ETHICAL AND COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY.

Psychology of the Moral Self. By B. BOSANQUET. London, Macmillan & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co. 1897. Pp. viii + 132.

The author thinks the time has come for some *rapprochement* between ethics and the new psychology. Although "psychology is still full of controversy, and fundamental questions are *sub judice*," yet "the doctrine of Apperception, and such an idea as that of 'vital series,' * * * are far enough advanced to throw a wholly new light upon the nature of Will, considered as the man in relation to action. When I say 'a new light,' I mean a light which is new as compared with the popular philosophy of the last generation. For that the most recent psychology is definitely corroborating the notions of Hellenic as of modern idealism, constitutes its absorbing interest, and its claim on the ethical student." (Preface.) The aim of the book is to indicate the chief lines along which the results of current psychological investigation afford this confirmation of philosophical and ethical idealism. The author's chief authorities in psychology are Mr. Bradley, Professor James, Mr. Stout and Professor Münsterberg. He has also learned much from Professors Ward and Sully. While his main interest is in volition, Mr. Bosanquet traverses rapidly the field of cognition and of feeling, and even devotes a lecture to the question of the relation of body and soul. Thoroughgoing in his philosophical idealism, he has no fear of scientific naturalism. "If you think the whole universe is mechanical or brute matter, then we can understand your trying to keep a little mystic shrine within the individual soul, which may be sacred from intrusion and different from everything else—a monad without windows. But if you are accustomed to take the whole as spiritual, and to find that the more you look at it as a whole the more spiritual it is, then you do not need to play these little tricks in order to get a last refuge for freedom by shutting out the universe. It has always been the most spiritual philosophy that has been most audacious in simply taking the soul as an operation or appearance within the universe, incapable of being cut off from other operations and appearances, and demanding to be investigated quite impartially with reference to the origin and connection of its elements" (pp. 9, 10). "The search for an innermost self, a sacred holy of holies in one's self which never changes and is never obtruded upon, is hopeless" (p. 89). All this may be true, but Mr. Bosanquet can hardly be said to have even contributed to its establishment in the present volume. The pace is too

rapid, the tone too jaunty, the atmosphere too reminiscent of the University Extension lecture-room in which the book originated. Indeed, if the truth must be spoken, what Mr. Bosanquet has given us is rather a collection of lecture-notes than a book. And, notwithstanding his evident desire to understand and to state correctly the findings of scientific psychology, his no less evident desire to reconcile these findings with the teachings of philosophical idealism, combined with the long habit of the metaphysical attitude, has often prevented his distinguishing with the required precision the psychological from the philosophical aspect of the question.

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The Psycho-Physiology of the Moral Imperative. J. H. LEUBA.

Amer. Jour. of Psychol., July, 1897.

The author does not write from the standpoint of the descriptive psychologist, or from that of the speculative or historical ethical writer. He does not enter into the quest for the *summum bonum* or the criterion of conduct. He takes it for granted that such exists, pays to the moral imperative a high and lofty tribute, and then seeks to ascertain its psychological correlate. The thesis of the article is that "the moral imperative is the psychical correlate of a reflective, cerebro-spinal, ideomotor process, the efferent end of which is organized into motor tracks coördinated for a specific action." The *imperative* element of conscience is compared with the phenomena of insistent ideas and their physiological mechanism. The non-moral is, however, carefully distinguished from the moral insistent ideas. The *reflective* element is characterized by the fact that with the sense of moral obligation there is always felt an antagonism of associated processes of the reflex-arc type. There is a retinal rivalry of ideas and their incipient motor accompaniments, so to speak. In other words, there is deliberation or reflection. The antagonism of the motor coördinations is on the side of consciousness an antagonism of intentions or ends. The *ideo-motor* element is that which James has made familiar to all. Then, again, the moral imperative is, on the physical side, non-sympathetic, cerebro-spinal in its nature. The calm, passionless insistence of the moral dictate is due to its freedom from the affecto-emotional life of the vegetative life, to the absence of the stimuli and passions of the sympathetic nervous system. Thus the moral dictate is more or less free from the desires, cravings and feelings which are peculiarly self-ish or personal. Thus we obtain the autocratic, impersonal, pas-