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Author(s): C. J. Hamilton

Review by: C. J. Hamilton

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that "*esprits prudents*" should consider this information less as a means of forming an opinion than as examples "*d'un argument facile et frappant*" (p. 581). The prudent English reader should perhaps omit this chapter altogether.

The author is at his best when discussing French urban and rural common rights, which he has evidently studied with great care, and concerning which many interesting facts are brought forward to show how complex and extensive they were and are. The monopolistic rights, feudal in origin, still possessed by certain communes concerning flour mills, are especially curious (p. 406). In economic criticism the author is, however, decidedly weak; as, for example, when he mentions, with apparent approval, the issue of paper money by Guernsey, without a gold reserve, as a means of raising money (p. 391). The information concerning English affairs is not always quite accurate. In fact, the great mass of detail contained in these 600 pages, some of which is of rather a trivial character, is not sufficiently tied together by bonds of thought and argument to make this a very valuable book.

As to the main thesis of the work, the author seems hardly to recognise that all institutions throughout the world, good and bad, have been produced by a continuous process of evolution; and that, consequently, the proof in a particular instance that such an evolution has, in fact, taken place, affords no criterion whatever as to whether the institution in question is beneficial or harmful. The principle of the survival of the fittest might perhaps be quoted to indicate that we must, at all events, be moving in the right direction. This would, however, hardly be a strong argument in the absence of effective competition between communities existing under different social institutions; and, in truth, the direction of our progress in social affairs at present depends more on some form of slowly acquired momentum than on any system of selection now in operation. It is not safe to assume that we are always travelling along the path of progress.

LEONARD DARWIN

Philanthropy and the State. By B. KIRKMAN GRAY. Edited by E. Kirkman Gray and B. L. Hutchins. (London: P. S. King, 1908. Pp. 325.)

It was the purpose of the author to complete in the present volume the examination of the relative spheres of private philanthropy and of State action in the work of Social Reform, begun in his *History of Philanthropy*, published in 1905. Mr. Gray's

premature death occurred before the book had been finished, but it was sufficiently advanced to enable the editors to publish it substantially in the form intended by the author.

Mr. Gray's method is historical. By examining the development of the main philanthropic attempts to relieve and to cure the evils of poverty, the strength and the weakness of voluntary work is made clear. Not only is the gradual supersession of private by State action described, but an attempt is made to formulate a philosophic explanation of the change.

A note by the editors in the introduction indicates the conclusion towards which throughout the book the author is felt to be working. The title of the book was to have been "The Failure of Philanthropy," and, although Mr. Gray was led in the course of his work to modify this absolute condemnation, it yet serves to suggest the standpoint from which it was conceived. The thesis maintained is that "private philanthropy cannot provide a remedy for widespread want which results from broad and general social causes"; and that "the provision of such remedies is the proper responsibility of the State."

In Part I. there is traced the "Transition in Thought" that has marked the passage of the views of the older *laissez-faire* school. The influences to which is assigned the chief part in producing this change are:—(1) the spread of knowledge concerning social conditions, largely due to the science of statistics; (2) the strengthened force of "social imagination," in the influence of the historical school, and in the teaching of biology; (3) the demand for efficient administration and supervision resulting in the gradual creation of professional services which replaced the amateur worker in such spheres as those of prison inspection, the superintendence of the Industrial Schools, and, later, of the British and National Schools; (4) the urgency of such problems as those of public health, arising from the growth of towns, and demanding corporate action; (5) the failure of private charity or of individual forethought to meet the needs for which the Poor Law of 1834 had made no provision.

Gradually, in consequence of such forces as these, we have become reconciled to a steadily expanding sphere of State action. The demand that it should be extended for the relief of the various forms of poverty is based still further on the view that the great mass of "the poor are too poor to help themselves. The ideal of "social self-maintenance" is a mere dream, resulting from "incurable optimism."

In Part II. the various types of State intervention are con-

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sidered : the annexation of voluntary undertakings by the State, as in education ; the co-operation of voluntary with State action, as in the case of discharged prisoners ; the supervision of voluntary work by the State, as in reformatories.

The lack of uniformity and the resulting anomalies found in the present relations between public and private enterprise are fully exemplified. But the anomalies are as great in the case of the various modes of State action, marking the gradual evolution from the old conception of deterrent and restricted relief by the State to the conception of the State as provider of common needs for all. Thus, at Brighton, "a workman having incipient phthisis is received into the municipal sanatorium without stigma of pauperism. At Bradford exactly the same kind of institution is maintained for the same class of patients by the Board of Guardians out of the poor rate."

What Brighton does for its phthical workman, Mr. Gray would have every municipality doing for its sick of all kinds, for its underfed children, for its aged, for its unemployed. To this end the teaching of history and of social philosophy point both as probable and desirable.

The place which should be left to philanthropy is that of pioneer in the path of social reform. It should stimulate the social conscience to apprehend new needs and undertake new duties. It may experiment with the purpose of paving the way for the assumption of new social responsibilities. But when the need is proved sufficiently general philanthropy should abdicate in favour of the State.

To enter into a detailed discussion of such an issue would obviously very far surpass the limits of a review. Mr. Gray's book is of great value in that it makes a beginning in the historical study of social economics as a whole. But when that study is intended to lead up to general conclusions, judging as between the two schools of political opinion, the criticism seems demanded that there has been a failure clearly to distinguish the real issues at stake. That in certain directions State administration and also State provision must be extended may be granted. For the solution of some problems there must be an exercise of sovereign power. Many benefits are common rather than individual, and can be provided better through taxation than by charging a price.

But ultimately the question is whether or no an individualistic organisation of society is desirable as providing the best guarantee that each shall produce as much as he consumes. Further,

whether ultimate progress does not involve the "learning by experience," and the freedom of selection which have been regarded as in a special degree characteristic of individualism.

The State may well increase its "minimum demands" with regard to the standard of life which its members must reach, but if it extend a general offer of provision for all "widespread want which arises from broad and general social causes," it will need to introduce a form of selection and control that is but the principle of "less eligibility" under a new name, and possibly either far less effective or far more onerous.

Perhaps the real difficulty lies in the fact that we have not to choose between the extremes of either individualism or socialism. It is less easy to keep to the *auream mediocritatem* than to invoke absolute principles. Mr. Gray, it seems to us, has represented an extreme view.

C. J. HAMILTON

Das Lebenswerk von Karl Marx. By WERNER SOMBART. (Jena : Gustav Fischer. 1909. Pp. 59.)

PROFESSOR SOMBART, in this monograph, estimates the real value of the work of Marx, as tested by the wear and tear of the quarter of a century since his death. The reverence which has come to him during that period is one of the freaks of literary history. In 1883 his name meant comparatively little; he was thought of as a mediocre economist, whose teachings supplied the unsuccessful Socialist party with their not very valuable weapons of offence. Yet now, according to our author, the whole "gigantic army of Socialists is governed by Marxist ideas"; and the 300 treatises devoted to their discussion between 1883 and 1904 supply a quantitative test of the volume of his fame. Paradoxically enough, however, this reputation has been consistently founded on misconceptions. His followers have seized on that part of his teaching which was least admirable, his theory of value, and have misinterpreted that. His influence may be well-deserved, but not on the grounds on which it is generally based. What, then, is his real position?

Professor Sombart's measured judgment pictures him as a colossal literary figure, "demoniacal," "Titanesque," abounding in life, but with a dispassionate outlook and regard for fact that has frightened away the poor, attractive phantoms which so long tantalised mankind with ideals of eternal rights and attain-

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