VIHI.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

Philosophical Review. Vol. xii., No. 6. J. E. Creighton. 'The Standpoint of Experience.' [Attempts, by a method of exclusion, to formulate a view of experience that shall stand the test of criticism as laid down in the history of philosophy.] F. L. van Boulaere. 'St. Thomas's Philosophy of Knowledge.' [Sketches St. Thomas's doctrine of the human soul, the human intellect and the value of human knowledge.]


S. J. Royce. 'The Eternal and the Practical.' [Discussion of the place which our acknowledged and indispensable empiristic tendencies ought to occupy in the whole context of our philosophical opinions, and of the share which our practical postulates (ethical undertakings, doctrine of conduct) ought to have in determining our entire view of the universe.] J. Watson. 'Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.—II. Induction.'

J. Dewey. 'The Philosophical Work of Herbert Spencer.' [Social philosophy gave Spencer his fundamental ideas and ideals; biology put these vague and pervasive ideals in something like scientific shape; physical-astronomical speculations furnished the causal machinery for getting the scheme under way, and added to the appearance of scientific definiteness and accuracy.] H. N. Gardiner. 'Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Princeton University, December 29-31, 1903.' Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles.

E. A. Singer. 'On Mechanical Explanation.' [If the inadequacy of the mechanical ideal cannot be demonstrated from the aspects of nature studied by the biologist, then in no other region of experience can we expect to find such a demonstration. The question of the ultimate success of this ideal remains.]

J. E. Creighton. 'Purpose as Logical Category.' [The terms 'practical' and 'purpose' are ambiguous; the instrumental view is, logically, individualistic; practical purposes must be referred to the unity of life and experience; the theory creates a dualism between immediate experience

**Psychological Review. Vol. x., No. 5. G. B. Cotten. 'The Case of John Kinsel.'—I. [First part of detailed account, without theoretical implications, of the development of 'double personality' in a college undergraduate.] J. P. Hylan. 'The Distribution of Attention.'—II. [Completion of account of tachistoscopic experiments; choice reactions; reactions to disparate impressions; the mental after-image. Results: the experiments on counting, and those in which reactions with concentration and with attempted distribution of attention were compared, gave no evidence of distribution. "Simultaneous distribution is... a psychological impossibility. The duration of the mental after-image easily explains the phenomena... ascribed to distribution in tachistoscopic experiments.'] M. Meyer. 'Some Points of Difference Concerning the Theory of Music.' [Reply to criticism of Dixon (MIND, Oct., 1902) and Lippa (Zeits., 1901), with further elaboration of the writer's theory.] Discussion. C. L. Franklin. 'An Ill-considered Colour Theory.' [Criticism of von Oppolzer (Zeits., 1902).] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. x., No. 6. I. W. Riley. 'The Personal Sources of Christian Science.' [Sketch of the life and personality of Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science.] G. B. Cotten. 'The Case of John Kinsel.'—II. [Completion of record, and discussion of certain features of the case.] W. Fite. 'The Place of Pleasure and Pain in the Functional Psychology.' [Conflict is a condition of consciousness, but specially a condition of pleasure-pain. Pleasure is succeeding, pain is failing, in the process of resolving a conflict.] Discussions. F. Hughes. 'Moral Feeling as a Basis of the Psychology of Morals.' [The moral sentiment proper is that which characterises the restraint of an emotive tendency to act, by a purely intellectual activity.] M. Prinse. 'Professor Strong on the Relation between Mind and Body.' [Argument of the writer's work The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism (1886) anticipates Strong's work.] W. R. Neubold. 'Professor Hammond on Aristotle's Psychology.' Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. xi., No. 1. R. Dodge. 'The Participation of Eye Movements in the Visual Perception of Motion.' [There are two types of eye movement concerned: the primary reactive displacement of the line of regard towards an eccentric point of interest, and the true pursuit movement. Neither is of any importance for movement perception.] B. Sidis. 'An Enquiry into the Nature of Hallucinations.'—I. [Perceptions are made up of nuclear elements, directly presented, and marginal elements, secondarily presented (not represented). Hallucinations are secondary sensations.] J. M. Baldwin. 'The Limits of Pragmatism.' [Pragmatism must give a logical account of reality. Neither member of a genetic dualism (such as logical truth and experienced value) can explain the principle of the process in which the dualism arises: a further genetic process is needed.] Discussion. W. I. Thomas. 'The Sexual Element in Sensibility.' [Egoism may go back to the food-struggle, altruism to courtship.] C. A. Strong. 'Dr. Morton Prince and Panpsychism.'

Vol. xi, No. 3. H. J. Pearce. 'The Law of Attraction in Relation to Some Visual and Tactual Illusions.' [Experiments designed to reveal the exact relation between primary and secondary stimuli and the effect in perception of the one upon the other.] W. R. Wright. 'The Relation between the Vasomotor Waves and Reaction Times.' [The reactions form a curve which agrees closely with the curve of the observer's Traube-Hering waves.]

G. T. Stevens. 'On the Horopter.' Shorter contributions: O. L. Herrlok. 'The Logical and Psychological Distinction between the True and the Real.' [The feeling of reality comes from the immediateness of the elements of experience; the judgment of truth is a fluctuating evaluation based on relations known rather than felt.] G. A. Tawney. 'The Period of Conversion.' [Character of conversion, and its relation to the adolescent period.]

J. M. Baldwin. 'The Genetic Progression of Psychic Objects.' [Tentative schema of the series of determinations of objects at the successive stages of cognitive development.]

Notes. M. W. Calkins. 'On the Attributes of Sensation.'

PSYCHOLOGICAL INDEX FOR 1903. Compiled by H. O. Warren, with the co-operation of O. B. D'Allonnea, F. G. Bruner and C. S. Myers. [Issued April, 1904: 2,122 titles.]

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xiv., Nos. 3, 4. This double number of the American Journal is edited by Profs. Sanford and Titchener as a commemorative number, dedicated to President G. S. Hall on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his attainment of the philosophical doctorate. It contains twenty-six papers, written by colleagues and former pupils, and has as frontispiece a heliotype of President Hall. We have space only for names and titles.


INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xiv., April, 1904.

F. Adler. 'The Problem of Teleology.' ['The notion of end as being bound up with the notion of organism exists in idea only and not in fact; it cannot serve us in the business of explaining nature at all, but only of evaluating it; its principal use must be found . . . in the ethical field."
]

J. G. James. 'The Ethics of Passive Resistance.' ["'Passive Resistance' has no support on ethical lines alone," but "may possess some moral value, such as will always attach to the movements that are carried out with moral seriousness and sense of moral responsibility."]

W. E. B. Du Bois. 'The Development of a People.' [A plea for the better education of the American negro.]

J. H. Mulrhead. 'Wordsworth's Ideal of Early Education.' [Wordsworth discountenanced the too early severance of the child from the objects and events which form the natural stimulus of its growing powers, and disregard of the unity of the child's nature.]

J. Kindon. 'Byron versus Spenser.' [A contrast of Byron's low ideal and rejection of morality with Spenser's high ideal of moral and spiritual beauty.]

J. O. Murray. 'What should be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy towards Religion.' [In opposition to Prof. Royce the writer maintains that the philosopher should not detach himself from the religious life of the community, especially as that is expressed in philanthropic movements.]

L'ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE (Neuvième Année), edited by Alfred Binet. Paris: Schleicher Frères et Cie, 1903, pp. 666. The first part of this volume consists of original memoirs (pp. 1-252), the second of very full analyses of recent books and articles (pp. 253-508), and the third of a title-bibliography for the year 1902 (with index, etc., pp. 509-666). The memoirs are the following: I. P. Malaupert. 'Enquête sur le sentiment de la colère chez les enfants.' [A report upon the returns of a questionnaire sent to various teachers regarding the origin, expression, concomitants and effects of anger in children. Incidentally paleness is shown to be a more common "expression" (40 per cent. in the returns) than Darwin, Ribot and Lange allow; perhaps, however, this could not be generalised to other races. Two distinct types of anger are said to emerge—the offensive (Ribot's colère animale) and the defensive: in the latter there is no act of attack or destruction, even incipient—the stamping, rapid movements, cries and blows upon inanimate objects are rather instinctive efforts of distraction (from physical pain), than results of hypo- or anaesthesia (Lange). Excessively frequent or grave crises of anger in children are correlated with degenerate heredity, nervous instability, etc.; the cure is to be sought in hygienic measures and rational education.]

II. B. Bourdon. 'Sur la distinction des sensations des deux yeux.' [An interesting review of the literature of this subject, to which M. Bourdon has himself largely contributed, and a statement of his position. There is (1) an objective phenomenon, showing that the sensations conditioned by corresponding processes in the two retines may be distinguished; when a luminous...
point (on the horopter) is observed first with both eyes, then hidden from one eye, there appears a shadow on that side of the luminous point which corresponds to the veiled eye (on the right for the right eye).

2. A subjective phenomenon: a sensation of bluntness, dulness, heaviness, in the veiled eye, a feeling of ease or lightness in the seeing eye: this is absent when the impressions received by the two eyes differ in quality only, not in intensity. Bourdon finds this sensation to be peripherally rather than centrally conditioned; its source is in the muscles or tendons of the eye: "the sensation of heaviness, if caused in the eye that receives the darker or less distinct image, is due to the fact that the muscular apparatus of this eye is, as compared with that of the other eye, in a state of relative depression, hence the effort of fixation is felt more strongly in this eye than in the other. The state of depression, again, is caused by the feebleness of the retinal excitation" (p. 54).

III. A. Binet. 'L'écriture pendant les états d'excitation artificielle.' Under mental excitement, the amplitude of writing movements is increased. Binet caused his subjects to write some phrases, then to repeat them, with a change of vowels, e for a, i for e, etc.: the effect was to increase the output of mental energy, and to concentrate it upon the writing movements. The letters were found to be larger, more clearly written, more detached from each other, more impersonal in form, i.e., the writing was less mechanical. The explanation offered is that there occurs a diffuse excitation of the movement area, partly perhaps connected with the more accurate and stronger images, to which the intensified thought gives rise.

IV. 'La mesure de la sensibilité.' V. 'Les simplistes.' VI. 'Les Distraits.' VII. 'Les Interprétateurs.' VIII. 'Influence de l'exercice et de la suggestion sur la position du seuil.' IX. 'Le seuil de la sensation double ne peut pas être scientifiquement.' These various papers by M. Binet (pp. 79-262) constitute in reality a work by themselves—a study in tactile sensation and interpretation. The conclusions are interesting and occasionally startling. M. Binet takes the reader wholly into his confidence and gives at large the materials on which he has founded. The methods of experimental psychology are still on their trial, and therefore the fullest description of the work of a skilled experimenter is valuable to those who are following after. M. Binet has certainly not erred on the side of restraint. The main theme which runs through the several papers is that the threshold of touch-sensation is the most unstable of quantities. What is tested by the Weber method in aesthesiometry is not the sensibility of the subject, but his judgment, his mental character, his ability to interpret the sensations received. The word "sensibility" has been used in two meanings—(1) power of appreciating the objects that surround us, and especially the stimuli that act upon our organism (Fechner's)—and these have been confused. Nor have we distinguished properly between tests of the fineness of sensibility—the threshold, initial or differential,—and tests of the accuracy of judgment—the error methods. The application of measure in psychological work does not result in any real measure of sensations or other psychical phenomena as such, its sole value is towards the classification of individuals as to the accuracy of their judgment. It is from the second conception of sensibility, confused with the first, that the errors of method in psychology have arisen; it being thought that sensations themselves could be measured, the subject became of no importance, his rôle automatic, his replies reduced to "yes" and "no," "one" or "two." M. Binet's studies bear especially upon what he calls
the distinction of tactile sensations" (Raumsinn), the ability to distinguish two points at small distances apart on the skin. In his scepticism with regard to the possibility of determining scientifically a minimal threshold, M. Binet claims a forerunner in Tawney (Phil. Stud., xii.), whose paper is said to contain ideas more revolutionary than their author supposed. Enormous differences were found not only between different persons, but in the same person at different séances: moreover the occurrence of the Verfahler, two points being felt when one only was applied, was hopelessly inconsistent with the conception of a threshold: it depends, as Tawney saw, on the direction of the attention, pre-perception etc. Binet's method is to invite the fullest self-analysis from his subjects: he asks them to describe their sensations, and the grounds of their judgment, and he correlates what is said with the numerical facts recorded at the same time. Much practical advice is given as to the choice of an instrument (for a new one vide p. 106 ff.), the choice of subjects (avoid the laboratory pupil, seek variety), the choice of experimental method (irregular variations rather than minimal), the importance of the Verfahler as a mark of mental character, the elaboration of protocols (omit nothing that is said or done), and the ways of avoiding distraction. In the course of his work on aesthesiometry Binet was led to distinguish two chief types of mind, with distinct attitudes towards the stimuli presented: they are the simpliste and the interpretateur. Incidentally we are given several interesting character studies of individual representatives of these types. The marks of the simpliste are that he makes no errors, or almost none, with regard to the single point; and that the threshold for "two points" is both obtuse and distinct—a line rather than a zone. The reverse is true of the "interpreter". The interrogation of some of the subjects brings out the fact that this difference depends on their attitude towards the sensations actually felt. The standpoint of the "simpliste" is objective; when his attention is directed to the sensation rather than to its object, he takes the former simply for what it appears to be. Hence he says "two points" only when he feels two distinct points: he says "one point" even for the broad or thick or linear sensation which occurs when the stimuli are at a moderate distance apart: he never confuses the one point with two except through distraction. In the "interpreters," one of whom (p. 209) gives the ratio ad absurdum of aesthesiometry, we find (1) an extreme lowering of the threshold for double sensation, and (2) a great increase in the number of errors on the single point. Psychologically, the character of this type is that it does not stop at the mere sensation, but regards that as a sign, by which to appreciate the external cause. Whenever there is any acquaintance with the instruments used, e.g., this phenomenon of interpretation is found, and it of course renders the results incomparable with those derived from a subject who is of the simpliste type. Mme A—-, for example, has reminiscences of a compass-aesthesiometer of ten years before, and all her reasonings have reference to this (p. 223 ff.). "The points are two but close together:" "one presses harder than the other," etc. The remarkably correct results and estimates of Marie G., whose threshold is 0.5 cm. on back of hand, and who estimates distances of 5 mm. (ten times and 1 cm. (eight times) in each case with absolute correctness, are probably to be explained by foreknowledge rather than by hyperesthesia: she was the femme de chambre of the laboratory (vide p. 228). Under the influence of autosuggestion or of emotion or of external suggestion of any kind, a simpliste may in a few séances develop into an interpreter: the standpoint, formerly objective, now becomes subjective.
facts as these there is derived the conclusion that threshold determination is scientifically valueless. The paper on "Les Distraints" shows that the Weber method may be used for detecting the influence of various types of distraction."

J. L. McIntyre.

*REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE.* Janvier, 1904. The interest of this number centres in the first article, 'La Science et l'Esprit Philosophique,' the tenor of which is this: Auguste Comte and his school regarded Religion as subjective and emotional, whereas Science was to them the grand revealer of objective truth and fact. The increased complexity of facts and laws, revealed by Science since Comte's time, has induced a New Positivism, which transfers Science in its turn to the subjective side, and regards a so-called fact or law of nature as representing chiefly a human mode or present phase of thought. Thus we may attain to consistent thought; and some modes of thought will be found practically advantageous above others; but we do not arrive at any final power of predication of the attributes of external nature in se. We have liberty in our scientific thinking; and nature is, in large measure, what man in any particular age chooses to take it to be. The mind does not passively register the facts of nature, as Comte thought: it in a manner makes them by its own activity. The facts and laws of one generation are set aside in the next; the one thing that endures is the activity of the human mind: action is our glory rather than knowledge; research into truth hidden, not contemplation of truth found. All this theory the writer, M. Georges Michel, argues to rest upon a confusion of two different things, the 'scientific spirit,' that is, the labour of research, and 'science' itself, that is, the results achieved by the scientific spirit, or the known truths the possession of which is the reward of research. The scientific spirit is 'free'; it multiplies hypotheses; it varies its methods at will; but Science is not 'free,' it is definite, determined, inexorably fixed by something which is not the mind of man. Nature is not the complaisant ally of our illusions. The last line of this number informs us: "Avec A. Bain l'Ecole anglaise perd son psychologue; avec H. Spencer, son métaphysicien". This total eclipse is not visible in England. Février, 1904. 'Le Problème moral,' by George Fomsagrive, is a luminous exposition of the foundations of Ethics; it points out the error of Stoicism: it carries us back to Newman's view of conscience. Paul Hermant, 'De la nature de l'émotion,' maintains that every sensation, thought, and act of attention is accompanied by emotion, emotion being our mode of grouping our subconscious states (états de pénombre), and every emotion creating in us a special way of regarding the external world. The cerebral location of the higher powers of mind is discussed between Drs. Surbled and Grasset. 'Méthodes et Concepts,' by Paul Dupuy, a remarkable defence of the subjective method in philosophy against the objective, is analysed minutely. There is a letter on the teaching of Thomism in grands séminaires. Lastly, here is one view of evolution: "Evolution of an animal species, endowed with a brain of intricate convolutions, which an unconscious selection has rendered more apt than other Primates to react against the causes of destruction that surround it, heat, cold, hunger, ferocity of Carnivora: a species the different families of which kill one another, in order that natural selection may accomplish its work of education, and allow only chosen races to subsist: where some individuals, inferior to others in muscle, but superior in cerebral development, have had recourse to stratagem to subdue their sturdy adversaries, and have put their instincts in fetters by means of..."