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Report Made in the Name of the Commission of the Budget Charged with Examining the "Projet de Loi" for Fixing the "Budget Général de L'Exercice, 1892."

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REPORT MADE IN THE NAME OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE BUDGET CHARGED WITH EXAMINING THE
"PROJET DE LOI" FOR FIXING THE "BUDGET
GÉNÉRAL DE L'EXERCICE, 1892."

By M. HENRI BRISSON (Député).

(From the "Journal Officiel" of the 29th September, 1891. Documents Parlementaires. Annexe No. 1643. Second sitting of 17th July, 1891.)

GENTLEMEN,—To a question which we put regarding the "Iphigénie" cadet school ship, the Ministry of Marine replied to us by a note dated the 22nd April, as follows:—

"The Department endeavours to keep its young Officers at sea as much as possible without sending them on board battle-ships, where there should be no Officers junior to the rank of Lieutenant. It may be said that what we are most deficient in are cruising vessels continually at sea, so as to ensure our Officers becoming seamen before everything else. Military spirit and knowledge will be the outcome of well-considered and well-conducted voyages, with no further classes and studies, but with the daily application of scientific knowledge, which in these days is as complete as possible."

And further,

"To give to this instruction its maximum utility, two obligations are now forced on the Department:—

"(1.) To keep up the zeal of Officers by accelerating promotion, the slowness of which must tend to discourage the best intentions.

"(2.) To maintain the greatest possible number of Officers at sea. The part of a naval Officer is to be on board his ship; the spirit of observation and thoughtful reflection complete the education of the Officer, and fit him for showing at the supreme moment that which the country expects of him."

These forcible words, coming direct from the pen of a sailor, have prompted and inspired your reporter.

It is only necessary, in fact, to generalize from these and apply them to our seamen as well as to our Officers, to enable us to conceive a system where shore-going appointments will give place more and more to sea-going ones—where the constant and practical instruction of the crews, their spirit and energy, their preparation for war, will become, if not the sole preoccupation, at least the most ardent wish, of those to whom is entrusted this portion of the national defences.

Whatever may be thought of comparisons, always most difficult to establish, between our forces and those of our rivals, and which, in

addition, were set forth last year by the eminent reporter of the Budget of 1891, it remains certain that the relative proportions have altered in the last twenty years in an alarming manner, and that the next conflagration will extend to both land and sea. It is necessary, therefore, for us, at sea as well as on land, to keep our fighting forces as nearly complete in preparation as possible.

Also, that which the Department told us in its note of 22nd April regarding the personnel is equally true of the matériel. The proper place for a ship is at sea, and this is not an absurd truism. At page 4 of an Exposé, referred on 23rd July to the Commission of the Budget, the Ministry of Marine, whom we like to quote as our authority, shows in the clearest manner that the status of *première catégorie* alone affords the means of providing for the proper care of our vessels so that they may be held ready in view of eventual mobilization. These are its own words.

Your reporter, impressed with these principles, has therefore been led to ask himself if it were possible, without raising the amount of the credits asked for by the Minister of Marine, or, perhaps, even while reducing them, to satisfy these three desiderata:—

(1.) To give our Officers and men more opportunities of being at sea and practising navigation.

(2.) To render our naval mobilization more rapid.

(3.) To place in the *première catégorie* all our vessels possessing a sufficient military value.

We leave aside for the present the improvement in vessels building, which is included among the proposals of the Minister.

The problem thus reduces itself to a better utilization of the credits.

Its solution has two sides, one financial, the other maritime.

The recital of the first point of view will naturally find its place in the discussion on the "chapitres."

Your reporter has attempted, not for the purpose of giving an indication, which is not in his province, but so as to avoid all vagueness and indetermination, to give to the solution of the second part of the problem a concrete and tangible form in the four following tables:—

¹ "*Catégorie*" may be rendered in English by "Class of the Steam Reserve." The "*première catégorie*," however, is much more ready for sea than our "First Class of the Steam Reserve," for the French ships in that *catégorie* have their Captains, Officers, and two-thirds of their crew on board, and proceed to sea every three months for target practice.

COMPARATIVE TABLES OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NAVAL FORCES.

1. *Coast Defence (Défense Mobile).*

Ports of 2nd class importance.

(The number of Torpedo-boats in Commission for the Military Ports is the same in both projects.)

Scheme of the Ministry of Marine. ¹	Proposed Scheme. ²				
	"Manche."				
	Dunkerque. Post-Captain.	Calais. Commander.	Boulogne. Commander.	Le Havre. Post-Captain.	Saint-Malo. Saint-Serran. Post-Captain.
4 1st class torpedo-boats (in commission).	2 1st class torpedo-boats (in commission).	2 1st class torpedo-boats (in commission).	2 1st class torpedo-boats (in commission).	4 1st class torpedo-boats (in commission).	2 1st class torpedo-boats (in commission).
4 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).	2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).	2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).	2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).	4 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).	2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in commission).
1 small torpedo cruiser, to be also employed in the supervision of the fisheries.	1 2nd class torpedo gunboat (in the "première catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 2nd class torpedo gunboat (in the "première catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 2nd class torpedo gunboat (in the "première catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 2nd class torpedo gunboat (in the "première catégorie" of the Reserve).	4 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).
1 2nd class armoured gunboat (in the "première catégorie" of the Reserve).					1 small torpedo cruiser (in commission, and stationed at Granville in peace-time to supervise the fisheries).
Total in the Channel: 32 torpedo-boats, 2 torpedo-cruisers, 3 armoured gunboats.					

¹ The Ministry consider that the distribution of the vessels of the mobile defences should be kept secret, and that, in consequence, during peace-time, neither the vessels, Officers, nor crews should be kept at these ports; in case of war, all this would be done "à la première heure."

² We have thought that everything, vessels, Officers, and crews, should be ready at their posts in peace-time and exercised frequently

Coast Defence (Défense Mobile)—continued.

Scheme of the Ministry of Marine. ¹	Proposed Scheme. ²	
Ocean.	Ocean.	
	Mouth of the Loire. — Commander.	Mouth of the Gironde. — Commander.
	2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in commission). 2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).	2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in commission). 2 2nd class torpedo-boats (in reserve).
	Total for the Ocean : 8 torpedo-boats.	

¹ The Ministry consider that the distribution of the vessels of the mobile defences should be kept secret, and that, in consequence, during peace-time, neither the vessels, Officers, nor crews should be kept at these ports; in case of war, all this would be done "à la première heure."

² We have thought that everything, vessels, Officers, and crews, should be ready at their posts in peace-time, and exercised frequently.

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Proposed Scheme.²

Mediterranean.	Mediterranean.							
	Cette.	Marsailles.	Nico and Villefranche.	Ajaccio.	Algiers.	Bonn.	Tunis.	
	Commander.	Post-Captain.	Post-Captain.	Post-Captain.	Post-Captain.	Commander.	Post-Captain.	
1 3rd class torpedo-boat and	2 1st class torpedo - boats (in commission).	4 1st class torpedo - boats (in commission).	4 1st class torpedo - boats (in commission).	4 1st class torpedo - boats (in commission).	4 1st class torpedo - boats (in commission).	2 1st class torpedo - boats (in commission).	4 1st class torpedo - boats (in commission).	
1 3rd class cruiser at Tunis.	2 2nd class torpedo - boats (in reserve).	4 2nd class torpedo - boats (in reserve).	4 2nd class torpedo - boats (in reserve).	4 2nd class torpedo - boats (in reserve).	4 2nd class torpedo - boats (in reserve).	2 2nd class torpedo - boats (in reserve).	4 2nd class torpedo - boats (in commission).	
1 small torpedo cruiser in Algeria.	1 1st class armoured gun-boat (in the "promièro catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 1st class armoured gun-boat (in the "promièro catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 1st class armoured gun-boat (in the "promièro catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 1st class armoured gun-boat (in the "promièro catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 small torpedo-cruiser (in commission).	1 1st class armoured gun-boat (in the "promièro catégorie" of the Reserve).	1 3rd class cruiser "Hirondelle" (in commission).	

Total in the Mediterranean: 48 torpedo-boats, 1 3rd class cruiser, 2 small torpedo-cruisers, and 4 armoured gunboats.

¹ The Ministry consider that the distribution of the vessels of the mobile defences should be kept secret, and that in consequence, during peace-time, neither the vessels, Officers, nor crews should be kept at these ports; in case of war, all this would be done "à la première heure."

² We have thought that everything, vessels, Officers, and crews, should be ready at their posts during peace-time and exercised frequently.

2. *Naval Forces, First Line of Defence (in Commission).*

Scheme of the Ministry of Marine.		Proposed Scheme.
<p>Cherbourg.</p> <p>One armour-clad division. One Rear-Admiral. 3 armour-clads. 1 3rd class cruiser. 1 torpedo-cruiser. 1 small torpedo-cruiser. 2 sea-going torpedo-boats. — 8 vessels.</p>	<p>Toulon.</p> <p>One squadron of three divisions. One Vice-Admiral. Two Rear-Admirals. 9 armour-clads. 4 cruisers. 2 torpedo-cruisers. 3 small torpedo-boats. 5 sea-going torpedo-boats. — 23 vessels.</p>	<p>Cherbourg.</p> <p>One squadron of two divisions. One Vice-Admiral. One Rear-Admiral. 6 armour-clads. 2 cruisers. 2 torpedo-cruisers. 6 sea-going torpedo-boats (one for each armour-clad). — 16 vessels.</p>
Grand total of scheme of Ministry of Marine : 31 vessels.		<p>Toulon.</p> <p>One squadron of three divisions. One Vice-Admiral. Two Rear-Admirals. 9 armour-clads. 3 cruisers. 3 torpedo-cruisers. 3 small torpedo-boats. 9 sea-going torpedo-boats (one for each armour-clad). — 27 vessels.</p>
Grand total of Proposed Scheme : 43 vessels. ¹		

¹ The Proposed Scheme includes as well (see Table 4) 24 cruisers, divided into six flying squadrons, of which one is continually at Trest and one continually at Toulon.

33. *Naval Forces, Second Line of Defence ("Première Catégorie" of the Reserve).*

Scheme of the Ministry of Marine.	Proposed Scheme.
<p>Cherbourg.</p> <p>One division in reserve. One Post-Captain in command of the division. 3 armour-clads.</p>	<p>Proposed Scheme.</p>
<p>Brest.</p> <p>Light squadron (ocean). One Vice-Admiral. One Rear-Admiral. 2 armoured cruisers. 4 cruisers ("à batterie"). 2 cruisers 2 { sea-going torpedo-boats } (in commission).</p> <p>— 10 vessels.</p>	<p>Toulon.</p> <p>A reserve squadron of two divisions. One Vice-Admiral. Two Rear-Admirals. 9 armour-clads. 3 cruisers. 3 small torpedo-cruisers 2 small torpedo-cruisers.</p> <p>— 12 vessels.</p>
	<p>Grand total of the Ministry of Marine 12 vessels. Grand total of Proposed Scheme.. .. 32 vessels.</p>

Proposed Scheme. Flying Squadrons.

Scheme of the Ministry of Marine. Naval Foreign Stations.					Proposed Scheme. Flying Squadrons.					
Atlantic.	Pacific.	" Extrême Orient."	Indian Ocean.	For filling vacancies and special service.	1st Division.	2nd Division.	3rd Division.	4th Division.	5th Division.	6th Division.
					At Brest for the N. Atlantic and special service.	At Toulon for the Levant and special service.	These four divisions will sail at intervals of 3 months from each other, so that there will be always one in the Atlantic, one in the Pacific, one in the Indian Ocean, and one in the "Extrême Orient."			
North.	Rear-Admiral. 1 cruiser (A battery) 1 2nd class cruiser 1 1st class cruiser 1 1st class despatch vessel	Rear-Admiral. 1 armoured cruiser 1 1st class cruiser 1 1st class despatch vessel 2 gunboats	Post-Captain. 1 1st class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser 1 1st class despatch vessel 1 " aviso transports"	1 armoured cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser 1 1st class despatch vessel 1 gunboat	Rear-Admiral. 1 cruiser (A battery) 1 1st class cruiser 1 2nd class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser	Rear-Admiral. 1 armoured cruiser (temporarily) 1 1st class cruiser 1 2nd class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser	Rear-Admiral. 1 cruiser (A battery) 1 1st class cruiser 1 2nd class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser	Rear-Admiral. 1 armoured cruiser (temporarily) 1 1st class cruiser 1 2nd class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser	Rear-Admiral. 1 cruiser (A battery) 1 1st class cruiser 1 2nd class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser	Rear-Admiral. 1 armoured cruiser (temporarily) 1 1st class cruiser 1 2nd class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser
South.	1 2nd class cruiser 1 3rd class cruiser	1 5 gunboats	2 gunboats; 0	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Total, 24 vessels.										

Total, 24 vessels.

Naval Stations (making good the connection).

[illegible]

Grand Total, 34 vessels.

Grand Total, 20 vessels.

NOTE.—The Naval Division in Coolin China remains as in the Scheme of the Ministry of Marine, and in addition receives a visit every three months from a flying squadron of six destroyers.

Some persons have thought fit to reproach the reporter with having gone beyond the scope of his duty—with having drawn the Commission, and having endeavoured to draw the Chamber, outside its sphere. He would, probably, also have been reproached with being too vague and indefinite had his views not been clearly stated. These are as follows:—The expenses of the vessels in the second and third "catégories"¹ are considerable, and from the point of view of rapid preparation for defence, the result is not commensurate. There is in this both a danger and an extravagance; what is required, then, is that all vessels capable of being made serviceable for war should be placed either in commission or in the first "catégorie"; this is our whole proposal, and, to do this, what can be wiser, from a financial point of view, than to carry over the costs from one vote to another, in fact, to apportion the credits in a different manner?

To place in commission or in the first "catégorie" a greater number of ships was not, however, everything. The transposition of the expenses alone would not have sufficiently demonstrated the utility of such a course. It was also necessary to show how to give unity and cohesion to the naval forces thus called into being, that the provision of their crews and Officers and their grouping together and utilization had been considered, for what does the principle signify if it is not made clear in every detail that it is possible to carry it out?

To give in a visible form the "cadres" expressive of the proposal, is the sole meaning of these tables; but neither your reporter nor the Commission have wished to draw up an organization or prepare a plan. We say to you simply: "In the interests of our naval defence it is possible to improve on what is done at present." For this purpose we put before you a better apportionment of the credits. The work of the Ministry will be, in the sense of this improved distribution, to take such measures as it may think necessary, neglecting, as is its right, its absolute prerogative (which it would be venturesome to meddle with), proposals which we again repeat we have only formulated to enable us to make our meaning clear.

MOBILE DEFENCES.

The Creation of Torpedo-boat Stations on the French Coasts.

The first of these proposals is the creation of torpedo-boat stations on the French coasts, complete and ready in every respect, in peacetime, with the boats, their Officers, and their crews.

By the statement furnished by the Ministry of Marine, the torpedo-boats for coast defence are concentrated in peacetime in the five military ports; in war-time they are to be despatched at the first

¹ The second catégorie consists, generally speaking, of armour-clads of an older type, coast-defence vessels and disposable cruisers. The Captains and a few Officers are appointed, and about one-fourth of the crew.

The third catégorie consists of wooden vessels and old transports; only a provisional Captain is appointed, and one-tenth of the crew is on board.

alarm to a certain number of posts selected beforehand, and whose positions remain a secret.

This is what appears to us a false conception, or, as has been said by the "*Journal des Débats*," a grave military error.

Our coast line is at present without mobile defences; we are speaking principally of the Channel and the Mediterranean. The defence of the most important commercial ports of those two regions is reduced to that afforded by forts and batteries and what are termed fixed defences, that is, mechanical and electrical submarine mines.

The matériel and stores destined for the torpedo-boat stations, the workshops for repairs, the air-compressing pumps, the slip-ways and cradles, are, according to the statements of the Ministry of Marine, all in place; whereas the vessels and their crews are completely wanting. They are to join their posts after the declaration of war.

We ask that this should be changed, and that the torpedo-boats be present at their posts in peace-time.

The defence of our chief commercial ports is, in our eyes, a matter of first importance. These large towns are the soul of our foreign commerce. They contain not only stores and provisions of every kind, but also the "matériel" of our mercantile marine. There is, besides, a question that we may put on higher grounds; are we to leave these hardy maritime populations, these sailor families, whose heads will be away on active service, without any defence, should the flotilla of torpedo-boats, destined for such or such a post, be prevented from arriving there—as there is too good reason to fear might be the case?

Whether one speaks of those of our coast towns provided with batteries, or of those which are completely unprotected, the necessity is the same.

In the first case, everyone is aware that it is impossible to draw a comparison between a battery on shore possibly more or less mobile, and a vessel standing "on and off" bombarding a coast. The latter, a floating mark, can advance or retire at will; bearing this in mind, it might be preferable if the guns in coast batteries were served by seamen gunners, who would, from their knowledge of the matter, be more likely to succeed in hitting a vessel in motion.

The necessity, therefore, of having a flotilla of light rapid boats in the hands of practical men to obstruct the movements of the enemy's vessels and oblige them to keep at a greater distance off the coast, is patent to everyone.

As for the towns which are completely unprotected, in the first place, there are not many of them. But we are told that to organize mobile defences for these would be to draw upon them the fire of the enemy; but you must choose between two courses: either you leave them without any defence at all, believing that by this means you will save them from the danger of attack, in which case you probably gravely misapprehend the conditions of future wars; or, as you have announced, you send the torpedo-boats to their posts at the commencement of hostilities, and thus lay them open, according to your

own arguments, to capture by the enemy, which, therefore, do not seem conclusive.

In fact, in an hour or two a cruiser with half a dozen quick-firing guns would easily throw a sufficient number of projectiles charged with high explosive into one of our towns to set it on fire.

Imagine the destruction of property, imagine the moral effect produced on the country, and you will agree with us that an organization is required which will place torpedo-boats during peace-time at the most threatened places, nearest to the most probable point of attack.

It is not enough that these organizations should appear on paper. The provisions of the department may clash with a thousand possibilities which it is easy to imagine. For example, the declaration of war may occur at a moment when the enemy's squadron is not far from one of our many commercial ports. Let us take, for instance, in the Channel, Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne; and in the Mediterranean, Nice, Algiers, and Corsica; notwithstanding all the activity that the arsenals of Cherbourg and Toulon may display in equipping their reserve torpedo-boats, completing their crews, and despatching them to their destinations, would there not be still a fair chance of them arriving too late, or being captured *en route*?

Another advantage of completing the organization in peace-time would be that our fleets in commission in the Channel and the Mediterranean, being relieved, more or less, of the defence of our coasts, would find themselves free to move with less restraint.

Other reasons also militate in favour of this preparation.

As there would be constantly in commission a certain number of torpedo-boats in what are known as our secondary ports, the satisfactory working of everything when actually required, which at present is none too certain, would be much better assured. In the same way, the keeping up of the matériel at each of these ports, consisting chiefly of stores of coal and oil, a workshop for current repairs, and various rather delicate pieces of machinery, among which an air-compressing pump, would be improved; all such are confided for the greater part of the time to the care of the Syndic, who knows nothing about this mechanism, but simply keeps it going as well as he can.

It is true that the torpedo-boats in commission in the military ports are ordered to visit these stations as often as possible, but such visits are, relatively speaking, rare, and it is impossible under these conditions to be always certain that everything is properly kept up.

Is not therefore the utility and necessity for the presence of this flotilla at certain points apparent—the narrow part of the "Pas de Calais," for instance, and Tunis and Corsica?

Let us organize therefore from henceforward the mobile defences of our coasts.

To command each group of these little vessels, the Ministry of Marine will probably appoint a superior Officer, whose rank will vary according to the number of torpedo-boats in his command. The duties of this Officer in peace-time are very important. He will have the command of the posts and torpedo-boats under his orders. He

will have to send these boats to sea for exercise as often as possible, either together or in turn, along the portion of the coast within their sphere of action. The detailed and perfect knowledge of our coast which a large number of our Officers and men will thus acquire is not one of the least of the advantages to be derived from this organization.

The senior Officer, too, of each station will have to inspect the electric semaphores ("électro sémaphores"), and satisfy himself as to the degree of instruction possessed and the vigilance shown by the look-out men ("guetteurs").

At the present time this duty, which on the outbreak of war will be one of extreme importance, is in each maritime "arrondissement" placed under the charge of a Commander ("Capitaine de Frégate"), residing at the chief town; and he often finds himself living at a considerable distance from some portion of the electric semaphores in his district. For instance, the semaphore stations in the departments of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, positions of first importance, have their inspector living at Cherbourg, and those of Corsica and Algeria are inspected by an Officer who resides at Toulon.

The manœuvres of 1889 showed how little we can rely on the services of these semaphore stations under their present organization. One of the most noted of our naval writers (M. Weyl), formerly an Officer of superior rank, wrote in the "Yacht," a well-known specialist paper, under date of 20th July, 1889, as follows:—

"The defence had the services of the semaphore stations at its disposal, but it must be said at once that the state of the weather interfered very much with their duties, and that on certain parts of the coast those were performed in a very inferior manner. It was ascertained that as one increased one's distance from one of the military ports, so were the look-out men ('guetteurs') found to be less efficient, and less to be counted on."

In the number of 27th July of the same journal, we read these lines under the same signature:—

"The look-out men keep a bad look-out, they know nothing about signals, and hamper the defence instead of aiding it."

It is only by a more constant and immediate supervision that we can acquire a personnel sufficiently trained to render the considerable services that in time of war we have a right to expect of it.

We will not further insist on the advantages that will accrue to the national defence by the establishment and disposition in time of peace of these torpedo-boat stations.

Against the creation of these posts is sometimes opposed the necessity of keeping secret the position of torpedo-boat stations; that, we are told, is confidential information, which should not on any account be divulged.

Is it seriously believed that the secret in such a matter can be long kept? Does not the commercial and strategical importance of the points where the torpedo-boat stations are, so to speak, necessarily placed in itself reveal them sufficiently? The Ministry of Marine tells us also that the posts are completely furnished and frequently

inspected and visited, both by sea and by land. How, under such conditions, can it hope to keep the matter secret?

No, the Navy cannot long refuse such an organization, or a similar one, without incurring the gravest responsibility before the country. Let it raise itself above certain personal claims. Competent writers of the greatest moderation¹ have said that the day when, at the chief towns of the "sous-arrondissement," such as Dunkerque, Le Havre, Saint Malo, and Marseilles, a Post-Captain ("Capitaine de Vaisseau") is established as Commander of the mobile defences, this Post-Captain will naturally become "Commandant de la Marine" of the whole "sous-arrondissement," and will take the place of the "Commissaire," who, at present, carries on these duties. No doubt the administrative work connected with the "Inscription Maritime" would still be left to an Officer of the "Commissariat" branch, but from the time a superior Officer of the executive branch is stationed at the chief town of the "sous-arrondissement," the supervision of the mobilization will devolve on him. The nearest Commissariat Officer to the "Commandant de la Marine" will simply retain the duty of the charge of accounts and expenses.

If we now venture to enter into the details of the proposed organization, it is solely to prove that we have thoroughly gone into the matter, and that our deductions are capable of application, and not on any account because we wish to propose a plan.

We should have liked to have done more, but our proposals are only what may be termed the inner kernel of a scheme of defence; in the course of the next few years they should be enlarged and made more perfect. It has been our duty to propose for 1892 what our resources as allowed by the Budget and in torpedo-boats permitted us to do.

The principles which guided us are these: To undertake, in the first place, the defence of the most prominent coast towns in the Channel and Mediterranean, and the mouths of our large rivers on the Atlantic Ocean.

Thus we propose to create in the Channel mobile defences for Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne, Le Havre, the mouth of the Seine, St. Malo, including the Bay of Mont Saint Michel and the western coast of the Cotentin.

In the Atlantic Ocean stations at St. Nazaire and the mouths of the Loire and Gironde, either at Royan or in the neighbourhood.

In the Mediterranean, two stations at Nice and Marseilles and one of less importance at Cette.

In Corsica, a station at Ajaccio, pending the efficient protection of Bonifacio from seaward, and till the admirable position of Porto Vecchio has been made more healthy, as it would be impossible for the crews to remain there at present without incurring the danger of malarial fever.

In Algeria, stations at Algiers, at Bona, and in the north of Tunis.

These 14 stations would require a total of 88 torpedo-boats, divided

¹ "Journal des Débats," 28th July, 1891.

into detachments of 4 boats each, so as to allow one or two detachments for each station.

The appropriation would then be as follows :—

The Channel.

Dunkerque	8 torpedo-boats.	4 1st class.	4 2nd class.
Calais	4 "	2 "	2 "
Boulogne	4 "	2 "	2 "
Le Havre	8 "	4 "	4 "
Saint Malo	} 8 "	2 "	6 "
Saint Servan			
Total, 14 1st class and 18 2nd class boats.			

Atlantic Ocean.

Saint Nazaire, 4 torpedo-boats of the 2nd class.

Mouth of the Gironde (Royan or Mortagne), 4 torpedo-boats of the 2nd class.

Total, 8 2nd class boats.

Mediterranean.

Cette.....	4 torpedo-boats.	2 1st class.	2 2nd class.
Marseilles.....	8 "	4 "	4 "
Nice—Villefranche	8 "	4 "	4 "
Corsica	8 "	4 "	4 "
Algiers	8 "	4 "	4 "
Bona	4 "	2 "	2 "
Tunis.....	8 "	4 "	4 "
Total, 24 1st class and 24 2nd class boats.			

Recapitulation.

Channel.....	14 1st class, 18 2nd class boats = 32		
Ocean.....	8 "	" "	= 8
Mediterranean....	24 "	24 "	= 48
Total	38 "	50 "	= 88

Let us now see if we shall have in 1892 the necessary number of boats. Besides those in commission, there are this year in reserve in the military ports, as follows :—

Cherbourg.

7 1st class, 20 2nd class, and 5 3rd class boats.

Brest.

3 1st class, 14 2nd class, and 5 3rd class boats.

Lorient.

1 1st class, 4 2nd class, and 2 3rd class boats.

Rochefort.

2 1st class, 6 2nd class, and 1 3rd class boats.

Toulon.

16 1st class, 22 2nd class, and 7 3rd class boats.

Total = 29 1st class, 66 2nd class, and 20 3rd class boats.

There will be, also, though on trial during two months of 1892, but capable of being used for service, 9 1st class and 12 2nd class torpedo-boats, giving a grand total of 38 1st class, 78 2nd class, and 20 3rd class boats.

Now we only require 38 of the 1st class and 50 of the 2nd class. So that in 1892 we shall have, in addition, to augment the defences of the military posts, 28 2nd class and 20 3rd class torpedo-boats.

This enumeration proves that in 1892 we shall be able to create the posts we propose; it shows us, also, how poor we are in torpedo-boats, and the necessity for augmenting this branch of our naval forces.

Organization of the Torpedo-boat Stations.

It has been shown above that these 14 posts may be grouped in two sections, those

With 8 torpedo-boats.

„ 4 „

There are 8 stations with 3 torpedo-boats, which are as follows, Dunkerque, Le Havre, Saint Malo—Saint Servan, Marseilles, Nice—Villefranche, Corsica, Algiers, and Tunis.

Those with 4 torpedo-boats are 6, Calais, Boulogne, Saint Nazaire, Gironde, Cette, and Bona.

Those with 8 torpedo-boats will have at their stations—

A "Capitaine de Vaisseau," director of mobile defences, who at the same time, where there is a "sous-arrondissement," will be Commandant de la Marine, namely, at Dunkerque, Le Havre, Saint Servan, Marseilles, Corsica (in Tunis this post of Commandant de la Marine will be created, there being none at present). He will also be inspector of the electric semaphores in his district, he will take the place of the "Chef du Service Administratif de la Marine," where there is one at present, and he will have with him the Harbour Master ("Directeur des Mouvements du Port"), who will become his assistant.

Where there is no Commandant de la Marine, as at Nice and Algiers, he will have with him as his assistants a Lieutenant and a "Sous-Commissaire."

There will also be at each post, a "Médecin de 2e classe" and a "Mécanicien principal de 2e classe."

At the stations with 4 torpedo-boats the Commanding Officer will be only a "Capitaine de Frégate," having with him as his assistants a Lieutenant and an "Aide-Commissaire."

The Chief Engineer (Mécanicien Principal) of the arrondissement or of the nearest 1st class post, will have charge of the machinery at the 2nd class posts.

The staff of these stations will, therefore, be altogether as follows—

- 8 "Capitaines de Vaisseau."
- 6 "Capitaines de Frégate."
- 14 Lieutenants (assistants), many are already there.
- 8 "Sous-Commissaires," the greater number already there.
- 6 "Aides-Commissaires."
- 8 "Médecins de 2e classe."
- 8 "Mécaniciens Principaux de 2e classe."

Let us now see what personnel is required for the torpedo-boats themselves.

To diminish the expense it would be very easy only to keep in commission the 1st class boats, leaving nearly all the 2nd class boats in reserve, with the half of their crews on board instead of the quarter as at present.

The store at each post would contain the bags of the "réservistes" or "inscrits," to be called out in case of war. These would be taken as far as possible from the corresponding district, which could be easily arranged; it seems to us also that these arrangements instead of doing harm to the general mobilization, as was stated by the Minister before the "Commission du Budget," would, on the contrary, assist it considerably.

The torpedo-boats in Tunis would be all kept in commission, because there is no "Inscription Maritime" in this country. The personnel would then be as follows:—

Torpedo-boats in Commission.

Each 1st class boat—

- 1 Lieutenant.
- 1 second in command ("Enseigne ou Aspirant de 1e classe)."
- 20 men.

Each 2nd class boat—

- 1 Lieutenant.
- 15 men.

Torpedo-boats in Reserve.

1 Lieutenant and 20 men for each pair of 1st class boats.

1 " " 16 " " " 2nd " "