Royal United Services Institution. Journal

Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19>

General Robert Craufurd and his Critics

Alexander H. Craufurd

Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Alexander H. Craufurd (1913) General Robert Craufurd and
his Critics, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 57:423, 599-609, DOI:
[10.1080/03071841309421793](https://doi.org/10.1080/03071841309421793)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071841309421793>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,
or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views
expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the
Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with
primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any
losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,
and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the
Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

GENERAL ROBERT CRAUFURD AND HIS CRITICS.

By ALEXANDER H. CRAUFURD.

NONE of Wellington's other Generals was nearly so difficult to understand and justly appreciate as Robert Craufurd, Commander of the famous Light Division.

The characters of Hill, Picton, Beresford, Lord Lynedoch, and Stapleton Cotton were all simple and easily intelligible. To some extent, Sir William Napier realized the difficulty of truly understanding his old commander, when he wrote these words concerning him: "If ever the Manichean theory was made manifest in man, it was in Craufurd." But, when expressing this opinion, Napier was, in Emerson's language, "wiser than he knew." His words, like some of those of the great Hebrew prophets, had a far wider range of significance than the writer was aware of.

Craufurd's character was an extremely complex one, full of inherent contradictions. His nature was never "as a city that is at unity with itself." In a letter to his wife he said correctly enough, "My whole life seems to have been passed in a kind of storm." To impartial outside observers, his nature was at once an enigma, and an incarnate paradox. He was, as Professor Oman perceives, a man of widely varying moods. At one time he was perilously rash in action, and at another time—as at Busaco and Fuentes d'Onoro—admirably cool and wary. He was a most severe disciplinarian, yet averse to punishment. Like Wellington and Picton, he firmly believed in the necessity of rather brutal severity towards the men, and yet his sensitive feelings made him detest such severity. He was at once stern and often unrelenting towards his soldiers, and full of consideration for their comfort and their welfare. His temperament was at once melancholy and hopeful, in some ways almost morose, and in other ways genial and much given to laughter. His external bearing towards his fellows was habitually proud, whilst his inmost soul was full of humiliating consciousness of his many faults and sins. He was neglectful of the ordinances of religion, and yet often greatly exercised in mind by its hard and insoluble problems, as is made manifest enough by his letters to his wife. He was profoundly affectionate, yet most irascible. He was, as Sir George Napier perceived, instinctively benevolent, yet easily irritated into fierce transient hatred. At first cordially disliked by most of

his officers, he was ultimately much valued by many of them. The feelings of his men towards him were a strange mixture of dread, keen admiration and affection, together with an almost boundless confidence in his genius for war. He was far the most quick-sighted, active, and vigilant of Wellington's Generals, and yet he was, on some few occasions, rather careless. He felt much respect and admiration for his chief, and yet he sometimes disobeyed him. His actions were sometimes no adequate expression of his deepest thoughts and habitual intentions. Delighting in war, he was yet always longing for his domestic life.

Hence arises an almost insuperable difficulty in fairly estimating his character, his talents, and his services.

And this difficulty has been much increased by the fact that Craufurd was unfortunate enough to incur the bitter hostility of Charles and William Napier, who almost invariably wrote of him with a pen dipped in gall, though in his later life Charles Napier seems to have often spoken of the fiery leader of the Light Division with a good deal of admiration, as I was informed by my friend the late General William Napier, a son of Sir George.

On one occasion Charles Napier accused General Craufurd of "ignorance of cavalry." This charge is manifestly absurd. When he made it, Napier was a very young man with no great experience. But his hastily formed opinion came to have a very undue weight attached to it, when it was published as the deliberate verdict of the conqueror of Scinde.

Craufurd's great practical knowledge of the Austrian Army, coupled with the fact that, together with his brother Charles, he had translated the chief official Prussian treatise on the art of war, constitutes a sufficient refutation of Charles Napier's accusation.

That Craufurd was by no means "ignorant of cavalry" is clearly proved by the very high estimate of his knowledge expressed by the admirable colonel of the 1st German Hussars, who so long served with the Light Division.

In a letter written to Craufurd's widow in the year 1814, William Campbell, formerly Brigade-Major of the Light Division, tells her that this German colonel had recently expressed his ardent wish that Craufurd had still been with them, saying that there was not one man in his regiment who would not willingly have given up his best horse, if, by so doing, he could once more secure the presence of their old General.

In our days Robert Craufurd has found a most able defender in Professor Oman. But Mr. J. W. Fortescue, in Volume 7 of his very valuable History of the British Army, has made a rather violent attack on the old leader of the Light Division. In fact, he seems to have carefully raked together all that has been said against this General, whilst to a great

extent ignoring very much that has been justly said in his favour.

So, as Robert Craufurd was certainly one of the most famous of Wellington's coadjutors, it seems quite worth while to endeavour to reply to Mr. Fortescue's criticisms. Those that refer to the General's *character* appear to be the worst and most damaging. Consequently, I propose to deal with these first, and afterwards to consider those that are depreciative of his talents for war.

Mr. Fortescue declares that Craufurd, like Picton, had "no refinement." This accusation can scarcely be justified. The leader of the Light Division was a much more scholarly and highly-educated man than Wellington. He knew French and German thoroughly. He habitually carried about with him the writings of one of the great French humorists. He had lived in good society, and he was descended from one of the oldest families in the south of Scotland. Mr. Fortescue might also have remembered that Craufurd had been sent on a prolonged military mission to the Austrian Army, together with his brother Charles, and that, when this brother was seriously wounded, Robert had charge of the mission, and discharged its duties—which required considerable tact—with much success. So his critic might well allow him some rudiments of refinement.

Craufurd's temper was certainly a very violent one—but that scarcely justifies Mr. Fortescue in saying that "his temper was fiendish, and his instincts tyrannical." A really fiendish temper would seem to imply sustained malignity of disposition, and of this there is no trace in Craufurd's character and history. Moreover, Sir George Napier has testified that the temper of his old commander was gradually becoming milder.

It is also evident that very considerable severity was then necessary, if the officers and men of the Light Division were to be trained effectively. By a curious coincidence, after condemning Craufurd's harshness, Mr. Fortescue, in the very next page of his volume, gives us a terrible account of the abominable and criminal behaviour of many of the men. Great severity was absolutely necessary if crime was to be repressed.

As regards the *officers* of the Peninsular Army, Wellington's opinion of them was far from being a high one. In a letter to Craufurd about camp kettles, he declared that, in the great majority of his regiments, the officers could not be trusted to perform some of the most ordinary duties.

A very large part of Craufurd's unpopularity with many of his officers was caused by his stern determination to oblige them to do their work efficiently. A story given us in Cope's "History of the Rifle Brigade" well illustrates this truth. A young officer named Smith was accompanying some ammunition. When he arrived at the quarters of the General, he was

both tired and hungry, so that he was much disgusted at receiving an order to prolong his journey. Consequently, he disobeyed the order. Next day, Craufurd put him under arrest, and, with a great oath, threatened to smash him. A long time after this, when conversing in a friendly way, Craufurd told young Smith what had been the result of his disobedience. He said that he found his ammunition steadily going over to the enemy, and that he had only just time, by spurring his horse, to rescue it.

Though the commander of the Light Division was for a long time cordially detested by many of his officers, some of the very best of them, such as his Brigade-Major, William Campbell, and his aide-de-camp, Shaw Kennedy, were much attached to him; and Kincaid, the adjutant of the 95th Rifles, has testified that he was "*ultimately* much liked."

So far as concerns the *men* serving under him, there is ample evidence that they eventually came to like as well as value their General. In the harassing retreat to Vigo, "Rifleman Harris," who was a private, thoroughly approved of Craufurd's iron discipline, and declared that it was absolutely necessary. Harris was extremely devoted to his commander. He wrote thus of him in his interesting little book: "Indeed I do not think the world over saw a more perfect soldier than General Craufurd. . . . It was gratifying, too, to me to think that he did not altogether think ill of me, since he has often addressed me kindly when, from adverse circumstances, you might have thought that he had scarcely spirits to cheer up the men under him."

Another man who served under Craufurd has recorded his opinion that the General hated the necessity of attending a parade for punishment, and that having to attend one ruffled his temper for the rest of the day.

Costello for long served in the ranks under Craufurd, in the 95th Rifles. He was a very intelligent man; and in his little book called "Adventures of a Soldier," he distinctly tells us that Craufurd "though a most strict disciplinarian, was averse to punishment, and beloved by the men for his justice, his gallantry, and his care for their wants." This writer also gives us a striking instance of Craufurd's great unwillingness to punish a man who was a really good soldier. He tells us that a sergeant of the 95th Rifles, named Fleming, was accused of knocking down and ill-treating an officer of the Brunswickers—temporarily attached to the Light Division—who appeared to be about to desert to the enemy. Costello says that this sergeant was tried by a court martial, convicted of the assault, sentenced to be reduced to the ranks, and to receive a corporal punishment of 500 lashes. But Craufurd, after saying to Fleming that his crime would be quite inexcusable, if it really was exactly of the sort described, took upon himself to remit the corporal punishment, on account of the excellent character

for gallantry and honourable conduct given of this sergeant by his own officers. And Fleming was soon afterwards reinstated in his rank.

No doubt, Craufurd was in some sense a martinet; but he was not a fussy and teasing martinet. He was essentially a rational, considerate, and benevolent martinet. And so Kincaid tells us that, though at first the men detested his strict rules, they ultimately became devoted to him, when they became aware that all his rules were designed for their comfort and well-being.

One extremely hostile officer has charged Craufurd with cruelty because, on one occasion, he had a man flogged for halting, in order to drink water, as his regiment was crossing a stream. Probably this man was an old offender. And Kincaid justifies the General's severity towards him. He wrote thus on the subject: "He showed that the comfort of every individual depended on the rigid execution of his orders; for he showed that, on every ordinary march, he made it a rule to halt for a few minutes every third or fourth mile, dependent on the vicinity of water; that every soldier carried a canteen capable of containing two quarts, and that, if he only took the trouble to fill it before starting, and, if necessary, at every halt, it contained more than he would or ought to drink in the interim, and that, therefore, every pause he made in a river, for the purpose of drinking, was disorderly, because a man stopping to drink delayed the one behind him proportionately longer, and so on progressively, to the rear of the column."

It is probable, as Kincaid intimates, that Craufurd's burning zeal for the efficiency of his troops caused him at first to enforce his rules with some rather unnecessary severity. But the same writer informs us that, once well established, the system went like clockwork, and punishment was seldom necessary. In short, Craufurd, in the earlier stages of their training, treated his men as ignorant, thoughtless, and childish. And this treatment was approved of by Wellington, when in a letter to the leader of the Light Division, he described the soldier of those days as being "the most thoughtless of animals." Craufurd was impatient, but not cruel.

That the men of his division ultimately came to value and like their passionate leader is amply proved by the vigorous and prolonged cheers with which—as Costello tells us—they received him when he returned, from absence on leave, just as the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro was about to begin. The men had had enough of the incompetent General Erskine, who had temporarily taken Craufurd's place, and they were delighted at the most opportune return of their old trusted commander.

The very worst charge made against Craufurd by Mr. Fortescue is to be found on page 486 of Volume 7, when he says that "It was the misfortune of this little, quick-tempered,

and black-muzzled man, that he could never think of anyone but himself."

This accusation is certainly a very mistaken one. It agrees very ill with the account of Craufurd's funeral given us by Gleig—afterwards Chaplain-General—who witnessed it, and was greatly impressed by it, and afterwards wrote these very significant words about it: "I could distinctly perceive that, among the six rugged veterans who had borne the body, there was not one dry eye, and that even of the privates, who looked on, there were few who manifested not signs of sorrow, such as men are accustomed to exhibit only when they lose a parent or a child."

When one remembers how much that was calculated to harden their feelings these soldiers had gone through, Gleig's testimony seems quite conclusive. The British soldier was and is no mean judge of character, and it is utterly incredible that he should display such profound sorrow for the death of a leader who could never think of anyone but himself. Nor was his affection for his General merely transient. Gleig, in a book published very long after the writer's death, has told us that the surviving soldiers of the Peninsular War were often full of stories about the kindness of Generals Hill and Craufurd.

Mr. Fortescue's very harsh accusation is also disproved by the very strong friendship and affection felt for Craufurd by a good many officers of really fine character. For instance, Sir William Napier, in his life of his brother, Sir Charles, speaks thus of William Campbell, the Brigade-Major: "He was known then and afterwards throughout the Army for every generous quality. He was sententious of speech, quixotic of look, but handsome and strong; and his sentiments of honour were worthy of a Spanish don, his courage as high, yet purged of folly; he was indeed a gallant English gentleman in thought, look, word, and deed."

Between this fine officer and Robert Craufurd there existed a singularly warm and persistent affection. Writing to Sir Charles Craufurd, after his brother Robert's death, Campbell declares that his heart "breaks to speak," and he says, "I am incapable of expressing my misery and the blank which his death has left in my heart." Writing to Sir William Napier about 20 years after Craufurd's death, he still speaks of him as "my much-loved friend."

To have been so fervently loved by a man like William Campbell is in itself a good proof that Craufurd was not the selfish brute that Mr. Fortescue supposes him to have been.

Lord Londonderry also, in a letter to his friend, Sir Charles Craufurd, poured forth an eloquent lament over his dead friend, the leader of the Light Division. He said: "I hope you know me sufficiently to believe what I must suffer on the present occasion. Where shall I ever again find so invaluable a

friend?" And in his "Narrative of the Peninsular War," Lord Londonderry also said of Craufurd, "He was a man to know whom in his profession without admiring was impossible. To me his death occasioned that void which the removal of a sincere friend alone produces. Poor Craufurd! whilst the memory of the brave and skilful shall continue to be cherished by British soldiers, thou wilt not be forgotten; and the hand which scrawls this humble tribute to thy worth must be cold as thine own, ere the mind which dictated it shall ever cease to think of thee with affection and regret."

Lord Londonderry was not a man of great intellect, but he was a gallant officer, a man with a very warm heart, and in every way a gentleman; and he knew Robert Craufurd very intimately. So his testimony to his character is decidedly valuable.

Sir George Napier, in his "Early Military Life," has left us a far more discriminating and just estimate of Craufurd's character than that recently given us by Mr. Fortescue. He says that the General was always kind to him, and willing to do him a service when it was in his power. And he gives us a touching account of Craufurd's disinterested and strong regard for him when he—George Napier—was wounded, and when his old leader was dying in the same house. He tells us that, amidst his very great sufferings from his mortal wound, Craufurd kept on sending "almost hourly messages" to Napier, to express his strong sympathy with him, and his approbation of his conduct. And *this* was the General depicted by Mr. Fortescue as incapable of thinking of anyone but himself. George Napier knew the heart of his old commander far too well to judge it in that way. He said that he himself would be an unfeeling brute if he had not been touched with gratitude for Craufurd's sympathy. He also left on record his opinion that the first impulse of Craufurd's heart was kindness, though the least opposition speedily made that kindness vanish. Mr. Fortescue must have forgotten George Napier's testimony.

This writer also accuses Craufurd of immense egotism. He says that he was always thrusting himself forward and urging his claims. As a matter of fact, Craufurd was *compelled* to act in this manner. His promotion had been quite extraordinarily slow, though he had good interest and had performed much valuable work. Considering his great abilities, it was natural enough that he should think himself deserving of a position in the army at least equal to that of a thoroughly mediocre officer, such as Stapleton Cotton was.

That the leader of the Light Division was not entirely egotistical, was made evident by the fact that at Busaco he appealed to the men's memory of Sir John Moore, and not to any claims which he himself might be thought to have on their allegiance. When he cried aloud, as he let loose on the French the regiments which he had hidden, "Now, 52nd, avenge the

death of Sir John Moore! " he certainly made it evident that he *was* capable of thinking of someone besides himself, at least occasionally.

When Mr. Fortescue ceases to attack Craufurd's *character*, and deals with his military talents, he writes of him with considerably greater justice. He says that he was the best man in the Army for outpost work, and also one of the best trainers of troops. He also says that he did "superlative service" when in charge of Wellington's outposts in the year 1810, and that he then "gave striking evidence of his very remarkable ability." He also says that Craufurd did better than any of the other Generals at the battle of Busaco.

But this critic's intense dislike of Craufurd causes him—quite unintentionally—to give a rather unfair account of his services in general. Thus, when describing the retreat to Lisbon, he sets forth some apparent carelessness of this General, whilst omitting to notice what Sir William Napier wrote in his favour on that occasion. Napier wrote thus of the way in which Craufurd then baffled Masséna. "The ground about Aruda did not give Masséna a view of the troops, although he frequently skirmished to make Craufurd show his force; but that General, by occupying Aruda as an advanced post, had rendered it impossible to discover his true situation without a serious affair, and in an incredibly short space of time he secured his position in a manner worthy of admiration."

Mr. Fortescue evidently considers Craufurd's rashness a good deal more *habitual* than it actually was. He declares that he "seldom shone in action," and he thinks that this was due to his excitable temperament, as he considers that so accomplished a master of outpost work must have surveyed the ground with no common eye.

Yet at Busaco and at Fuentes d'Onoro, it is evident enough that Craufurd displayed admirable coolness. His magnificent retreat over the plain at the latter place has been immensely admired by the most competent judges, and it is obvious enough that the perfect coolness of Craufurd and his men was then very largely instrumental in saving Wellington from defeat.

The greatest mistake of Craufurd's career was his fighting on the wrong side of the river Coa, contrary to Wellington's wishes. Sir George Napier evidently thought that the leader of the Light Division was eventually taken by surprise, and that he did not intend to fight any large force. He seems to have considered himself bound to prevent the investment of Almeida by any small or moderate force. And Wellington's disgust at the premature fall of this border fortress later on shows that he thought it important to retain it as long as was reasonably possible. Mr. Fortescue declares that, in this combat, Craufurd "made every mistake that a commander could make."

This statement is a great exaggeration, as anyone can find out by reading Craufurd's defence of his conduct, printed in the *Times* for November 21st, 1810, and reproduced in my book called "General Craufurd and his Light Division." Mr. Fortescue has probably been a little misled by the fact that almost all the accounts of the combat on the Coa were written by officers who hated Craufurd. Sir James Shaw Kennedy unfortunately did not take much part in the battle. Otherwise from him we might have received a really impartial account of it.

Though so much has been written about the combat on the Coa, there still remains a good deal that is obscure and unintelligible. In the first place, it is not evident to what extent Craufurd calculated on receiving the assistance of Picton, who had been *ordered* to support him. Moreover, it is not clear why he kept some of the 43rd within high walls; but it is evident that so accomplished a master of outpost work must have had *some* reason for this arrangement. Mr. Fortescue and other writers censure Craufurd for prematurely ordering the troops posted on a knoll which commanded the passage over the Coa, to retire, "forgetting" half a battalion of the 52nd, which was still holding its ground nearly a mile up the river." It seems probable that this half battalion of the 52nd had either failed to receive an order to retire which had been sent to them, or else that they were slower in their movements than the General expected them to be.

One detail of Mr. Fortescue's account of the combat on the Coa is quite incredible. He says that "even then"—when the troops had passed over the bridge—"the General appears not immediately to have realized that the bridge must be defended; for the first and most urgent disposition for defending it was left to Charles Napier with such mixed men of all regiments as he could collect." The necessity for defending the bridge was so very obvious that it is utterly unlikely that the General did not at once perceive it. It seems far more probable that Charles Napier rather over-estimated his own services, and that he did what someone else would otherwise have been ordered to do.

One of Craufurd's mistakes certainly was that he placed too much confidence in the Governor and garrison of Almeida. In the "Life of Sir William Napier," by H. A. Bruce, we find the following remark by that great historian: "Colonel ———, of Almeida, was very negligent in not putting some men into the windmill in front of the works. It would have delayed the investment, and have given time to General Craufurd to withdraw his Division in safety." Napier also thought it a great piece of neglect that some guns belonging to the garrison of Almeida were not mounted, and the tower garrisoned. He said that "had it been otherwise, the French cavalry could not have charged the left of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have been retarded."

Even whilst condemning Craufurd's rashness on the Coa, and granting that some of his arrangements on that occasion were not good, one ought to bear in mind that the marvellous regimental discipline, which then prevented disaster, was to a very great extent the creation of the General himself. He had, as Kincaid declared, "*introduced* a system which made his division unrivalled." Craufurd had communicated to his officers and men some of his great knowledge of outpost work, and some of his extraordinary quickness both of perception and of movement. On that most trying occasion, in that hour of supreme danger, the regimental officers were, to a great extent, giving back to their brilliant teacher what he had given them.

Kincaid informs us that the officers, in the latter part of Craufurd's career, a good deal altered their feelings towards him. And it seems a pity that Mr. Fortescue has attached rather undue importance to the expressions of hatred which these officers recorded of their leader in the earlier stage of their connection with him. Kincaid declared, as I have said already, that Craufurd was "*ultimately* much liked," and that "a very rigid exaction of the duties pointed out in his code of regulations made him very unpopular at its commencement; and it was not until a short time before he was lost to us for ever, that we were capable of appreciating his merits, and fully sensible of the incalculable advantages that we derived from the perfection of his system."

Mr. Fortescue owns that Wellington had a very high opinion of Craufurd's abilities. For he says that "few more flattering letters have ever been written than the one which Wellington addressed to Craufurd," when giving him entire command of his outposts. And in one of Wellington's letters to Craufurd he says that "nothing could be of more advantage to me than to have the assistance of your opinion on any subject."

Professor Oman has also said that Hill, Craufurd, and Beresford were the only Generals whom Wellington ever *consulted* about anything. The rest of the Generals merely received orders.

Craufurd's recent critic has also forgotten to mention the great and lasting value of that General's "Standing Orders for the Light Division." He might also have mentioned that Lord Seaton said that Craufurd taught the British Army how to march properly. Surely that was a very great and important service.

Sir William Napier declared that Craufurd in his better hours was "full of fire and intelligence, a master spirit in war," and, in an appendix to his history, he wrote thus: "As for the charge of faintly praising Picton's talents, a point was forced by me in his favour, when I compared him with Craufurd, of whose ability there never was any question."

Sir George Napier, who served for long under Craufurd in the 52nd, wrote thus of his old commander's talents: "As a General commanding a division of light troops of all arms, Craufurd certainly excelled. . . . Although he was a most unpopular man, every officer in the Light Division must acknowledge that, by his unwearied and active exertion of mind and body, that division was brought to a state of discipline and knowledge of the duties of light troops, which was never equalled by any division in the British Army, and never surpassed by any division of the French Army. . . . His knowledge of outpost work was never exceeded by any British General." George Napier also said that, when his passions were not roused, few men possessed more clearness of judgment. One obvious reason why Wellington was ready to condone Craufurd's occasional rashness is to be found in the fact that he had to complain greatly of the *timidity* of some of his other Generals. In his "History of the Peninsular War," Napier says of Wellington, "To the ministers, however, he complained that his Generals, stout in action as the poorest soldier, were commonly so overwhelmed with fear of responsibility, when left to themselves, that the slightest movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment, and they spread unnecessary alarm far and wide."

General Le Marchant said of Craufurd: "Whilst others shunned responsibility, he courted it." Craufurd's audacity was often of great value to his Chief. Napoleon would have been glad if some of his Marshals had had more of this quality. And it will be an evil day for the British Army, when its leaders shrink from responsibility, and become devoid of that extraordinary and unflinching daring which made Robert Craufurd so dangerous to the enemy, and which, together with his unsurpassed power of training troops, and his large knowledge of the art of war, has caused Professor Oman to declare that, "on one of his happy days, which were many," the old leader of the Light Division was "undoubtedly the most brilliant subordinate that Wellington ever owned."

THE ARMS OF GENERAL ROBERT CRAUFURD.