will; though that term is scarcely more explanatory than is hysterical.

I am half tempted now to add a third class, in which blindness is real and absolute, but transient, and without recognizable cause.

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27. "PSYCHOLOGICAL ATOMISM. Hugo Münsterberg (Psychological Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan., 1900, p. 1-17).

This ingenious article will probably advance the science ultimately, in one way or another, more than will any other of its speculative achievements in months, for it is vital with the psychologic spirit of the hour—parallelistic, analytic, and scientific.

Having pointed out the success of analysis in the affective modes of consciousness as well as in the cognitional, the writer draws attention to the fact that in trying to determine the aspect of psychological correlation it is no longer the purely "material" or physical stimulus with which (as in Fechner's abandoned "law") the sensation is considered to be correlated, but that it is rather with that still indefinite commotion which is concomitant in the neural structure. "We have been too long satisfied with the hypothesis that the elementary stimulus of the outer world excites merely the physiological unit in the brain which is represented by the isolated ganglion cell. * * * * We are becoming more and more accustomed to the view that the most elementary stimulus brings about a nervous excitement which grows from the periphery to the center like an avalanche and stimulates in the brain a whole area which may overlap the area stimulated by another isolated excitement. * * * * As soon, therefore, as it is recognized that the brain-effect of the indivisible stimulus is an easily divisible physiological process, the sensation ceases to be the ultimate result of psychological analysis, since a still more elementary psychophysical unity can now be conceived as the last factor in the explanation."

"I am convinced," says the writer, "that the time has come when we need a psychological atomism just as much as an atomism of the physical universe." Professor Münsterberg's atoms then are elements which, while under the general conditions of consciousness, are different from our sensations, they are absolutely dissimilar to each other (for on such uniqueness alone can the empirical differences in the vividness of sensations depend); they can vary through all degrees of vividness; they are all co-ordinated, not being in special groups according to our different senses; and lastly, they by their manifoldness are the material out of which is built both the "so-called qualities" and the intensities of the sensations. All the differences in consciousness seem to Dr. Münsterberg explainable by the changes in vividness of his atoms.

"We must begin to see that the sensations are unsatisfactory as ultimate conceptions; and that they must be replaced by psychical atoms if psychology really desires to become worthy of its great older sisters, the natural sciences"—not, we presume, that the author deems psychology at present an unnatural science, or even that it is too largely metaphysical, if, possibly, too "mystical."

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