The Classical Review

<http://journals.cambridge.org/CAR>

Additional services for *The Classical Review*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)

Fairbanks's First Philosophers of Greece *The First Philosophers of Greece*, an Edition and Translation of the Remaining Fragments of the Pre-socratic Philosophers, together with a Translation of the more important Accounts of their Opinions contained in the early Epitomes of their Works. By Arthur Fairbanks. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1898. Pp. x, 300. Price 7s.

R. D. Hicks

The Classical Review / Volume 13 / Issue 09 / December 1899, pp 450 - 452
DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00079270, Published online: 27 October 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X00079270

How to cite this article:

R. D. Hicks (1899). The Classical Review, 13, pp 450-452 doi:10.1017/S0009840X00079270

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

common advantage and public utility, from his anxiety to train promising pupils for public life, and to impart to them the science whereby a household and a state are well administered. In other words, the Socratic society aimed at constitutional reform by means of persuasion: it objected to the appointment of officials by lot and cherished the ideal of a genuine ruler of men, capable of moulding his subjects to his ends. 'A beautiful but unpractical Utopia' is the author's own comment on the picture he has drawn (p. 527).

M. Boutroux regards Socrates as the founder of moral science, and compares his aims (p. 405) with those of Descartes and Kant. Socrates proposed to show that, even assuming the end of human activity to be practical, it cannot exclude science, that in reality it supposes it; similarly the Cartesian doubt became the ground of certitude and Kant's experience is found ultimately to repose on reason. By a careful examination of the Socratic method it is shown that both the outward form—the dialogue, Socratic irony, maieutic art, and personal attachment (*ἔπος*)—and the logical groundwork of elenchus, induction and definition, are primarily applicable to conduct alone and have nothing to do with physics. Even the teleology and theology, Socrates' 'pious opinions,' are but complements, and never essential parts, of his ethical science. But the method reacted on the subject-matter. Socrates was thus led to declare all the virtues forms of knowledge, i.e. of practical science, and hence to affirm his famous paradox, which was no denial of free-will, but a hasty assumption of the identity between moral and material good. Virtue is always a man's interest: *οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως*. Under the principle thus postulated the rules of ordinary morality can

be brought; for they are deductions made by tradition or positive law. It is not true that Socrates tried custom and legality by the standard of abstract reason and justice; it was in the positive and traditional that he sought the expression of the rational. Plato and Aristotle applied the Socratic method to subjects never contemplated by its author; but contemporary ethics may be content once more to return to the limits which Socrates marked out for an independent science dealing with the totality of the ethical facts of human nature.

To present anything but an imperfect sketch of Aristotle's system in a little over a hundred pages is impossible; yet the clear, though condensed, summary of M. Boutroux contains many valuable hints and abundantly testifies to his mastery of the interminable detail. The last section, on the influence of Aristotle, concludes the historical sketch with a few pages of criticism, indicating in a temperate manner, though with something of partisanship, Aristotle's position in regard to Kantianism, evolution, and teleology.

The English version of that part of Zeller's monumental work which treats of Aristotle, supplies a want long recognised. It has been executed in a praiseworthy manner, which, both in accuracy and style, marks an immense advance upon preceding sections. Four-fifths of the *Philosophie der Griechen* now wears an English dress, and from the translators' note it may be inferred that there is at present no intention of adding the last section, treating of Neoplatonism.¹

R. D. H.

¹ The reviewer begs to apologise for the unforeseen delay in noticing these works.

FAIRBANKS'S FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE.

The First Philosophers of Greece, an Edition and Translation of the Remaining Fragments of the Pre-socratic Philosophers, together with a Translation of the more important Accounts of their Opinions contained in the early Epitomes of their Works. By ARTHUR FAIRBANKS. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1898. Pp. x, 300. Price 7s.

THE idea of this book is an excellent one. For the sources of our knowledge concerning

the Presocratics students have been in the habit of resorting to Ritter and Preller's *Historia Philosophiae*, now in the eighth edition. That invaluable handbook presents in 200 pages a selection of the more important fragments, the biographical and doxographical detail, with a scanty Latin commentary, containing the most important textual variants, occasionally a note or two on the meaning, and a number of parallel passages. So useful is this selection, that once or twice an attempt has been made to

offer a translation of *Ritter and Preller* as an introduction to the history of Greek philosophy. The design of Mr. Fairbanks has been 'to prepare a Greek text of the fragments which shall represent as accurately as possible the results of recent scholarship, and to add such critical notes as may be necessary to enable the scholar to see on what basis the text rests.' If he had contented himself with this, his book would have deserved unstinted praise. Unhappily he was tempted to prepare a translation, not only of the fragments, but of the 'important passages bearing on these early thinkers in Plato and Aristotle, and in the Greek doxographers.' Of this part of his work it can only be said that, if the intention is good, the execution is so faulty that a pupil who followed the translation (especially where the Greek is not appended, as is the case with most of the extracts from Plato and Aristotle) would be liable to serious misconceptions at almost every step. To justify this severe judgment it will be necessary to quote at length some of the incorrect versions, which, for the sake of distinctness, are here italicized.

P. 104, line 12. *To those proceeding after this impossible manner things seem to be one*. Arist. *Phys.* i. 3; 186a, 4. The Greek is τὸν τε δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπιούσιν ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἶναι. Here ἀδύνατον is predicate. If it were attribute of τρόπον we should expect the article, or a participle (ὄντα), with it. The meaning is: 'not only then if we approach (the subject) in this way does it appear impossible that all things should be one.'

P. 104, line 19. *And the same sort of arguments are used by Parmenides, although he has some others of his own*.] *Ib.* 186a, 22, καὶ πρὸς Παρμενίδην δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῶν λόγων, καὶ εἰ τινες ἄλλοι εἰσὶν ἴδιοι. Melissus has just been refuted, and Aristotle goes on to observe that 'arguments of the same kind can be used against Parmenides, as well as others which apply specially to him' and not to Melissus. The meaning 'by,' which Mr. Fairbanks gives to πρὸς, would only be justified if the genitive followed, and only then in Attic verse or Ionic prose.

P. 104, line 22. *He makes a mistake in assuming that being is to be spoken of absolutely, speaking of it thus many times*.] *Ib.* 186a, 24, ψευδὴς μὲν ἡ ἀπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὄν λέγεσθαι λεγόμενον πολλαχῶς. With λεγόμενον supply the subject τοῦ ὄντος: 'to be spoken of in many ways' is Aristotelian Greek for 'to be a term of various meanings.' Thus Parmenides 'is mistaken in so far as he

assumes being to be an unequivocal term, whereas it has several meanings.'

P. 104, line 27. *Since neither in the succession of things nor in the argument will whiteness be one*.] *Ib.* 186a, 28, οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἐν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ = 'for then neither by continuity nor by unity of essence will that which is white be one.' Unity, Aristotle elsewhere explains, belongs, not only to continuous things, but also to things which have the same essential notion, ὁ λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλοῦν. An individual may grow larger or smaller; yet so long as the 'definition of its essence' is the same, we speak of it as one and the same individual.

P. 57, line 19. *For the same thing will apply to good and bad and to good and not-good*.] From Aristotle, *Phys.* i. 2; 185b, 21, ταῦτόν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. It is usual with Aristotle to express the abstract notion of a thing—goodness, the being good (of some thing), the notion of good—by the infinitive εἶναι and the dative: ἀγαθὸν <εἶναι> and κακὸν εἶναι are such nominal infinitives without the neuter article more usually prefixed. The sentence becomes more elliptical as it proceeds; with μὴ ἀγαθόν and ἀγαθόν at the end εἶναι must be understood. 'For then to be good will be the same as to be evil, and to be not-good will be the same as to be good.'

P. 215, line 11. *But the gentler concede that these things are always thus, and they say, in part, that sometimes all is one, &c.*] From Plato *Sophist*, 242 E, αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τότε μὲν ἐν εἶναι φασιν τὸ πᾶν... τότε δὲ πολλὰ κ.τ.λ. The verb χαλᾶν does not mean 'to concede,' but 'to relax': its object is the nominal infinitive τὸ αἰεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν 'the eternity of this condition,' (the fact) that these things are *always* so. To αἰεὶ is opposed ἐν μέρει, explained by τότε μὲν... τότε δὲ. Heraclitus made the unity of opposites an everlasting condition: Empedocles's gentler muse substituted an alternation of the unity of all things (in the sphere) with their dissipation under the dominion of strife. We may render: 'but the gentler muses have relaxed the perpetuity of this relation and make the universe alternately at one time united and friendly, obedient to the Queen of Love, at another disunited and hostile through a principle of strife.'

P. 221, line 11. *Nor does he find in them what has been agreed upon*.] Ar. *metaph.* i. 4; 985a 23, οὐτ' ἐν τούτοις εὐρίσκει τὸ

ὁμολογούμενον. The present participle, not the perfect. 'Consistency' is what Empedocles does not 'find' in the use of his two moving causes. We might render: 'nor is he consistent in the use of them.'

P. 78, line 11. *When Lasos, son of Hermiones, called that man a coward who was unwilling to play at dice with him, Xenophanes answered that he was very cowardly and without daring in regard to dishonourable things.* [Plutarch *de vit. pud.* p. 530 F: ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης, Λάσου τοῦ Ἑρμιονέως μὴ βουλόμενον αὐτῷ συγκυβέειν δειλὸν ἀποκαλοῦντος, ὁμολόγει καὶ πάντῃ δειλὸς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀπολμός. The whole point of the anecdote is that Lasos called Xenophanes a coward for refusing to play at dice with him. Mr. Fairbanks's version would require the article before μὴ βουλόμενον. There is a similar mistake on p. 71, line 21 where a *passer-by* should be 'he,' i.e. Pythagoras, 'passing by.' The name of Lasos's father was not certain in the time of Diogenes Laertius (or his authority) who calls him 'the son of Charmanrides, or Sisymbrinus or, according to Aristoxenus, Chabrinus': but Ἑρμιονέως is

genitive of Ἑρμιονεύς which mean 'native of Hermione,' a town in Argolis.

It may be said, in justice to the translator, that these strictures chiefly concern the *testimonia*, and that the general sense of the fragments themselves is fairly given. At all events, this is true of some authors, although a comparison of Mr. Fairbanks's version of Parmenides with that since published by Diels will show divergences of view on every page. And how, in the name of common sense, can any one who claims to furnish his text with critical notes and appraise the value of readings, translate the remarkable variant of Plato *Thaet.* 180 E, οἷον ἀκίνητον τετέλεθει τῷ παντί τ' ὄνομα εἶναι (which is duly recorded in the footnote on p. 96), where it occurs on p. 103, line 3 as follows: 'the all is alone, unmoved; to this all names apply'? The absence from p. 103 of the text which is translated, makes it uncertain whether Mr. Fairbanks is grappling with παντὶ or πάντ' or πάν, but in any case the version *donne furieusement à penser.*

R. D. HICKS.

STOCK'S *BELLUM GALLICUM*.

Caesar de Bello Gallico, Bks. I.-VII., according to the text of Emanuel Hoffmann (Vienna, 1890), with Introduction and Notes by ST. GEORGE STOCK. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Pp. 586. Post 8vo. Cloth. Price 10s. 6d.

'THE main object of this work is to treat Caesar as an historian.' In pursuance of this object Mr. Stock has written seven introductory chapters of considerable length dealing fully and accurately with various topics suggested by the Commentaries, though here and there one feels that the style is not quite adequate to the dignity of the subject, and to these in a second part he has added an uncritical text with a rather uneven commentary. The preliminary chapters occupying 224 pages treat of The Commentaries, The character of Caesar, Wars with the Gauls, Gaul, Britain, Germany, The Roman Army. On these subjects Mr. Stock has read the ancient authorities with care and, as far as I can tell, has omitted nothing of importance. In his second essay he speaks of ambition as the keynote of Caesar's character: 'Caesar was in fact the most

deliberately ambitious man that ever lived.' To be a despot 'was the aim and object of his life and the good that he did was incidental.' Of Caesar as a statesman with definite political aims he says nothing. This cannot be regarded as an adequate characterisation of one who, like Napoleon, was a great constructive statesman as well as a soldier of surpassing genius.

The Essays on Gaul, Britain and Germany contain a great amount of skilfully assorted information, though perhaps nothing distinctly new, and will well repay perusal. The same may be said of the Essay on the Roman army which contains however a new and probably correct explanation of the difficulty attached to the mention of *legio prima* in viii. 54. Mr. Stock suggests that I. was the number this legion bore in Pompey's army and that it afterwards appears as VI. in Caesar's roll of legions. The remarks on the standards in use in the army might be more precise in detail considering the existing sources of information.

Part II. containing the text and notes is less satisfactory. Mr. Stock has reproduced the text of Emanuel Hoffmann (1890) which