THE STAGES OF HYPNOTISM.

By EDMUND GURNEY.

One of the first things which strikes the student of what is often loosely called the 'hypnotic' or 'mesmeric' state is this—that even the simplest manifestations of hypnotism are wont to present not *one* state but *two*, distinguished from one another by very marked characteristics. But the distinction, as usually drawn, has been of a very rough kind. As a rule, it has been noticed that good 'subjects' first get into a state in which many of them show great acuteness of sensibility, and in which all of them can be made to do or imagine very odd things; and that from this they gradually merge into a state of profound sleep or even coma. Such were the stages as originally observed by Braid, and subsequent investigation has done little to define them further. I am going to point out what appear to me grave deficiencies in this distinction of states, and to attempt to draw a much more precise one. But, before doing so, it is necessary to refer to another mode of distinction, which, if not cleared out of the way, might greatly confuse us. In discussions on hypnotism we continually find three *types* of condition recognised—the *cataleptic*, the *lethargic*, and the *somnambolic*: the cataleptic being the condition where the limbs will remain in any position in which they may be placed, without effort on the 'subject's' part; the lethargic being the condition where the muscles are relaxed, but abnormally liable to contractions and spasms under gentle stimulation; the somnambolic being the condition in which the 'subject' exhibits the singular eccentricities of conduct associated with public entertainments. But though these are all real and important conditions, they do not the least represent distinct *states of the individual*, or distinct *stages of hypnotism*. For the peculiarities of muscular condition may quite well *coexist* with that peculiar mental state which is described as somnambolic. The cataleptic state, moreover, does not belong to normal hypnotism at all, but is a decidedly exceptional phenomenon, and can only be considered otherwise by confusing it with the mere ordinary *rigidity* of the limbs; and again the effects of muscular irritability may be locally produced, by hypnotic processes, in various parts of the body, while the 'subject' remains in his normal waking state. On the whole, then, this mixing up of physical and mental and of constant and occasional characteristics, in a list which professes to sum up the fundamental forms of hypnotism, seems extremely misleading; and in what follows I shall speak only of cases where the *mind* of the 'subject' is to some extent affected, and shall base my distinctions primarily on the constant features which that mental affection displays.

If, then, the 'subject'—the conscious individual and not merely a part of his body—has succumbed to the hypnotic influence, if

he has passed out of his normal waking state and crossed the threshold of trance, then, before he reaches the profound sleep in which his mental condition is a mere blank, there lie before him two and only two markedly distinct states or stages, each of which however may present within itself a very large amount of variety. We may conveniently designate them as the *alert* state or stage and the *deep* state or stage. These states are, I believe, produced or producible in the case of every 'subject' who is sufficiently susceptible to hypnotism to be able finally to be put to sleep by it; but the question will very naturally occur how, if that is so, there can ever have been a doubt about it. How is it that the character, and even the very existence, of the two states has escaped general recognition? The answer is broadly this,—that, in the first place, each state admits of many degrees, and the characteristics of either of them may be only very slightly or only very transiently presented; and in the second place, unless special means are adopted, it is very easy to mistake the alert state for normal waking, and the deep state for sleep. This will become clearer when the states themselves have been further described.

To begin, then, with the *alert* state. This is the state in which a 'subject' is when, after the usual preliminary period of gazing fixedly at some object held near the eye, or of having passes made over the upper part of his person, and after the usual involuntary closure of his eyes, the strain on his eyelids is released by a few touches and words, and he is restored to what may look quite like his natural waking condition. Sometimes, it is true, the difference is very marked, and he will sit with a vacant air, irresponsive to every voice except that of the operator, and clearly not in possession of his ordinary faculties. He may be made to perform imitative actions and to obey commands in a mechanical way; but his consciousness may be at a very low ebb, or (as some have held) may have lapsed altogether. But even these cases will exhibit two characteristics of the alert stage which are also characteristics of normal waking:—the 'subject's' eyes will be open and capable of seeing; and he will (almost invariably) prove sensitive to pain if he be pinched or pricked. Very often, however, the resemblance to normal wakefulness is far closer than this; for the 'subject' will be found to converse with perfect comprehension, memory, and even humour. Where then does the essential distinction of his state lie?

The main point which can be observed at the moment is that though perfectly capable of sustaining a conversation, he does not *originate* remarks. If not spoken to he will sit quiet, and, if simply asked what he is thinking about, he will almost always answer 'Nothing'. Perhaps it may be said that even this condition of passive vacancy is after all not so very different from that in which a large number of our fellow-creatures spend a large portion of

their waking hours. If this be allowed, then we shall have to seek the essential difference of the hypnotic condition, not in any feature which it immediately presents, but wholly in two *possibilities* attaching to it, either of which demands appropriate treatment to become a reality. In the first place, if the 'subject' be left completely to himself, he will rapidly sink into the *deeper* state, and thence into hypnotic sleep, in either of which he will prove insensitive to any moderate amount of torture. Clearly the condition which leads rapidly and naturally on to further conditions of this sort is not a *normal* one: it can never be said of a person in a *normal* state, however sleepy he may be, that in two or three minutes he will be in a condition when pins may be run into him, or the severest pinches applied, without awaking him or evoking any sign of distress. The passage into these deeper conditions, it should be observed, is often so rapid that the fact of their being reached *through the alert stage* may be wholly unnoticed. The hypnotising process may carry a sensitive 'subject' in a minute or less from a condition of normal waking into hypnotic sleep; and in such a case the 'alert' period has been represented only by the few seconds before his eyes closed. If he had been taken in hand during those few seconds, and been talked to or kept employed, this passage into the deeper state would have been prevented; but if he is allowed to follow the natural course without interference, he will simply be seen to go to sleep, and he must be awakened by the operator before any phenomena can be exhibited. This liability to lapse, then, is one distinguishing characteristic of the alert state.

It is characterised, in the second place, by the possibility of obtaining, while it lasts, certain special phenomena of an active sort. The 'subject' can be made to do, and to continue doing, any action which the operator commands, although he may be perfectly conscious of making a fool of himself, and may strongly desire to resist the command. He can also be put under the influence of delusions—can have his senses deceived, so that he mistakes salt for sugar, ammonia for *eau de Cologne*; or can even be made to believe that he is in some distant place, or that his identity is changed.¹ These are the common platform-phenomena; and as the very object of hypnotising a 'subject' at all is usually to procure some of them, and the possibility of procuring them is thus practically certain to be tested, it might seem that the recognition of the abnormality of his state was in this case, at any rate, assured. But though this may be

¹ It should be remarked that even here the necessity remains of stimulating the 'subject' from time to time, to keep him going. When he is under a delusion, he will sometimes give long connected accounts, in great part often fictitious, as if he were following the course of a dream; but though very slight questions and comments will be enough to make him proceed, he will not do so if left to sustain a complete monologue.

so during the *course* of the manifestations, it is not unfrequently otherwise at their *close*; and a 'subject' who has been allowed, perhaps, to lapse into sleep, while others are being operated on, is often roused and even sent away, without its being observed that he has been roused not into a state of normal wakefulness, but only into the alert stage of hypnotism. To all appearance he is quite himself; and, the performance being over, it does not occur to anyone to try whether he is still at the mercy of commands and delusions; while the general stir and commotion prevent him from lapsing again into sleep. So he goes off home, acting and answering in a quite natural manner, till the effect wears gradually off; or, as more often happens, he continues to feel drowsy, and headachy, goes to bed, and wakes up in his usual condition next morning.

Passing now to the *deep* stage, we find that this in turn is liable to be confounded with a contiguous condition, namely, the genuine hypnotic sleep into which it tends to merge. It resembles that condition in the fact that the eyelids are closed; that, if one of them be forcibly raised, the eyeball is found to be rolled upwards; in the general insensibility to pain and to ordinary modes of stimulation. And there exists here precisely the same chance as we noted in the former case, that the particular stage will escape detection. If the 'subject' be left to himself, he will have no opportunity to manifest its characteristics, but, passing rapidly through the period during which these might be evoked, will soon lose consciousness and individuality in profound slumber. With some 'subjects,' moreover, the invasion of mental torpor is so rapid that it might be hard to fix and retain them in the genuine deep stage, even if the proper means were adopted. But many others, if taken in time, after their eyes are closed and they have become insensible to pain, but before sleep has intervened, will prove quite capable of rational conversation; they are mentally awake, even when their bodies are almost past movement, and when even a simple command is obeyed in the most languid and imperfect manner. The state is, however, harder to sustain at an even level than the alert one, owing to a stronger and more continuous tendency to lapse into a deeper condition. In the alert state the 'subject' can usually be kept going for an indefinite time: in the deep state he usually shows an increasing dislike to being questioned or meddled with.

Enough, perhaps, has been said to show how the two stages of hypnotism may be distinguished from normal waking on the one hand and from blank slumber on the other. But the marks which have been so far given as distinguishing the two stages from one another are by no means equally constant and precise. The closure of the eyes, the insensibility to pain, the disinclination, amounting sometimes almost to inability, to move, are all in a general way characteristic of the deep stage; and to them may be added a diminution of the irritability of the conjunctiva and

of the susceptibility of the pupil to light, with irresponsiveness to any voice but that of the operator.¹ But of these characteristics the only one which is invariable is the bodily torpidity. Closure of the eyes is nearly invariable; but I myself have seen two well-marked instances where the eyes remained wide open throughout the period which, as judged by all other indications, was certainly the deep stage. The irritability of the eye is sometimes only slightly affected. Insensibility to pain, though usual, is liable to still more frequent exceptions, as also is the irresponsiveness to the address of persons other than the operator. Nor are these normal features of the deep stage, even when present, entirely distinctive; as more than one of them are often also present in the alert. The irritability of the eye may at once suffer marked diminution.² Again not only is insensibility of a *local* sort in the alert stage one of the commonest phenomena of public exhibitions, when an arm or a leg is stiffened, and submitted to the audience to stick pins into or otherwise maltreat; but even *general* insensibility may supervene while the 'subject' is still open-eyed and capable of actively responding to suggestions and commands. This is especially the case if his attention is strongly directed in some particular channel: for instance, a 'subject' who normally is sensitive in the alert stage, if while in the deep stage he be ordered to do some particular thing when he wakes and be then roused into the alert stage, will often prove insensitive *till the thing is done*. Similarly I have known a 'subject,' who was quite sensitive before, become insensitive after, the communication of some strong impression. Being told that his sweetheart was drowned, he expressed the resolution not to survive her; and, while in this heroic mood, he bore the severest and most continuous pinching without a sign of sensation. In such cases the nervous energy is all, so to speak, concentrated into a single channel, in the performance of the task or the contemplation of the catastrophe, and there is none left to feel with—just as it has happened to soldiers in the excitement of battle to be temporarily unconscious of wounds. Insensibility to pain may also be present in the alert state, if the 'subject' is put under the influence of such a delusion

¹ How little even the most elementary distinctions between the two states have been realised by high authorities, a couple of specimens from Heidenhain may show. "The pupil of a hypnotised person contracts energetically when light falls upon the eye." It is impossible that this sweeping assertion could have been made, had Heidenhain examined eyes in any but the alert state. "Hypnotised persons never fall down." This statement, it is true, he qualifies in a note by saying that he has seen *one* person fall down. The fact, of course, is that in an enormous majority of cases (I myself have never seen an exception) the 'subject', if standing, falls down a very few seconds after closing his eyes and lapsing into the deep state.

² See (in addition to the observations of Braid, Tamburini and Seppelli), the case recorded by Mr. Stanley Hall in *MIND* XXX., p. 177.

as would naturally involve it, *e.g.*, if he is made to believe he is a statue; and I have known insensibility, which originated in this way, *continue* for some little time after the delusion was withdrawn, and another substituted—the phenomenon being the more remarkable in that the ‘subject,’ who had been receiving the most savage nipping with total indifference, actually shed tears at the memory of a *fictitious* nipping, which he was told had been administered to him on the previous day. Closure of the eyes, again, may be present in a state which in respect of every other symptom is the alert one: indeed, unless the spasm which brings down the eyelid during hypnotisation be relieved by some distinct local process, the eye might naturally remain closed as much during the alert stage as during the deep. Nor can we even account the bodily activity which may be evoked during the alert stage, in contrast with the torpidity of the deep one, as a really sharp or essential distinction. The activity, it will be remembered, always has to be evoked *ab extra*, and often much against the ‘subject’s’ inclination. If left to himself, he will sit as passive in the former state as in the latter, and the one will insensibly merge into the other. The difference here, then, might seem to be one rather of degree than of kind; and the two states to be merely the less and the more advanced stage on the path to complete torpor. I may add that the advance of *mental* decline, where it can be marked, seems to be of the same graduated kind. Thus a ‘subject’ who, first in the alert and then in the deep state, is assured that he is going to be hanged next morning, will succumb to the idea with about equal readiness in both cases; and the only observable difference will be that in the deep state he does not seem equally to realise its gravity. A ‘subject’ for instance, with whom I tried this particular experiment and who was rendered decidedly grave when in the alert state, was chiefly occupied, in the deep state, with the half-jocular invention of dodges to avoid pain. But, where the whole mental condition is so abnormal, it is hard to regard such slight differences in the power of judgment as important or distinctive, or to regard them as other than steps in a single process of mental unhinging.

The question then presents itself: Is there any distinction of *kind* between the two states—any single test by which we can make sure in which of them the ‘subject’ is—any sort of phenomena, capable of constant reproduction, which will draw a clear line between them, and not merely represent a gradual and continuous decline of hypnotic waking into hypnotic sleep? I believe that there *is* such a distinction; and that the phenomena needed to establish it are to be found in the domain of *memory*. And as memory will afford the means not only for distinguishing the one stage of hypnotism from the other, but also further for distinguishing the ‘hypnotic state’ as a whole from the normal one, I may attempt to make my rapid sketch embrace all its various conditions, so far as I have been able to observe them.

First, then, as to the 'subject's' memory, when completely awakened from the alert state, of what has taken place during that state. The degree of it varies with the number of times that he has been under the hypnotic influence.

(1) A 'subject' who is quite fresh to hypnotism has frequently some remembrance, on waking, of *all* that he has gone through. Of such actions as are usually exhibited on platforms—imitative movements, sneezing, laughing, jumping and the like—his remembrance is distinct; and he perfectly recalls not only the actions but the feelings of passive acquiescence, or of surprise, or of repugnance, with which he performed them. A not uncommon description is that he felt as if he had *two selves*, one of which was looking on at the involuntary performances of the other, without thinking it worth while to interfere. He also perfectly remembers such simple mental operations as the effort to recall his name. Of performances which have involved more complex *mental ideas*, and where his mind has been at the mercy of some concrete form of delusion, his remembrance is dimmer. But still he will give some account of parts played by him in imaginary scenes, or even when under the impression that he was some one or something other than himself. It is probable that the delusive impression in such cases has not been quite complete. For instance, a 'subject' who, when awakened to his normal state, remembered the fact of having been put to flight by a white ghost, described himself as having in a sort of way known that it was only a handkerchief which the operator was flourishing, and yet as unable to resist the ghostly terror.

(2) After a very short course of hypnotisation, these illusory changes of scene or of identity, and even the simple mental operation of trying to recall some familiar fact, are found to have left no trace on waking; but the 'subject' can still perfectly recollect the imitative and other actions which he has performed *in propria persona*, and the sort of feelings which accompanied them. It will be observed how curiously fatal this fact is to Professor Heidenhain's theory that the actions of imitation, and of what he calls automatic 'obedience,' which a hypnotised person performs, are purely reflex and unconscious. For it is just of these actions that the clearest remembrance is retained; and in fact, if the 'subject' has been made to perform a few of them after being thrown into a light trance-condition, and is then brought back to the normal state, there has been absolutely no breach whatever in the continuous stream of his consciousness. He has passed through a strange experience, and that is all.

The memory of the events of the alert hypnotic state finds its precise parallel in certain cases of natural somnambulism—a condition in which all actions are of course performed *in propria persona*, and without any externally-induced illusion. Somnambulism is, as a rule, a decidedly deeper state than the lighter stage of hypnotism; and memory, on waking, of what has oc-

curred in it is exceptional. I have, however, lately met with well-marked cases of it in two of my own acquaintance, who gave descriptions of their somnambule experiences very similar to those given by hypnotic 'subjects'. Though exceptional, such cases are probably not absolutely rare; and it is the more curious that Despine, Heidenhain, and others should have so hastily and sweepingly assumed that the function of true psychic memory is suspended in hypnotism.

(3) In my experience no true memory has ever been exhibited, on complete waking, of things which have been done or suffered in the *deep* state. Nor am I aware of any record of such an event. The performance, at the appointed time, of *commands* impressed on the 'subject' when in the deep state hours or even days before, is not a case in point. For though he feels impelled to do what he has been told to do, he has no recollection of the fact of having been so told, and is at a loss to comprehend his own impulse. This is merely an instance of the well-known phenomenon of cerebral (or as it has been called 'organic') memory; but is interesting as taking place when the person is otherwise in a completely normal state.

So much, then, for the conditions of the memory on complete waking; next as to its conditions in the hypnotic states themselves.

(1) Facts of the 'subject's' general knowledge, his address, business, recent employments, and so on, are remembered even in the deep state, if that state is sufficiently marked and prolonged for some amount of conversation to be sustained in it.

(2) With a favourable 'subject,' something that has happened during one of the hypnotic states will often recur to the memory on the next occasion when that state is produced, though in the interval of normality—amounting it may be to several days and nights—which has intervened between the two occasions, it has been completely forgotten. (The thing, however, must not be an action performed in *propria persona*, for this—as we have seen above—would *not be forgotten* during the *normal* state; nor connected with a delusive impression, for this—as we shall see below—would *not be remembered* on the recurrence of the *abnormal* state.) This recurrence may be made a test of the extreme rapidity with which a 'subject' will, in exceptional cases, pass from the alert hypnotic to the normal state—his attention being first arrested by a suitable incident, a few passes of the waking and 'clearing' sort obliterating all knowledge of it, and then a few more of the opposite sort bringing it back again to his mind, all within the space of a minute. But the chief interest of this *induced* phenomenon of alternating memory lies in its resemblance to what occurs in *spontaneous* conditions. Even ordinary *dreaming* occasionally presents this feature in an embryonic form—a dream-scene or dream-incident being often more apt to recur in dream than in waking moments: not that the mere recurrence could

be taken necessarily to imply memory; but experiences are recorded in which the scene or incident, though not one associated with the waking life, is distinctly *recognised* as familiar when it recurs, which of course does imply a sort of memory. *Natural somnambulism* may seem to present more distinct resemblances; and certainly, if one judged from expressions used by the somnambulist, particular ideas which have made no part of the waking life, are apt to recrudescence in the sleep-waking state. As a rule, however, it would be hard to represent this phenomenon as involving more than a mere reawakening into activity of certain nervous tracts, which naturally manifest the fact of their activity by the same external results as on previous occasions. Even in the rarer cases, which more strongly suggest the recurrence of the past events as such, the presence of true psychic memory is more doubtful than in hypnotism, or at any rate is harder to substantiate; for the very tests which might substantiate it naturally tend to wake the somnambulist, and so to put an end to the condition. Perhaps, therefore, the clearest interest of the hypnotic alternations of memory is rather as illustrating the spontaneous alternations in cases of '*double consciousness*,' where a single individual lives in turn two (or more) separate existences. There, as here, the transition may be almost instantaneous; and there, as here, while the memory of the *normal* state is continuous (its events being remembered even in the abnormal condition, just as we have seen that the events of ordinary life are remembered in either of the hypnotic states), the memory of the past events of any *abnormal* state lapses and recurs with the disappearance and reappearance of that state.

(3) If the phenomena mentioned under the last head are somewhat uncertain, it is otherwise when the condition intervening between two hypnotic states of the *same* kind is not normal wakefulness but an hypnotic state of the *other* kind—i.e., when a deep state intervenes between two alert, or an alert between two deep states. I have then found that (with certain well-marked exceptions to be mentioned hereafter) the ideas impressed in the one sort of state are invariably forgotten in the other, and are as invariably again remembered when the former state recurs. Thus the 'subject,' when in the alert state, is told something—some anecdote or piece of ordinary information—which we will call A. He is then thrown, or allowed to fall, into the deep state with closed eyes, and is asked 'What were you told just now?' He is quite unaware what is meant, nor will the broadest hints recall the missing idea. He is now told something else, which we will call B; and is then re-awakened into the alert state. Being asked the same question as before, he at once repeats not B but A, and it is impossible to evoke in him any memory of B. Thrown again into the deep state, he in a similar way recalls B, and A has once more vanished. Finally he is completely awakened, informed that two things have been told him within the last five

minutes, and offered £10 to say what either of them was—with a result entirely satisfactory to the experimenter. Occasionally I have succeeded in hitting a transitional moment at which *both* things were remembered; but it was a sort of knife-edge, and the slightest manipulation or pause tending to deepen the condition brought about the customary separation and oblivion of the thing told in the alert state.

These phenomena seem singularly constant. I have obtained them with a large number of 'subjects,' and with three operators in three different parts of England, two of whom certainly had no idea what result I was expecting. They represent, of course, that clear distinction of the two hypnotic stages—as something more than mere continuous degrees of a single trance-condition—to which I have been leading up; and the great rapidity of the transition, together with the sharpness of the results, seems to make them as satisfactory indications of that distinction as could well be imagined.

(4) To the rule thus established, there are certain definite exceptions. If the idea impressed in the alert state is a *delusion*, involving either a change of *scene* or a change of *identity*, it is not remembered in the usual way. A 'subject' who has been made to believe himself elsewhere than in the room where he actually is, or to assume the part of another person or of an animal, and who while under this delusion has been carried into the deep state, on returning from that state proves almost always to be the natural self of the alert state, and refuses to believe that any idea of any sort has been impressed upon him. In the few cases within my experience where this has not happened, and where the delusory part was resumed when the alert state returned, it was noticeable that the bare *idea* seemed to revive first—very likely as the memory of the remark which had preceded and produced the illusion—and that then the illusion followed in the wake of the idea. Thus a boy who had been enacting the part of a fish on the floor, and who had been then thrown into the deep state and placed in a chair, was brought back to the alert state by gentle upward passes. He sat for some seconds staring at the floor in a puzzled way, and then flung himself down and recommenced the fish-like movements. Waking to the alert state by any *sudden* means always ensured forgetfulness, carrying the 'subject' at once over that low degree of the alert stage where recurrence of the delusion was possible. It may be added that though delusive ideas are thus forgotten, yet if the same delusion be again suggested in a general way, the *details* of the former one will be remembered. Thus a youth who had been impressed with the idea that he was a schoolboy attending Brighton College, and that his name was 'Gerald Hamilton,' completely forgot this change of identity when he returned to the alert state in which he had undergone it; but on being then again told that he was

attending Brighton College, and asked his name, he gave it as Gerald Hamilton.

(5) The next case is stranger still, though quite as definite. If in the alert state any physical effect is produced by suggestion—*e.g.*, if the 'subject' is made unable to flex his arm by being told that he cannot do so—a further very marked effect is produced on his mental powers and memory, although there is no special sign that his mind is preoccupied with attending to his bodily symptoms. A boy's arm was thus extended; he became unable to talk rationally; and being set to read aloud, he did so in a stupid and mechanical way, and could not recollect what he had read. He was now passed into the deep state, during which his arm dropped; and on being recalled from this state, was asked what he had been doing just before he went to sleep. He replied that he was holding his arm out; but both forgot and utterly denied the fact of the reading. Similarly the operations of opening a piano and picking out a tune on it, carried out by a 'subject' while under an impression that he could not unclench one of his fists, were clean forgotten after an interval of the deep state.

(6) Any sort of argument or bothering has a singular effect in causing the 'subject's' mind to drift into a deeper dream-like state. Thus, at the close of the experiment just mentioned, the 'subject' was pressed for some time as to how his arm, which he remembered to have been stiff and extended, had dropped. While he was in a state of puzzle and worry, a sudden clap and call brought him instantly to a point at which the whole circumstance as to his arm was completely forgotten; but being allowed to lapse quietly, he again recalled it. There are thus subdivisions of recollective power within the alert stage itself.

(7) We now come to an apparent exception of another sort. If the thing impressed on the 'subject's' mind in the deep state is a *command*, which he is to execute 'on waking,' he will execute it as soon as he returns to the alert state; or, if allowed to work off his trance in natural sleep, he will usually perform the act on normal waking; but, if the act has been performed in the alert state, he will have no recollection of it when brought to his normal state.¹ Such obedience is, however, no true exception to the rule that psychic memory of ideas does not extend from one state to another, any more than in the case above noticed where a 'subject' obeys a command fixed for some distant hour: he feels an impulse but does not remember its source. A singular

¹ After what has been said above, it will be readily understood that performance in the alert state of commands given in the deep, and remembrance of impressions from one alert state to another with a deep state between, are liable to be represented as performance or remembrance on *waking*—*i.e.*, on *complete* waking into the normal state—owing to the ease with which the alert state may be confounded with the normal.

point in connexion with this obedience is that it seems apt to fail in cases where a vivid and interesting idea is suggested at the same time as the command. Thus several 'subjects' who were told in the deep state that a fire had broken out at home, and that they must go and help to put it out, on being recalled to the alert state sat without moving, and denied any impulse to do anything. The idea probably produced a strong mental picture, which, in disappearing with the change of state according to the rule above given, involved the further disappearance of the sense of obligation.

(8) Obedience also fails in the following case. If a command has been imposed in the deep state, and the 'subject' is woken into the alert, but then, before he has time to perform it, is put under a delusion—this will *suspend* the performance of the act. Thus, a youth who had been told that he was to put on his hat and begin reading the newspaper, and had then been roused, was on the point of carrying out the command, when he was suddenly told he was a chicken. He instantly went down on the floor and began to cluck. He was then allowed to lapse into the deep state, and again brought out of it: he now at once performed the order. In this particular instance the order was not *remembered* in the second deep state, though carried out on emergence from it; the delusion had altogether obliterated it, as far as psychic memory was concerned. But this feature seems unsymmetrical, and was found not to be constant—the delusion as a rule having no effect beyond the particular sort of state in which it is induced.

Such in briefest outline is a sketch of the conditions of memory connected with hypnotism, so far as my own observation has gone. Brief as it is, it may perhaps suggest matter of reflection as to theories which assume hypnotism to be a state of mere unconscious automatism, on the ground that no true memory ever exists of what happens in it.