judgments are possible. But why and how are universal judgments possible? Because we have the remaking of facts within our power. In the resistance of facts to our formulæ we simply experience the discrepancy between old choices and present needs; and hence, the search for universal formulæ is bound to succeed. Every one says that the law of gravitation does not express the facts: we have other 'laws' dealing with the exceptions. In other words, we have introduced new classifications which have the conditional flavor of all classifications. Exceptions only invite, they do not force, a rejection of the old classification.

When we wonder at Nature's order and simplicity, it is at our own handiwork. When we find the scheme of things 'sorry' we 'shatter it to bits and remold it nearer to the heart's desire' — only the heart's desire must not be unprincipled. It must abide by the principle of maximum simplicity, economy or unity. Why is this regarded as true? It is in fact a strong intellectual need. Second, it is the principle expressing a universal will. But why listen to intellectual rather than to æsthetic or spiritual needs? The social will is no mere *consensus gentium*: the will we seek must be found *sub specie æternitatis*. We do not mean to stop with any empirical generalization, for our problem is the same as Kant's in the deduction of the 'categories.' Post-Kantian thought has passed from Kant's static to a dynamic attitude toward experience. Not the unity of thought but our thought's struggle after maximum unity constitutes experience what it is. Observations stimulate new interpretations determined by the principle of choice — not the individual's choice, but society's — not that of any particular society, but of all society, to contradict whose will is to destroy the meaning of experience. The question, are not the demands for the goodness and beauty of our world involved in this struggle, is put but not discussed at length.

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Ueber die allgemeinen Beziehungen zwischen Gehirn und Seelenleben. TH. ZIEHEN. Leipzig, Barth, 1902. Pp. 66. Mk. 1.80.

This is the German edition of an address which first appeared in a Holland magazine (*Gids*). The writer's reason for reproducing it is his conviction 'that in the many addresses by great physicians and naturalists on the same subject, the historical and epistemological standpoint has everywhere been kept too much in the background.'

A brief history of this problem in ancient and medieval thought,

interesting for its mention of many unfamiliar names, leads up to Cartesianism and the Associationists. Many attempts were made by the anatomists and physiologists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to find the organ of the soul in the brain. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Gall and Spurzheim emphasized the view that the soul life is directly related to the brain, and Flourens, by experiments on the brains of living animals, showed that all that is characteristic of spirit disappears with the disappearance of the cerebrum. Foville and Delaye studied pathological cases and began dissection of the brain. Then came the localization theory, finally established by Broca in 1861. The author gives a brief review of the pathological and other evidence for the localization of brain-functions, leading up to the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism. After explaining this principle, the question is asked, 'What relation obtains between material processes and our sensations?'

First, a group of insincere answers to this question: the answer of those who deny the facts of localization and parallelism, that of those who ignore science entirely, and that of those philosophers who, beginning with the absolute, still hope by a play of logic to deduce a world and more. The sincere theories are either dualistic or monistic. Dualism breaks over the question, 'How comes it that out of all the numberless material processes, only those of the cortex are accompanied by psychic processes?' The psychic is known only as the conscious, and those who look upon it as an epiphenomenon, see it as forever mysterious and unintelligible. Another form of dualism goes by the name of psychophysical causation, holding that through the body, material things act on the soul and the soul on material things. This view is opposed to the scientific principles of the conservation and persistence of motion and the conservation of energy. Some have maintained that when the material world acts on the soul, kinetic energy is changed into potential, and vice versa when the soul acts on the material world. But in this case we have monism of the materialistic type, and not dualism.

In his discussion of monistic theories, the author first mentions what he calls pseudo-monism, the doctrine that the mental and the physical are two attributes, or manifestations, or aspects of one reality. Here belong Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Spencer, Münsterberg, and others. Similarly, Fechner, the physiological psychology of Ebbinghaus, and others, hold that the two are the inside and the outside of the same thing. But a dualism of attributes or aspects is unintelligible until we ground them in the 'one' reality; and then the one reality

ceases to be one, and we have dualism in a worse form than before. Of genuine monisms the author mentions three: (1) Materialism. But thought cannot be scientifically classed as a secretion of the brain. Materialism, moreover, contradicts the epistemologically fundamental fact that we are given in experience only sensations and ideas derived from sensations. (2) Spiritualism regards material processes as functions of the psychic; and 'on the vanity of such a view we need waste no words.' (3) Idealism accepts the opposition of the material and the psychic, but goes on to ask the critical question whether both are given to us in experience as primary. To this idealism answers, no; and with reason; there stands the fundamental fact of epistemology. Kant tried to overthrow the idealism of Berkeley, but failed. He had rightly limited the knowledge of causal relations to phenomena, but himself fell foul of this limit when he said that we know of a cause for phenomena—a thing-in-itself. We are forced to remain in the psychic, and for this reason the idealistic theory has been called the 'immanental philosophy.' Above all, it is necessary to rid ourselves of the prejudice that our sensations are *in* our brains—what Avenarius called the introjection hypothesis. Sensations by no means have a spatial locus in the brain. "The only place of our ideas is yonder in the world." The world of sensation is to-day reduced by science to movements of mass and the ether, and there are indications that the ether may, *in futuro*, be regarded as a sort of mass. But this 'mass' is certainly not a 'matter' which is different from our sensations. It is impossible to form an idea of anything that is not psychic. Impenetrability and extension, the two most general characteristics of matter, are simply very general marks of our sensations, very general notions of sensations themselves.

But, we add, the place of our sensations is no more 'draussen in der Welt' than it is here in the brain-cells. The difference between yonder and here is an experience which the immanental philosophy must account for—and that, perhaps, by turning to social intercourse and to the social consciousness.

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SOCIOLOGICAL.

Games, Sports and Amusements. WALTER E. ROTH. North Queensland Ethnography Bulletin, No. 4. Brisbane, 1902.

Mr. Roth gives an exceedingly interesting account of the play activities of the aborigines of northern Australia. The different games