and increasingly constituted by adjustments which have become automatic, and are thus put beyond the range of discussion. In the resulting economy of attention the social mind is set free for new ideas. The routine of civic life, the use by the state of coercion upon the individual, and the function of punishment to awaken attention are explained in terms of this automatism. The biological principle of 'short cuts' is given application in tracing the transformations of stimuli and reacting apparatus in the world of volition. In society phenomena of identity and phenomena of difference are at once of prime importance, as is evidenced by the principles of imitation and invention, active under the forms of habit and accommodation. B. finds that repetition and similarity are only superficial characteristics of the true operative nature of social unity. No differentiation can be got out of the tendency to reproduce a copy *per se*. To introduce 'invention,' as explanatory leaves an awkward dualism. Baldwin's analysis of mental development is regarded rather as failing in its resolute repudiation of this dualism. The root of this, and other similar failures, is traced to a fallacy introduced by the influences of the atomic doctrine of association, or the repetition of similar units. Baldwin, in attempting to remould the theory, strains the idea of imitation by extending it to cover volition—the passing of an idea into fact, instead of limiting the process to mere reproduction of a copy. Nothing of serious importance happens by genuine imitation. All the business of society goes on by differentiated reactions. Every man in society is what he is through a law or scheme which assigns him an individual position, differing from all others, and identified with them precisely through these differences, by which alone he can coöperate with them. The error in question springs from working with similarity instead of identity (of factors and processes). Directly we introduce identity, difference falls into its place as an inherent aspect of the principle. Every action, without any exception, is, in principle, a difference within an identity. Relative Suggestion is a more adequate view of identity than Associationism, and B. finds in Baldwin's later writings a tendency toward the former.

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The Nature of Judgment. G. E. MOORE. *Mind*, No. 30, N. S., April, 1899, p. 176.

This article suggests a theory of perception and knowledge which has avowedly much in common with Kant, differing chiefly in substituting for sensations, as the data of knowledge, concepts; and in re-

fusing to regard the relations in which they stand as, in some obscure sense, the work of the mind. The view which inclines to take the categorical judgment as the typical form, and attempts in consequence to reduce the hypothetical judgment to it, is attacked. A judgment is universally a necessary combination of concepts, equally necessary whether it be true or false. It must be either true or false; but its truth or falsehood cannot depend on its relation to anything else whatever—reality, for instance, or the world in space or time. Both of these must be supposed to exist, in some sense, if the truth of our judgment is to depend upon them; and then it turns out that the truth of our judgment depends not on them, but on the judgment that they, being such and such, exist. The truth or falsehood of this judgment must be immediate properties of its own, not dependent upon any relation it may have to something else. The existential judgment, which is presupposed in Kant's reference to experience, or in Bradley's reference to reality, remains merely a necessary combination of concepts, for the necessity of which we can seek no ground, and which cannot be explained as an attribute to 'the given.' A concept is not in any intelligible sense an 'adjective,' as if there were something substantive, more ultimate than it. It is not a mental fact, nor any part of a mental fact. Concepts are possible objects of thoughts; they may come into relation with a thinker; and in order that they *may* do anything, they must already *be* something. It is indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks them or not. They are incapable of change; and the relation into which they enter with the knowing subject implies no action or reaction. It is a unique relation which can begin or cease with a change in the subject; but the concept is neither cause nor effect of such a change. It is of such entities as these that a proposition is composed. The difference between a concept and a proposition, in virtue of which the latter alone can be called true or false, would seem to lie merely in the simplicity of the former. What kind of relation makes a proposition true, what false, cannot be further defined, but must be immediately recognized. Existential propositions do not escape this description. We must regard the whole world as formed of concepts, these being our only objects of knowledge. Perception is to be regarded philosophically as the cognition of an existential proposition, and thus it furnishes a basis for inference. From this description of a judgment there must, then, disappear all reference either to our mind or to the world. Neither of these can furnish 'ground' for anything, save in so far as they are complex judgments.

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