many ideas, and before many others; a psychical existence which is a unique, unshareable, irrecoverable experience. What constitutes it we need not here inquire, though our psychological research goes to show that it is a clustering of sensations, visual, muscular and tactile, due to the immediate stimulation of my nervous system. *Similar* stimuli may occur again doubtless, but the present existence endures only while the given stimulus is actually there. How stands it with the other connotation of the term? It is evident that here we are dealing with meaning or significance—all that would be included in the definition, say, of pen, plus the fact that it is now present, which is, after all, part of the meaning, and not of the existence. To state the whole matter simply, every psychical state or 'idea,' in Locke's sense, is at once sensation and interpretation of that sensation or meaning conveyed. It is sign and signification. We do not go here into the theoretical justification of the latter element. We do not ask whether there *is* any pen really there, or whether, if there is, our idea of it corresponds to reality. We merely state the fact that in every psychical experience there is the psychical existence, and there is what this existence stands for to the mind. It is an undoubted fact that the meaning *seems* to be objective, permanent and universal; that the idea of existence, in other words, seems to us to report a reality which is there, aside from our particular mental state, one which is equally there for my intelligence at times under the same conditions

and for all intelligences. This apparent report is part of the complete psychical fact, but we do not now ask whether it has any right to be, or whether it is an illusion unconsciously superadded to the legitimate content of the fact. Recognising that every psychical fact does have these two aspects, we shall, for the present, confine ourselves to asking the nature, function and origin of the aspect of meaning or significance—the content of the idea as opposed to its existence.¹

To develop what is meant let us take Locke's favourite example—a perception of gold. If we ask what is psychically present, by way of immediate existence, we shall find that it is only a group of sensuous feelings—some strong, some faint. If we inquire further, we find that the stronger ones are due to a direct stimulation of some organ of sense, while the fainter are due to the indirect stimulation of some central organ. If we simply look at the piece of gold, there are the vivid sensations of colour and muscular tension only; clustered about these may be less vivid feelings of contact, perhaps of slight metallic taste and odour. But it is a mistake to call these latter feelings ideal, and the former real. One class is just as real as the other; the only distinction is one of strength. It is quite true that the weaker feelings may be found upon examination to be due to previous stimulations, and to be due to connexions in the brain previously established, so that now a direct peripheral excitation serves to set up a change in some connected part of the brain and awaken sensation. But as existences, there is no difference in the feelings, whether peripherally set up or centrally excited. The stronger one, as existence, does not report that it is due to present direct stimulation; the weaker one does not report that it is ultimately due to past stimulations. This is a matter of interpretation, and even as interpretation it does not enter into the *perception* of the gold. I repeat, as existence, we have only a clustering of sensuous feelings, stronger and weaker.

But what is perceived is *not* a clustering of feelings of any sort. It has taken centuries of scientific psychological observation even to ascertain that sensations of these kinds are involved at all: so far is their presence from being an element of the content of perception. What is perceived is the thing gold, with its various properties, which the sensations stand for. And in our anxiety to get at meaning, to

¹ In thus calling attention to the distinction of the two senses of the term 'idea,' I am, of course, but repeating what many others have said—among them most clearly Mr. F. H. Bradley, in his *Principles of Logic*, pp. 5 and 6.

find out what is symbolised, we actually neglect utterly that which is the symbol, the psychical existence. What is perceived is, in short, significance, meaning. The amount of perception one has, whether as a babe or adult, as layman, or as chemist, is precisely the meaning that one finds signified by one's sensations: the *sensations*, as such, may be precisely alike in the four cases. Perceiving, to restate a psychological commonplace, is interpreting. The content of the perception is what is signified.

Now, it is to be noted that the meaning constitutes for us the whole value of the experience. As a physiological fact, the occurrence of nerve tremors of some sort may be the important thing. But as a fact of human experience, the important thing is that the experience has significance. It means something to us. It reports something to our intelligence. Absolute nonsense and nonentity are synonymous as matters of conscious experience. It is true enough that without the idea *as existence* there would be no experience; the sensuous clustering is a condition *sine qua non* of all, even the highest spiritual, consciousness. But it is none the less true that if we could strip any psychical existence of all its qualities except bare existence, there would be nothing left, not even existence, for our intelligence. Even the fact that there *is* an experience, aside from *what* it is, is not the sensation itself; it is the interpretation of the sensation. It is part of the meaning. If we take out of an experience all that it *means*, as distinguished from what it *is*—a particular occurrence at a certain time, there is no psychical experience. The barest fragment of consciousness that can be hit upon has meaning as well as being. Take away the meaning, and consciousness vanishes.

We may seem to be dwelling needlessly upon the veriest truism of psychology—that its subject-matter is conscious experience, for that is all that is really meant when we say that significance constitutes the worth of an idea. But, perhaps because it is such a truism, there is no fact so often overlooked. The fundamental distinction between physical facts and psychical facts is not that the former exist in space, the latter in time, or any other specific distinction of mode of occurrence. It is that physical facts as such are facts of existence; psychical facts are facts of meaning. Physical facts have meaning, but they have it as psychical, in relation to intelligence; psychical facts have existence, but the existence does not constitute their express value in human experience. An idiot has as many ideas, *quid* existences, as Shakespeare; the delirious patient has, in all probability, more in a given time than his physician.

What then is the nature of meaning, of significance, of that which is conveyed by every fact of consciousness, and which constitutes the value of that fact? It is, of course, a mediate factor; it is due to inference. In passing, I must commend this statement to those who are telling us that the only realities which we can ultimately admit are those which are immediately present in some state of consciousness, and that we must reject all inference if we are to get the fact. For my part, it seems that when the mediate element is gone, meaning is gone, and consciousness itself disappears. If someone takes away from me all the inference contained in a fact, hunt as hard as I will, I cannot find but that he has taken with him the fact also. He may have left me with nervous tremors in my brain, but all significance, *i.e.*, conscious experience, is gone. So far is it from being true that we know only what is *immediately* present in consciousness, that it should rather be said that what is *immediately* present is never known.

But we must leave these general statements and come to particulars. That which is immediately present is the sensuous existence; that which is known is the content conveyed by this existence. The sensuous material is of worth only as it is a sign; it is a sign only as it signifies or points out meaning. This meaning is present as mediated. It is not there as existence; it is there as pointed towards, as symbolised. If we owe nothing else to what is called physiological psychology, the experimental result reached by Helmholtz, that we always neglect sensations, or pay no attention to them as existence, in behalf of the meaning conveyed by them, gives physiological psychology a higher scientific stand than introspective psychology has yet attained; for introspective psychology is always descriptive, while Helmholtz's generalisation explains. It is true, for example, that every experience of tone is complex, containing the fundamental and the partials. Yet we are entirely unconscious of this complexity, which as matter of sensuous existence is the all-important thing. Why? Because this complexity is taken solely as a sign of the instrument to which the tone is referred—human voice, violin, piano. We interpret the various combinations of sensations as signifying this or that object. We are equally unconscious of the nature of the sensations in themselves, and of the process we go through. Psychical result or significance is all intelligence cares for. Starting-point and way to this result are swallowed up in what they symbolise. This explains 'unconscious cerebration' on its psychical side. Processes

whether of perception or of reasoning, are of no account to intelligence except as they lead to meaning. Perception is well defined as unconscious reasoning. And as such it illustrates the way in which the process loses itself in the result. The process is nothing *as* a process, or psychical existence; it is everything in what it means or symbolises. In reasoning proper, the processes are of some account to us, because we know that upon variations in the process depend variations in result. The matter is more complex, and we go through it step by step; but even here we do not pay attention to the process as an existence. We simply take one *meaning* at a time, and then go on to the next meaning. Reasoning is the way in which we separate and unite meanings into one complex meaning. As our power to reason becomes developed, and the subject-matter becomes familiar, we cease considering the various subordinate meanings in their relation to each other. We grasp the meaning as a whole, as we do in perception, and reasoning becomes, as we say, automatic or intuitive. Conversely, when we are in doubt in perception as to whether the result is genuine or is an illusion, we do pay attention to the process. We repeat the process, analysing it into its steps, to see if we have drawn a correct inference. So, when we wish to decide whether that red colour is really on the wall or is due to a purely organic affection, we move the body or head, and observe results, and draw our inference accordingly. We often separate the various steps in perception, just as we often consolidate them in reasoning; but the separation and the consolidation are always of meaning, and never of the psychical process as an existence.

But let us consider another example or two of the fact that we neglect sensuous *basis* and regard meaning alone. Everyone knows that we have two retinal images of an object in every case of binocular vision; that is to say, we have two complete sensuous outfits. In the vast majority of cases, these two sensuous bases are slightly different; in one case in a thousand they may be alike. Yet we are ordinarily conscious of but one object; in some cases, those where the retinal images are similar, we can be conscious of but one, do what we will. I know of no more striking illustration of the fact that sensations, as existences, are nothing for us, while sensations in their symbolic function are for us everything. The sensations *mean* but one object, and, do what we will, we *see* but one object. The duality of the sensation is nothing for us. But we neglect the greater part of the case, when we speak of the matter as

if it were confined to a few special cases of eye and ear, and as if in these cases the sensations, as existences, were only double, or triple or quadruple. In fact, as existences, they are indefinitely multiple in every case. As I touch the table, how many distinct sensations do I have? As the ray of light affects my retina, consider what a chaos of sensations is stimulated. I may remark incidentally that a large number of the psychologists who have occupied themselves with the problem of space-perception do not seem to have realised the elements of the problem. They first talk as if the problem were: How to get space-relations out of sensations, as existences? and secondly, as if the problem were: Given isolated sensations as equivalent to isolated points in space, to tell how these come to be connected with each other in complex space-forms? But the problem in the first place is: How do we *interpret* sensations into spatial meanings? and secondly: How do we interpret *some* sensations as isolated points and *others* as connected bodies? We do not start with separate points which are to be combined through the medium of motion, or in any other way. The separate point is as much an inference, an interpretation of the sensation, as the connected line, surface, or solid. Our experience of one is built up along with that of the other. Sensations, as existences, in spatial perceptions as in all perceptions, are naught; sensations, in their symbolic quality, as inference is put into them and they become meaning, are all.

Our fundamental position is that sensation, as existence, and the process, as psychical occurrence, by which sensations are connected, never enter into knowledge. Knowledge is both the sensation and the process in their significant or sign-bearing quality.

But what is the sense in calling the sign-borne content inferential, and in separating it from the sensational basis as immediate? The general ground is the fact that the sensuous clustering is all that is present by way of immediate existence, and it is convenient to have a term to express that which is present by way of being signified or symbolised. The sensuous basis stands for, conveys to intelligence, the content of the experience, and the meaning is present only as thus represented. The sensations, as immediate existences, have no more meaning than letters of the alphabet or than vocal noises. The meaning is read into them or out of them, as one may prefer to state it. But more specifically, this element may be called mediate or inferential because it is present as the result of a process

of reasoning. There is no need at this time, I suppose, to do more than state the fact that every perception is a judgment based on an inference. It is indifferent to the sensation whether it is interpreted as a cloud or as a mountain; a danger-signal, or a signal of open passage. The auditory sensation remains unchanged whether it is interpreted as an evil spirit urging one to murder, or as intra-organic, due to disordered blood-pressure. The result is arrived at by a process of inference. It is not the sensation in and of itself that means this or that object; it is the sensation as associated, composed, identified, or discriminated with other experiences; the sensation, in short, as mediated. The whole worth of the sensation for intelligence is the meaning it has by virtue of its relation to the rest of experience. Since the rest of experience is not and cannot be present as so much immediate existence, we may well call the element which gives any psychical fact its value mediate.

We have just been introduced to some terms which, indeed, it has long been difficult to keep in the background; terms like 'identification,' 'discrimination,' 'relation'. For this mediate element is precisely what we mean by relation, and the processes by which it is got at, and read into the sensation, are those of association and comparison. It has long seemed to me a remarkable fact that the later writers of the specifically British school of psychology, led by Mr. Spencer, recognise this truth and yet do not think it necessary to revise their fundamental notions of intelligence. I can account for it only on the supposition that they do not attend to the double sense of the term 'idea'. Their general theory of intelligence, as at bottom sensational, requires that it be the sensations as existences which are compared and related. Their theory, as it actually works, is that the sensations in their intellectual quality, as significances, are compared and identified. Their theory as they employ it for purposes of explanation is in direct contradiction to their theory in its fundamental presuppositions. If all intelligence is a product of psychical existences, called sensations, plus their association and comparison, no amount of association and comparison will ever give a result which has meaning for consciousness. Strictly speaking, it is impossible for such processes to occur. But if the comparison of sensations does result in significant experience, there must be a certain intellectual quality in the sensations not due to their properties as bare existences. A relation of identity is not a sensuous skeleton which runs through psychical occurrences and ribs them together. It is identity of meaning; permanence, in short, of intelligence.

And discrimination is not the introduction of unlikeness between ideas as occurrences in the psychical life. They are already as unlike as they can be, each being already a unique distinct existence: as Hume says, every distinct idea is a separate existence. Nor can it mean recognition of this unlikeness of existence, except in the sense that it is recognised that the two psychical occurrences do not mean the same. They may *be* unlike, but we should never know they were did we not discover that they did not point to or symbolise the same intellectual content. They must mean difference of times at least, and conscious experience of difference of times is just as much a matter of interpretation of sensations as recognition of spatial differences is.

Wundt has shown clearly enough, as it seems to me, that association is finally a function of attention; but, not to confuse ourselves with terms, let us take a simple example. Of all the sensations which, as existences, are presented to us at any one time, how many come into consciousness together? To put it in the old-fashioned way, how many ideas can we be conscious of at once? To answer the question in this form: Of idea in the sense of meaning, we can be conscious of but one; of idea in the sense of existence, or psychical occurrence due to separate stimulation, we may be conscious of an indefinite, limitless number. Just as many as can be made to convey one meaning, just so many may be comprehended in one idea. If we make, for the sake of example, the assumption that the universe is a unity, it is theoretically possible to grasp every detail of the universe in one idea. In fact, it must be so grasped, for the unity of the world can only mean that it ultimately possesses oneness of meaning.

In any given complex of presentations, therefore, just as much will be selected and united into a conscious experience as harmonises in meaning. The astronomer cannot attend to the ticking of the clock and to the passage of a star at the same time, because they are *interpreted* in two different ways. Were they interpreted in the same content of significance, they would be, *ipso facto*, members of the same experience. To borrow Wundt's illustration, if the eye sees a falling rod at one place, and there is a noise made at a slight distance, and if the noise occurs regularly after the rod falls, although there is no connexion between them, the sight of the rod and the sound will be united in the same idea. So ineradicable is the mind's bent after meaning, that it will force it, if it be possible. In case, however, the noise is not harmoniously related to the fall of the rod, the mind will have to alternate between the two facts. They cannot both be pre-

sent in the same consciousness. Their unlike significance makes them, by necessity, two distinct consciousnesses.

Unity and difference, relation in short, is always a matter of significance, of content for intelligence, and not of psychical existence. When we say then, as Mr. Spencer and all the later English writers do say, that a sensation is nothing until it is identified and discriminated—that is, brought into relations of unity and difference—it is necessary to remember that the identification and the discrimination are elements of meaning, of relation to intelligence. The sensations, or existences, never unite themselves, and never differentiate themselves. But sensations, as they exist in conscious experience, are always united and differentiated. What is this but to say that intelligence is necessarily involved in every sensation as known, and, therefore, that it is impossible to derive intelligence from any combination of sensations? Let us remember two things : first, a sensation is not knowledge until united and differentiated ; secondly, these processes have absolutely no reference to the existence of the sensations, but only to their significance, to the meaning conveyed by them. Can we avoid drawing the conclusions: negatively, that relations—that is, connexions of unity and difference of meaning—can never be produced by sensations as psychical existences ; and, positively, that the factor of relation—or ideal significance—is necessarily required to make sensations elements of conscious experience ?

This brings us to the fact that relations are thoroughly *ideal*. Lewes frequently noted that science is a process of idealisation, but he seems never to have realised either the true import of idealisation, or the fact that all knowledge, perception included, requires the ideal element. Idealisation is not a process of departure from the material presented in perception, for this material is itself ideal. The idealisation of science is simply a further development of this ideal element. It is, in short, only rendering explicit and definite the meaning, the idea, already contained in perception. In the act of perception we do not realise anything like the whole meaning of what the sensations convey ; our interpretation is fragmentary and inadequate. The other processes of knowledge, the so-called faculties of memory, conception, judgment, self-consciousness, &c., are only progressively fuller interpretations, as each introduces some ideal factor—that is, relation—neglected by the previous. Memory, for example, simply makes explicit that ideal relation of our present experience to past experiences, which is involved in every perception, and which indeed makes it what it is,

although in the stage of perception we are not conscious of this relation. Self-consciousness, again, is simply the conscious recognition that the ideal element is involved in all knowledge together with what is implied in this statement. Self-consciousness is the idealising process of all knowledge continued till it becomes conscious of itself. But these are aspects of the question that must now be deferred.

We have to ask what is the especial ground for calling the element which makes knowledge significant an *ideal* element? The answer in general is that this factor is ideal, because it is not present by way of immediate psychical occurrence, but as meaning. It is significance; and this is *significance*, presence as symbolised. It is convenient to have a term to denote what is present in the way of meaning rather than in the way of existence, and the term 'ideal' just meets the demand. It meets it negatively in suggesting that this factor is not one of space- and time-existence and occurrence; it meets it positively in suggesting that it is due to intelligence.

This is the point which has now to be shown, and shown not through an examination of the logical *conditions* of experience, but through a psychological inquiry into its *facts*. Whence come the ideal elements which give to experience its meaning? By what process do we interpret sensations so that they become significant to us of objects and events in space and time? These questions are simply the fundamental questions of psychology, and can be answered only by a complete treatise on psychology. Nothing but very general considerations may be expected of me here. The answer which is ordinarily given to the question, the one we have just seen given, is undoubtedly the correct answer. Sensations get meaning by being interpreted through their relations to the rest of experience; through the processes of identification and discrimination. But the sensation is not identified with nor discriminated from another sensation. This would add no whit to its significance, besides being a process psychologically impossible. Previous sensations, as existences, are gone for ever; gone as much as the time in which they occurred. It is true, doubtless, that they have left organic traces of their occurrence in the brain; it may be true that these organic traces may, by indirect stimulation, re-awaken sensations like to the previous ones. But in this process there is, as such, no aid. There is so much sensuous material indirectly stimulated added to the sensuous material directly stimulated, and that is all. If sensations before were multiple, chaotic,

needing interpretation, there has been added more multiple chaotic material, equally in need of interpretation. Multiplication of sensations is not interpretation of sensations previously existent.

The identification is of the meaning of the present sensation with some meaning previously experienced, but which, although previously experienced, still exists because it *is* meaning, and not occurrence. This identification gives the present sensation all the meaning possessed by those experiences with which it is identified. It renders it symbolic of whatever these other experiences signified. If I attribute any meaning to the idea gold, all that meaning is transferred into the present sensation as soon as this sensation is seen to have the same symbolism. And it is seen to have the same symbolism just because the mind brings this meaning to bear upon the given sensation. There is undoubtedly a mechanism, conveniently termed the association of ideas, which insures that the mind brings a certain set, as it were, of its interpreting activities to bear rather than another, but the final result of meaning is wholly dependent upon the group of ideal significances which is brought to bear. The interpreting activity may bring itself to bear in such a way that it shall regard the sensations as iron pyrites or as the talisman of life; but upon this way depends the meaning of the experience. In short, the sole way of accounting for the fact that we have significant experience, or that sensations, in addition to being psychical occurrences, are also psychical meanings, is that the mind conserves permanently out of every experience the meaning of that experience, and, when it sees fit, reads this conserved meaning into a given sensation, thereby completing the transfer of significance. The experience, as an existence at a given time, has for ever vanished. Its meaning, as an ideal quality, remains as long as the mind does. Indeed, its remaining is the remaining of the mind; the conservation of the ideal quality of experience is what makes the mind a permanence.

If it be asked, then, how psychical experience can begin, the answer is, indifferently, either that it does not begin, or that it begins as the beginning of the development—the manifestation—of internal content of intelligence. It does not begin in the sense that meaning arises out of that which has no meaning. It does not begin in the sense that sensations as mere occurrences ever group themselves so that they have in addition meaning. For meaning is mediate, being through relation; it is ideal, being what is symbolised to intelligence. If intelligence were not present with a

minimum of intelligent or ideal quality to read into sensations, these sensations would never get significance, or presence in conscious experience. The mind must possess at the very outset the idea that there is meaning there. It must project into sensations the conception *that* they are significant, even if it does not develop the measure of this significance. A mind which does not come to sensations with an ineradicable pre-judgment that the sensations are interpretable, that is, possible bearers of an ideal quality, does not have the starting-point for any interpretation, and its sensation could not ever get a beginning on the road of meaning. The sensations might conceivably revive each other and fuse with each other indefinitely, but meaning is absent until they symbolise each other; and they fail to symbolise each other until the *meaning* of one is represented by another. But, after all, the conception of the recalling and fusing of sensations is not one to be allowed, except upon the supposition of the interpreting activity of intelligence. The very fact that sensations are so connected that the peripheral stimulation of one kind will set up the central stimulation of another is due to the unification of meaning which has some time made them fractional members of one whole, so that one cannot recur, even as existence, without the other. Attention has at some time laid its delaying hand upon them and conjoined them; it has selected them for and excluded others from its connecting grasp; and this is to say that they have been given a unity in that which they symbolise. Sensations cannot revive each other except as members of one whole of meaning; and even if they could, we should have no beginning of significant experience. Significance, meaning, must be already there. Intelligence, in short, is the one indispensable condition of intelligent experience.

This seen and stated, it becomes a question of simple fact how far developed in any case the necessary intelligence may be. For our general considerations, it is enough that the minimum requirement of an intelligence which recognises that its sensations have meaning be met; whether any definite meanings, and, if so, what, are projected into sensations, is at present a matter of indifference. We do not care whether they are interpreted as in space and time; as possessing necessarily quantity, quality, relation and modality or not. It is enough to know that they become experience only as interpreting intelligence projects into them something of its own being; they are what they are through this relation to intelligence. There is therefore no beginning of intelligent experience, except such as involves intelligence.

This leads us to recognise that intelligence has a necessary internal permanent content; and that it is only because it has, and because it supplies it to its sense-stimuli, that there ever arises significant experience, and that this occurs just in the degree in which intelligence possesses a synthetic content which it can project into its stimuli. In other words, whether we inquire after the origin or growth of mental experience we find involved a synthetic intelligence, that is to say, an intelligence which possesses a content as opposed to one which is purely formal. Recent Empirical Psychology shows that it has run the circuit and returned to the position of Locke. Locke fitted the mind out with sensations on the one side, and associating comparing activities on the other. These latter were purely formal. They merely operated from without *upon* the material of sense, dividing and combining. Then Psychology attempted to get along with the sensations only. But it was driven to re-introduce the associating activity, and now we see it driven to bring back the comparing relating activity. We have complaints that the Empirical School has neglected the native reading capacity of the mind, and that we must recognise that it is endowed with the ability to identify and discriminate. But this relating capacity is still conceived as formal, although the conception involves a contradiction. The relations are conceived as superinduced, as it were, upon the material of sensation, introducing *ab extra* order into them; instead of as necessary to constitute their entire being as members of conscious experience. When Psychology recognises that the relating activity of mind is one not exercised *upon* sensations, but one which supplies relations and thereby makes meaning (makes experience, as Kant said), Psychology will be in a position to explain, and thus to become Philosophy.

The mention of Kant's name suggests that both his strength and his weakness lie in the line just mentioned. It is his strength that he recognises that an apperceptive unity interpreting sensations through categories which constitute the synthetic content of self-consciousness is indispensable to experience. It is his weakness that he conceives this content as purely logical and hence as formal. Self-consciousness has a material, a psychological content. Kant was never able to bridge the dualism between his *a priori* form and his *posteriori* content, because he conceived of sensations as furnishing meaning provided only they were unified by the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding. In truth, the sensations supply no meaning.

It is the sensations, however, with the ideal content given them by the self, which are meaning. The self does not work with *a priori* forms upon an *a posteriori* material, but intelligence as ideal (or *a priori*) constitutes experience (or the *a posteriori*) as having meaning.

But I must return from this digression. Experience begins when intelligence projects something of itself into sensations. We have now to recognise that experience grows, or gets more meaning, just in the degree in which intelligence reads more ideal content into it. The adult has more experience than the child—the Englishman than the Bushman—because he has more ideas in his intellect to bring to bear upon his sensations and thus make them significant. Were the theory of our recent writers of the Empirical School correct, the difference must be (1) that the English adult has his formal capacity of relating more sharpened, and (2) that he has a greater number of revived sensations which he combines with his present. But it ought to be evident by this time that (to take the latter point first) the addition of revived sensations would in itself make the experience more confused, make it less significant. It is the addition of sensations selected because they possess the same meaning, it is their unification with the present as same content to intelligence, it is their discrimination as suggesting here and there a new and different shade of meaning,—it is, in short, the supplying of *meaning through sensations*, and not of sensations, that makes the experience more significant. And this is to say that experience grows as intelligence adds out of its own ideal content ideal quality. So we may see (to take up the other point) that any amount of sharpening of the mere power of identification and discrimination, of comparison as a formal power, would add no whit to the experience. The experience as an existence, as a clustering of sensations, is already there. The sole thing is to find out what it means, and this can be done only as there is supplied the mediate relational ideal factor. The growth of the power of comparison implies not a formal growth, but a synthetic internal growth. It implies that when the mind is stimulated to an act of comparison, it has a more varied, complex, better organised system of ideas or meanings to bring to bear upon its sensations, and thus to transfer to these its own content of significance.

This transference evidently incorporates the given experience into the system of meanings or of intelligence, and thereby the better prepares the latter for future apperceptive acts; its incorporation adds to the synthetic content of

intelligence, and thereby to the meaning of possible future experiences. The process of the growth of experience is accordingly a reciprocal one. Any experience has meaning as the self projects this meaning into it from its own ideal store ; this projection appropriates the given experience, as to *its* meaning, into the ideal store of the self, thereby farther developing it. Knowledge might be indifferently described, therefore, as a process of idealisation of experience, or of realisation of intelligence. It is each through the other. Ultimately the growth of experience must consist in the development out of itself by intelligence of its own implicit ideal content upon occasion of the solicitation of sensation. But this is again a thought to be elaborated at another time.

We may sum up our results as follows : meaning constitutes the worth of every psychical experience ; meaning is not bare existence, but is an inferential mediate factor ; it is relation and is ideal ; as ideal it is supplied by intelligence out of its own content ; this content constitutes, indeed, the reality of intelligence. I think we may have reason now to congratulate ourselves that we did not, at the beginning, make any inquiry into the connexion between this ideal quality or the meaning of experience and objective reality. For, it seems to me, that would have been to begin at the wrong end, and imply that there was somehow, somewhere present to consciousness, a conception of what reality is by which we could measure the significance of our experience. And I have become convinced by the inquiry set forth in the preceding pages that if reality is itself an element in conscious experience, it must as such come under the scope of the significance, the meaning of experience, and hence cannot be used as an external standard to measure this meaning. The reality of experience is, in short, an element of its interpretation, of its ideal quality or relation to intelligence. We do not have externally given to us some fixed conception of reality which we can compare with our ideas, and thereby see how much agreement with reality the latter have. Reality, like everything else that has meaning, is a function of our ideas. To find out what it is we must look within these ideas. It is the great merit of English Psychology that in attempt, at least, it has recognised this. It is its defect that it has tried to find this reality in the ideas, as existences, where naught can be found. We have now to see whether better fortune may meet an attempt to discover the nature of reality, where all is ultimately contained and must be found in the ideas as significances, as meanings. I hope, accordingly, at some future time, to ask after this relation of idea to reality.